Thesis

By

MUSHEMEZA, ELijah Dickens

MAKERERE UNIVERSITY

Politics and the refugee experience: the case of Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda 1959-1994

March 2002

POLITICS AND THE REFUGEE EXPERIENCE: THE CASE OF BANYARWANDA REFUGEES IN UGANDA (1959-1994).



Elijah Dickens Mushemeza B.A. (Hons) MUK, M.A. (ISS – The Hague)

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE OF MAKERERE UNIVERSITY

March 2002

DECLARATION

I, Elijah Dickens Mushemeza, declare that this thesis is original, and has not been published and/or submitted for any other degree to any university before.

Signed:..... Date....30 March 2002

This thesis has been submitted for examination with our approval as supervisors

Signed:..... Date April 19, 2002.....

Professor A.G.G. GINGYERA-PINYCWA

Signed:...JBMugaju..... Date....19/4/2002....

DR JUSTUS MUGAJU

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my late father, Samson Ruteraho, whose determination to educate me was never compromised, by either his occupation as a middle rich peasant, or discouragement from his contemporaries who never understood the value of education.

May his soul rest in eternal peace.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work would not have been accomplished without the contributions of various individuals, supervisors, academic mentors, institutions and family members.

In this regard, I recognise the intellectual guidance from my supervisors, namely, Professor A.G.G. Gingyera Pinycwa, and Dr Justus Mugaju, who saw me through the entire research process and production of the final document.

Tribute is also given to the late Professor A.B. Mujaju, who was my second supervisor before his demise. Similarly, the late Professor Dan Mudoola deserves recognition, because he was the one who introduced me to the field of refugee studies twelve years ago. May their souls rest in eternal peace.

Special thanks go to the sponsors of this study. The German Academic Exchange Programme (DAAD) paid my tuition fees, administrative costs, and partly the field research. The Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) provided me small grants under their programme for Thesis Writing which enabled me to complete the thesis.

I cannot forget the contribution of the Government of the Republic of Uganda through the School of Post Graduate Studies, which contributed toward the expenses for field research.

My heartfelt thanks also go to the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, which provided the initial contribution to research that enabled me to do field work in Rwanda.

On a special note, I register my appreciation to all my research assistants who worked with me at various stages of the research process, namely: Peter Kashure, Alice Arinaitwe, Jackline Akankwatsa, Hilarly Beyunga, Alex Semarinyota Richard Musinguzi and Jackie Dorothy Katana. I would like also to thank Jennifer Semarinyota who made important contacts for me during the field research in Rwanda. Surely, Jennifer deserves the blessings of the almighty God for her openness, good heartedness, and style of approach to others.

It would have been difficult to process the thesis in time had it not been for the dedicated secretaries who worked with me at various stages. My thanks, in this regard, go to Obed Collins, Ruth Balinda, Mrs Joan Tumusiime and, above all, to the highly experienced Florence Nakiwala, who never got tired whenever I called on her at short notice.

Last, but not least, I thank my colleagues in the Faculty of Social Sciences and members of my family. The faculty staff encouraged me, particularly, Mr Augustus Nuwagaba, who assisted me to shape up appropriately my conceptual model.

To my wife Irene Tuhairwe and the entire family, I would like to re-assure you most sincerely that I appreciate your patience and support, especially when you understood my needs to divert part of the family resources to the academic work even though you were very much in need of those resources. The Lord will certainly reward you for your generosity and kindness in this regard.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

CHAPTER 4: THE 1959 REVOLUTION AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE BANYAWANDA REFUGEES

CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

LIST OF TABLES

List of Figures

ACRONYMS

ADF	-	Allied Democratic Forces
APROSOMA	-	Association Pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse
CBR	-	Centre for Basic Research, Kampala
CDR	-	The Coalition Pour le Defense de la Republique
CODESRIA	-	Council for Development of Social Science Research in Africa
DAWN	-	Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era
DP	-	Democratic Party
DPKO	-	Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN
DRC	-	Democratic Republic of Congo
FAR	-	Rwandese Armed Forces
FEDEMO	-	The Federal Democratic Movement
FRONASA	-	Front for National Salvation
ICCPR	-	The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESC	-	The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
IDPs	-	Internally Displaced Persons
IFRC	-	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
LCs	-	Local Councils (in the current Ugandan local government system)

LRA	-	Lord's Resistance Army
MDR	-	Mouvement démocratique Republicain
MISR	-	Makerere Institute of Social Research
MRND	-	Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Development
MSM	-	Movement Social Muhutu
NRA	-	National Resistance Army
NRM	-	National Resistance Movement
OAU	-	Organisation of African Unity
PARMEHUTU	-	Parti du Mouvement et d'Emancipation Hutu
PL	-	Parti Liberal
PRA	-	Popular Resistance Army
PSD	-	Parti Social Democrate
RADER	-	Ressemblement Démocratique Ruandaise
RANU	-	Rwanda Alliance for National Unity
RPA	-	Rwanda Patriotic Army
RPF	-	Rwanda Patriotic Front
RRWF	-	Rwanda Refugees Welfare Association
RTLM	-	Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines
SPLA	-	Sudan Peoples Liberation Army
UDHR	-	Universal Declaration of Human Rights (of the UN), 1948
UN	-	United Nations
UNAMIR	-	United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda
UNAR	-	Union Nationale Rwandaise

UNEP	-	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNHCR	-	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UPC	-	Uganda Peoples Congress
UPDF	-	Uganda People's Defence Forces
UPM	-	Uganda Patriotic Movement

ABSTRACT

This thesis attempts to interprete the experiences of the Banyarwanda refugees from a historical perspective. It analyses and explains the struggle of the Banyarwanda refugees to regain their rights as citizens of Rwanda and to escape from the trials and tribulations of refugee status.

The thesis also analyses why and how Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda organised themselves to empower themselves to return to their homeland. It also draws lessons from the Banyarwanda refugee experience not only for Rwanda and Uganda but also the entire Great Lakes region of Africa, and indeed for the entire continent.

The study employed an appropriate methodology in which the research design was conceived and developed from a historical perspective. Thus, a case study design is used in order to study a single group (Banyarwanda refugees) for a period of time.

As a result, the study mainly employed qualitative methods of data collection and analysis namely: interviews, focus group discussions; and construction of themes, hypotheses, and the use of good arguments so that those themes and hypotheses are reasonable.

The research established that the Banyarwanda refugees achieved reasonable levels of integration in the Ugandan society because of similar demographic, social, economic and cultural characteristics with the Ugandan population in the parts where they settled. If the Ugandan state had not broken down in the late 1970s and 1980s, these refugees would have, perhaps acquired naturalisation – a veritable form of empowerment. However, although the ordinary Tutsi refugees achieved integration, their leaders and some of the elites never gave up the dream of returning home. The challenge was how to realise that dream. Indeed, the opportunities eventually emerged in the context of the civil war in Uganda (1981-86). This is when Banyarwanda refugees joined the NRM/NRA struggle that enabled them to acquire political, diplomatic and military skills which they used effectively to achieve their empowerment ambitions.

The research findings show that the Banyarwanda refugees formed the RPF and the RPA while still in Uganda. This was possible because the refugees had identified and mastered the weaknesses in the Ugandan society and turned them into opportunities for themselves. Since their leaders had been in positions of responsibility in the Ugandan state machinery, while others had been successful as traders and farmers, the Banyarwanda refugees covertly strengthened themselves economically, socially, militarily, culturally and politically so that few Ugandans suspected that preparations were underway between 1987 and 1990 to invade Rwanda.

The thesis concludes that the understanding of the Banyarwanda refugee question is very important for Rwanda, the Great Lakes region, and Africa, as a whole. Unless African states learn how to build institutions that allow popular participation in decision making, transfer of political power from one group or generation to another, and generally, address the question of democracy and good governance, the creation of refugees will be unavoidable and this will sooner or later culminate into Rwanda like - upheavals of genocidal proportions.

CHAPTER 1

THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES IN AFRICA IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

1.0 Introduction

Forced migration is not a new phenomenon on the African continent. Pre-colonial Africa is rich with examples of the rise and fall of empires, states and principalities. These events in history forced people to move from their original homelands to seek refuge elsewhere.

Indeed, the problem of forced migration or refugees is probably as old as human history. Some people have always been forced by famine, drought, disease/epidemics, war and political persecution to flee their homelands to seek sanctuary in foreign lands.

Perhaps, the most important example of the generator of refugees in pre colonial Africa was the slave trade. The process of acquiring slaves unleashed the mass displacement and movement of millions of Africans especially in West, Central and East Africa. This mass exodus was due to raids and kidnappings before captivity, economic disruption, social dislocation and political instability in the regions ravaged by the slave trade.

It is difficult to quantify how many Africans fled from their homes during the era of the slave trade but, given its intensity over almost 400 years, they must have

been in their millions. Not only did the slave trade precipitate the involuntary movements to other continents but it also spurred forced flights within the African continent itself, as numerous small communities and ethnic groups abandoned their traditional homes and moved to new regions to avoid the raids and wars that slave hunters conducted throughout the continent for a very long period of time (Bulcha, 1988:18).

Since it has been estimated that anything up to 30 million Africans may have been shipped out of Africa (Amin, S. 1972; Curtin, P. 1969; and Rodney, W. 1972), it is plausible to assume that as many perished from the time they were captured to the time of shipment from the continent and perhaps twice as many were displaced within the continent.

Similarly, the nineteenth century revolutions which included the jihads and the Yoruba wars in West Africa and the *mfecane* movements in southern and eastern Africa provide another good example of mass displacement of people from their original homelands.

Indeed, the jihads of the nineteenth century in West Africa which created empires through expansion displaced people. The jihads led by Usman dan Fodio, Shaikh Ahamadu Lobbo of Macina, Al Hajj Umar caused much dislocation, much confusion and much suffering, especially among the non-Muslims who were raided to swell the volume of the trans-Saharan slave trade (Afigbo A.E et al.

1992). As the Muslim faithfuls moved to achieve extensive conversions and create more states, the people who felt threatened moved on and became refugees elsewhere.

Furthermore, the Yoruba wars which involved the Yoruba states, namely, Ijaye, Ibadan, Egba and Ijebu, caused untold suffering and mass displacement of people. These wars coincided with the collapse of the Oyo empire at the hands of the Fulani. The collapse of the Oyo empire had dire consequences for the Yoruba people. It brought about massive shift in population. As the Fulani advanced from Ilorin, the Yoruba fled the more open lands of the North to the thickly forested lands of the south in search for refuge or safety.

Of great significance in the first half of the nineteenth century was the *mfecane* down in southern Africa. In this period, southern Africa witnessed a very large migration of people. It started in Zululand; and gave rise to a chain of movements which affected areas as far as the northern part of what is now Tanzania.

There are many factors that historians advance to explain the rise of the Zulu kingdom; but the most prominent one was the emergence of great powerful leaders like Shaka, and Dingiswayo the chief of the Mthethwa, who built up empires, developed new methods of military organisation and administration. These wars of conquest and empire building forced people to flee for safety. In

some cases whole communities were massacred and even more died in the famine and anarchy which followed. Thus, greater numbers abandoned their ancestral lands and sought refuge in difficult mountain country or elsewhere, where geographical features held out hope of asylum (Omer-Cooper, 1988:4).

The European conquest and occupation of Africa (1884-1914) set in motion a new phase of refugees and human displacement. Colonialism replaced mercantilism as an important factor in population displacement. After the ending of the slave trade, beginning with England in 1809 and other areas in 1850, there followed colonial conquests to complete the political subjugation and economic subordination of the African people.

In fact, the latter half of the nineteenth century witnessed Africa and Asia being carved out among the imperialist powers of Europe. But it was not always without resistance from the Africans. For instance, between 1891 and 1898 Samori Ture of Malinke – land, fought the European traders until he was forced to surrender. Between 1901 and 1903 a series of major battles around Kontagora, Yola, Kano and Sokoto left the great emirates of northern Nigeria under the control of the British. In western Sudan, the Anglo-Egyptian force broke the Khalifa's power at the battle of Omudurman in 1898. Here in Eastern Africa in 1893 Isike, the Nyamwezi leader, and Meli, the Chagga leader, were beaten after bitter fights with the Germans. Other notable resistances were the

Maji Maji rebellion in German Tanganyika and the Herero resistance in German South West Africa, today's Namibia. But they, too, were eventually sudduced.

As a programme of consolidating their rule, the Europeans resorted to use of forced labour. Africans were either compulsorily recruited to work in European settler agriculture, or they were forced to grow commercial crops which they were obliged to sell to companies that enjoyed a monopoly over the purchase of all agricultural produce. These injustices, especially forced labour, forced many Africans to flee from their places of traditional habitation.

In French West Africa, a ruthless policy of stamping out anti-colonial resistance was pursued; flogging Africans even for the slightest act of insubordination became the legendary hallmark of French colonial policy and administration. Colonial ruthlessness often termed as pacification was of course designed to bring Africans to heel. Although the struggle was unequal given the colonialists' technological superiority, the so called process of pacification took decades to accomplish (Mushemeza, 1998:82). As was to be expected these acts of violence led to tragic population movements.

The refugee phenomenon during this period, therefore, was a consequence of a combination of colonialism, violence and organised African resistance (Bulcha, 1988:19; Kibreab, 1983:19).

Further, the colonial process gave rise to another cause of population displacement, namely, that arising from the expropriation of land. In Kenya, the colonial administration alienated 7.5 million acres of highly fertile land in the so-called 'White Highlands' for exclusive use of the colonial settler farmers. In order to provide cheap labour for the settler farmers, the colonial state imposed, on the one hand, hut and poll taxes; and, on the other, forbade the Africans from growing cash crops, so that they would be forced to work for the settlers (Leys, 1975; Wallerstein, 1965). In this way, out of a land area of 219,709 square miles in Kenya, only 52,146 square miles were reserved for Africans (Mukaru Nganga, cited in Kibreab, 1983:20).

The refugee population during the colonial period remained, nevertheless, relatively small compared to what it is today. Bulcha (1988:19) explains why when he argues that:

> As nearly all colonial territories were surrounded by territories with the same status, flight from one region to another provided little escape from exploitation and oppression. In addition, there was always the danger of forced repatriation. Therefore, there were few refugees during the second stage in the history of colonialism in Africa, inspite of the injustices, which constituted the *modus vivendi* of the colonial system. The circumstances also gave the colonial system an appearance of relative stability, for several decades after colonisation.

Indeed, the consolidation of colonialism eventually ended the mass flight of people, because it imposed colonial boundaries and made it difficult for people to move from one territory to another.

It is important to note that during the periods of refugee generation that have been examined, there was no institutionalised framework to handle the refugee problem.

It was not until after the First World War, when the League of Nations came into being, that the refugee question came to be regarded as an international problem that had to be handled at the international level. A number of high commissioners and envoys to deal with specific refugee groups such as Russians, Americans, Germans were appointed by the League of Nations, but none of these arrangements turned out to be permanent. The turning point came in 1950-51, with the establishment of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the adoption of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. This convention was initially limited to refugees from Europe.

This means that until the 1950s, refugees, whether in Africa or elsewhere, did not enjoy international recognition and protection. There were no rules to govern the handling of refugees in the host communities, there were no rights or obligations on the part of refugees or the host communities. Thus, though the humanitarian law was designed to protect refugees it inadvertently tended to institutionalise the problem of refugees. And since the 1951 convention primarily focused on the European refugees, Africa benefited from the legal framework governing refugees only by default.

Despite the absence of legal or institutional framework before the 1950s, the problem of refugees tended to be resolved by the passage of time. Refugees, for instance, expected no repatriation contrary to Bulcha's argument. They became integrated in host communities or founded new autonomous communities or even states, as was the case of the Ngoni in Central and East Africa. What is important to note is that refugees did not become a permanent 'alien' community in the host societies they fled to. They were either integrated into, or imposed themselves on such communities. Those who integrated became successful men and women and, with time, they lost the memory of their original homelands or at least the compelling urge to return. They started new ways of life.

This picture was to change tremendously during the 1950s and the 1960s as the struggle for independence intensified. The belief and hope that once the Africans were once more in charge of their own destiny, they would live in democratic societies based on the rule of law, social justice, equality and respect of human rights and dignity were never realised. In fact, by the mid-1960s about half a million refugees had been created in Africa, while by the beginning of the 1970s, the one million mark was surpassed (Aga Khan, 1971). This increase in the numbers of refugees prompted the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), created in 1963, to take on the European path of institutionalising the refugee problem.

In 1969, the OAU established a convention, as shall be discussed later, relating to the status of refugees and the methods of responding to them both for protection and humanitarian assistance.

By the middle of 1970, the number of refugees had shot up to more than four million (Adepoju, 1982). Currently, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) place the number of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as other persons of concern in Africa at around six and twelve million respectively(UNHCR, 2000; IFRC, 1999). Although, there are disparities in estimates, the tables 1.1 and 1.2 below show that the number of refugees was between 2.8 million and 3.6 million for the year 1999.

Table 1.1: Number of refugees and other persons of concern to UNHCR, 31 December 1999.

				Others of concern			
Region/territory of asylum	**Refugees**	**Asylum seekers**	**Returned refugees**	**Internally displaced**	**Returned IDPs**	**Various**	**Total**
Eastern Africa	1,615,130	25,720	186,200	50,000	676,100	10,600	2,563,750
Middle Africa	475,300	6,030	200,400	-	-	-	681,730
Northern Africa	574,650	4,840	250	-	-	-	579,740
Southern Africa	23,820	17,870	1400	-	-	-	43,090
West Africa	834,150	6,530	544,530	712,900	265,000	26,400	2,389,510
	3,523,050	60,990	932,780	762,900	941,000	37,000	6,257,820

Source: Compiled from UNHCR, **The State of the World's Refugees, 2000.**

Table 1.2: World total of refugees and IDPs according to host regions by December 1999.

Continent	**Refugees**	**IDPs**
Africa	2,872,000	8,770,000
East Asia and Pacific	503,000	527,000
Europe	1,790,200	3,269,000
America and Caribbean	760,100	1,765,000
Middle East	5,880,400	1,575,000
South and Central Asia	1,690,100	2,120,000
Totals	**13,496,000**	**18,026,000**

Source: International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) **World Disasters Report**, 1999 p.10.

Table1.4: Rwandan refugee population by country of Asylum 1993-99

Country of asylum	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Burundi	245,500	278,100	153,000	720	2000	2,000	1,300
DR of Congo (ex-Zaire)	53,500	1,252,800	1,100,600	423,600	37,000	35,000	33,000
Tanzania	51,900	626,200	548,000	20,000	410	4,800	20,100
Uganda	97,000	97,000	65,000	11,200	12,200	7,500	8,000
Total	447,900	2,254,100	1,808,100	455,520	51,610	49,300	62,400

Source: UNHCR, **The State of the World's Refugees, 2000** p.250.

Table 1.5: Rwanda refugees in the Great Lakes region, August 1994.

Location	
Northern Burundi	270,000
Western Tanzania	577,000
South western Uganda	10,000
Zaire (Goma)	850,000
Zaire (Bukavu)	332,000
Zaire (Uvira)	62,000
Total	2,101,000

Source: **UNHCR, The State of the World's Refugees, 2000 p.251.**

Although the delimitation of the Great Lakes region is still a contested issue; Tables 1.4 and 1.5 show that the Banyarwanda refugees were in very large numbers in the region between 1993 and 1995.

Since the late 1950s and early 1960s, Uganda, the main area of the study has been a host to refugees from neighbouring countries, Kenyans during the Mau-Mau emergency; Sudanese fleeing from clashes between the successive governments in Khartoum and the rebels in southern Sudan, and the Congolese fleeing from internal strife immediately after independence, etc. During the war against Mobutu's dictatorship and the anti-Kabila rebellion that began in 1998, other large numbers of people took to flight. Nor must one forget the Rwandese who had to flee after the social revolution in 1959 as well as a result of the 1994 genocide. After independence, Uganda itself experienced acute internal conflicts that generated refugees. Therefore, Uganda stands out clearly, as a society with long experience both as a generator and as a host for refugees. This experience

has a bearing on both the violation of the human rights and the attempt to regain them.

It is against this background that this thesis seemed appropriate as an attempt at the analysis of the inter-play of politics and the rights of refugees.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

The Banyarwanda are one of the oldest of modern refugee groups in Africa. And of all the refugee problems, none has been more intractable and hard to solve than that of the Banyarwanda. This is because the refugees developed a sense of grievance and injustice that they have always attempted to redress. As it will be demonstrated later, the phenomenon of refugee warrior communities and other refugee political activities, whose experiences are similar to that of the Banyarwanda, who resolved to return home by force, deserve more attention in contemporary studies.

Forced to flee from Rwanda between 1959 and 1974, and harassed within Uganda between 1982 – 1983, the Banyarwanda refugees came to constitute a unique category of a victimised social group attempting to engineer the improvement of its fate. They were unique in a sense that they were disowned by their country of origin, and were taken as temporary visitors by the host country. Even those who had more or less integrated in the host communities, were told after 30 years that they would have to leave. Fortunately for the Banyarwanda refugees, the developments in both the countries of origin and

refuge in the 1980s provided opportunities and challenges which were to strengthen and to propel the empowerment process of these refugees to a level that could not have been imagined when their influx into Uganda first began in 1959.

Despite all the odds stacked against them, the Banyarwanda refugees transformed themselves into a formidable social and political group, which in the end managed to achieve self empowerment. The study of the dynamics of politics amongst the refugees themselves; between the refugees and the host community; between the refugees and their country of origin; and between the hosts and their country of origin has regrettably been neglected and not accorded the attention it so well deserves. In fact, as this study will demonstrate, the Banyarwanda refugees manipulated the weaknesses in the social, economic and political situation in the host country to enhance their own empowerment in preparation for their own return to Rwanda.

But, how did they organise? What forms did their participation take? What were some of the major constraints in their way? What, in the end, did they achieve? What made such achievements possible and what are some of the pertinent general lessons to learn from their experience as well from experiences in other refugee situations?

All these questions have a bearing on the problematique of the study which is **empowerment of refugees in a politically conflict-ridden host society**. It would appear that a conflict-ridden host society can present an excellent environment for refugees to exploit in the pursuit of their rights and aspirations. This possibility has neither been adequately recognised nor studied so far and constitutes, therefore, a problem that deserves detailed exploration. It is this that is the challenge of this particular study.

1.2 Purpose of the study

The main purpose of this study is to interpret the experiences of Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda from an historical perspective in order to analyse and explain their struggle to regain their rights as citizens of Rwanda and to escape from the trials and tribulations of refugee status that faced them in Uganda.

1.3 Specific objectives

The specific objectives of this study are:

(i) To unravel through the specific case selected here, some aspects of the phenomenon of forced migration that are hitherto not very well appreciated;

(ii) To analyse why and how Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda organised themselves in a host country as a process of empowerment; and

(iii) To draw lessons from the Banyarwanda refugee experience for the host state, for the country of origin, and for the entire Great Lakes region of Africa.

1.4 Research questions

To analyse the research problem adequately, the following research questions were found to be useful.

(i) Why was there the exodus of refugees during and after the `social revolution' of 1959?

(ii) How were the Banyarwanda received by the host communities and host government?

(iii) Why and how did Banyarwanda refugees organise in the host state, which in turn facilitated their empowerment?

(iv) Is there a future for political stability in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region in which all Banyarwanda can live in peace without recourse to violence?

1.5 Justification of the study

This study is justified in terms of its contribution to public policy making and implementation as well as to research.

In terms of policy, the case for resolving the refugee question in the Great Lakes region of Africa is compelling. A better understanding of the origins of the

refugee problem and the role of Banyarwanda refugees and immigrants in the crisis of the Great Lakes region should provide clues on how the crisis in the region and other related conflicts on the continent should be handled and resolved.

At the higher levels of the organisation of African Unity (OAU), recently transformed into the African Union (AU) and of the United Nations (UN), the study should provide some knowledge not only about what went wrong, and why Africa and the international community failed to stop genocide in Rwanda; but also what they ought to do in future to prevent similar occurrences. The study should also provide clues on how to enhance the OAU's/AU's and the UN's capacity to play a meaningful and effective role in assisting the Great Lakes region to emerge from the cycle of violence in which it is presently mired.

At the national level of Uganda, the study can contribute to the efforts of the government towards the formulation of a better refugee policy and law.

With regard to research, this work is further justified by the fact that little research has been carried out so far on the question of the human rights of refugees and where they may lead if disregarded or abused.

This work is based on an empirical investigation which was carried out in Uganda and Rwanda between October 1998 and October 2001. A number of concepts

and theories were employed which, hopefully, should enable the study to add new knowledge to the understanding of the phenomenon of forced migration, and the struggle for the rights of marginalised groups such as refugees. In this way the thesis should enrich the study and understanding of the refugee phenomenon, and also bring to the foreground new research issues for exploration.

In trying to fill the gap in the field of research, the study opens a new path of critical analysis on issues of forced migration. In particular, the study brings into focus the significance of the refugees as political actors who, if ignored or neglected, can pose serious threats to the security of the host country and that of their own country of origin. Furthermore, the analysis captures and sheds light on an important dimension of the Rwandese refugee situation in which failure to resolve the refugee problem culminated into disastrous consequences, namely, war, genocide and more refugees whose repercussions in and on Rwanda and the Great Lakes region generally are still unfolding.

1.6 Scope of the study

The study is limited both in terms of the category of refugees and in terms of chronology. It focuses on the Banyarwanda refugees, who lived in Uganda between 1959 – 1994 as a case study. It begins with 1959 when the first exodus to Uganda occurred to 1994 when many Banyarwanda refugees returned home after capturing political power in Rwanda. The years in between were equally

important because the refugees in the host state sought to empower themselves in various ways in order to regain their citizenship and residence rights in Rwanda.

1.7 Limitations of the study

During the course of the study there were a number of obstacles that were encountered.

For a start, it was discovered that a study on refugees, particularly, one dealing with the political dimension and the rights of refugees is a sensitive one. Some respondents were very suspicious of the intentions of the research. For instance, when the foreign relations between Rwanda and Uganda became restrained, it became extremely difficult to return to Rwanda for more field work in order to probe in greater detail some of the issues raised in this thesis. Similarly, it became very difficult to have interviews with key actors, particularly President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and President Paul Kagame of Rwanda.

Further, attempts to locate important documents on the organisations of refugees, particularly the *Inyenzi* and the RANU were not successful. Visits to the National University of Rwanda, Butare; the RPF Secretariat; the Uganda National Archives in Entebbe; the Department of Refugees, Office of the Prime Minister Kampala; the United Nations Library in Dakar; the United Nations Library in Nairobi and the Pan African Movement Library in Kampala; did not yield some of the documents we wanted. Such documents would have without

any doubt enriched the study by providing more detailed information regarding the mobilisation of resources, strategies during the refugees struggle, and, perhaps the number of refugees recruited into the *Inyenzi,* the RANU and the RPF at various historical periods. This problem was compounded by the author's limitation to read French in which some of the important documents were published.

Lastly, Uganda's past history of turbulence seems to have affected, among other things, record keeping. That is why one hardly finds documents on refugees in the National Archives at Entebbe save Jacob's collection Administrators in East Africa (1965) which was itself heavily based on materials on refugees then available at that time; and minutes of important political meetings at district headquarters even as recently as 1980. Such records would have provided more valuable evidence for the research problem that was investigated.

All these limitations, not withstanding, the methodology adopted enabled the researcher to gather sufficient valuable information to satisfactorily test the hypotheses and make reasonable conclusions.

1.8 Organisation of the study

In terms of organisation, the study is presented in ten chapters some of which are interlaced with appropriate tables. There is an Abstract at the beginning while References and Appendices constitute the terminal materials of the presentation.

Of the substantive chapters, Chapter One is the introduction. It traces the refugee question from an historical perspective in the broader African setting. The chapter also discusses the research problem, sets the objectives, justification and the scope.

Chapter Two comprises the theoretical framework and the literature review. In this chapter the literature review highlights the existing gaps in refugee studies especially in Africa and shows why the refugee question requires investigation. At the end of the chapter, hypotheses are posed for testing.

Chapter Three deals with the methodology of the study. Here, qualitative methods of data collection and analysis and of hypotheses testing are discussed.

Chapter Four analyses the emergence of the Banyarwanda refugee question. It reviews the historical background to developments in Rwanda that culminated into the vicious cycle of forced migration.

Chapter Five focuses on the flight dynamics of refugees from Rwanda to Uganda. It also discusses attempts by refugees to return home and the difficulties they initially faced.

Chapter Six discusses the foundations of the empowerment process. The argument here is that refugees achieved meaningful or reasonable levels of

integration politically, economically, socially and culturally. It was this integration that provided opportunities in education and trade, which were essential for the quest for empowerment.

Chapter Seven identifies the challenges and opportunities which the Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda faced, in their quest to realise their dream of returning home.

Chapter Eight analyses how the Banyarwanda refugees manipulated the weaknesses in the social, economic and political situation in Uganda to enhance their own empowerment.

Chapter Nine traces the formation of the RPF, its organisational structure, its programme, its strategies during the war (diplomatic and military) and its final showdown with the Rwanda government forces.

Chapter Ten is the conclusion and highlights the empowerment gains which the Banyarwanda refugees achieved first in Uganda in the political, military, education, and economic spheres and later in Rwanda. The chapter also spells out recommendations on how Rwanda and the international community should resolve the Banyarwanda refugee question and other refugee problems on the continent of Africa.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Definition of important concepts

An analysis of forced migration would be difficult without defining a number of important theoretical concepts. The relevant concepts addressed in this chapter are **refugees, empowerment, human rights, politics** and **conflict.**

2.1 Who is a refugee?

One modern dictionary defines the `refugee' as a `person who goes to find refuge, especially one who escapes invasion, oppression or persecution'. Sometimes, the concept is used interchangeably with, `asylum seeker'. Refugees do, indeed, share many characteristics with other migrating people. But there are two important distinctions between them and the latter. Unlike that of other migrants the movement of refugees is involuntary and their status is defined and regulated by the provisions of international refugee laws and other related humanitarian laws.

Until 1951 the international community considered refugees in terms of a specified group of people fleeing a specific country or group of countries for reasons of belief or status or fear of persecution. In 1951 the Geneva

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted by the United Nations. On 22 April 1954, this convention went into effect.

The convention defined a refugee as any person who has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of International Refugee Organisation, (1951 convention). Furthermore, according to the convention [article 1(2)] a refugee is:

> ...any person who as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951, and owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (1951 Convention).

The five key elements of the convention's definition were: (a) its time limitation - `refugees', it implies, were generated by the effects of World War II; (b) its fundamental reliance on the concept of a `well founded fear of being persecuted'; (c) its specification of forms of persecution which qualify an individual for refugee status; (d) its limitation to persons outside their country; (e) and its geographical target of European nations as the sources of refugees.

The convention provided what might be called the first international `Bill of rights' for refugees. Among other things, it provided that refugees are entitled to travel

documents issued by the host country, it set forth the very important principle of non refoulement, which states that a refugee should not be returned by force to the country of origin and it stated that refugees are entitled to the same basic human rights enjoyed by nationals of the host country.

Over time, the international community grew to recognise that protection for individuals other than those covered by the convention's time period was a necessity. As a result, the United Nations General Assembly enacted the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees which became effective on 4 October 1967. States which bind themselves to that protocol fundamentally agree that the substantive provisions of the convention covering its Articles 2 to 34 will be applied generally to refugees without reference to the 1951 date, although individuals declared to be refugees under prior international agreements also continue to be covered by international protection of and assistance to refugees. The administration of the convention and protocol were assigned by an earlier legal instrument, the Statute of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

What turned out, eventually, to be the very important Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was established on 1 January 1951 for a period of three years, to aid the millions of refugees and displaced persons in

Europe who had fled their homes during and after the Second World War. Since that time, the UNHCR's mandate has been renewed every five years.

The UNHCR is non political and strictly humanitarian UN agency. It has two main functions: to protect refugees and to seek durable solutions to their problems. In order to protect refugees, the UNHCR must safeguard their life, security and freedom. The UNHCR must ensure that refugees are not refouled or returned to their country without their consent. It must also protect and promote their rights in such vital fields as accommodation, education, employment and freedom of movement.

According to the UNHCR, refugees can benefit from three different durable solutions. They can choose voluntary repatriation if they believe that they are no longer targets of persecution in their country of origin, and they feel that it is safe enough for them to go back. Secondly, they can opt to integrate themselves in the host community and to become citizens of their country of asylum by naturalisation.

Thirdly, they can request the UNHCR to resettle them in a third country if they cannot stay in their country of first asylum or return to their country of origin. Until durable solutions are found, the UNHCR is duty bound to provide emergency aid and long term assistance to refugees or to induct them toward self sufficiency. To this end, the UNHCR uses the funds which it receives from public and private sources, and co-operates closely with the host governments,

the specialised agencies of the UN and numerous voluntary organizations (UNHCR 1989:4).

One other important shortcoming of both the UN convention and the protocol is that they did not cater for persons who at the time were dislocated from their country as a result of struggles against colonial or minority white rule. To accommodate these sets of persons as refugees, among others, the UN definition was expanded by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in its Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (10 September 1969).

The Organisation of African Unity's, definition of the `refugee' takes off from that of the 1951 convention, to start with, and thus applies to any person who, reasonably fearing persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a social group or political opinions, is outside the country of origin but cannot or will not, because of fear, claim its protection. It also applies to any person who, possessing no nationality and being outside the country of usual residence because of such event, cannot or will not return there.

In the same convention, the term `refugee' is applied also to:

> any person who, following an aggression, the occupation or exploitation of his/her territory by a foreign power, or other events which seriously disturb public order in either part or the whole of that country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his/her place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside the country of origin or nationality (Article 1, OAU Convention 1969).

In his opening speech at a conference on the situation of refugees in Africa, held at Arusha, Tanzania, on 7 May 1979, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, defined refugees as `people who are now, and perhaps in the future, obliged to flee their fatherland and seek refuge in another country in order to escape persecution, death or famine. He described them as `victims of racism, of colonialism and of the social changes in Africa', and categorised them into three groups:

> The first group is composed of political refugees, but the act of giving asylum to the refugees is unhappily not always considered as a humanitarian act. The second group consists of those who are fighting for liberty, but the United Nations and the other international organisations do not recognise these people as refugees. The third category, which is by far the largest is made up of men and women and children who are running away from war, from persecution, from religious, racial or cultural conflicts or from famine and other natural calamities (Nyerere, 1979).

Although the meaning of refugee and refugee rights are clearly spelt out in the UN and OAU conventions and are fully recognised by African states, in practice the handling of refugees in Africa has often fallen below universal standards and expectations. There are numerous cases where persons escaping from danger have been ignored or subjected to bureaucratic delays and procedures so that UNHCR intervention does not arrive soon enough to alleviate their suffering.

Furthermore, there are persons in the world who are refugees and have not sought refugee status because of one reason or another even though they may be entitled to. There are also persons who are in `refugee-like situations', but technically do not meet the requirements of the international conventions. One

explanation for this phenomenon is that such persons are often still within the borders of their homeland. They are, therefore, often called `internally displaced' persons (IDPs) – not refugees. Internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced to flee their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular, as a result of, or in order to avoid, the nasty effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border (Deng, Francis M. 1998:1;Cohen and Deng 1998:18). For practical purposes, their conditions and needs are hardly distinguishable from those who cross international borders and as such deserve refugee status in terms of humanitarian assistance.

In addition, recent discussions for example on the significance of environmental issues, have identified another category of displaced persons, now commonly known as environmental refugees. These have been defined by some scholars as:

> persons who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their traditional homelands because of environmental factors of unusual scope, notably drought, desertification, deforestation, soil erosion, water shortages and climate change, also natural disasters such as cyclones, storm surges and floods. In face of these environmental threats, people feel they have no alternative but to seek sustenance elsewhere, whether within their own countries or beyond and whether on a semi-permanent or permanent basis (Myers and Kent, 1995: 18).

Various other observations and definitions are critically analysed by Zolberg, *et al.* They observe that:

> The current institutional meaning of refugee is a composite of three categories founded on the causes of the refugees' departure. The first two, constituting the U.N. definition, are a formalisation of the classic types. They include the refugee as an activist, engaging in some politically significant activity that the state seeks to extinguish; and the refugee as a target, by misfortune of belonging `often by accident of birth' to a social or cultural group that has been singled out for the abuse of state power. The major change in the definition since its inception in the 1950s is the emergence of the third category, the refugee as a mere victim (Zolberg, et al 1989:330).

Claiming a theoretically grounded definition arising from the above which is consistent with ethical considerations, Zolberg, *et al.* define refugees as:

> persons whose presence abroad is attributable to well-founded fear of violence, as might be established by impartial experts with adequate information. In cases of persecution covered by the statutory definition, the violation is initiated by some recognisable internal agents, such as the government, and directed against dissenters or a specified target group. The presence of the victims abroad may be the result of flight to avoid harm or the result of expulsion, itself a form of violence. But flight inducing violence may also be inflicted indirectly, through imposed conditions that make normal life impossible (Zolberg, et al 1989:33).

In this work the concept of refugee as defined by the OAU convention, which encompasses all the previous definitions and the universalist legal instruments, is preferred and consistently applied.

2.2 Empowerment

Since this is a very key concept in this study, forming the central theme of the study, it requires detailed explanation in relation to the research problem and hypotheses.

There are several ways of understanding the concept of empowerment. To start with, empowerment is defined as the process of enabling persons (women and men) to take their destiny into their own hands (Pezullo 1994). Through such process those persons may acquire or pass on the necessary tools to achieve certain specified objectives. The tools could be knowledge, certification and materials with which the recipients are empowered to carry out their tasks.

Among women activists, the concept empowerment was championed in the mid-1980s by the women's group, DAWN, which stands for Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (Gita, Grown 1987). According to this group, empowerment has three constituent elements: economic, human development and participation. The first element revolves around issues relating to access to generating assets such as land, credit and technologies. The second centres on access to basic needs such as education, health services, pure water, fuel and shelter. The third element is concerned with decision making.

Subsequently, Bookman and Morgen (1988) defined empowerment in the specific context of political and power relations. According to them, it is a process aimed at consolidating, maintaining or changing the distribution of power in a particular cultural context (1988:4). In other words, it is the struggle by the powerless to acquire political power through the process of self-empowerment.

The discussion of the empowerment concept has gathered even more momentum in recent years, and continues in various international forums. For example, in the proceedings of the Pan-African Conference on Popular Participation for Development held at Arusha, in 1990, in Tanzania, empowerment is alluded to mean a new era in which democracy, accountability, economic justice and development or transformation become internationalised and become the order of the day in every country.

The views of the Pan-African Conference, as well as those associated with DAWN, appear to present two perceptions of empowerment of people in relation to the state. The first, articulated by the Pan-African Conference, and subsequently supported by the World Bank, sees empowerment as a process by which `... Ordinary people and especially women, ... take greater responsibility for improving their lives' (World Bank 1989: xii). In otherwords, empowerment in this context is a process that unburdens the state and reduces its role while pushing over some responsibilities towards the citizens. This interpretation is in line with the Bank's report which emphasises that people as entrepreneurs, rather than the state, are the economic motor of society.

This perception of empowerment (Pan-African Conference & World Bank) underscores the dominant modernisation and neo-liberalism paradigms. It holds that the capitalist market system provides a sound basis for achieving equitable and sustainable development.

The second perception, frequently associated with the theories of Paulo Friere (1971), treats empowerment as a process which enhances people's ability to achieve their rights to emancipate themselves from dependent economic relations and to exert just demands on the state and its servants. It stresses that empowerment results from the transformation of social relations to enhance the capacity of the poor to influence or control political and bureaucratic systems which directly affect their lives.

A critical analysis of these two perceptions shows that the empowerment concept like the concepts of participation, transformation and sustainability is development-focused. However, the interest of this study in the empowerment of refugees should be understood in terms of attempts to re-distribute power. The argument is that when refugees flee their country they may seek to build up their own platform of interests and network of alliances with other groups in order to regain whatever they have lost and to add even more to what may have been regained.

Therefore, in discussing the empowerment process certain underlying assumptions should be taken into account. First, it is natural that people who are deprived of their rights will sooner or later strive to regain them through empowerment. This would invariably entail the exploitation of whatever opportunities are available in their country of origin or host country to redress what they see as injustice. Secondly, states or governments which deny their citizens their rights (in the case of refugees the right of return) necessarily

generate conditions for conflict and instability. Thirdly, any country which blocks return of thousands or millions of restless and politically conscious citizens, in this case refugees, can hardly be secure and stable. Those who are locked out will continue to knock on the door with whatever means at their disposal in order to achieve equality and the redistribution of power and resources in their country of origin.

Arising out of the foregoing assumptions, empowerment means a group process where people who lack their share of valued resources strive to gain greater access to, and control over, those resources. They may or may not succeed, but when they do, empowerment invariably entails the redistribution of power and resources in favour of the beneficiaries.

2.3 Human rights

As a result of the gross violation of human rights in post-colonial Africa, the need for the understanding and appreciation of these rights has become increasingly imperative. Human rights were first stipulated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948. But since then many other international declarations on human rights have come to be utilised (UN, 1985: 135). These rights include, among others, the right to life, liberty, security of person, freedom of movement, the right to own property, the right to take part in the government of ones country and the right to education etc. Since the mere existence of

refugees is a product of violation of human rights, the concept of human rights becomes yet another important term in this study.

Therefore, this study will conform to the understanding of the concept as stipulated by international charters, which are considered adequate for the purpose of the study. As noted earlier, the violation of human rights leads to discontent which may in turn lead to violence and displacement.

2.4 Politics

In Africa, access to and control of power have become a matter of life and death because the scarcity of resources is more acute than elsewhere in the world. Therefore, any analysis on refugee issues and politics must properly conceptualise the concept of politics. The concept politics is defined, amongst others, by Nnoli as all those activities which are directly or indirectly associated with the seizure of state power, the consolidation of state power and the use of state power (Nnoli, 1986:7). These activities, usually go hand in hand with conflict in society over scarce resources, like land and other property; as well as esteemed values like prestige, social status, education and employment. That being the case, refugees by virtue of their position in alien or new societies will generally find themselves very much at the periphery of the arena in which the game of politics is played out. The quest for empowerment by refugees does, therefore, imply targeting entry into this very arena. Their attempt may or may not succeed depending on the dynamics in the host state.

2.5 Conflict

Refugees are a clear symptom of unresolved conflicts. Conflict occurs when there is breakdown of dialogue or discussion to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. Conflict may or may not be violent. It can occur between individuals or groups. Several scholars have attempted to define conflict although they do not relate their conceptualisation to the phenomenon of forced migration.

Coser (1956), defines conflict as a `struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralise, injure or eliminate rivals (Coser 1956: 8).

According to Mujaju:

> Conflict may range from an argument, a quarrel, to a military hostility ..... The hostility may be between communities, such as ethnic or tribal ones..... The conflict may be directly between rival armies, conventional or guerilla, sponsored by the established disagreeing parties (Mujaju 1989: 252).

On his part Himes (1980:14) defines conflict as follows: `Social conflict refers to purposeful struggles between collective actors who use social power to defeat or remove opponents and to gain status, power, resources and other scarce values'.

Kriesberg (1973:17) maintains that social conflict is a relationship between two or more parties who (or whose spokesmen) believe they have incompatible goals. This definition centres on conflict as a relationship, and more importantly, that

conflict is rooted in people's beliefs about goals. This focus on people's beliefs is carried through in Pruitt and Rubin's definition in which conflict means perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that the current aspirations of the parties cannot be achieved simultaneously (Pruit and Rubin 1986:14).

Anstey (1991:4) when utilising these contributions, defines conflict in two aspects - one, its causes and the second, it expression. Thus, conflict exists in a relationship when parties believe that their aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously or perceive a divergence in their values, needs or interests and purposefully employ their power in an effort to defeat, neutralise or eliminate each other to protect or further their interests in the interaction. When this understanding is put in the context of forced migration, conflict means dispossession, violence, denial of the right to citizenship and participation in national life, injustice and deprivation. Understandably, no person or group of persons would like to be permanently deprived or rendered stateless. Consequently, unresolved conflicts breed more conflicts. And if conflicts in refugee situations are not resolved either by negotiation or arbitration, refugees can as well become a cause of a new phase of violent conflict as was the case in Rwanda.

2.6 Theoretical Framework

2.6.1 Introduction

Various scholars have argued that refugee research lacks a theory, general epistemological approach and attracts limited interest from social scientists (Rose 1981). Responding to these assertions, Johannson (1990) observes that since the problems of refugees are multifaceted, it is necessary to approach them from different angles. And even though there is no consistent and elaborate theoretical structure concerning such problems, there are, however, some theoretical and methodological constructs which may be used to study the problem of refugees and their actions. This study shares the views of Johannson and its approach will utilise a similar strategy of employing the existing methodological constructs to study the problem of forced mass exodus.

In the absence of a single adequate refugee theory, the study utilises a combination of orientations from other relevant theories and typologies to inform the analysis.

Drawing on the work of Eisenstadt (1954) and Kunz (1973), Bulcha (1988) divided the process of forced migration into four general stages which were found very useful in this study's analytical approach. These stages are;

a) Events preceding exodus,

b) Immediate factors and `motives' generating exodus,

c) The dynamics and social structure of the migratory process,

d) The interaction and integration in the socio-economic structure of the receiving society.

This phasing of the forced migratory process is very pertinent to this theoretical part of the study. Each of the phases deserves scrutiny, as a consequence of this. But, before such detailed scrutiny, it is important to capture the analysis of Kunz (1973 and 1981) that informed Bulcha's conceptualisation.

Kunz's kinetic model (1973 and 1981) explores theoretical concerns for the periods before and after flight. Kunz sees the flight and settlement pattern of most refugees as conforming to two kinetic types – anticipatory refugee movements and acute refugee movements. The anticipatory refugee senses the danger early, before a crisis makes orderly departure impossible. The anticipatory refugee wants to leave and will leave as soon as he/she finds a country willing to take him. The pattern is push-permit. Anticipatory refugees are normally the educated and well to do persons.

Acute refugee movements result from an overwhelming push. The acute movement may be a mass flight which includes many who actually have little to fear but who flee because of the atmosphere of panic. Usually such refugees will not have planned or prepared for the journey; they are not looking at their future; they are simply trying to get out of danger.

Because the decision to flee is spontaneous, refugees give little thought to the consequences of flight. Not until they reach the place of asylum, often in a state of shock, in a condition Kunz calls 'midway to nowhere', will the refugee ponder the three classic choices that face refugees: to return home, to remain in the place of first asylum or to accept a distant resettlement opportunity in a third country. At this point, according to Kunz, the kinetic factor will be one of pressure from the country of asylum and the international aid agencies to force the refugee and others to make a choice.

2.6.2 Events preceding exodus

A fruitful treatment and analysis of the refugee question must begin with the social and political configuration of the forces at play before involuntary migration. These forces may be internal or external. They may be spontaneous or organised. Any society is invariably characterised by different social forces, such as class, ethnicity and religion. When these forces are not contained and accommodated they may erupt into explosions forcing people to move away from their homes for their own safety.

This is evident, unlike in situations of voluntary migration where the `pull factor' is crucial to the decision making process. In situations relating to refugees, conditions in the environment particularly the violation of human rights and unresolved conflicts are signs of discontent and uncertainty, threatening the security of the people or communities. There are, however, exceptions to this

observation, especially in situations where the compelling factors are natural hazards that may not easily be anticipated particularly in societies with poor technology as was the case in Goma, in the Democratic Republic of Congo when the Nyirangongo volcano erupted.

The point is, throughout history, where forced migration has occurred, there have been preceding conditions, in most cases unresolved communal differences, state-inspired actions against certain communities, and the denial of political participation for some organised groups. All these socio-political contradictions force people to flee.

2.6.3 Immediate factors and `motives' generating exodus

Although all societies are characterised by inequalities and attempts to redress them are ongoing processes, the issue of refugee generation occurs when people's lives are in danger as a result of circumstances imposed by their opponents or enemies. In fact, in this situation, the so called `push factors' are much more compelling than where people migrate in search for better opportunities. This is why in host states, economic refugees try to justify their claim to asylum on the ground that they are running away from danger. These people know that escape from danger or persecution is a pre-condition for acceptance by the recipient country rather than the simple seizing of available opportunities to get away from one's country in order to go into another country to settle.

There are identifiable factors, that can be pointed out as good causes of immediate exodus. Spontaneous communal violence based on religion, ethnicity, etc. in which defenceless victims are forced to flee their homes as it has been happening in Nigeria. However, this can be curbed and resolved through state intervention and imposition of law and order. State sponsored persecution against individuals, groups of individuals as was the case with the violence in Kenya's Rift Valley region in 1992, may force people to flee. External attack, like when the USA waged war on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, also causes mass exodus of people. In war situations, when members of a particular society lose their colleagues in a violent death, and also their property, the decision to move is very quick to take and enforce. Similarly, information related to possible destruction of life and property through the media, rumours or relatives coming from the area where danger is emanating would equally make people to move. Therefore, fear of anticipated dangers and persecutions from perceived enemies can make a population to flee.

Furthermore, there are cases in the colonial history of Africa particularly in Rwanda, Burundi, and Democratic Republic of Congo in the 1920s where people fled because of forced labour. Colonialists in those societies compelled the natives to provide labour on public works or private farms. In these countries, the individuals felt forced labour was intolerable and, therefore, they fled to countries like Uganda and Tanzania where such policies either did not exist or were not strictly enforced.

2.6.4 Dynamics and social structure of the migratory process

Refugees like other people are not a uniform mass. There are elites who may flee by air or by car. Usually this category has money and contacts abroad. They may even have a choice on where to go. In Africa, the majority of people who find themselves refugees are peasants or pastoralists. Usually these people move with household implements and animals. Once they cross the border to the territory of the host state they are inclined to settle down hoping that their plight is temporary and that they would return to their homeland as soon as the situation stabilised. But soon reality dawns upon them that life in exile is unpredictable and may be harsher and longer than expected. Nevertheless, the very conditions that work against them may be transformed to consciousness and a serious resolve to return home.

This study will show that when the Banyarwanda refugees fled to Uganda in the early 1960s, they too settled near the border in anticipation of quick repatriation. The response of the government at the time was, however, contrary to their own expectation of a quick return. The refugees were relocated to other areas reasonably far from the border in accordance with the UNHCR regulations.

According to UNHCR regulations, refugees are supposed to be settled 50km inside the host state from the border. This is why the Banyarwanda refugees were transferred to Orukinga valley and Nakivale in Mbarara district and later to as far away as Kyaka in Kyenjojo district in western Uganda.

2.6.5 Interaction and integration in the socio-economic structure and culture of the receiving society

Refugees who flee to the host country with similar social, ethnic and cultural practices and affinities tend to integrate in that society. However, the 'integration' may also generate conflict arising out of the competition for values and resources. This study will use the integration approach (Barongo, 1998; Eisenstadt, 1954; Bulcha, 1988) to answer the following questions in the context of Banyarwanda refugees: What factors facilitated or hindered integration? Did integration or lack of it affect the refugees' attitudes and their hope for return? What was the relationship between integration or lack of it and the quest for empowerment?

As for Barongo's conceptualisation, the following indices are applied to understand integration of refugees. Immediate needs of survival such as food; the social dimension which includes integration in the networks of primary and secondary social relationships with the members of the host society. He also points out the importance of the cultural dimension which analyses language, forms of worship etc; and the psychological dimension which takes into account refugee fears and hopes.

Similarly, Eisenstadt (1954) submitted four stages of integration although he uses the term 'absorption'. First, is the acquisition of language, norms, roles, customs; second, learning to perform a host of new roles and hence to handle the many

new situations that will occur; third, development of a new identity and staus-image, new values about oneself – a basic personal adjustment; and fourth, movement from participation in the institutions of the new ethnic group to participation in the institutions of the host society. All these dimensions will be utilised for the analysis in Chapter Six and Seven.

Bulcha's (1988) analysis of involuntary migration focusing on a large forced mass movement from Ethiopia to the neighbouring state, the Sudan, is particularly appropriate here. His ultimate purpose was a sociological enquiry into the causes and consequences of the dislocation of hundreds of thousands of people of different nationalities from different parts of Ethiopia who sought asylum in Sudan. He focuses on both history and the present conditions in the society of origin in relation to opportunities and challenges of integration.

More importantly, making use of the pioneering work of Kunz, alluded to above, Bulcha effectively demonstrates how the approach and topology developed by the latter can be utilised in the study of forced displacement. He examines in this regard, the events preceding exodus, factors generating exodus, the dynamics of forced migration and the dynamics in the socio-economic structure and culture of the host society. In this way Bulcha is a significant inspiration not only to this study but to studies on forced migration, generally.

2.6.6 Other theorists

In addition to the above analytical approach, this study utilises two other theoretical approaches namely, one on conflict (Brown and Selznick 1981), while the second one is a general theory on basic values and their relations with each other, as postulated particularly by (Maslow 1954). What are they and why these two approaches?

To begin with, the conflict approach holds that in social order the quest of some groups to dominate others is inevitable. In this perspective, society is invariably an arena of actual or potential conflict. If such conflicts are not contained or accommodated, the propensity to explode is very high. It is generally recognised in this regard that resource scarcity, and maldistribution, and the loss of material security are underlying root causes of many conflicts in society (Doornbos, 1992). The conceptualisation by Brown and Selznick is instrumental in exploring the causes and management of conflict. Therefore, the task of those who manage society is to contain conflict within peaceful bounds. If conflicts are not properly managed to the satisfaction of the concerned parties, they can sooner or later erupt into violent explosion which may or may not generate refugees.

Similarly, the conflict approach is used by Zolberg *et al.* (1989), but in a much broader perspective. According to them, the refugee question is located in historical processes in which complex internal and external forces interact. Consequently, they propose a useful typology of the refugee movements from an

analysis of different forms of conflict. The examples they employ are Eritrea in Ethiopia, where issues had autonomous and separatist dimensions; ethnic revolutions and counter revolutions, such as those in Rwanda (1959) and Burundi (1972); class conflict as in Kampuchea; tyrannical rule and its legacy, as was the case in Uganda (1971-79); struggle against settler regimes, like in South Africa (1960-1994) and Zimbabwe (1960-1980); and international wars, such as World Wars One and Two.

Finally, the compounding of internal struggles with external interventions, as was the case in Vietnam from the years immediately after World War Two to 1975 constitute conflicts that can also make important contributions toward forced displacements of people.

Furthermore, Zolberg *et al.* (1989) provide a more useful contribution to this study in these respects. Assuming that refugee flows are rooted in broad historical processes, Zolberg *et al.* demonstrate that different types of social conflict give rise to different types of refugee flows and that the patterns of conflict are themselves ultimately related to more general economic and political conditions, not only in countries from which the refugees migrate but also in the world at large. Furthermore, they argue that `internal factors themselves often are part of patterns of social change determined by a combination of closely external and internal processes' (1989:vi). Therefore, since refugees result from

different factors, then they require different handling methods and solutions particularly the root causes.

Of even more relevance to the research problem here, Zolberg *et al.* (1989) identify a special category of refugees whom they term `Refugee Warrior communities'. They argue that `refugee warrior communities', in sum, represent a transformation of refugees from being mere objects to being simultaneous actors and subjects in their own right. This implicitly points to the idea of empowerment. Though it is an important observation not much scholarly research attention has been given to the idea of refugee empowerment. Such a gap in refugee studies is what this work will attempt to fill.

Turning to the general theory on basic values, Abraham Maslow points out that human behaviour revolves around five fundamental needs: survival, security or safety, belonging and love, self esteem, and self actualisation. In interpreting this theory, Johannson argues that:

> These needs are not equally important to the individual and can be ranked in order of importance. Their relative position in the hierarchy would be as specified above and generally speaking, an individual would not be aware of a new step on the scale of needs until the need on the step below is fulfilled .....If applied to refugee movements and refugee actions in general, it gives rise to certain hypotheses. The high priority given to survival would mean that if the political conditions in a country endanger the lives of certain persons, and these persons cannot change the situation, they would generally – though not necessarily always - be prone to save their lives by becoming refugees (Johannson 1990: 256-7).

Where the security or safety of persons is at stake as a result of political turmoil or persecution and where liberty is endangered those persons may be forced to become refugees. Therefore, according to Maslow's value hierarchy, such insecurity would be a strong determinant for a person to become a refugee, and would rate even higher than the value of belongingness and love, self esteem and self actualisation. Without going into the details of the theory, if people cannot influence the political situation in their country and if they believe that their lives and property are in danger, then they will flee the country to meet the needs of survival and security. Indeed, the problem of Banyarwanda refugees and the way they have been fleeing to the neighbouring countries since 1959 conforms to the interpretation of Maslows general theory on basic needs.

2.7 Other related literature

Some analyses of the refugee crisis in Africa have tended to perceive refugees as a problem of international charity and not as a social group capable of empowering themselves for self determination and emancipation. For example, Varginia Hamilton (1987) who discusses the civil war which erupted in Angola in 1975, emphasises the escalation of the conflict by the involvement of the super powers in the 1970s and 1980s leading to massive uprooting of the rural population that had to flee in consequence to the neighbouring countries. Crawford Young (1982), analyses the struggle for power during the Independence period in former Zaire. The conflicts included attempted secession by the former mineral rich province of Katanga which forced

thousands of Zairian citizens to flee to Angola, Uganda and the Sudan. Again the United States Department of State Bureau for Refugees Programme publishes reports annually in which issues of refugee assistance and root causes of refugees are discussed. The common denominator among all those works is their focus on how refugees need international help – basic needs, protection, resettlement, repatriation and the like. Thus, the study of refugees as active subjects of history is evidently absent in them.

However, though for sometime the literature on refugees like those alluded to above tended to present them as mere objects of history, recent literature has begun to take them seriously as active subjects of history.

For instance, Catherine Watson (1991) makes an exposition of the situation of the refugees in Uganda, similar to the Palestinians in Jordan and Lebanon (emphasis mine), up to the invasion of Rwanda in 1990. She argues that having lived an exile life for more than three decades, the refugees drive to have a homeland became an important agenda and was behind the violent means they chose to achieve their `dream'. Watson, in contrast with the foregoing literature, makes an interesting analysis of the life of refugees in Uganda and the challenges Rwanda faced amid pressures from the host country and the international community. She then attempts to give possible solutions to the Banyarwanda refugee problem. Her treatment did not, however, anticipate

the implications of the Banyarwanda refugees empowerment to the entire Great Lakes region.

Similarly, Robert Dodd (1982), attempts to analyse the political situation of Uganda in the 1980s in which Banyarwanda refugees found themselves as actors rather than mere objects. Their harassment, and subsequent involvement in the guerilla war in Uganda (1981-1986) transformed them even much more clearly into active subjects.

Equally, Jason Clay (1984) draws attention to the response of the Ugandan government to refugees which accused them of not only supporting the opposition parties in the 1980 national elections but also of the subsequent insurgency. In fact, Van de Meeren (1996) highlights, in a comparative manner, certain respects in which refugees became `scapegoats' in the ethnic conflicts within Congo and Uganda, conflicts which eventually led to the military invasion of Rwanda by Rwandese refugees from Uganda, in 1990.

Although, important new insights are emerging from these authors and although there is certainly progress in the perception of refugee issues, the existing studies do not go far enough to tackle the process of empowerment and its implications with regard to the refugee question. This is because, these works do not show how the refugees responded to the challenges they faced in the host country and how they responded over time, and how they took advantage of the opportunities that came their way.

But Grahl-Madsen (1978) introduces some new aspects that are pertinent to the debate on the subject. He discusses the question of political rights and freedoms and raises a number of questions which are, indeed, pertinent to the research problem. He asks: Are countries of refuge justified to deny political rights and freedoms of refugees? Or, conversely, are countries of refuge obliged to afford political rights and freedoms to refugees? Or for that matter what happens when refugees are denied their political rights and freedoms? What options will they have to seek redress? Inspite of the existing gaps in the literature reviewed, more useful information close to the research problem is growing. Henceforth, I turn to this more relevant literature.

Within the area of the research interest, attempts have been made to study the refugee problem. In Gingyera-Pinycwa (ed.)(1998), various authors explore the economic, international, political and sociological implications of refugees problem in Uganda. The contribution by Nabuguzi, `Refugees and Politics in Uganda' shares some political conception with the problematique of this study. This is particularly true with regard to his submission that African countries can no longer indefinitely lock out their citizens as refugees by hoping that host states will control and keep them at `reasonable distances from the border'. Similarly, on the political implications of victimising refugees, Yolamu Barongo (1998) touches briefly on how the Banyarwanda refugees, who suffered under the hands of the government of Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) between 1981 and 1985 were compelled to join Yoweri Museveni's guerilla war in Uganda.

Although Barongo's main focus is an attempt to understand the difficulties which refugees face in their struggle to settle down in the country of asylum in order to lead normal lives in their new environment, which touches on the matter of integration, problems of integration have bearing on the empowerment process of refugees and enjoyment of their rights in a host state.

Gerald Prunier (1995) presents yet another important work that is close to the area of study and may furnish much needed insight. His main focus is on the internal politics in Rwanda and the contest in which genocide was organised. Although the interpretation of the facts is not in terms of empowerment process, Prunier traces the establishment and the development of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) in the context of Ugandan politics in the 1980s, and the complexities of international involvement, notably by NGOs and aid agencies.

Equally important is the work of Kamukama (1997) in which he traces the roots of the Rwanda conflict which forced thousands of refugees to leave their country from 1959 as refugees, up to the time of the invasion and subsequent signing of the pact between the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), and the Habyarimana government. His work, however, does not deal with various forms of political, economic and military organisations in the context of empowerment.

Rene Lemarchand (1970) is yet another work that is useful in the treatment of the contradictions in Rwanda society before and immediately after the 1959

revolution. Lemarchand traces the development of Rwanda principalities into a one centralised kingdom under the leadership of the Tutsi kings. He brings out the role of the monarchy, the colonial collaborators and the circumstances that made the colonialists switch their support from the Tutsi to the Hutu. This is the basic work on the relationship between colonialism and the contemporary Rwandan problems and it provided invaluable insights in the course of this work

In her recent publication (2000), A People Betrayed: The role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide, Linda Melvern gives an account of the tragic events that took place in Rwanda. She raises important questions that are relevant to this study. For instance, why did the tragedy occur, and what should have been done to prevent it?

Although Malvern does not view the events as a process of empowerment, she nevertheless brings out the roles of external forces that either directly or indirectly, facilitated the process of empowerment of refugees and the resultant repercussions to other people in Rwanda at the time.

As for future prospects, Filip Reyntjens' (1996) interesting analysis should enrich the thesis. In an attempt to explain why extreme violence affected Rwanda from April to July 1994, he argues that violence has been political rather than ethnic. He contends that Rwanda and Burundi have a problem of bipolarity. They are among the few African countries with only two significant ethnic groups, the Twa

being too few in number and too marginalised to play any significant political role. Most other African countries have several ethnic groups which prevent this bipolar pattern of opposition. This fact encourages inter-ethnic alliances in this latter category of countries **and minimises bloody conflicts** (emphasis mine). However, in a situation like that of Rwanda and Burundi, it is not difficult to mobilise the population along ethnic lines for political ends and this is what has been happening. Therefore, whoever is out as a refugee or as an internally displaced person engages or hopes to engage in a process that would culminate into the re-distribution of power. Reyntjens, therefore, warns that the ingredients for renewed violence are present and that the country is likely to face a prolonged period of destabilisation if no appropriate political solutions are found. This is not an idle warning as events in Congo with the involvement of Banyarwanda has so far revealed for the entire Great Lakes region.

Pamphile Sebahara (1998,) like Reyntjens, analyses the role of ethnicity in the politics of Rwanda. While tracing the circumstances that enabled the genocide of 1994, he argues that it was a result of interdependent factors using ethnicity as an instrument of violence, control and realisation of a perceived objective, namely political power. His work is relevant here, too, particularly for its recommendations towards a stable society. He argues that, when it comes to the management of conflict, we must recognise the key role of the state as regulator of society at the national level. Conflicts already in existence can only be resolved if all parties involved (the state, other organizations, and individuals)

work together according to a constructive rationale, that is to say one which can recognise the mistakes of the past – deliberate or otherwise – in order to start afresh. Indeed, the empowerment of refugees would be meaningful if such strategy is taken into account for the establishment of both democracy and social justice.

Finally, Mahmood Mamdani's book, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism and Genocide in Rwanda, was very useful to this study. He makes an attempt of critically addressing the ways in which the post-colonial state reproduced and reinforced colonially produced political identities in the name of justice.
In his analysis, Mamdani attempts to rethink existing facts in light of historical contexts, thereby illuminating old facts and interpreting them in a new perspective. This is in line with the study's main aim of interpreting the Banyarwanda refugee experience in order to explain their struggle to regain their rights as citizens of Rwanda.

Although Mamdani does not view the processes in Rwanda and outside in the context of refugee empowerment, his discussion on the social revolution of 1959, the background to the RPF invasion, the racial/ethnic divide, the civil war and genocide provide important points of reference on why and how the refugees manipulated the weaknesses in Uganda society to pursue their perceived objective of gaining their citizenship rights and escaping the tribulations of refugee status. Like Reyntjens, Mamdani concludes that the problem of Rwanda

is first and foremost one of political power and that there can be no reconciliation without a reorganisation of power.

2.8 Conceptual model

The foregoing theoretical treatment leads quite logically, into the quest for a conceptual model for the study. The model is conceived on the theoretical premise that politics is a complex of inter-dependent variables. Conceived in this way, it is operationalised both as an underlying variable, A, and an intervening variable, B, which affects empowerment, which is, thus the dependent variable, C. The relationship between variables are indicated by different arrows in the diagram that follows.

BUILDING EMPOWERMENT – A CONCEPTUAL MODEL

A. UNDERLYING VARIABLES B. INTERVENING VARIABLES C. OUTPUT VARIABLES



At the beginning, citizens are forced out of their country of origin because of conflict as conceptualised in 2.5 above to become refugees. Their entry into the host country may bring them to challenges and opportunities within the host communities. Depending on the similarity or dissimilarity in their social, cultural and economic configuration with the indigenous population, coupled with refugee policies, they may or may not easily integrate. Whichever is the case, it is likely

to impact significantly on their quest for resources and esteemed values like land, education, employment and cultural identity.

If refugees enter a conflict-ridden society, they are likely to position themselves to exploit the weaknesses in that society for survival and empowerment. This is because the entry of refugees into the job market, education, acquisition of land, and particularly illegal participation in politics, leads to resentment and persecution by their host community, which in turn enhances their involvement in partisan, political and military alliances. The alliances they make are determined by their levels of economic status, formal education, age, religion and socio-cultural linkages with the host population. Refugees will take advantage of the opportunities and weaknesses in the social and political situations in the host country to serve their interests. On the other hand, if refugees are exclusively kept in refugee camps, their contact with the indigenous population may be limited to individual interactions. Therefore, the empowerment expected may not be possible. If conditions are favourable inspite of the challenges e.g. frustration, and exclusion as presented in the intervening variable B, such processes may lead to individual consciousness, political consciousness, political and military organisation – the sum total of which is an empowerment which may culminate into the entry into power in the host state. This latter may then, be used as a conduit to capture of state power in the country of origin, ultimately. Similarly, a conducive environment, in the form of acceptance by the host community and

positive integrative policies by the host state may lead to another form of empowerment, particularly, naturalisation and the acquisition of new citizenship.

2.9 The hypotheses of the study

The complexity of the research problem, as well as the foundations laid down in the sections on theoretical treatment and in the conceptual model, tend to suggest a plausible hypothesis. Indeed, to elucidate the main problem, an attempt shall be made to test the following hypothesis.

In the politics of a host state, where refugees have similar social, cultural and demographic characteristics with the indigenous population, the prospects for their empowerment are considerably enhanced.

From this central hypothesis, the following auxiliary hypothesis will also be explored and tested in order to expound further the problematique of the thesis.

In a politically conflict-ridden host society, refugees are likely to manipulate the weaknesses in the social, economic and political situation as a means of empowerment.

2.10 Summary

In conclusion, this chapter presents a hybrid theoretical discourse in which conflict theory and other methodological approaches are used to explain and understand why people become refugees, when they decide to flee and the possible responses to their new status. The factors responsible for the mass

exodus, the political dynamics and expectations in the host state and the possibilities of empowerment are articulated in the conceptual model.

The related literature, demonstrates that although studies have been carried out on the Banyarwanda refugee question, none has interpreted their experience using the empowerment discourse. And to demonstrate this, a number of issues are raised so as to assist the testing of the hypotheses and the understanding of the research problem.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

In Social Sciences there are many methodologies. For instance, qualitative and quantitative researches require different appropriate methodologies to be accomplished. Each methodology has its own strengths and weaknesses. Similarly, different subjects and/or problems require appropriate methodological designs and approaches. While, some subjects are best investigated using quantitative methods, in others qualitative approaches yield better results. Whereas quantitative research is structured, logical, measured and wide, qualitative research is more intuitive, subjective and deep. Qualitative research is most appropriate where the investigator is attempting to understand the nature of the experiences of people. It can help us to understand what lies behind any phenomenon about which little is known and to gain fresh insights on things about which quite a lot is known.

On the negative side, good qualitative methods depend on smaller groups in order to facilitate indepth interviews. This is particularly the case when the selection of participants is based on specified and identified characteristics of target group. As a result, answers provided during interviews by individual respondents are hard to be standardised. This shortcoming reduces the

scientific value of the qualitative approach (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 1991).

Given the nature and complexity of the Banyarwanda refugee question, this study considered the qualitative methods as appropriate to collect data and analyse the empowerment of the Banyarwanda who lived and operated from Uganda between 1959-1994.

3.1 Research design

The research design was conceived and developed from an historical perspective. As a result, a case study design was used in order to analyse a single group (the Banyarwanda refugees) from 1959-1994. The aim of a case study is description. Therefore, what I do is to explain a relationship between politics and empowerment in the context of the Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda. The research problem and the questions are analysed and answered as events unfold.

3.2 Survey population and area of study.

The research was carried out in Uganda and Rwanda. In Uganda, the districts of Mbarara and Kyenjojo were purposively selected as appropriate for the purpose of the study since they have refugee settlements in which Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda have lived from 1959 to 1994. The districts of Ntungamo, Bushenyi and Kabarole were also surveyed to locate opinion leaders knowledgeable about

the life history of the Banyarwanda refugees and non-refugees. This was done because from the outset not all refugees went to the camps. Some drifted into the interior of Uganda and acquired land while others joined relatives after crossing the border. Furthermore, in the course of time refugees spread out of camps and settled among the host population in south-western Uganda. It was, therefore, important to capture the experiences of those Banyarwanda who now regard themselves as citizens of Uganda, as well.

Areas around the refugee settlements were also targeted for the study since I needed to get information from the indigenous host population about refugee behaviour, activities and movements. The population was easily accessible because of the local administration system in Uganda based on villages known as Local Councils and Committees (LCs). What I did was to locate the leadership of the LCs, identify myself, explain the objective of the research and request access to residents of the villages who became the respondents as I shall explain later under the sampling and data collection methods.

In Rwanda, fieldwork was carried out in Kigali, in Butare, and at the National University of Rwanda. This was important because it helped me to locate key former refugees to give their side of the story on the process of empowerment they went through right from Uganda and other neighbouring countries where the Banyarwanda refugees had taken refuge.

3.3 Sampling

In order to have a good diversity and a reasonable number of respondents, my research utilised non-probability sampling method. This was preferred because it was not possible to have reliable lists of former Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda and the neighbouring countries so as to use probability sampling which could have given all elements in the population equal chances of selection as respondents.

After settling on a non-probability sampling method, two techniques were applied. First, I employed a purposive sampling technique. Here, I used my judgment to select scholars in social sciences, opinion leaders in the districts, and the officials from the Department of Refugees in Uganda who had been handling refugees for sometime.

With the help of a research assistant, who was a Uganda Peoples Defence Force (UPDF) officer, I identified the National Resistance Movement/National Resistance Army (NRM/NRA) soldiers who fought in the bush war (1981-86) and therefore had interacted closely with the Banyarwanda refugees in the NRA. This method was chosen because the army regulations do not allow civilians to move freely in barracks to interview soldiers. The identified soldiers were given questionnaires to fill. The research assistant supervised the administration and the return process of the questionnaires.

I also used the snowball samplings technique. I identified some former refugees now living in Rwanda. I won their confidence, and they introduced me to more respondents.

To achieve initial contacts, I convinced the state security agents in both Uganda and Rwanda especially those that controlled key positions in order to have a free movement in Rwanda. This was possible because some of the security agents and respondents had been schoolmates and acquaintances who did not find it difficult in opening their minds and hearts to me.

With an introduction letter from the Head of Department of Political Science and Public Administration, I approached the Uganda embassy in Rwanda, which, in turn gave me an open introductory letter to any authority or potential respondent in Rwanda. These letters of introduction and my identification as a Ph.D candidate enabled me to move from one respondent to another who in turn introduced me to their colleagues and sometimes arranged interviews for me. The exercise in Rwanda took the whole of May 2000.

Snowball sampling was also applied in the refugee settlements namely, Nakivale, Orukinga, both in Mbarara district; and Kyaka I and Kyaka II in Kyenjojo district.

After being cleared by the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology, I obtained introductory letters from the Department of Refugees in the Prime

Ministers Office addressed to the camp commandants of the respective settlements.

Whenever I reached the settlements, the respective camp commandant would then select one refugee leader to identify knowledgeable refugees for interview. In Orukinga settlement, the camp commandant assigned his secretary who had been a refugee before, but had naturalised herself and was employed by the government of Uganda within the settlement. Her relatives and associates had all repatriated to Rwanda in 1994. She took me around the settlement and identified refugees who constituted focus group discussions where each consisted of 10-20 people.

For the indigenous communities around the settlement, I approached the Local Council executives who organised the residents for interview individually and in focus groups. The villages and participants were randomly selected from those identified by the Local Council executives.

With the above sampling techniques, the following numbers of respondents were selected and accessed, using appropriate research instruments as will be described shortly.

Table 3.1: Numbers and categories of respondents in the research.

(i)	Former refugees living in Rwanda	30
(ii)	Banyarwanda refugees (Tutsi) still living in Uganda	10
(iii)	Banyarwanda refugees (Hutu) living in Uganda since 1990	100
(iv)	Participants in Focus Group discussions (Indigenous communities)	60
(v)	Opinion leaders in the 5 districts of Uganda	50
(vi)	Department of Refugees, Prime Ministers Office in Uganda	8
(vii)	UPDF officers, men and women	20
(viii)	UNHCR officials	2
(ix)	Scholars (in the field of refugee studies)	20
	Total	300

Secondary sources were also fully exploited in the study. In this regard, I reviewed the existing literature in order to establish the current debate in relation to the research problem. Sources of information included published books, journals, reports and newspapers. These sources were a complement to data from the field. But where the field data contradicted written sources, the judgment and the conclusions became mine.

Holdings or collections at the following places were very useful, Makerere University, Main Library; the Centre for Basic Research (CBR) Kampala; the Council for Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Dakar; UNEP Library, Nairobi; and the Makerere Institute of Social Research (MISR).

In addition to all the above category of sources, the research utilised the modern information technology facility of the Internet within and outside Makerere University main campus. Numerous pertinent websites were visited in the course of the research process.

3.4 Data Collection

A number of instruments were used during the research. In order to generate adequate information, a participatory approach was adopted as a guiding principle. This approach allowed the respondents reasonable time to express their views in a free atmosphere. This was possible because of the instruments that were chosen namely the interview schedule and the focus group discussion.

The interview schedule (appendices I, III & V) was chosen because it is an important technique in qualitative research. One aim of the interview method is to understand others, it follows that one way to do this is to ask them about themselves. Since the aim of the research was to understand the empowerment of the Banyarwanda refugees, it was found appropriate to ask them about themselves and also to ask others who closely interacted with them or had studied similar social groups or issues.

The instrument was administered by the principal investigator on the respondents and in some cases by a research assistant. This was applied to the former refugees living in Rwanda, refugees still in Uganda, opinion leaders, UNHCR officials and government officials in the Department of refugees in Uganda.

The questions started with background information of respondents and this gave them adequate time to feel free and later answer questions that were demanding

intellectually. Specific questions were also in-built in the interview schedule so as to check the consistency of the respondents.

The research also utilised another important instrument of data collection the focus group discussion (appendices IV & VI) which produced valuable information on the behaviour, activities and movements of refugees.

Six groups of ten people were organised in villages with the assistance of LCs around the settlements camps of Nakivale, Orukinga and Kyaka II. A total of sixty participants were interviewed using focus group discussion with the help of research assistants. It is interesting to note that information from various villages in different districts around the settlement was similar as far as the behaviour and activities of refugees during the RPF struggle to return home were concerned. This implies that the RPF was organised and had political networks throughout the refugee settlements in which Banyarwanda refugees lived.

The focus group discussion was also used on the Hutu refugees who have been entering Uganda since 1990. This was done in Nakivale and Orukinga. Whereas the groups started with numbers between 10 and 20, they kept on expanding and by the time we completed the exercise, an estimated number of 50 could be seen at the venue. In fact, the refugees enjoyed the focus group discussions, opened their hearts to us and went further to suggest solutions to the refugee crisis in Rwanda and what genuine empowerment should entail for all citizens.

The study also made use of a questionnaire instrument (Appendix II). This was administered on the UPDF officers with the help of a research assistant who was an officer himself. All the questionnaires were dully completed and returned. The instrument provided valuable information on how the Banyarwanda refugees organised inside the NRM/NRA without being restrained, how they used their positions to prepare an invasion, and generally how they acquired political, economic and military advantages.

The questionnaire instrument was pre-tested on ten randomly selected students of Makerere University who were taking a course in Refugee Studies. This helped to re-shape the questions and to meet the objectives of the study.

3.5 Data Analysis

The study employed a qualitative data analysis approach. The qualitative method according to Patton (1980) produces information which can be aptly given in words rather than in numerical terms. It includes description of situations, events, people, interactions and of observed behaviour; direct quotation from people; and excerpts or entire passages from documents, correspondence, records and case studies.

Similarly, Bouma, Gary and G.B.J. Atknison (1995: 206) observe that:

> Qualitative research can be described as any social science research that produces results that are not obtained by statistical procedures or other methods of quantification. Some of the data may be quantified, but the analysis is qualitative. It can refer to research about people's lives, their

> stories, and behaviour, and it can also be used to examine organisations, relationships, and social movements. Research done in this way produces descriptive data such as people's own spoken or written words or observable behaviour.

It is important to note that in qualitative research (as in this study), 'analysis' is the process by which you use data to identify themes, to construct hypotheses, and then show support for these themes and hypotheses. One difference between qualitative and quantitative research is that in the former, the researcher does not seek to prove a hypothesis, instead the aim is to show that the hypothesis is plausible. In otherwords, you provide good arguments that the hypothesis is reasonable. This is what it entails to test a hypothesis when applying qualitative analysis in Social Sciences.

In this study, themes have been identified and presented as chapters in which arguments are supported by the views and facts generated from the field in order to test the hypotheses.

In particular, politics is presented as a complex independent concept, operationalised in various variables as: forced migration, socio-economic status, refugee policies, human rights, unresolved conflicts and war. These variables affect empowerment, the outcome concept which is operationalised into output variables which are tested as explained above, by interpreting facts and giving arguments to their realisation. They are: political consciousness, political organisation, military skills and organisation, power and naturalisation.

On the whole, the study employs a style of writing that makes chapters, headings and sub-headings to reflect important issues that are raised in the statement of the problem and hypotheses. And where I felt that more information could be presented in few pages, tables and bar charts are used to condense the information for easy interpretation.

3.6 Summary

In conclusion, this work set out as a qualitative research on a case study. As such, it employed mainly qualitative methods of data collection and analysis, namely: interviews, focus group discussions; construction of themes, hypotheses and made use of good arguments to demonstrate that those themes and hypotheses are reasonable.

The results which now follow would appear to have vindicated the aptness of the choice of this methodology.

CHAPTER 4

THE 1959 REVOLUTION AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE BANYARWANDA REFUGEE QUESTION

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents a historical background to developments in Rwanda that culminated into the vicious cycle of forced migration. The main argument runs as follows: whereas the Hutu gained political and economic empowerment during and after the 1959 social revolution, the Tutsi were severely disempowered. This new configuration of forces sowed the seeds of the quest for empowerment among the Tutsi, which invariably resulted in the disempowerment of the Hutu, and generated a new wave of Banyarwanda refugees.

To understand these processes, it is necessary to capture the mood and the events that occurred much earlier than the year 1959. This is important because not many people are acquainted with the history of Rwanda.

4.1 The physical setting, demographic and social pressures

Rwanda is one of the smallest but most densely populated countries in Africa. Its area is only 26,300 square kilometers, while its density is 271 people per square kilometer or 10,200 sq. miles; and population density of 800 per sq. mile (The World Almanac, 2000: 853).

The country has fertile soils, reliable rainfall, and moderate climate all of which contributed to rapid population growth resulting in increasing demographic pressure on land, so that even long before the 1959 social revolution which marked the beginning of the refugee problem, many Banyarwanda were migrating out of the country to Uganda, Congo and Tanzania. But the refugee problem as is known today is different from such migrations that existed at the time. This is why the 1959 upheaval becomes important as a launch pad to understand the contemporary refugee problem in Rwanda.

4.2 The historical perspective: pre-colonial period.

On the face of it the Banyarwanda the Tutsi, the Twa and the Hutu should have a high sense of national cohesion and solidarity. The Banyarwanda have all the building blocks required for nationhood – a homogenous culture, language etc. So how can the intense pathological antipathy between the two communities be explained.?

Rwanda consisted of three distinct communities, the Twa, the Hutu and the Tutsi who lived side by side, shared a common language and culture, traded with each other and to some extent intermarried. The people of Rwanda were, however, differentiated by occupation. The Twa engaged in hunting, the Hutu practiced farming and iron smelting while the Tutsi were herders or cattle keepers. These occupations served all the communities where each group exchanged with another according to its needs.

However, there have been attempts to explain the political and social structure of Rwanda in order to locate which group exercised power more than others and possibly laid ground for social tensions. Hans Meyer (cited in Lemarchand, 1970) suggests that the Tutsi had an upper hand, He argues that the secret of Tutsi domination lay in their innate superiority – in `their superior intelligence, calmness, smartness, racial pride, solidarity and political talent. On the other hand, he argues that the Tutsi could have used their cattle as a lever of economic power to subdue the so called indigenous tribes into a form of cattle client-ship, through which the Tutsi oligarchy acquired sovereign political rights over their Hutu clients.

This explanation further contends that the transition from statelessness to kingship was achieved by the amalgamation of a few autonomous chieftaincies into a small kingdom, under the leadership of a royal clan. In Rwanda it is believed to have taken place during the leadership of *Ruganzu Bwimba* near Kigali around the fifteenth century (Vansina, 1962; Kagame, 1972).

Further development of the kingdom was registered in the sixteenth century, when many areas were gradually conquered by the next king *Ruganze Ndoni*. The ultimate stage of territorial consolidation was achieved in the latter half of the nineteenth century under the reign of *Mwami Kigeri Rwabugiri*.

King *Rwabugiri* is the most celebrated *Mwami* of the Rwanda kingdom. One of the Rwanda's Apostolic Vicars described him as follows:

> *Rwabugiri* was a conquering monarch, benevolent towards the masses, ruthless towards *Batutsi*. The masses loved him because anyone could approach him and lay his claims and grievances before him.... Ceaselessly at war with his neighbours, *Rwabugiri* led the Banyarwanda almost everywhere, providing them with un-parallel opportunities to acquire abundant loot' (in Lemarchand 1970:20).

But where autonomous Hutu communities had emerged, Rwabugiri found a lot of resistance. This is why the effective annexation of small Hutu chieftaincies in the north and eastern Rwanda was completed only as recently as in the 1920s, and with the assistance of the colonial authorities, at that.

With the leadership qualities of *Mwami Rwabugiri*, Rwanda achieved a remarkable degree of centralisation and state formation. In the new political structure, power was exercised effectively by suppressing the independence of the local hereditary chiefs and by replacing them with loyal chiefs whose responsibilities included exploitation of the territories.

It is important to emphasize that *Rwabugiri's* state building activities sowed the seeds of ethnic hatred. As Newbury (1988:51) explains:

> With the arrival of central authorities, lines of distinction were altered and sharpened, as the categories of Hutu and Tutsi assumed new hierarchical overtones associated with proximity to the central court-proximity to power. Later when the political arena widened and the intensity of political activity increased, these classifications became increasingly stratified and rigidified. More than simply conveying the connotation of cultural

difference from Tutsi, Hutu identity came to be associated with and eventually defined by an inferior status.

4.3 The role of ideology and myth in the Rwanda kingdom.

Each society has its own myths, ideologies and symbols to justify the existing political and social structures. In order to rationalise the existence of social stratification, inequality, and particularly the unequal distribution of power and resources in Rwanda society, the ruling elite had to create a number of self-serving myths.

> A myth is a body of values and beliefs which tend to embellish or falsify historical truth. The function of a myth is to strengthen tradition and endow it with greater value and prestige, by tracing it back to a higher, better, more supernatural reality of initial events (Lemarchand 1970:31).

There are three themes which form the mythology of Rwanda society. One such theme was that of a divinely ordained social structure in which each individual Tutsi, Hutu and Twa was assigned a specific task and each category a specific rank. According to this theme, the *Nyiginya* clan of the Tutsi were to be rulers, the Hutu were to be serfs, and the Twa a pariah class. The second theme has to do with royal omnipotence. According to it, the king is presented as the incarnation of the deity (*Imana*), the embodiment of ancestral virtues, and the source of all prosperity.

The third theme combines the kingship with the thinking of Tutsi supremacy and seems to have developed much later and perhaps during colonialism. According to this myth, the king and the Tutsi leaders were the heart of the country. Should

the Hutu chase them away, they would lose all they have and *Imana* would punish them. From these body of myths the Tutsi claimed to be *Imana's* elect, endowed with superior military skill, extraordinary courage, and great wealth and commensurate intelligence. These myths were used by the Tutsi elites and later by colonialists to consolidate the kingdom of unequal relationship, a situation that led to serious repercussions as shall be shown later on.

4.4 Patron – client system.

In the kingdom, people were linked together by the institution known as *ubuhake*. This was a highly personalised relationship between two individuals of unequal social status. It was in reality a patron-client relationship, but involved reciprocal bonds of loyalty and exchange of goods and services (Maquet, 1954). The patron was mostly a Tutsi, but the client could be a Hutu or a Tutsi of inferior social status. One person could be a client, as well as a patron. Thus, even Tutsi or Hutu patrons could be clients of yet another Tutsi. A Hutu who successfully made his way up the social ladder could be assimilated into the Tutsi social group and be regarded as a Tutsi, accordingly. This means a group of Hutu were inevitably destined to remain in an inferior position. Theoretically, the only person ultimately not a client of this system was the *Mwami* himself.

The *Ubuhake* relationship had important effects in relation to the creation of inequalities in society, which eventually explode in 1959. As Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth (1996) point out, it institutionalised the economic differences

between the mainly cultivating Hutu and the cattle-breeding Tutsi. It was an instrument of control, and turned the Hutu into socio-economic and political clients; and some Tutsi into patrons. But also it led to a process of `ethnic' amalgamation, particularly among the Hutu. The result was an `ethnic' Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy, following the socio-economic process engendered by Tutsi extension and occupation (Lema, 1993).

By the end of the nineteenth Century, pre-colonial Rwanda had developed into a strong state with the *Mwami* as the head, and as the owner and controller of all land and cattle. He had created a political board of chiefs and a permanent council of *abiru* or ritual specialists who advised him about the divine obligations connected to his office. The genealogy of all *bami* were Tutsi and all married Tutsi women. Even if some of the women could have been of Hutu or Twa origin, they were assumed to have crossed the social ladder at marriage.

The *mwami* was the supreme judicial person in the realm. Similarly, he was the Commander in-Chief of the army, whose composition was mainly Tutsi. The kingdom was administratively divided into provinces, districts, hills and neighbourhoods. The provinces were normally administered by high chiefs or army commanders. The districts were administered by two chiefs appointed by the *Mwami* – one cattle chief in charge of cattle taxes, and one land chief responsible for agricultural levies. The Tutsi were mainly appointed as cattle chiefs; and the Hutu as land chiefs. The districts were divided into hills,

administered by chiefs responsible for handing over levies to the two district chiefs (Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth, 1996). But although, Rwanda had inequalities, it would appear that these were manageable within the existing social and political framework, and this may well explain why there is no record of mass displacement arising out of the oppressive regimes of the kings of Rwanda.

4.5 Events preceding the exodus of 1959

4.5.1 The colonial period and the road to independence

The two kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi were annexed by Germany in 1899. Later, *Rwanda – Urundi,* as it was called, became a mandatory territory of the League of Nations and was placed under Belgium. Subsequently, with the demise of the League and the birth of the United Nations, Rwanda became a Belgian trust territory in 1946.

Earlier the Germans had employed indirect rule as a method of administering the kingdoms. It is believed that, like in Tanganyika, the Germans lacked personnel to rule more directly. It was, in any case, also convenient in a territory where there was already a centralised state system particularly in Rwanda.

When Belgium took over, this policy of indirect rule was preserved. For forty years, the Belgian authorities entrenched and redefined the traditional system of administration. The indigenous social and political structures were distorted. For instance, the indigenous pre-colonial client system which was flexible with a

significant element of reciprocity was rigidified, and the system of mutual obligations was abolished. The Belgian colonialists introduced forced labour, discriminative educational policies, and strengthened the socio-economic divisions between Tutsi and Hutu. Colonial policies, thus, helped sharpen lines that had been more diffuse and, in so doing, eliminated elements of social structure that had hitherto helped to contain and neutralise social conflicts. Nevertheless, it is possible given the forces of freedom that were unleashed after World War II that the traditional structures would not have persisted for long even if colonialism had not interrupted them.

The inter ethnic relations in Rwanda were heightened by Europeans who were working in the region with the so called Hamitic myth that racialised Rwandan society. This myth treated the Tutsi who were considered alien and the Hutu who were considered indigenous as unequal entities. It, thus, rigidified the Hutu-Tutsi identities.

According to this myth, everything of value in Africa had been introduced by people with Hamitic qualities. For Europeans, the attractiveness of this myth lay in the fact that it allowed for linking physical characteristics with mental capacity: the `Hamites' were supposed to be born leaders and, in principle, had the right to a history and a future almost as noble as that of their European `cousins' (Linden, 1977). In Rwanda, the proponents of the myth claimed that, it was the

Tutsi who could fit in that category, and, therefore, the Europeans could find no obstacle in working with them.

The Hamitic myth was further strengthened by the letters and the position taken by Monsignor Leon-Paul Classe, the Roman Catholic Vicar Apostolic to Rwanda. In a letter dated 21 September 1927, he wrote to Georges Morsehan, the Belgian Resident Commissioner:

> If we want to be practical and look after the real interest of the country we shall find remarkable element of progress with the *Mutusi* youth [...] Ask the *Bahutu* whether they prefer to be given orders by uncouth persons or by nobles and the answer will be clear; they will prefer the *Batutsi*, and quite rightly so. Born chiefs, the latter have a knack of giving orders. [...] Here lies the secret of how they managed to settle in this country and hold it in their grip (de Lacger, 1961).

This perception of Hutu complacency was, however, to diminish considerably with the increased level that eventually came to be attained in Hutu consciousness and political activism, as will now be shown.

4.5.2 The rise of Hutu political consciousness and activism

Although pre-colonial Rwanda was partly built on the myth of a Tutsi supremacy, the Hutu did not always take it while sitting back. The northern Hutu, who preferred to be called the *Bakiga,* allied with the section of Tutsi aristocracy excluded from power at the death of *Rwabugiri* in 1895. The rebellion was led by members of the Tutsi aristocracy who were opposed to the usurpation of power by the *Abeega* clan at the death of *Rwabugiri.* The *Bakiga* among other issues

opposed the imposition of forced labour tribute (*abareetwa*) by the establishment, and the new administration of colonialists.

When this revolt (*Nyabingi*) was defeated a new type of anti-colonial revolt emerged in the north again led by the indigenous *Bakiga* who opposed the colonial methods of alienation of their land. The colonialists changed the ownership of land from the *Bakiga* to the Tutsi elites who collaborated with the new dispensation. As a result, the Hutu (*Bakiga*) elites defined the enemy as both the Tutsi chiefs/elites and the colonial authorities. Elsewhere in central Rwanda, colonial oppression, manifested in the activities of the Tutsi chiefs, was real and could not remain unchallenged for ever.

Hutu political consciousness was further raised by a new phenomenon of migrant labour (Mamdani, 2001). During the inter-war period, a labour market developed in Congo around the mines in Katanga and the plantations in Kivu. In Uganda, labour opportunities were available among the rich peasants of Buganda who had established a coffee economy, and in the sugar plantations in Busoga and Buganda. Later, after World War II the copper mines that were opened in Kilembe also offered opportunities for migrant labour from Rwanda. What is important to note here is that most migrants who went to the Congo and to Uganda were Hutu either escaping forced labour imposed by Tutsi chiefs and local authorities in Rwanda or searching for new opportunities. There are studies that were carried out on this subject (Richards, 1973; Powesland, 1973); but the

pertinent point is that the migrant experience opened the eyes of the Hutu, gave new insights on the world outside one's locality, and, when they returned the migrants easily provided much-needed leadership in the protest that mushroomed over the first decade after World War II (Mamdani, 2001:111). For instance, the Hutu protest in *Kinyaga* was led by the former wage earners who had established themselves in the locality as business entrepreneurs (Pottier, Johan 1991).

Furthermore, colonialism introduced cash crops in Rwanda like elsewhere in Africa. This integrated Rwanda in the world capitalist economy. Whereas the Tutsi remained largely cattle keepers,, the money economy encouraged the Hutu to grow cash crops for exports. The Hutus were able to earn money and educate their children. Although the school system favoured the Tutsi, the Hutu gradually increased their numbers. But side by side with these positive development for the Hutus there was segregation in employment. Hutu graduates at various levels could not be absorbed in the civil service. This is why many Hutu elites tried the church service although even there, the Tutsi still had an upper hand. However, the church provided a forum where the Hutu could express their grievances as evidenced by the management of the church publication of the *kinyarwanda* language magazine known as *Kinyamateka*. This magazine began to address issues to whoever could sympathise with the Hutu plight whether the ordinary Hutu or the United Nations Commissions that used to visit Rwanda.

But how could the church, which was predominantly pro-Tutsi, be sympathetic to the upcoming Hutu elites? The explanation lies in the shift that was made by the European clergy after World War II. The clergy that came to Rwanda had been influenced by the anti-racist ideological perceptions that had become characteristic even in Europe at this point in time. The new comers were sympathetic with the Hutu majority and their problem; and therefore, allowed more breathing space to the Hutu elites and their activism. In general terms, Hutu consciousness had developed from a situation of people meekly conquered to a situation of a people that was now activist and determined to acquire power as means of liberation and emancipation.

4.5.3 The politics of decolonisation

It has already been noted that Rwanda became a UN trusteeship territory after the Second World War with the UN picking off from where the League of Nations had left. Under the UN tutelage a number of reforms were attempted in the form of electoral changes in order to address the challenges of the 'status quo'. In 1949, when the first UN mission visited Rwanda, the colonial authorities, together with the king announced that the hated *ubuleetwa* system was to be replaced by a mandatory money payment. This appears to have been calculated to appease the Hutu and to show to the UN mission that democratic processes were beginning to be implemented. However, the pronouncement remained largely on paper in the end.

Similarly, in 1954 the Mwami and the High Council issued a reform decree to coincide with the visit of another UN decolonisation mission. The decree was expected to abolish *ubuhake* ties and the distribution of cows held under it to former clients. But, again, nothing practical was done by way of its implementation, and peasant revolts against these exploitative tendencies continued to be reported in the Rwanda press (Newbury, 1988: 182-183). All these pronouncements seem to have indicated to the Hutu elites that unless they achieved political power, economic and social empowerment would remain a dream.

More attempts towards political reforms were, nevertheless, made in 1953 and 1956. In 1953, the local council elections which were wholly indirect were carried out. This indirect elections where the candidates were nominated by the chiefs and sub-chiefs inevitably left the Tutsi chiefs establishment unchanged.

In 1956, the general elections were no better in terms of addressing democratically the grievances on power to the majority. At the lowest administrative level, the principle was one man one vote; while at the higher council levels the candidates were nominated by the chiefs and the voting was done through electoral colleges. With this kind of arrangement, the lower levels became predominantly Hutu while the higher levels remained solely for the Tutsi. The message was clear to the Hutu elites. Reforms had failed; and to achieve political power required a fundamental change.

From the mid 1950s, political demands in Rwanda were formulated in ethnic terms. In March 1957, just shortly before the arrival of a UN Trusteeship visiting mission. The Bahutu Manifesto was published.

> In it, for the first time in the history of Rwanda, a group of nine Hutu intellectuals, all former seminarians, systematically challenged every conceivable feature of the feudal system. `The heart of the matter, they said lies in the political monopoly of one race, the Tutsi race, which, given the present structural framework, becomes a social and economic monopoly (Lemarchand, 1970: 149).

To remedy the situation they proposed a series of measures designed to achieve the integral and collective promotion of Hutu: `the abandonment of caste prejudice, the recognition of individual landed property, the creation of a rural credit bank (*Fonds de Credit Rural*) to promote agricultural activities, the codification of customs, the promotion of Hutu to public office, and the extension of educational opportunities to all levels of Hutu children.

The quick publication of the Hutu Manifesto was partly a reaction to the *Mwami's* High Council that was mainly Tutsi in composition. This council had prepared a statement in February on the prevailing situation in Rwanda with a view to seek a rapid transfer of power to the incumbent monarchical establishment.

Subsequently, in June 1957 Gregory Kayibanda, who had been the Editor in chief of the church – controlled newspaper, *Kinyamateka,* launched the *Movement Social Muhutu* (MSM), an all-Hutu cultural association, whose

objectives were similar to those contained in the manifesto. The association however, remained weak on the ground.

A number of factors have been given as to why the MSM remained weak. One of the reasons was the contradiction among the Hutu leadership. There were divergent opinions on the way forward. The main divergence related to these questions: Against whom should the campaign be directed? To all Tutsi without distinctions? Against the high aristocracy or against the specific abuses committed by certain representatives of the Tutsi establishment?

These contradictions produced moderates and extremists – a feature that has since continued to characterise the politics of Rwanda. The result was a split of the party. In November 1957 Joseph Gitera set up his own party known as the *Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse* (APROSOMA). This party shared with the MSM a deep commitment to the democratisation of Rwanda institutions. However, the APROSOMA sought to enlist the support of the people, regardless of their ethnic background. In the end, the APROSOMA only succeeded in areas around *Butare* but generally failed to achieve widespread following in the rest of country.

In all these activities, the Belgian authorities more or less kept behind the scenes, a gesture that was interpreted as an approval of the Tutsi political manouvers. Although the Hutu were not receiving official support at this time, the

publicity of the Manifesto in the local press provided an attractive menu for discussion on the hills of the kingdom.

4.5.4 The monarchist reaction and the Belgian response to subsequent events.

Time had come and the Belgian authorities could not remain on the fence because tension had emerged between the trusteeship authorities and the Tutsi elite. Similarly, the post World War II US domination of western Europe also translated itself into pressures exercised on European imperialist countries to bring political reforms in their respective colonies. The Belgians had to respond to a new international political economy and the internal contradictions within the colony.

By late 1958 the consensus among Belgian administrators was that a profound transformation was taking place, one that should be activated and controlled through appropriate institutional reforms and that the Belgian presence in Rwanda should be maintained for as long as the exigencies of the situation required.

It appears, however, that the change of heart was not solely from such external pressures. Rather, the internal conditions and particularly the behaviour of the Tutsi elites and the continued rise of the Hutu consciousness prompted the actions of the Belgian colonialists.

Indeed, in the 1940s and 1950s, the Tutsi, being more educated than the Hutu took the lead in challenging the colonial 'status quo' in the church and in the state. They were at the fore front of the anti colonial movement. For this they were seen as dangerous radicals with communist tendencies. To contain Tutsi militancy in church and in the state, the colonial and church authorities now shifted their sympathies and patronage from the Tutsi to the Hutu.

In reaction to this shift, the Tutsi oligarchy drew up a strategy calculated to evict the trusteeship authorities as quickly as possible in order to reassert their control over the destiny of their kingdom. In the process some liberal Tutsi chiefs came up with a strategy of social reforms to address Hutu grievances and to accommodate their aspirations. In response, the *Mwami* had Tutsi chiefs of this tendency transferred and pushed to the background.

On the other side, the Hutu continued attacking the monarchy in the local press. With the defeat of the moderate Tutsi chiefs, the ruling oligarchy responded in a much tougher manner than before in two public letters. Thus, Reyntejens (1994) recounts as follows:.

> In May 1958, a group of elderly Tutsi at the *Mwami's* court the so called *bagaragu bi'bwami bakuru*, the *Mwami's* clients – issued a statement in which they said that the ancestor of the *Banyiginya, Kigwa*, came to the throne by reducing the indigenous Hutu tribes to a state of servitude, and thus there could be no basis for brotherhood between Hutu and Tutsi. Since our king conquered the country and the Hutu and killed their petty kings, how can they claim to be our brothers?

In a second public letter issued on 12 June 1958, these Tutsi notables at the *Mwami's* court rejected the demand that *ibikingi*, the landed property held by Tutsi lords, be abolished. The Tutsi notables defended its continuation as the `custom of the country'. In short, the Hutu and their demands were considered as sectarian and divisive agitations and a threat to the national unity of Rwanda. Although this statement was not shared by the entire Tutsi group it intensified tension between the Tutsi and Hutu.

By this time the trusteeship authorities were still determined to introduce `democratic processes' by organising popular elections of one person one vote through the ballot box. On the other hand, the ruling oligarchy was determined to frustrate the process and to find means of achieving independence on its own terms. The maneuvers and counter maneuvers of all the actors – the Tutsi, the Hutu, the church and the Belgians came to surface after the death of the king and in the political parties which were formed thereafter.

4.6 Immediate causes of forced migration

4.6.1 The death of the king

The Rwanda social revolution was precipitated by the sudden death of the king. On 25 July 1959 *Mwami Mutara* died in mysterious circumstances. While in Bujumbura, the *Mwami* fell sick while watching a film. After being examined by his doctor who administered medication on him, an injection of antibiotics, the *mwami* died shortly after.

The official explanation from the trusteeship authorities was that he died of heart attack. The Tutsi did not believe the explanation and, in fact, suspected that he had been assassinated like *Rwagasore* of Burundi. The *Mwami* was expected to give an important statement about the independence of his kingdom in two days' time. To have died before his policy statement, raised more suspicion about the role of the Belgian authorities. Whatever the merits of this explanation, the death provided controversy and highted tension and suspicion in Rwanda.

The *Mwami* was buried on *Mwima* hill, the official burial site on 28 July 1959 in a tense atmosphere. Before the burial a new king was announced. A 21 year old young man, Jean Baptiste Ndahindurwa, was enthroned under the dynastic name of *Kigeri V.*

The immediate problem that confronted the king was to unite his subjects. Unfortunately, King *Kigeri* was too inexperienced to reconcile various social and political tendencies. There was a need to find an alternative formula of uniting the people of Rwanda in order to maintain the Tutsi legacy. Therefore, such a need became a very urgent one. Toward that end, and in this charged atmosphere the Union *Nationale Rwandaise* (UNAR) was formed on 5 August 1959 with a Hutu Francoise Rukeba as leader possibly to attract Hutu support. Inspite of its Hutu leader the UNAR was clear in its objective - namely to play the nationalist card to acquire legitimacy, and then to serve as an instrument of the Tutsi establishment.

4.6.2 The establishment of political organisations

As a first step to establish its legitimacy, UNAR organised a public rally at Kigali on 13 September 1959. An estimated crowd of 2000 people attended. Francoise Rukeba, the leader of the party, together with other leaders addressed the gathering. In his speech Francoise Rukeba outlined the significance of the monarchy, attacked colonialism, and pledged to fight for independence. In a highly emotional, rhetorical and oratorical manner he asserted: `To remake our country we need a single party, like UNAR, based on tradition and no other ideology. He who does not belong to this party will be regarded as the people's enemy', the *Mwami's* enemy, Rwanda's enemy' (*Nkundabagenzi,* 1961). Other speakers kept up the tempo, and issued similar provocative sentiments against the Hutu despite the fact that the party was supposed to unite all Rwandans. In fact, the rally was characterised by intolerance and extremism.

A second step was introduced on 16 September 1959. That was when the UNAR attempted to pre-empt the Hutu from forming a party of their own as was anticipated. In a circular the UNAR stated:

> Rwandese! children of Rwanda! subjects to *Kigeri,* rise up! Let us unite our strengths! Do not let the blood of Rwanda be spilled in vain. There are no Tutsi, Hutu, Twa. We are all brothers! We are all descendants of *Kinyarwanda* (Dorsey, 1994:76).

Yet a third step was initiated on the external or diplomatic front. It forged alliances with the nationalists of MNC-*Lumumba*, communist countries like China, and the UN Trusteeship Council. But these external alliances with militant nationalists else where were interpreted by the Belgians as attempts to drive Rwanda into Communism. The Belgians, therefore, took it as a confirmation of their earlier suspicions that the Tutsi elites were a dangerous group not to be entrusted with power at independence.

In response to the Kigali meeting which was characterised by intolerance and extremism of UNAR leaders, chief Bwanakweli, a moderate Tutsi, formed a new party on 14 September 1959. The party was called *Rassemblement De'mocratique Ruandais* (RADER). It's main objective was `to work towards the realisation of a social, economic, political and cultural order based on authentic democracy and harmony among the constituent groups of Rwanda. He wanted reforms but also to maintain ties with Belgium. But the party only gained sympathies among Tutsi students. As a Tutsi, Bwanakweli was suspected by the Hutu; and as a moderate progressive democrat, he was accused of being disloyal contempt to the *Mwami*. This means he was treated with suspicion by both the Hutu and Tutsi extremists who were not interested in sharing power or any democratic dispensation. Although he had significant support among university students, his combined call for internal reform of Tutsi power and a soft line against Belgian power was enough to brand RADER as a pro-Belgium puppet organisation among the Tutsi at large (Prunier, 1995:48).

Meanwhile, on the Hutu side of the political divide, a new political party was formed which widened the gap between Tutsi and Hutu. On 19 October 1959, Gregory Kayibanda converted the MSM into a new party called the *Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu* (PARMEHUTU). This party emerged as a militant organisation with considerable support from the Hutu population. Its main programme was to liberate the Hutu in all aspects of life, be it political, economical, social and cultural. Although UNAR tried to decampaign it as a church based `charity organisation', it gained popularity quickly, because it claimed to be Hutu and democratic. For the first time, a political organisation of the Hutu was put in place to champion the cause of the oppressed majority. Ethnicity was, thus, turned into an instrument of political action.

The Catholic Church gave its full backing to the PARMEHUTU and its spokespersons branded the UNAR a pro communist and pro Islamic party that had a plan to nationalise church-based schools. The church support was manifested in providing 'ghost writers' for the manifestos and UN petitions; and making external contacts for the Hutu party. Whereas the Belgians, the church and the state, first favoured the Tutsi in education, administration, priesthood and justified this discrimination using the racial ideology of Tutsi 'alieness' and superiority; when the Tutsi elite began to spearhead the nationalist struggle against Belgian power, the Belgians shifted their favours to Hutu and depicted the Tutsi as alien oppressors. It was clear now that the church had also

abandoned the Tutsi establishment in its quest to maintain privileges and inherit leadership from the colonial authorities.

Like the Tutsi, the Hutu elite were not homogeneous in their struggle for emancipation. Thus, as mentioned earlier, in November 1957 another party *Association pour la Promotion sociale de la Masse* (APROSOMA) was formed. It sought to enlist the support of the poor-Hutu as well as Tutsi in an attempt to unite the Hutu and Tutsi poor against Tutsi privilege. APROSOMA tried to present itself as a popular Rwanda nationalist party which could operate beyond the colonial racialisation of society - `Hutu indigenous', and `Tutsi alien'. But because society was very sharply divided along Hutu-Tutsi lines, APROSOMA ended up being mainly a Hutu party. Had the progressive objective of APROSOMA succeeded, the history of Rwanda might have been different.

By this time, the emergence of the PARMEHUTU had intensified the tensions. To make the bad situation worse, on 1 November 1959 a group of young UNAR militants attacked Dominique Mbonyumutwa, a Hutu sub-chief. The message went around that this popular chief had died of injuries sustained during the attack. In response a group of Hutu went to the compound of a local chief in Ndiza to express their disappointment. In the process a Tutsi sub-chief called Nkusi criticised PARMEHUTU and threatened to kill its leaders. The reaction of the mob was to chase Nkusi, seize him, and cut him into pieces.

This incident marked the beginning of violence which spread like a bush fire. By 6 November 1959, the territories of *Ruhengeri* and *Gisenyi* were on fire. Hutu against Tutsi and the next day more casualties were reported in the area of *Kibuye.* In response to the attacks, on 6 November, the UNAR leaders organised a series of raids against Hutu leaders. Some Hutu leaders were captured and taken to the *Mwami's* court where they were tortured and massacred. As violence continued, the *Mwami* called upon the Belgian Parliament and king to restore order, but instead Belgium declared a state of emergency and put Rwanda under the command of Colonel B.E.M. Guy Logiest.

Troops were mobilised from the Belgian Congo and order was restored temporarily. In the process of restoring order, Guy Logiest replaced Tutsi with Hutu chiefs, claiming that the Tutsi were disturbing public order. More than three hundred Hutu chiefs and sub chiefs replaced Tutsi incumbents who had been deposed, killed or had fled. Arrests were made and available records show that more Tutsi were apprehended than the Hutu. Even the trusteeship authorities had evidently taken sides. Although a UN visiting mission recorded 200 persons killed, many more were massacred during the violence (Mamdani, 2001:123). This is why the mission noted that `the number may be even higher since the people preferred to bury their dead (Lema, 1993). A lot of property, such as livestock, crops, and personal belongings, were destroyed on both sides of the ethnic divide.

With Hutu chiefs in place, and the Belgian authorities in support, the Hutu elite moved and organised the 'coup of *Gitarama*' and formed a provisional government. On 28 January 1961, the provisional government addressed 3,126 councilors and burgomasters about the need to reconsititute the Rwandan state. As a result the monarchy was abolished and a republic proclaimed. Then, sitting as a Constituent Assembly, the councilors and burgomasters elected a President of the Republic. Thereafter, the President called upon Gregoire Kayibanda as a Prime Minister to form a new government. The Hutu seizure of power would not have been easy without the support of the colonial authorities. They surrendered control over local government, openly supported the reorganisation of the central state, in short made what could have remained a peasant revolt into a real revolution.

4.7 The aftermath of the Crisis - Forced migration

A major consequence of the 1959 crisis was the uprooting of many people from their homes. Many people became internally displaced; while thousands fled to neighbouring countries. By 1963 approximately 130,000 Tutsi had left the country (Lemarchand, 1970: 172). The Hutu also fled but in considerably less numbers. The problem of refugees was further encouraged by the `interim appointment of Hutu chiefs and sub-chiefs who continued to harass the Tutsi that were suspected not to support the new administration.

As noted in the theoretical framework, the 1959 events took the form of a conflict in which the parties involved believed that their aspirations could not be achieved

simultaneously and purposefully. They, therefore, had to employ their power in an effort to defeat, neutralise or eliminate each other.

Similarly, the events of 1959 marked a fundamental shift of power. This was confirmed by the local elections held in June-July 1960 in which Tutsi dominated parties got only 16% of the votes. After elections, no less than 211 out of 229 burgomasters were now Hutu (Newbury, 1988). These events forced the *Mwami, Kigeri V,* to go into exile in 1960.

The transition from the trusteeship authorities to Hutu rule was finally accomplished through the parliamentary elections of 25 September 1961. The PARMEHUTU received as many as 78% of the votes, gaining 35 seats out of 44, while the UNAR received a mere 17% and seven seats. A referendum that followed shortly, thereafter, rejected the monarchy; and on 26 October 1961, Gregoire Kayibanda was elected by Parliament as the President of the republic. Subsequently, on 1 July 1962 Rwanda (and Burundi) gained formal independence as two separate sovereign states.

4.8 Summary

The 1959 social revolution was a protracted process which sowed seeds for the nature of politics and the problem of refugees for Rwanda as has been seen since that time. The roots of the problem of Banyarwanda refugees can be traced to both pre-colonial and colonial social forces that operated in Rwanda.

The pre-colonial traditional rivalry between the Tutsi and the Hutu that had been politicised during the reign of King Rwabugiri in the nineteenth century was bound to erupt. The traditional mechanisms of containing discontent would not have survived long, given the dynamics of political change that were taking place in the world at large at this conjuncture in history.

The injustices in Rwanda were consolidated and perpetuated by colonialism. Colonialism further consolidated Tutsi privileges and aggravated Hutu subordination through discriminatory policies in education, administration and access to land and other resources. In short, colonialism empowered the Tutsi elite and disempowered the Hutu.

After the Second World War and in the environment of decolonisation, the Hutu elite, taking advantage of the formal modern education introduced in Rwanda, slowly galvanised their grievances and created a Hutu political consciousness or awakening. As a blessing in disguise, the Tutsi elite in the1940s and the 1950s, being more educated than the Hutu, took the lead in challenging the colonial 'status quo' both in church and in the state and as such took the early lead in the anti colonial movement.

Perceived as dangerous radicals with communist tendencies, and with the Belgian authorities determined to neutralise their militancy; the colonial and church authorities shifted their sympathies and patronage from them to the Hutu.

To make matters worse, the political parties that emerged during this period of decolonisation practiced politics of extremism that plunged Rwanda into violence. The colonial power, instead of restoring order in a neutral manner, took side, thus helping to unleash more violence.

In fact, had it not been for the support of the Belgian authorities, the reorganisation of the central state and the coup at *Gitarama* might not have been successful. But the unfortunate reality is that this process of shift of power marked the beginning of the refugee problem in the Great Lakes region of Africa and sowed the seeds of future conflict and genocide as has been witnessed in the recent past.

CHAPTER 5

THE YEARS OF FRUSTRATION 1959-1971

5.0 Introduction

Between 1959 and 1971, Rwanda's neighbours inevitably became recipients and hosts to Rwandese refugees. Whereas earlier migrants were mainly Hutu, the post 1959 refugees were mainly Tutsi. But why did they move in large numbers? How did they move from Rwanda to Uganda? Where did they settle? How were they received? Did they make any attempts to return home? What other alternatives did they have to cope up with the new environment? These questions are very pertinent and the research findings show that the period 1959-1971 marked the beginning of trials, tribulations and frustrations as both events in Uganda and Rwanda bear testimony.

5.1 Dynamics and social structure of the migratory process

Not all social conflict situations generate refugees. In a particular conflict situation it is the interaction of subjective and objective factors i.e. the social psychological structures of the weak parties in the conflict and the available opportunities for the escape that determine the outcome (Bulcha, 1988:80). Indeed, some are forced to migrate while others remain, a situation that may result into death, repression or acceptance of the existing social order (Hansen, 1982; Boesch, 1982, Zolberg and Suhrke, 1984). There are various categories

of forced migration and the causes have already been identified in the introductory chapter.

However, Bulcha (1988) identifies five categories of refugees. Following him, this section locates in which category the subjects of the study fall and how that categorisation determined their flight dynamics, particularly, the decision to flee their habitual residences, accessibility to international borders, and socio-psychological problems.

There are, to start with, the revolutionary activists. These are men and women who have the conviction and `purpose' to overthrow an existing regime. While in exile most of their energy and time is spent on the preparation for the changes to be brought at home and very little effort, if any, is made to integrate socially and culturally into the host society.

Then, there are the coup makers and targets of coups de'tat. This group consists of those who flee because of their involvement in coups or revolutions. The coup or revolution may have been abortive or successful. In the former event the coup makers, or the would be revolutionaries must flee. In the latter event, people identified with the fallen government are likely to become exiles.

The other category are the opponents of change. These are persons who leave their homes because they are not prepared to accept political conditions and changes that have occurred due to a revolution.

We also have the oppressed minorities. This is a category of refugees consisting of racial and religious minorities pushed out by the members of the majority in the country of origin.

Lastly, the displaced masses consists of the majority of people in flight. These are people who are uprooted and displaced by the generalised insecurity produced by conflicts although they are not partners in it or may not be its direct targets.

The flight of displaced persons in most cases is acute, often in panic and of mass proportions. In this kind of refugee movement the 'push' factors are concentrated and overwhelming (Kunz, 1973). But the masses affected are not prepared for the flight and encounter several obstacles and hazards on their way to the country of asylum.

The Banyarwanda refugees who moved from Rwanda between 1959 and 1973, and their descendants, mainly fall in category one and five. Category one involves the sons and daughters of the refugees who fled in 1959 and 1960s.

This is a group that formed the core of the Rwandese Patriotic Front. The rest are the displaced masses – men, women and children.

Given the fact that the majority were the displaced masses, they did not have the time to plan and assess the implications of their flight. From the findings through interviews, as shown on the next pages, the most important consideration at that time was survival. Many people were being killed and as the Belgian helicopter gunship purportedly to restore order moved around, the panic of the people increased. This was amidst destruction of property, huts were burnt down, crops destroyed and animals shot.

If any decision was made to flee, it was at the household level. This is why Maslow's hierarchy of needs (1954) becomes very important in understanding this particular flight dynamics.

Kibreab (1985), cited in Bulcha to whom we have already alluded, has argued that `the propensity of people to respond to a situation which they perceive to be dangerous by resorting to flight is higher among pastoral communities than among communities with a long history of being sedentary. His conclusion is based on refugees originating from Eritrea living in eastern Sudan. It is true that the majority of the Banyarwanda refugees who fled between 1959 – 1973 were Tutsi and pastoralists, but even agriculturalists followed and fled along with them. The history of Rwanda has shown that during the genocide of 1994 and that as RPF closed in on Kigali, Ruhengeri and Gisenyi, many Hutu agriculturalists fled

to Zaire. This means that the occupation of the people does not matter all that much really. If there is a danger, priority is given to save one's life. And this is what all Banyarwanda people, have done at the different cycles of violence that have confronted them over the years. The following more or less 'verbatim' testimonies during the interviews bear evidence to this submission:

I. I was born at *Nshonga* village in Rwanda near the Uganda border of Kamwezi, Kabale district. I am 60 years old. I came to Uganda with my family in 1959. We were fleeing from the Hutu chiefs who were killing people and looting our property (interview with *Elizabeth Mukankubana).*

II. I came to Uganda in 1966 and joined this settlement Nakivale. I am 70 years old. I was running away from war. We had cattle but most of the animals were stolen by the government officials who were chasing us (*interview with Catherine, Mukakariisa).*

These experiences were not limited to the Tutsi refugees of the 1960s. Even the Hutu refugees who now live alongside the Tutsi, who never repatriated, faced similar circumstances as witnesses recollect the horrors of genocide in 1994.

I. We were residents of Rwanda in 1994 and we came from *Muhura* Commune, Byumba Prefecture; and some of us came from *Murambi* Commune, Mutara Prefecture; and *Gikomero* Commune, Kigali Prefecture.
We fled Rwanda because of war and took refuge in Tanzania. In 1996 the authorities in Tanzania, together with authorities in Rwanda tried to force us to go back home. We felt that Rwanda was not yet safe and we decided to come to Uganda. The journey to Uganda was 'hell'. We suffered from hunger and starvation. We were mistreated by the 'sung sung' (local defence units in Tanzania) who raped women and stole our money and property acquired in Tanzania (*focus group discussion in Michinga zone, Orukinga Refugee Settlement).*

II. We came from Ngarama Commune, Byumba prefecture. When the killings started we felt insecure and we had to run for safety. We moved for 3-4 days up to *Rwembogo* Catholic church in Uganda. Our journey from Rwanda to Uganda was full of hardships. Some of our

> relatives and neighbours drowned in Kagera river and river omuvumba on the border with Tanzania and Uganda respectively. We were hit by rains and starved for days on the road. We were received by the YMCA group which gave us food and water until the Red Cross came and transported us to here in Orukinga settlement six months after our arrival (*Focus group discussion, Kazinga Zone, Orukinga refugee settlement*).

Another important factor in flight dynamics is accessibility to international borders. Distance from the border areas also determines the rate of refugee flow from a given area. Revenstein (cited in Bulcha, 1988:135) has proposed that the volume of migration is inversely proportional to the distance between the points of origin and destination.

In the cases of the refugee exoduses the occurrence of intervening obstacles in the form of hardships, illness and the danger of being detected by the security force increases with the geographical distance. The relationship between distance and volume of migration is reflected in the pattern of movement and settlement of the majority of African refugees.

Rural refugees tend to move only far enough to escape detection or the jurisdiction of the home authorities. Once they cross into the host country they tend to settle at the first point of safety in border areas (Bulcha, 1988:137). Refugees prefer border areas because they hope that conditions may improve so that they can return home quickly. This is true and applies also to the Banyarwanda, who fled and came to Uganda between 1959 and 1973; and between 1990 and 1994.

In Uganda, they settled mostly in Ankole and Kigezi and later in Toro, Bunyoro and Buganda; in Tanzania, it was in the Kagera region; in the Congo, North and South Kivu were generally preferred; and in Burundi in Mushisha, Kyankuzo province near the border of southern Rwanda. Even when the authorities established refugee settlements, it was first in those border areas that refugees were settled and some of them resisted transfer as was the case in Uganda. In his memorandum to his minister, in 1961, the Acting Permanent Secretary observed that: 'the major factor in refugees wishing to stay in Ankole is not the well being of their cattle, but the hope that they will be able to return to Rwanda' (SD/C. 141/1/4 Document viii).

Refugees are never free from socio-psychological problems during the flight. The long flight journeys cause physical exhaustion, malnutrition and refugees become vulnerable to infectious diseases like measles in children, cholera, typhoid, malaria etc. The Banyarwanda refugees suffered these hazards during the flight from Rwanda to Uganda (interview with the Tutsi refugees in Nakivale, 12 September 2001).

5.2 The first Hutu republic and the exile politics of the Tutsi

The years between 1959 and 1964 could have provided an opportunity for a new approach within Rwandan politics that might have ended in a positive direction for the parties involved, if the contradictions both inside and outside Rwanda had not turned the period into one of wasted opportunities.

Kayibanda, the leader of the PARMEHUTU and, therefore, the leader of the revolution called for Hutu power and for the exclusion of the Tutsi from political life. He proposed the separation of the Hutu and the Tutsi into separate zones. He compared Rwanda to `two nations in a single state'. He noted that Rwanda was `two nations between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy, who are as ignorant of each other's habits, thoughts and feelings as if they were dwellers of different zones or inhabitants of different planets (Lemarchand, 1970: 169). This exclusionist ideology became the leading tendency for the Hutu while in power. As Mamdani (2001:126) put it:

> The thread that unites both expressions of Hutu power, the informal and the formal, is an overriding conviction that the Rwandan nation is Hutu and, therefore, power in an independent Rwanda must also be Hutu. Tutsi may live in Rwanda , but only as a resident alien minority, at sufferance of the Hutu nation'.

It was not all Hutu that supported Kayibanda's leadership style of exclusion. There were those who believed that Hutu and Tutsi could be part of the new Rwanda as one community. But, as we shall show later, the exclusionists took the day. Outside Rwanda, the Tutsi elite in exile started preparing an armed return to Rwanda. The '*Inyenzi*', or cockroaches, as they were called, started to infiltrate border areas in small groups. The *Inyenzi* were small armed guerilla groups which carried armed incursions to border areas in Rwanda and later to the interior. The leadership of *Inyenzi* came from the Tutsi elite who themselves opposed any compromise with the Hutu establishment. The individual leaders are not known because they are not recorded anywhere in the history literature of

Rwanda. However, their main objective was to fight their way back home, and to restore an order in which the Tutsi elites would be in charge of the affairs of an independent Rwanda.

To achieve their objective, the *Inyenzi* employed two main tactics. First, they identified the Hutu officials as their target and enemies. The Hutu chiefs were believed to be the backbone of the new Hutu leadership and power. During the colonial period, the Tutsi chiefs at the local level were the symbol of Tutsi power and even at the apex of the colonial structures, the Tutsi were clearly working hand in hand with the colonial authorities. The *Inyenzi* targeted the local Hutu chiefs because these chiefs were agents of the new Hutu regime. The *Inyenzi* strategy was to disorganise this Hutu power base in order to enable the Tutsi to regain control of Rwanda.

Furthermore, the Hutu chiefs were targeted because they were principle actors in the process of destruction and distribution of the Tutsi property during the 1959 revolution.

The second tactic used by the *Inyenzi* was to target the local Tutsi population both in Rwanda and Uganda as possible allies. This move did not go down well with Ugandan authorities. Thus, in the `Notes for Minister of Internal Affairs for discussion on Rwanda Refugees on Tuesday, 29 May 1962, prepared in reaction to the suggestions of the Cabinet Committee on refugees in relation to the

distance of location of refugees from the border, the following arguments were given in favour of five miles as against one mile:

> While *Batutsi* remain just inside Uganda, they will always be in sight of *Bahutu* in Rwanda and the *Bahutu* can be expected to try to attack them in retaliation for any incidents which may take place in Rwanda itself. The pattern of these raids has invariably been that *Bahutu* are attacked and sometimes killed. They then take the first opportunity of attacking any *Batusi* who remain in Rwanda and they have not stopped crossing the Uganda border in order to attack *Batutsi* who have already fled to Uganda.
>
> Batutsi in Uganda near the border will provide moral and sometimes material support to members of the *Inyenzi* organisation who wish to create trouble in Rwanda itself. Special Branch is entirely satisfied that members of *Inyenz*i organisation are living in Uganda (Document XXI).

What is clear from this observation is that some Tutsi elite in exile defined politics in the new terms of armed rebellion. However, there were other sections of the Tutsi elite who did not share the extremist view of exclusion. Earlier, the UN had, as we have already seen above, initiated parliamentary elections in September 1961 in which PARMEHUTU gained an overwhelming majority. When the new Parliament elected Kayibanda Gregoire as President, UNAR abstained from the vote. But, Kayibanda appointed members of the opposition to his government. After the New York Accord of February 1962, one accommodationist faction of UNAR, led by Michel Rwagasana accepted to join the government in the form of a coalition. Lemarchand (1970:203) clearly brings out Rwagasana's commitment to the politics of accommodation and partnership:

> Our party can assure you that it will spare no effort in working for the achievement of a genuine understanding between the majority and the opposition, which by virtue of its entry into the government, can no longer be considered an opposition, but rather a partner.

This statement was taken seriously only in a period of honey moon. From May 1962 to November 1963, the *Inyenzi* raids had not inflicted much damage to the extent of threatening the Kayibanda regime. In any case the possibility of the *Inyenzi* to hide within Tutsi population on the Ugandan border had been checked by August 1962. This is evidenced by the report written for the Director of Refugees to the Principal Medical Officer, Ministry of Health after the visit of the Minister of Health to the Orukinga valley.

The Principal Medical Officer noted that:

> The refugees have a patriotic but frequently a sentimental feeling that they will be going back within two months. Whether they go back or not is not a direct concern of this Ministry but the Ministry has certain suggestions which we think can remedy the situation. The demotion of Lake Nakivale Holding camp by allowing cattle owners to drift into the interior, look for jobs, work and start life as their predecessors have done. Here again they should move into small groups. The reason for moving in small groups is that big groups tend to scare local government (Document XXIII, Ministry of Community Development).

These suggestions were accepted by the Director of Refugees in his letter to the Chief Medical Officer on 25 August 1962. He wrote:

> Thank you very much for your memorandum referenced above. We are most concerned that refugees should become self supporting in the quickest possible time and that the government of Uganda should disengage itself from relief activities..... As you will see, we are in complete accord with your suggestion of disengagement from refugees at the earliest possible moment and are endeavouring to obtain this objective as speedily as possible (Document XXIV, Ministry of Community Development).

From 1962 onwards some refugees just moved into the interior of Ankole and settled as we shall discuss in relation to the process of integration in the next

chapter. But what is important for us here is that the *Inyenzi* which had taken the advantage of the refugees on the border and sometimes posed as cattle owners were denied this fall back position. Furthermore, the UPC government led by A.M. Obote, a republican, which succeeded the colonial authorities in Uganda was not eager to identify with the monarchists and activists who had lost the 'opportunity' to take over from the Belgians. They could only be accepted as refugees as recognised by the International legal instruments. Subsequently, even at the regional level the OAU Charter in its article III came to condemn state interference in the internal affairs of another. Uganda thus acquired an additional excuse not to support the *Inyenzi* because of this principle.

As a result, the *Inyenzi* became more aggressive in the interior of Rwanda. Earlier incursions in 1962 led to 1000 - 2000 Tutsi men, women and children massacred and buried on the spot, their huts burnt and pillaged and their property divided among the Hutu population (Mamdani 2001:129). This was confirmed by one respondent who preferred anonymity in the following terms:

> I lost cattle, my hut was burnt and I had no choice but to flee.

The most fierce raids of the *Inyenzi* took place in November and December 1963. This raid popularly known as the 'Bugesera' invasion reached nearly twenty miles outside Kigali. As the *Inyenzi* intensified their raids, the coalition spirit collapsed and the Hutu leadership responded by harsher repressive measures upon the Tutsi population. To the Hutu the best response was to kill the Tutsi – the

collaborators in the homeland. The estimates of those who were killed in 1963 vary but Mamdani (2001:130) summarises it all:

> The figures vary widely, depending not only on the source but also on the time of writing. Before the 1990 civil war, estimates of the number killed had ranged from 750 to 5000. The government officially estimated killings at around 750, but no other source believed it. Africa Contemporary Record reported un-official estimates nearer 5000. After the 1994 genocide, estimates tended to be much higher ranging between 10,000 and 20,000..... Catherine and David Newbury estimated that between 10,000 and 14,000 people were killed in the first few years after decolonisation. Human Rights Watch put the figures as many as 20,000.

As people were killed, others ran to safety and became refugees. It is estimated that some 35,000 refugees with 15,000 head of cattle were received in Uganda from Rwanda up to the end of 1963 (Jacobs, B. L., 1965:49) One of the respondents during the research remarked:

> Many Tutsi were running away from death and that is how my parents came to Uganda' (*interview with Ruzibiza William – Nakivale Refugee Settlement).*

Apart from well directed massacres of the Tutsi population, the Hutu leadership went a step further and arrested twenty leading Tutsi personalities and executed them in the town of Ruhengeri in northern Rwanda. Among these was Rwagasana who had responded positively to the politics of accommodation as narrated above, and the President of RADER, Chief Bwanakweri. By killing the Tutsi leadership in Rwanda, the entire Tutsi population within Rwanda was subdued, cowed and frustrated. Similarly, by re-locating the Tutsi refugees from the border to the refugee settlements, while others mingled in the Ugandan population to build new lives, the Tutsi's dream of returning to Rwanda was soon

shattered, they too became frustrated. On the other hand, the Tutsi elite in exile, who never envisaged any compromise, strengthened their view by pointing to the example of those who returned to Rwanda but never lived to tell their story. They vowed to fight on. It is this spirit of some of the Tutsi elite of 'we shall fight on', and the spirit of some Hutus 'we shall kill them if they return' that constituted the seeds of the genocide that was to take place in future.

5.3 Banyarwanda immigrants and refugees in politics of Uganda

By 1959 when the Banyarwanda refugees, mainly Tutsi, arrived in Uganda, the anti colonial movement had taken shape. Political parties had already been formed and different groups in Ankole had joined different political parties to further their interests. Joining a political party was done not only along the lines of ethnicity but also along those of religion and proximity to the monarchy in Ankole. By and large the Bairu Protestants joined the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC), while the Bairu Catholics and the Bahima joined the Democratic Party (DP). One could have expected the Bahima protestants to join the UPC, but they did not. This is because, their opponents the Bairu Protestants, who had taken over the District and other lower councils, were in the UPC and, therefore, the Bahima had no choice but to join the D.P.

When the Rwandese refugees entered Ankole, and given the fact that the politics of Ankole were more or less a reflection of those of Rwanda (with the ruling clan of the Bahima being a close ally of the colonial authorities), the Bahima saw the

Tutsi refugees as potential allies. As it happened, the alliance was possible because of similarity of interests (monarchical leadership), similarity of fears, and close social ties especially through inter-marriage.

It is important to note that the majority of Banyarwanda refugees and non refugees; whether Hutu or Tutsi were Roman Catholics. But the Tutsi whether Catholic or Protestant were on the same side as Bahima for the reasons articulated above. There could have been exceptions, but these were very few indeed.

As for the Hutu, they were divided along religious lines as their Bairu counterparts, with Catholics joining DP and Protestants joining UPC. Therefore, the configuration of forces were such that the majority of the Banyarwanda ethnic group (refugees and non refugees) were opposed to the UPC, a party that succeeded the retreating colonial power, with A.M. Obote as its leader.

With Obote and the UPC in leadership, the alliance of the Banyarwanda and the opposition forces became a matter of concern to the ruling party. Popularly known for its anti-Banyarwanda sentiment, the UPC cultivated this attitude within the ranks of its 'trusted' functionaries to harass the Banyarwanda that had joined the `wrong side of politics' – the opposition.

In fact, Jason Clay (1984) in his report for the American Organisation, Cultural Survival, records that Banyarwanda support for the DP became so pronounced

that by 1969 President A.M. Obote was apparently planning a survey with the view to excluding them from the political process as non citizens and eventually expelling them from Uganda altogether.

One of the respondents during the research and who had served in the UPC government of 1962-1971 (but must for obvious reasons remain anonymous) had this to say on the above view:

> The Banyarwanda people are not trustworthy. You give them land, food, water and education and yet they support your opponents. Obote was right to find out how many they were in order to find an appropriate solution to them and rid the country of the problem once and for all (*interview, in Mbarara*).

Subsequently, after Amin's coup, the anti-Obote sentiments of the Banyarwanda and those of the new military government converged. Amin was searching for legitimacy; and, as a strategy, he encouraged various minorities to join him in order to expand his political base. Given, the hatred and fears the Banyarwanda had for Obote, some of the Banyarwanda joined Amin's secret or intelligence agencies both as an opportunity for employment and as a celebration of the removal of Obote from the political scene in Uganda.

Since, fundamentally, Amin had no problems with the Banyarwanda and now that they were allies, he invited King Kigeri to Uganda as a sign of solidarity. This was the time when many Banyarwanda moved out of the settlements and acquired land in Ankole, Rakai, Masaka and Toro as explained in the next chapter.

5.4 Summary

From the early 1960s, the Tutsi refugees or at least the activists dreamt of returning home. However, in the 1960s the international environment and the specific conditions in Uganda were not conducive to the empowerment of the refugees for the realisation of their dream. Republican Obote was not sympathetic to the Tutsi activists with their largely monarchical bias. Therefore, the *Inyenzi* guerillas in Uganda were not permitted to be active; and neither did the Ugandan government wish at that point in time to interfere in the internal affairs of Rwanda since this would have been contrary to the OAU charter to which Uganda subscribed.

Similarly, at the local level in Ankole, where most of the refugees settled, the population was more sympathetic to the Hutu cause since the politics of Rwanda more or less resembled that of Ankole in which Bairu were pitted against the Bahima, who were more closely affiliated with the Tutsi refugees who had now entered Uganda from Rwanda. Like the Ankole Bahima, these had been traditionally dominant politically, socially and economically back home.

To make matters worse, with the passage of time, the Banyarwanda both Tutsi and Catholic Hutu were seen as allies of the opposition forces in Uganda namely, the Bahima, the monarchists, and the DP with which they tended to identify themselves as this study has already amply shown.

Accordingly, given this hostile environment of the 1960s, the refugees had to lie low, rebuild their lives, acquire some property, mainly land and cattle; and educate their children and establish social networks through either marriage and friendships as articulated in the next chapter.

When Amin came to power, the political fortunes of the Banyarwanda refugees appeared to change for the better. For one thing the Banyarwanda welcomed the fall of Obote, a man whom they had accused not only of blocking their quest for return, but who was also deliberately blocking their social and political advancement in Uganda. On his part, Amin was eager to cultivate the support of all anti Obote forces in Uganda in order to consolidate his power and enhance his legitimacy. Amin's invitation of King Kigeri to settle in Uganda was also viewed as a sign of a much-desired appreciation of the plight of the Rwandese which some of these refugees hoped could translate itself into assistance by the regime to facilitate their return home one day. However, whatever good will was now extended by the new regime came in the years after the period covered in this chapter, a period which for the refugees consisted, indeed, of years of frustration as the title of this chapter aptly tells us.

CHAPTER 6

INTERACTION AND INTEGRATION OF BANYARWANDA REFUGEES IN UGANDA

6.0 Introduction

How, one might well ask, did the Banyarwanda refugees, despite the initial obstacles came to attain meaningful levels of integration among the local communities in Uganda? This was possible partly because the refugees had social, cultural and demographic characteristics similar to those of the indigenous population in these communities. The similarities, coupled with hard work, gradually enabled the Banyarwanda refugees to attain not only such meaningful levels of integration, but also to develop some forms of political and military organisations that facilitated the process of their empowerment.

6.1 The concept of integration

It is convenient to begin the treatment with a clarification of the notion of integration. What does it really mean? The concept integration of refugees or any other social group for that matter has different meanings. It may also have different scholarly interpretations. Bulcha (1988:84), thus observes: `that there is controversy among sociologists regarding the use of the concepts of assimilation and integration in the analysis of immigrant experiences and relations with their new social environment'.

The related concept of assimilation, has been defined by some scholars as `a process of change during which the immigrant seeks to identify himself in various respects with members of the host group and becomes less distinguishable from them. Both external and subjective assimilation form the components of the process. One without the other is partial assimilation.

But the notion of integration is preferred because of its adjustment implications to both immigrant and non-immigrant. Thus, Borrie (1959: 91) argues that the concept of assimilation has a physiological implication since it suggests the disappearance of the immigrant's separate origin in the process. Hence when used in a social context it is somewhat analogous to the physiological process whereby nutrients are assimilated into the system of a living organism.

Similarly, assimilation is criticised by William Bernard (1973:87). He argues that:

> ...`assimilation' besides its misleading biological connotation, implies a one-way street in group relations. It suggests that the new comer is divested of his old culture completely and is virtually remoulded in everything from clothes to ideology. It denies or ignores the many gifts brought by the immigrant to his new home and the impact of his ideas, his talents, his hopes upon the community that has admitted him.

Accordingly, in support of integration, which denotes the process of immigrant adjustment in a new environment and the relations that obtain between immigrant and non-immigrant groups at the various levels of social organisation, integration is conceptualised by (Bernard, 1973: 87) as follows:

> Integration is achieved when migrants become a working part of their adopted society, take on many of its attitudes and behaviour patterns and

> participate freely in its activities, but at the same time retain a measure of their original cultural identity and ethnicity.

In the Ugandan context few studies have been carried out on the process of integration of refugees. Among these are: Harrel Bond (1987); Barongo, (1988); and Kabera, (1990). Kabera in his paper entitled 'Prospects for Integrating Refugees in Uganda: The Case of Banyarwanda' uses the term integration to mean complete absorption of the refugees by the asylum country through the legal process of naturalisation. Integration in this case implies a process of complete absorption and assimilation by the host country of people who formerly had refugee status and their acquisition of a new national identity. This position as already discussed is problematic and is hereby rejected.

On the other hand, Barongo observes that:

> Uganda, for one, has persistently maintained an official policy which believes that the refugee problem is a temporary phenomenon. Those forced to live in the country as refugees, it has been assumed, would sooner or later return to their own countries once the conditions that made them to flee their home lands no longer existed (Barongo, 1998: 123)

Similarly, for Harrel Bond (1986:7) integration denotes a situation in which host and refugee communities are able to exist, sharing the same resources both economic and social – with no greater mutual conflict than that which exists within the host community.

In my analysis of the experience of the Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda, I shall adhere to the notion of integration implied in Bernard, in Harrel-Bond, and in

Barongo where parties involved must co-exist, recognise and accommodate differences in culture, beliefs and language for any meaningful levels of integration to be achieved. In other-words, integration implies that a person is accepted in the local community and he/she accepts their values without loosing his/her identity, although some measure of conflict as is usual in all human life is not at all excluded.

6.2 Categories of Banyarwanda in Uganda

There are four broad categories of Banyarwanda in modern Uganda. The first category consists of Banyarwanda whose parents and grand parents were inside what became Uganda after the colonial boundaries were created. These people inhabit the district of Kisoro at the extreme south western tip of Uganda. During the constitution making process in Uganda in 1994-95, their representatives rejected the label Banyarwanda and were recorded as Bafumbira in the Third schedule that recognises the indigenous communities of Uganda as at 1 February 1926 (The Constitution of Republic of Uganda, 1995). But there are those found in the southern counties of Bukanga and Isingiro in Mbarara district; in the counties of Ruhama and Rushenyi (particularly Ngoma subcounty) in Ntungamo district who have no problems with being referred to as Banyarwanda Ugandan citizens after the promulgation of the 1995 Ugandan Constitution (Third Schedule, 1995: 113).

The second category consists of economic migrants to Uganda, mostly of the Hutu ethnic group, who came to the country in the 1920s, due to `push' and `pull' factors that prevailed at the time in Rwanda and Uganda, respectively. Some Tutsi also came to work as cattle keepers for the Baganda in the south and for others in northern and eastern Uganda. As noted earlier, the Tutsi in Rwanda occupied a privileged position that enabled them more access to western education and technology than the Hutu. From the 1920s and under this power imbalance the Belgian administration imposed food cultivation, anti-erosion measures, the use of manure, afforestation and other steps thought necessary to save the people from famine and other hardships (Richards 1973). Much of this involved the use of force; and it was the Hutu who were compelled to do such forced labour. These measures forced a number of Rwandan Hutu to migrate to Uganda and to settle in the countryside.

Powesland (1955:30) writes:

> The two chief motives for the immigration were, at that time, to obtain money for payment of taxes, dowry and to escape the unpaid labour which the inhabitants were obliged to undertake on road construction and maintenance and other government work of various kinds.

The `pull' factor was further strengthened by the conditions that existed in Buganda between 1870 and 1920. In this period, Buganda experienced a sharp decline in population due to war and diseases (Mamdani, 1996). And yet, the British were in the process of introducing cash crops, particularly cotton and coffee which required considerable labour input. To remedy the situation, the

British encouraged migrant labour from Rwanda-Urundi as the region in which Rwanda found itself was called at the time.

Generally, the Banyarwanda immigrants settled and integrated in Ankole and Buganda although some used to return to Rwanda annually. But those Banyarwanda who went to north eastern Uganda did not integrate with the local communities. As herders, they led separate lives revolving around cattle herding while their masters lived in villages.

There are also those Banyarwanda who escaped the skirmishes of the conflict between the Belgian colonialists and the anti-colonial Nyabingi religious movement at the beginning of the twentieth century. This third category integrated among the Bakiga in what used to be called Kigezi (Murindwa-Rutanga, 1991).

The fourth category are the refugees who arrived after the 'social revolution' in Rwanda in 1959 as explained in Chapter Four. The exact numbers of refugees under this category have been a subject of debate and manipulation of different interest groups for propaganda purposes, especially after the RPF attack on Rwanda on 1 October 1990. But the truth of the matter is that Banyarwanda left their country during a number of successive episodes, mostly in 1959 – 1961, 1963 – 1964 and 1973 before and after the establishment of the second republic in Rwanda. It is important to emphasise that there is no consensus about the

number of refugees who fled to Uganda from Rwanda. For example, *Africa Contemporary Record* reported in 1986-87 that UNHCR recognised 30,000 Rwandan refugees in Uganda. *Africa South of the Sahara* reported in 1988 that:

> In 1986 the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that there were about 110,000 registered Rwanda refugees living in Uganda, while an even greater number of refugees were believed to have settled in Uganda without registering with the UNHCR'.

The official Government of Uganda records in the Ministry that housed the portfolio for refugees at the time put a number of 36,825 in the settlement and 35,260 outside the settlements by 31 December 1971 as illustrated in the table 6.3 below.

Table 6.1: Numbers of refugees living in settlements in Uganda as of 31 December, 1971.

Group of Refugees/Area of Settlement	Situation as at 31.12.1970	Net increase/ Decrease	Situation as of 31/12/1971
A. IN SETTLEMENTS			
Rwandese			
(a) Orukinga	4,860	+130	4,990
(b) Nakivale	8,500	+220	8,720
(c) Kahunge	9,300	Nil	9,300
(d) Ibuga	80	+85	165
(e) Rwamwanja	2,700	+200	2,900
(f) South Kyaka	1,750	+50	1800
(g) Kyangwali	8,880	+70	8,950
Sub-Total	36,070	+755	36,825
Sudanese			
(a) Nakapiripirit	9,150	+11,200	20,350
(b) Onigo	5,620	+2,180	7,800
(c) Agago/Acholipii	7,290	+1,355	8,645
(d) Ibuga	1,480	+40	1,520
Sub-Total	23,540	+4,775	28,315
Zairians			
(a) Agago/Acholipii	710	-110	600
(b) Nakapiripirit	20	NIL	20
Sub-Total	730	110	620
Grand Total	60,340	5,640	65,760

Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs, Annual Report 1971

Table 6.2: Numbers of refugees living in Uganda outside settlements as of December, 1971.

Group of Refugees/Area of Settlement	Situation as at 31.12.1970	Net increase/ Decrease	Situation as of 31/12/1971
B. OUTSIDE SETTLEMENTS			
1. Rwandese	35,930	-670	35,260
2. Sudanese	50,160	-1010	49,600
3. Zairians	33,000	Nil	33,000
TOTAL	119,540	-1680	117,860

Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs, Annual Report 1971.

Table 6.3: Grand Totals of refugees in Uganda as of 31 December 1971

	In settlements		Outside settlements	
	By 31.12.1970	By 31.12.1971	By 31.12.1970	By 31.12.1971
1. Rwandese	36,070	36,825	35,930	35,260
2. Sudanese	23,540	28,315	50,610	49,600
3. Zairians	730	620	33,000	33,000
Total	60,340	65,760	119,540	117,860

Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs, Annual Report, 1971.

Table 6.4: Nakivale refugee settlement Annual Report, 1969

Year	Population
1965	7,150
1966	8,000
1967	8,100
1968	8,232
1969	8,404

Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs, Annual Report 1969

As may be seen from Tables 6.1 – 6.4, the number of the Banyarwanda refugees kept increasing annually due to both natural increases and more inflows. The inflows were because of the internal dynamics of conflict in Rwanda. As the *Inyenzi* continued to make attempts to return to Rwanda, so were the repression of the Hutu extremists towards the ordinary Tutsi in Rwanda. As a result more Tutsi fled from Rwanda to Uganda and other neighbouring countries.

As for integration, the tables do show that those in settlements were more or less the same number as those outside the settlements. There were also refugees who were outside the settlements and were not recorded. Therefore, the presence of the refugees in south western Uganda plus the Banyarwanda ethnic group that lived there before the 1959 events, provided an environment for others who subsequently sought sanctuary in the years that followed. This was consistent with the views of some of the Uganda government officials of `advising refugees in Orukinga valley to drift into the interior, look for jobs, work and start life as their predecessors had done' (Document XXIII, Ministry of Health, Entebbe, 1962).

It is the fourth category of Bayarwanda, who are, indeed, refugees in all the senses involved in the various international legal instruments relating to refugees who are the main subjects of the study. This does not suggest that I sideline other categories; rather, I recognise the significance of the immigrants in integrating some of the refugees into Ugandan society. It is this relationship as I

shall explain shortly, that partly enhanced in some areas of Uganda, the prospects for empowerment of Banyarwanda refugees.

6.3 The socio-economic structure and culture of south western Uganda

To understand the dynamics of integration, it is important to examine briefly the set up of south western Uganda in which Banyarwanda refugees settled. Before the advent of colonial rule, a number of kingdoms had developed as part of the process of state formation in the interlacustrine region. Among these were Bunyoro, Buganda, Toro and Nkore (later named Ankole after the amalgamation with Nkore of such smaller kingdoms as those of Igara, Buhweju, and the principalities of Mpororo with the help of colonial rulers).

The emergence and development of these states is outside the scope of this study. However, what is important and relevant to us, is the presence of various socio-economic and cultural characteristics and activities in these areas of present day Uganda and Rwanda.

For instance, one finds both agriculturalists and pastoralists whose main forms of livelihood were subsistence farming and pastoralism, respectively. Two categories of people interacted both in times of war and peace. They fought and conquered each other. They exchanged commodities (barter) for consumption and weapons for hunting and war. Therefore, one can safely submit that long before 1959 the people of Rwanda (both Hutu and Tutsi) had long

historical/cultural ties with their neighbours in south western Uganda through war, intermarriage, migration and trade.

Their social, religious, economic and political structure were similar. The border communities had relatives on either side. The refugees did not, therefore, enter an alien environment when they crossed the border into Uganda.

Inspite of the above submission, and whereas some refugees joined relatives immediately, others were taken to refugee settlements by the government of Uganda. Those refugees in the settlements initially found difficulties to cope up with the environment and even to seek integration strategies. What, then, were the inhibiting factors?

When this question was put to some of the respondents that had lived very close to the refugees, the following evidence was recorded to explain the factors that initially inhibited integration:

I. Banyarwanda refugees had a language barrier. The old refugees had problems to learn the local language compared to the young. Some of the refugees in the settlements especially the Tutsi felt more comfortable in isolation. *(Interview with Charles Ndahagire in Mbarara)*

II. Some refugees were lazy. They did not want to join us in cultivation. They wanted to live a `nobility life', perhaps some of them were chiefs in Rwanda. Some were contented with the settlement facilities. The UNHCR provided facilities that were better than ours in the surrounding communities. Some of those refugees never had the opportunity to interact with the local community since they kept in the settlement. *(interview with Katushabe Private, former Agricultural Extension Officer, Ankole district)*.

III. When Banyarwanda refugees came to Uganda, the Banyankole welcomed them. But there was a belief that `Banyarwanda are not trustworthy. A Munyarwanda (singular) can entertain you and kill you. Therefore, when you are dealing with him/her be conscious and careful'. Quite often this attitude discouraged complete integration in local community (*Interview with a respondent who preferred anonymity).*

IV. Some Banyarwanda refugees had cases of indiscipline especially those who used to get drunk and fight as this would also happen among the locals. But as foreigners, the refugees were not trusted in certain respects. (*Interview with Mzee Francis Nyindo at Kaberebere, Isingiro county, Mbarara district).*

V. Few Tutsi left the settlement to buy land in Bukanga county, Mbarara district. They seem to have been comfortable with the facilities in the settlement. Some hoped to go back home soon. *(Interview with a Local Council member in Bukanga who preferred anonymity).*

VI. We are residents of this village known as Kyakatwanga LC.I., Kabweza parish, Kyegegwa subcounty, Kyenjojo district (formerly part of Kabarole district). The Banyarwanda refugees who lived in our neighbourhood were mainly Tutsi. Many of them had cattle with few cultivators. Because of adequate land, they multiplied their cattle, some produced a lot of maize, beans and sorghum. As a result, they made reasonable incomes which made their lives comfortable compared to us. We used to interact with them freely until they left in 1994. The Tutsi refugees did not integrate with us except few marriage cases, because they were always expectant to return to Rwanda one day. *(Focus Group discussion, near Kyaka II Refugee settlement).*

From the above evidence some factors can be singled out as obstacles to integration initially in south western Uganda and non-integration in the case of Toro. These are language barrier, exclusive type of life in the settlements, suspicions, lack of trust, and the desire to return home. In addition, the Uganda

government policy of keeping some refugees in the settlements rather than explicit encouragement towards naturalisation, hindered integration.

In the case of Toro, Kyaka I and Kyaka II settlements provided adequate land for both cultivation and grazing. This explains why the refugees never bothered to move out of the settlement to buy land. They produced enough food for consumption and sale and, therefore, kept to the settlements. Even the local market for the exchange of goods is located within the settlement, while the railway line to Kampala is at a walking distance from the settlement.

Over time, the Banyarwanda refugees, overcame some of the obstacles outlined above and achieved meaningful levels of integration. Similarly, the results of the research findings to follow provide evidence for this submission.

6.4 Levels of refugee integration: The early beginnings of empowerment.

In order to understand the various levels of integration that are pertinent here, the analysis shall follow the footsteps of other scholars particularly those of Barongo (1998) whose effort preceded this study with regard to the matter of refugee integration in Uganda. I shall, thus, examine in this regard the following dimensions which he used.

a) Immediate needs of survival such as food, shelter and clothing.

b) The economic sphere, which concerns the refugee's means of earning a livelihood, economic interdependence, and self sufficiency.

c) The social dimension, which includes integration in the networks of primary and secondary social relationships with the members of the host society as well as within the refugee community, and the role of social conflict in these relationships. Examples of social links include interpersonal relationship such as friendships and inter-marriage practices.

d) The cultural dimension, which includes a number of indices, such as language, patterns of entertainment, forms of worship, changes in food habits, and changes in clothing styles etc.

e) The psychological dimension, which takes into account refugee fears and hopes, their attitudes about their new environments and the level of their adjustment or maladjustment.

6.5 Immediate needs of survival

As, explained in the previous chapter, when the Banyarwanda refugees arrived in Uganda, they received immediate assistance from border communities especially food and water. But because they were in large numbers, the influx attracted the attention of the Ugandan protectorate government and that of the international community. This is why the UNHCR Branch Office was established in Kampala as early as 1964. The UNHCR was largely the provider of food, tents for shelter, medicine and water while the Uganda government allocated land for settlement camps.

With the economic factor, the refugees registered a number of interactions that facilitated integration. In all the settlements studied, although many Banyarwanda refugees who came to Uganda between 1959-1973 had repatriated, there is evidence that the dominant economic activity was agriculture, both farming and cattle rearing. Refugees cultivated the plots they were allocated to produce food, both for consumption and the market. Common

crops in the refugee settlements included maize, millet, cassava, potatoes, beans and vegetables.

This kind of farming enabled the surrounding communities and traders beyond the communities to interact with the refugees in the market. In the settlements, markets were and are still organised on weekly basis, where refugees sell their produce and animals for cash in order to purchase other necessities like clothes, kitchen utensils and radios. The research findings provide evidence for this interaction.

I. The Banyarwanda refugees who used to live in Nakivale refugee settlement interacted with us mainly in the market. We would sell them clothes, soap and food items in exchange for milk, ghee and cattle. *(Interview with Mzee Leo Kiiza a trader in Isingiro Mbarara).*

II. Some of the Banyarwanda refugees settled in Birere subcounty Isingiro while others moved to the settlement. At that time land was cheap, those Banyarwanda who worked hard as labourers bought land for themselves. The community did not discriminate them. *(Interview with Mzee Francis Nyindo in Kaberebere, Isingiro).*

III. In 1969, we migrated from Ntungamo to Masha, Isingiro. We came to Uganda in 1959. The practice in Masha was not discriminative. The parish chief would allocate land to all those who approached him. He did not discriminate against us as Banyarwanda refugees. What was required was to give a cow or a goat that was referred to as `a chicken for the chief'. In the period that followed, we had good relationship with the people. We learnt their language and they learnt ours. We exchanged gifts, food and cooperated in all society's activities and ceremonies. In the 1980s, because of too much sunshine (dry season) we moved to Mutukula in Tanzania. When the conditions improved we returned to Masha. We came here to Nakivale in 1993. We are peaceful, we belong to Local Councils and vote in elections. *(Interview with Makankubana, an example of the old case load of refugees who has naturalised herself and the family but still live in the outskirts of the settlement).*

IV. We are residents of this trading centre (Kyaka II Refugee Settlement). We bought these plots and some shops from the Tutsi refugees who were staying here before they left in 1994. They were friendly to us. We exchanged commodities here in the market through trade. We shared may things including schools, churches and water supplies *(Boreholes).*

Through their economic activity, refugees were reported to have used their surplus earnings as well as supplements from the UNHCR and the Red Cross to send their children to schools for formal modern education.

The educated children quite often obtained employment in Ugandan society as professionals or other categories of employees. Indeed, from amongst their ranks there were doctors, teachers, nurses, electricians in the towns of Mbarara, Masaka, Kampala, Hoima, Fort Portal whose origins were in the refugee settlements. A Congolese refugee, who also acts as a Deputy Camp Commandant of Kyaka I had this to say:

> The old case load of Banyarwanda refugees left in 1994. There are, however, very few cases scattered in the game reserve next to us where they graze their cattle. They pay taxes to the government and actually have naturalised themselves as Uganda citizens.

In terms of employment, the Banyarwanda refugees acquired education for their children and this enabled them to get jobs in the wider society of Uganda. In a focus group discussion, the researcher was informed that refugees worked in Nshugyenzi Health Centre and Kazaho, Rwamurunga, Kyandera Primary Schools in Orukinga settlement. It was not possible to get statistics since refugees in urban centers of Uganda disguised themselves as citizens.

Moreover, Uganda lacks a system of registration of births and national identity cards. And, the Banyarwanda refugees being an invisible minority easily mixed with Ugandans in all activities and sharing of valuable resources.

It was, therefore, possible over the years for the refugees to integrate together with the local population in reciprocal relationships of economic interdependence. This is not to suggest that conflicts did not occur between the locals and the refugees. Competitions over land as the population grew created serious conflicts between them.

This is why over the years, the local communities have encroached on the land previously gazetted as refugee settlements. Close to the Orukinga refugee settlement, some locals believe that refugees, as foreigners, must not enjoy fertile lands at the disadvantage of the citizens. This was confirmed by a focus group at Kajaho L.C.I, a village that is separated by a road from the settlement. In fact, by the time the current Hutu refugees arrived between 1990-2000, large parts of the settlement had been acquired by the local population especially those areas close to the hills.

Turning to the social dimension, the observations of the surrounding communities indicate that the Banyarwanda refugees developed inter personal relationships such as friendships and intermarriages which enabled them to achieve reasonable levels of integration that indeed provided early beginnings of

empowerment. Mr Ndahagire who joined the civil service in Mbarara in the early sixties made the following observations on the social dimensions of integration:

> The Banyarwanda refugees in the sixties and seventies were mainly Tutsi. They were cattle keepers. They provided labour to the local community in looking after their cattle. Ugandans appreciated their services by giving them gifts in form of land, cattle and goats. The refugees became friends. Ugandans married their daughters and the two communities became close.

Intermarriages were common among the refugee women and Ugandan men as illustrated by one of the respondents during the research in Nakivale refugee settlement.

> I had four sons and two daughters, three sons joined the war in Rwanda and were killed. My two daughters are married in Bukanga and I am left with only one son Nathan. Many girls from this settlement (Nakivale) are out there with Banyankole men. They are comfortable and occasionally they come to visit us.

There are also cases, although few, where refugee men married women from local communities. This was found out in Orukinga and Nakivale where it was reported that the Banyarwanda men who repatriated to Rwanda went with Banyankole women who had married to them. Therefore, this type of social intercourse encouraged integration; and had it not been due to the breakdown of the Ugandan state in 1980s as the next chapter shall show, this integration would have resulted into naturalisation – also a form of empowerment.

The 1979 war between Ugandan exiles and Tanzania on the one hand, and Idi Amin and his army, on the other, opened more opportunities for integration. Refugees left the settlement because of the war. Some of them who had made

contacts with their relatives elsewhere, just mingled in the society and never returned to the settlement. Mr. Kabera Faustin, one of the respondents in Nakivale recollects the 1979 experience and the opportunities it offered.

> I came to Nakivale settlement in 1969 with my family. The majority of the refugees here were cattle keepers. Over time, refugees would leave the settlement to buy land elsewhere. But in 1979 when war forced us to leave this settlement, many refugees ran away for safety. Quite a number settled in Kooki in Rakai district, Sembabule, and Toro. They are our friends, we visit them and some visit us. They are now Ugandan citizens.

It is important to note that these areas where refugees moved to were already inhabited by the Banyarwanda immigrants of the 1920s and the 1930s, and were therefore, easily penetrable by some of the refugees. It was, therefore, easy to integrate in those areas without suspicion since the political environment was favourable. Furthermore, Uganda as a state has been weak to implement its control measures in terms of refugees movements and their obligations (The Control of Alien refugees Act [1960]). And if it is not weakness, then, it has been liberal towards refugees and other aliens in the country.

On the cultural dimension, the Banyarwanda refugees speak a language that belong to the Bantu dialects. There are, therefore, similarities in their language with other languages in Uganda particularly Runyankole, Rukiga, Rutooro, Runyoro, Luganda.

Their diverse interactions with the citizens of Uganda in the market, in marriage ceremonies, in schools, in churches, etc, thus enabled them to learn the language of the Ugandan communities although initially it was a barrier. Coupled

with the rather long time span in Uganda, the refugees became more or less proficient in these languages. This was even more so, especially for their off-springs many of whom went to the extent of adopting local Ugandan names as their true names. This was done in order to overcome social and policy hurdles in Ugandan society. Even today, in their country Rwanda, the former refugees maintain the names they acquired in Uganda which are very clearly Luganda, Runyankole, Rutooro and Runyoro names. For instance, you find Runyankole names as; Busingye, Ibingira, Baingana, Mugisha, Asiimwe while Luganda ones as Mukasa, Wasswa and Runyoro-Rotooro ones as Kuhebwa, Byarugaba and Kaboyo very much in use over there.

Equally, the Banyarwanda through the Ugandan school system learnt English since it was the language of instruction. The impact of the English language is reflected in Rwanda today. English and French are now both official languages of the state, an innovation that has its origins in Uganda.

In the spiritual domain, the Banyarwanda refugees, who were predominantly Catholic, found Christianity deeply rooted in the Ugandan society. This made it easy for the Ugandan citizens to accept them as brothers and sisters in the Lord. Such acceptability enabled them to access church resources particularly training in skills and scholarships for higher education.

Last, but not least, the psychological dimension is important in assessing the level of integration. Not withstanding the foregoing, the refugees generally have nostalgic feelings about their country. Recent experience during the study shows that some Banyarwanda refugees who have settled in Kyaka II, Orukinga and Nakivale since 1990 still long to go back home to Rwanda when they are convinced beyond reasonable doubt, that it is safe to repatriate.

The feelings of their lost property in the past and the nostalgia to repatriate to some extent hinder them psychologically to settle down. This is very common among the old generation who talk of the settlements as `prisons' or `human game parks. Psychological integration is an area that was never taken seriously in refugee settlements until recently when humanitarian refugee assistance Programme have focused on this sector. Under the Red Cross structure (the implementing agency of UNHCR) there are officers who are trained social workers and medical officers who handle counseling and related psychological therapies.

On the positive side, from a traumatised life, refugees developed a consciousness over time that return to their homeland as another form of empowerment had to be organised and achieved. I shall explore this dimension in the Chapters that will follow later. In the meanwhile, let us turn to Table 6.5 and Figure 6.1 which summarise aptly some of the factors that facilitated the integration of these refugees into the local communities.

Table 6.5: Ranking of the factors that facilitated integration

Category of Respondents	No. of Respondents	Factors				
		Education	Trade	Religion	Marriage	Hospitality
Refugees	10	10	5	5	5	5
Former Refugees	30	30	25	30	10	20
UPDF soldiers	20	20	15	10	15	15
From Indigenous communities	40	40	35	30	30	20
	100	100	80	75	60	60

Source: Field Data 1999-2001

Note: the respondents from indigenous communities were the same as those interviewed in the focus group discussions around the four villages of Orukinga and Nakivale settlements.

Figure 6.1: Ranking of the factors that facilitated integration



Source: Field Data 1999-2001

Table 6.5 and Figure 6.1 show that all respondents rank education and trade high, followed by religion as the most important factors that enabled the Banyarwanda refugees to achieve meaningful levels of integration in Ugandan society.

6.6 Summary

From the foregoing discussion, it is clear so far, that refugees achieved reasonable levels of integration in the Ugandan society because of similar demographic, social, economic and cultural characteristics with Ugandan population in the parts where they were settled. This integration was initially undermined by language barrier and the exclusive type of life for those who were in the settlements. Similarly, the desire to return home kept some refugees expectant for the conditions in their country of origin to improve in order to repatriate quickly.

However, overtime the obstacles of language were overcome because of long contact with the local community and education. Through education, the refugees, especially their offsprings mastered the local languages, made friends, intermarried and actually participated in all activities of the communities in which they lived.

Furthermore, some refugees acquired land outside the settlements to enable them to produce more for sale. Since south western Uganda had long been

receiving people of Rwanda origin, it was not difficult for the refugees to find allies socially and culturally. Another point to bear in mind is that Banyankole were receptive and kind to the new entrants because of affinities based on shared christianity and tradition. Finally, the lack of a system of registration of births and national identity cards in Uganda made it easy for some members of the relatively invisible minority of Banyarwanda refugees to move freely and enjoy similar facilities as nationals even at the highest echelons of national public affairs.

All this, let it be noted, has a strong bearing on the main hypothesis of this thesis which, it should be recalled, is that in the politics of a host state, where refugees have similar social, cultural and demographic characteristics with the indigenous population, the prospects for their empowerment are considerably enhanced. In the case of the Banyarwanda refugees who sojourned in Uganda from 1959-1990 that clearly is what came to happen.

CHAPTER 7

THE CIVIL WAR IN UGANDA: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

7.0 Introduction

Empowerment of refugees in a politically conflict-ridden society offers both challenges and opportunities. As noted earlier, right from the outset, the Banyarwanda refugees, at least the activists among them in Uganda, dreamed of returning home. The challenge was how to realise this dream. The purpose of this chapter is to identify and explain the obstacles and opportunities that the refugees met on their way to realise their objective in the context of the civil war between the government and the NRM/NRA 1981-6, in Uganda.

7.1 The 'expulsion' of the Banyarwanda and the facilitation of the empowerment process

When an economy is under pressure (for instance as a result of scarcity of jobs, land and other resources) and there is inequality in distribution of wealth and access to resources, the tendency sometimes has been to look for scapegoats. This is more so when a regime is also facing political challenges like the demand to open up political space and democratisation. Uganda has not been an exception to this kind of situation. In 1970, Uganda expelled Kenyan workers, in 1972 Indians were expelled, and between 1982-3 the Banyarwanda were also expelled. This shows that one characteristic of vulnerable political systems is to

try and push their internal political problems to external causes, in this case to aliens or refugees.

Clay (1984) notes that between 1959 and 1973, there were attempts to resettle Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda. One of the areas of resettlement (Orukinga) was located in tsetse fly infested zones and was, indeed, sparsely populated. When the refugees occupied the area, cleared the bushes and trees, the local population began to covet the land owned by refugees. As population increased in Ankole and demand for more land rose, the Banyankole and Bakiga (who had migrated to Ankole) became much more interested. The locals claimed that 'the Banyarwanda refugees occupied too much land'. This was confirmed by the investigations during a focus group discussion with residents of Kajaho village which is separated by only a road from the settlement. They noted:

> Some nationals have encroached on the land gazetted as refugee settlement. This land from the beginning was never properly demarcated and therefore, Ugandans who had no land occupied those areas near boundaries, cultivated and planted perennial crops, built semi-permanent houses. It is difficult to remove them. Furthermore, during the RPF struggle and in anticipation of victory, some Tutsi refugees sold pieces of land that had perennial crops to the locals. Others (citizens) grabbed pieces of land after the departure of refugees in 1994.

The point is, over time, the demand for scarce resources particularly land generated resentment to the Banyarwanda ethnic group (both the citizens and refugees).

But although the anti-Banyarwanda sentiments existed, the Banyarwanda lived side by side with the local community without violence before 1980. Why then,

did the Banyarwanda, both refugees and non-refugees, who achieved such reasonable levels of integration come to face persecution and `expulsion' in the 1980s, and, moreover in such a violent way? How did they cope up with this persecution?

After the downfall of Idi Amin's regime in 1979, there were attempts to put Uganda on the path of democratisation. To achieve that, an election was organised in which four political parties participated namely: the Uganda Peoples' Congress (UPC), the Democratic Party (DP), the Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM) and the Conservative Party (CP). Supervised under the Military Commission government led by Paul Muwanga, the UPC emerged the winner amidst accusations of vote rigging. Soon after, some leaders of the UPM declared a guerilla warfare against the government. The UPC was accused by the UPM and DP of vote rigging, disenfranchising some eligible voters and un-leasing intimidation of voters while collaborating with the Electoral Commission and the Military Commission.

The DP and UPM claimed that before the December 1980 elections, attempts were made to identify the Banyarwanda with the aim of disenfranchising them without making a distinction between refugees and citizens (*Weekly Topic*, 18 October 1985). This, according to earlier submissions above, was a task which nobody at the time had a capacity to undertake given the process of integration that had taken place over the years. After the election in which the UPC

emerged winner, the DP claimed that partial exclusion of the Banyarwanda from the polls facilitated the false victory of UPC candidates in eight (8) out of eleven (11) constituencies in Ankole.

As already noted, the launching of a guerilla war by some UPM leaders, calling themselves the Popular Resistance Army (PRA), soon put the UPC government under pressure. Meanwhile, the UPC youth activists (youth wingers), as they were called, had taken it as a habit to terrorise non UPC supporters throughout the country. These UPC functionaries had also started stealing and looting in the name of identifying collaborators of the guerillas.

On one such mission of theirs in Rakai district, the UPC activists were confronted by the Banyarwanda pastoralists and some of them were killed, an event which later turned out to be a watershed in the history of Rwandese refugees or exiles in Uganda, as one Mr. Charles Bashakara narrates:

> I was working in Mbarara as a junior officer in Administration in 1982 having been transferred from Masindi district. I heard that the UPC youth activists were in Lyantonde Rakai district stealing cattle from Banyarwanda pastoralists. Some of the youth activists were killed using spears. The activist survivors mobilised their colleagues to revenge while claiming that Banyarwanda were rebels fighting the UPC government. Since retaliation was carried out by gun powder, confusion erupted and many Banyarwanda started to flee. Some were killed and their property looted. These events later spread to Mbarara, Bushenyi and Ntungamo. The message was 'Banyarwanda should go home' where home meant Rwanda.

Instead of investigating the circumstances that sparked off the violence, the UPC government put all the blame on the Banyarwanda as they were branded terrorists.

Earlier, President A.M. Obote had made inciting statements against the refugees. He had claimed that some people had been forced to be refugees in their own country because real refugees had taken advantage of the hospitality of Uganda. Obote seemed to have been set to implement one of his 'postponed agenda' of 1969, as narrated in chapter five. In a speech reprinted in the *Uganda Times* of 11 January 1982, Obote re-emphasised that refugees had displaced citizens from their land and that they were, therefore, inviting Ugandans to send them away.

In the same issue, the *Uganda Times* editorial further charged the political atmosphere by contending that:

> Time had come to chase the refugees. Most atrocities during Amin's era were committed by refugees. There is evidence that many refugees voted in December 1980 elections.....Refugees have been found to chant with terrorists in Luwero district and are responsible for the unrest there ..... Some refugees have proved a liability to the nation.....If refugees particularly from Rwanda, don't reciprocate our hospitality, Ugandans may order their government to build camps for them.....Alternatively, we shall tell them to go.

Therefore, when the UPC activists struck in Rakai, the political atmosphere was already dangerously charged against the Banyarwanda.

In late September 1982, the District Council in Mbarara passed a resolution that all refugees living outside settlements should be moved into the refugee settlements. As violence continued to be used for expelling away the Banyarwanda, two UPC ministers, Chris Rwakasisi, Minister of state for security, and Patrick Rubaihayo, Minister of state for Agriculture, came out openly to support the action to evict all Banyarwanda, refugees and non refugees.

By 30 September 1982 UPC officials in Mbarara district were announcing that all *Kinyarwanda* speakers were to be moved to refugee camps with immediate effect.

On 1 October 1982, UPC officials and local chiefs together with Youth Wingers and police began to sweep through the district. This exercise was subsequently carried out in Bushenyi, Masaka and Rakai districts. In this way, more than 19,000 Banyarwanda from Rakai and Masaka were evicted by UPC *Youth Wingers* (Watson, 1991:10)

According to a statement subsequently issued by the DP, there was assistance given by a large group of the paramilitary Special Force, which had been specially moved to the nearby township of Lyantonde a few days before the start of the operation.

The *Kinyarwanda* speakers were given the choice of removing themselves to the established refugee settlement camps at Orukinga and Nakivale in southern

Ankole or of leaving the country altogether. It was clear that displacement was effected by force; many people were beaten up, others were killed, while others committed suicide rather than face eviction. Some people were transported by lorries; others were herded into groups and forced to walk with such little property as they could carry. One Mbarara UPC official, Mr. L.R. Makatu, proclaimed that it would be anti-Ugandan for anyone to provide food or water to the refugees as they moved back to the settlements or Rwanda.

Clay (1984) estimates that only 25-30% of the people affected by the operation were genuine Rwandese refugees. In all, some 35,000 uprooted people fled for protection to the established settlements, over 40,000 fled to Rwanda, and another 4,000 were trapped just inside Uganda, when Rwanda closed its border in November 1982. A conservative estimate is that 45,000 head of cattle and 16,000 homes were destroyed in 1982, Watson (1991:10). In fact, while the Hutu were prepared to return to Rwanda, Tutsi (refugee/non refugee) preferred either to return to settlements or to seek refugee elsewhere in Uganda particularly to Toro, Kasese and Mubende.

An eye witness, who should have been well-informed, considering his status, narrates the ordeal of the Banyarwanda during the expulsion operations.

> I was a Bishop of East Ankole at the time and I saw many people of Rwanda origin being harassed, and their property looted within Mbarara. Archbishop (Rtd.) Kosia Shalita was being chased by Rwakasisi the Minister of Security in the office of the President. Not until H.E. the President, Milton Obote telephoned the District Commissioner to halt the expulsion of the man of God, that the Minister left him alone. Harassment

> continued on other religious leaders. This prompted the Vice President Paul Muwanga to invite all Bishops of western region to explain the Government position. For him, he played the diplomacy card. That the acts of chasing the Banyarwanda were not government sanctioned'. Eric Bwerere who studied with me at Mbarara High School in 1936 was being chased. He now lives in Mbarara municipality. Reverend Kabenga who was my Pastor at Migyina Buremba, Kazo resisted the expulsion. In a desperate reaction, he said. '*Tindikuhunga Kabiri, Munyite nekayangye*' I shall not be a refugee twice, kill me with all my family, The Youth Wingers left him alone.

When some UPC liberals tried to intervene on the side of the Banyarwanda, the UPC extremists intimidated them.

For instance, my witness continued his narration as follows:

> I invited Dr. Adonia Tiberondwa a Minister in the government to preach at Ruharo Cathedral so as to condemn acts of violation of human rights. His summon was expected to restore confidence in the people and make them calm. When this invitation was known to the UPC extremists, I heard that he was intercepted at the border between Mbarara and Bushenyi with threats of death if he dared to preach on that day. He never appeared despite his earlier confirmation.

These gross violations of refugees rights could not go on unchallenged. The main opposition party, the D.P. issued a statement that put the government to task to explain the events. The statement noted that:

> The Geneva Convention on the status of refugees to which Uganda is a signatory provides in Article 3 that contracting states shall treat all refugees without discrimination as to the country of origin.....If it is the chosen policy of the UPC government to keep refugees in specified camps or settlements or even to cause refugees to run out of the country, then that should apply to all refugees whether they be from Sudan, Zaire or Rwanda.

The statement criticised the decision to expel refugees on ground of national security which, even if it was the case should have ensured due process of law. The statement concluded that:

> In the considered opinion of the DP, the expulsion of Rwanda refugees en masse and in the manner it was done was NOT in the public interest .....The DP maintains that it would rather have been in the public interest to assimilate and absorb these people in our country and even grant those who so desire the Ugandan citizenship (Statement by the Democratic Party on the Expulsion of the Banyarwanda in Uganda, 1982, The DP Headquarters, Kampala).

The government official response was contradictory because the UPC leadership itself was divided on the issue. On 19 October 1982 a government spokesman announced on Radio Uganda that Rwandese had simply panicked and fled after the shooting incident of thieves in Mbarara town. Prime Minister Otema Allimadi delivered the 'government opinion' that the refugees had voluntarily returned home because peace once again prevailed in Rwanda. Obote, who had been in Italy when the operation began, waited for nearly a month before making a statement. On 29 October 1982 in a communication read to six district councils which were assembled in Mbarara, he stated:

> I am concerned that aliens, including Rwandese refugees, , who left their homes because of rumours of various kinds, did so in circumstances that gave the impression that they were actually forced to leave..... It is absolutely not true that the government, ever authorised or in any way ordered the UPC Youth Movement in your areas to uproot Banyarwanda (Speech, 1982).

However, at the very same meeting, L.R. Makatu, Chairman of Mbarara District Council declared:

> For the past twenty years, we have been generous enough to accommodate those Rwandese refugees and normal aliens of Rwandese origin, not knowing that we were nourishing a viper in our chest until recently we realised that they were dangerous criminals, killers, smugglers and saboteurs (Speech, 1982).

At another meeting on 4 November 1982 at Kamukuzi, Makatu thanked his audience:

> For that work you have done..... When lifting a roof off a house you cannot avoid nasty happenings that may arise thereof .....Be patient as the District Council will determine a way for you to divide these (Banyarwanda) properties (Speech, 1982).

Mr. L. R. Makatu, like other UPC functionaries with the connivance of the central government, hoped that by dispossessing the Banyarwanda and giving their land and property to the locals they would gain popularity in the affected areas. (*interview with Charles Ndahagire – eye witness in Mbarara).*

By this time L.R. Makatu had been appointed Chairman of the committee set up by Obote to identify who is a refugee from any other state outside Uganda. Indeed, he used his power to conduct a mopping-up operation between December 1982 and January 1983.

7.2 Recruitment of refugees into the NRA

While the efforts were being made to get rid of the perceived political opponents and to take over their properties, the refugee youths especially those in schools and settlement camps, opted to join the guerillas of the National Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/NRA). This is not to suggest that all those refugees who

joined the NRA had a common agenda. Their backgrounds (education, status, level of political consciousness), determined the time each individual joined the guerillas.

There are four possible explanations as to why these refugees made alliances and/or joined the guerillas of NRA.

First, let us be mindful of Maslow's theory and his discussion of basic human needs and their relationships with each other, in which survival is emphasised as the most important of all needs. That is why, whereas some refugees and others of Banyarwanda ethnic group ran to the settlement camps in Uganda, and to the Rwandan border, those who could neither be in camps again nor go back to Rwanda `prematurely' opted for the bush war as an alternative.

Secondly, the alternative of the bush must have been related to the character and the composition of the NRA. Among the commanders of the NRA was the late Major General Rwigyema, (a refugee himself) who had had training with the chairman of the high command, namely, Yoweri Museveni of the NRA in Mozambique in the mid nineteen seventies. As he demonstrated later, Rwigyema could have developed the ambitions of organising his fellow refugees in political and military activities as far back as those years of the nineteen seventies. Related to this fact, was Museveni's welcome to these refugees. At one time he remarked: `I was busy fighting, could I have asked those boys, are

you Banyarwanda?' (Quoted verbatim while addressing students and staff at Makerere University on 25 May 1990 during the **Africa Week** Symposium).

Although he claims that it was not his intention to recruit refugees, it did not make sense to turn away from a readily available fighting force at a time of need. Therefore, Museveni was willing to welcome whoever was willing to fight Obote, such as Moses Ali, a Moslem and Madi from northern Uganda, regardless of ethnic, religious, and ideological background.

In addition, Museveni's choice of the `LuweroTriangle' which comprised the districts known today as Luwero, Mpigi, Wakiso, Kiboga and Mubende was deliberate. Apart from the 'Triangle's proximity to Kampala, its suitable forests for concealment, the hostility of its inhabitants the Baganda to Obote and his UPC, the `Luwero Triangle' was inhabited by pastoralists, Bahima and refugee/non refugee Tutsi, who for cultural and political reasons, were sympathetic to the NRA and were willing to sacrifice their lives and property to realise its war aims. `Indeed they supported the NRA whole heartedly' (*interview with Brigadier (Rtd) Matayo Kyaligonza*).

Yet another explanation as to why the refugees joined the guerillas is that, in the Luwero triangle they were attracted by the high level of organisation of the NRA, a level of organisation that allowed the inhabitants to join its councils, resistance councils and committees, on the basis of residence, rather than citizenship. This

created a sense of belonging for the refugees, having been traumatised by the experiences of the 1982-83 expulsion.

The participation of refugees alongside other Banyarwanda and Uganda nationals in the guerilla warfare provided them with yet another opportunity to reflect on their exile predicament and champion new strategies to regain their lost citizenship of Rwanda. How this opportunity was actualised is what the next chapter shall explore.

7.3 Summary

For better or for worse, the Banyarwanda refugees got entangled in local politics as soon as they arrived in Uganda. The participation and alliances they made can be interpreted as coping mechanisms to a new environment. When the *Inyenzi* activists found it difficult to operate in Uganda, the rest of the Banyarwanda refugees who were not activists and could not be mobilised by the guerillas, decided to lie low and start a new life. However, from 1979 and through the 1980s, when a serious civil war started in Uganda; the refugees became victims. The sitting government branded them enemies although, officially, it denied this attitude.

The subsequent expulsions of 1982-3 of all Banyarwanda without distinction between refugees and non refugees gave a signal or message to the refugees that the integration they had achieved was not sufficient, in any case. If there

were any doubts about organising to return home, time had come to think otherwise.

It is during this period that some refugees, especially the youth, joined the NRA guerillas for the reasons already articulated and opened new vistas for the Rwandese to seek an equally new type of empowerment. Whereas, some of the refugees could have settled for naturalisation as one form of empowerment, the civil war opened up opportunities to seek new skills that eventually enabled them to form more vigorous political and military organisations than those of the earlier years. These now acted as conduits for them to capture power in their country of origin.

CHAPTER 8

THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THE PREPARATIONS OF THE INVASION OF RWANDA 1987-1990

8.0 Introduction

This chapter provides an important analysis of the research problem and also tests the validity of the auxiliary hypothesis which is that: 'In a politically conflict-ridden host society, refugees are likely to manipulate the weaknesses in the social, economic and political situation as a means of empowerment'.

The main concern here is to explain the capacity of refugee communities to effectively mobilise resources to regain their civil and political rights in their homeland. As the analysis will show, the Banyarwanda in Uganda demonstrated that, refugees are not passive actors. Although the limitations they faced varied with circumstances, the study pays attention to their ability to organise themselves politically, to seek the support of external patrons, to gain access to weapons and ammunition, and to manipulate ties of ethnic solidarity among both the civilian refugee population and the host community and to strike at the `right time'.

The chapter also explains how the Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda under specific conditions developed appropriate forms of organisation as a process of empowerment to engineer the improvement of their fate.

In order to have a coherent analysis, the chapter shall systematically answer some of the questions raised in relation to the research problem. It is important therefore, to re-state these questions which are: How did they organise? What forms did their participation in Ugandan politics take?

8.1 The political organisation of the refugees.

8.1.1 The Rwanda Refugees Welfare Association (RRWF) and the Rwanda Alliance for National Unity (RANU).

After the fall of Idi Amin in 1979, the Banyarwanda in Uganda formed an association whose main objective was to help the victims of the anti-Rwandan persecutions by the successors of Amin, which were focused particularly on the Tutsi community. They called it the Rwanda Refugees Welfare Association (RRWF). But the RRWF was very short-lived as it soon after, namely on 2 June 1979, turned into the Rwanda Alliance for National Unity (RANU), which thus, deserves the real attention in this section.

It has not been possible to have RANU's documents for scrutiny, as a consequence of the limitations of the study which were outlined in Chapter One. However, it was possible to interview one of the founders of the organisation, Ben Rutsinga, currently Charge de Affairs in the Rwanda Embassy in Kampala who revealed why RANU was formed, its structure, recruitment, the problems it faced, and why it changed its name to the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). What follows, therefore, is a narration based on Ben Rutsinga's revelation and

confirmed by one of the earliest RPF cadres, Lieutenant Colonel Wilson Rutayisire, who was interviewed in Kigali.

The Rwanda Alliance for National Unity was founded in Nairobi, Kenya, by a group of Rwandese intellectuals mainly from Makerere University and Mulago Paramedical school. The founders included, Ben Rutsinga himself, Fideli Rwigamba now the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Public Service in Rwanda, Patrick Mazimhaka, one-time Lecturer in the Department of Geology at Makerere University in Kampala during Amin's regime and currently Advisor to the President of Rwanda, Fred Rwigyema, and Paul Kagame the current President of the Republic of Rwanda.

According to Ben Rutsinga, the formation of RANU was a reaction to the discrimination, oppression and frustration which some Banyarwanda refugees faced in Uganda. These Banyarwanda felt they were denied their rights which included employment, education and freedom of movement from Uganda to other countries. Given the fact that the above leaders were educated and employed in Uganda, the claim of discrimination does not hold water. In any case some of the refugees had integrated in the Ugandan society quite meaningfully already as seen above. Accordingly, the claim of discrimination must be treated as only a cover up or a rationalisation that might have served to entice other less fortunate Rwandese to the real but initially hidden cause of the formation of the organisation.

The RANU had a number of objectives relating to the main goal which was: To go back to Rwanda. This they hoped to achieve through seeking dialogue with the regime in power in a peaceful manner. If peaceful means failed then, RANU would use force to liberate all Rwandese people in the diaspora. Wilson Rutayisire noted that `the strategy was to negotiate return, although it did not rule out force. RANU had no vision of a military strategy at this point in time, according to Ben Rutsinga's account, which was confirmed by that of Colonel Wilson Rutayisire interviewed in Kigali.

The RANU believed that the Habyarimana regime was a military dictatorship built on the ideology of 'ethnic divisions' whereby the Hutu majority enjoyed all the rights and privileges from the state, while the Tutsi minority lived under oppression, exploitation and with fewer rights. Therefore, RANU sought to democratise the Rwandan society in such a manner that all citizens would enjoy full rights without discrimination.

The RANU identified the identity card system (*indangamuntu*) as a tool to discriminate the Tutsi from accessing opportunities in education, employment and leadership. The intellectuals in RANU felt strongly that they should fight such an instrument and liberate `their people' (Patrick, Mazimhaka, 1994).

In terms of an official statement of the later organisation, the RPF, RANU's main objective was: `to bring together various forces committed to national unity, which since independence, has eluded our motherland'.

In terms of structure, RANU had regional branches in such different countries as Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, and in those of West Africa, Europe and North America. The Branch committees worked clandestinely for fear of repression as was the case in Uganda and Rwanda. RANU had a central committee based in Nairobi to coordinate regional committees.
It was the regional committees that were responsible for recruitment of members into the organisation.

In order to function effectively, RANU introduced a subscription fee which depended on the circumstances of the region. For instance, in Kenya, members paid a hundred shillings annually.

During mobilisation and recruitment, RANU's main challenge was found in Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania. In Uganda, this was the time (1980-85) when the UPC government was persecuting all people of Rwanda origin. Therefore, to openly talk of RANU objectives was suicidal, but later the repression turned out as a blessing in disguise as already explained.

In Burundi, the refugees never faced harassment from the state; and, therefore, their response was very slow to a cause that never ruled out force to return to Rwanda. In Tanzania, the government had taken on a policy of naturalisation, and therefore, many refugees had come to take Tanzania as their home. To begin to think of struggling to return to Rwanda was to many a waste of time and a suicidal attempt.

Inspite of the problems and challenges already faced by RANU, the organisation continued its programme of recruitment and mobilisation towards its objectives. For instance, in Uganda, influenced by the success of the anti-Amin forces in 1979, RANU advised its followers, wherever they were throughout the world, to try as much as possible to secure military training (in host states) on an individual basis. This was envisaged to be done through the disguise of Rwandese as nationals of the host country or by joining a rebel group, as long as it enabled the individual to be skilled in the art of handling weapons of war (*interview with Angelo Semwanga RPF Headquarters, Kigali).*

The anti-Amin struggle had created some outstanding Rwandese soldiers who were members of RANU like, Fred Rwigyema, Chris Bunyenyezi, Sam Kaka, Peter Bayingana, C. Kayitara and Paul Kagame.

When the political climate in Uganda changed with the 1980 December elections and the victory of Obote of the UPC, some RANU leaders like Fedeli Rwigamba,

Ben Rutsinga, and Tito Rutaremwa felt insecure and had to change their location. It was during this time of the aftermath of the elections that Yoweri Museveni launched the war against the new UPC government. Among the 34 men with 27 guns who did this, two were Rwandese refugees, namely, Fred Rwigyema and Paul Kagame. It was these two who were instrumental in the recruitment, training and sensitisation of refugees, a process which crystallised into a military and political organisation that later made empowerment a reality.

As soon as the NRA captured power, the RANU leaders packed up from Nairobi and moved back to Uganda. It appears, with some of its members in high positions of the NRA, RANU members in Nairobi felt secure in Uganda. As Gerald Prunier (1988:124) put it

> The Museveni victory had given a strong psychological boost to the exile community and many were only too ready for action. Socially and economically too, Rwandan Tutsi from all over the diaspora were now saying that 'Uganda is ours' ..... Kayibanda (the first Hutu President of Rwanda) took our country, but Museveni gave us another one.

Those feelings were echoed by James Musoni, Executive Assistant to the Chairman of RPF who contended that the NRA victory provided an ideological inspiration and that Uganda therefore, was an ideal place to house RANU's activities (*interview in Kigali, RPF Headquarters, 7 May 1999).*

In December, 1987, RANU held its seventh congress in Kampala and decided to change its name to the Rwanda Patriotic Front. Ben Rutsinga gave two reasons why the name was changed.

First, when RANU is read from the end to the start, it becomes UNAR as can be seen, an abbreviation similar to the party of some of the Tutsi in 1960s, this would link them to the old guards who were discredited. This had never occurred to the founders initially, but was brought by the new cadres who joined RANU and were very conscious and anxious to have a new organisation that would be entrusted with revolutionary agenda.

Second, the new entrants like Peter Bayingana and Theogene Rudasingwa wanted an organisation that sounded more inspiring, vibrant and all-embracing to various shades of opinion among the Rwandese in the diaspora.

When Peter Bayingana was asked why they changed the RANU to the RPF, he observed that:

> RANU had an outlook of a political party with a limited membership. We then adopted RPF, which we hoped would accommodate all political shades (*The Weekly Topic*, 19 October, 1990).

From the official RPF document, the Political Programme (1990), which was drafted before the change of name from RANU to RPF; the refugees argued that:

> a permanent solution for the refugee problem can only be found in the institution of democratic reforms, which can form a basis for national unity and sectarianism in all its forms must be eradicated.

From the above evidence, it can be seen that RANU was inspired by the NRA's revolutionary language and its methods of work with concepts like resistance, cadreship, and patriotism which became ideals for imitation and emulation.

In terms of achievement, RANU managed to mobilise refugees in the diaspora and for the first time raised the question of return to the homeland in an organised manner.

Similarly, RANU encouraged its members, especially the youth, to join the guerillas of the NRA in order to acquire military skills that would be necessary if negotiations with the Rwandan government failed.

8.1.2 The Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF)

The RPF, the successor to RANU, was led by Major General Fred Rwigyema as its chairman. Other leaders included Paul Kagame, Peter Bayingana, Patrick Mazimhaka, Pasteur Bizimungu, Ben Rutsinga, Aloysius Inyumba and Charles Murigande.

From the time the RPF was formed, it operated in a clandestine manner until its invasion of Rwanda in 1990. In fact, all the activities of the RPF, particularly the mobilisation of resources and recruitment of personnel, were characterised by two related factors: individual consciousness or awareness to redeem one's identity and political consciousness or awareness that the solution was political.

In an interview with Peter Bayingana, one of the RPF leaders, by Teddy Seezi-Cheeye, reproduced in the Weekly Topic of 19 October 1990, the element of consciousness came out very clearly. Bayingana is quoted there to have said:

> Our people individually and collectively, increasingly saw the need to master military science if they were to overthrow the Rwanda dictatorship .....When NRA launched an armed struggle, for us we saw opportunity for individual training and actually participating in order to get experience without raising the eye brows of both the NRA leadership and Rwanda government. We were a people with our own political programme.

There are other experiences of individual consciousness which turned into political consciousness and participation in the activities of the RPF. Thus, during the research both in Uganda and Rwanda, I captured experiences like the following which were narrated by seven respondents, who have to be protected through anonymity for obvious reasons:

I. I was born and grew up in Rwikiniro Ruhama county, Ntungamo district. I never knew that I was not a Ugandan until 1982 when the UPC government displaced us. This later forced me to join the RPF activities.

II. I lost my brother who was working in Burundi. He was the provider of our family. I had a Ugandan Passport. When we reached the Uganda-Rwanda border with my sister, on the way to Burundi via Rwanda, I was harassed. I used to travel to Burundi by air but the sponsor was no more. On my way back, I was made to stay behind on the same border when the rest crossed to Uganda. I was terrified. The only hope I had was a Ugandan official whom I had briefed about my previous experience. When he reached the Uganda side and couldn't find me, he came back for me. The Rwanda soldiers on seeing him, released me. How could this happen to me in my own country? When I reached Kampala, I tried to find out those involved in RPF activities. I joined to fight and return to my country Rwanda.

III. When I was young in the 1970s, my family lived in Isingiro, Mbarara district. One old man, a strong supporter of UPC and the president A.M Obote by then,

said to us, a group of young people: *"Imwe baijukuru ba Rwabugiri, Obote ariyo naija, amaguru mugazingye engata".* (This is a Runyankole proverb which means, You, the grand children of king Rwabugiri, Obote is coming back and be ready to be on the move). I grew up knowing I was a foreigner.

IV. I was born and grew up in Bujumbura City of Burundi. I had my education there up to the University. Whenever I wanted to travel I would be given a travel document valid to all countries except Rwanda, my own country. I used to ask why, with disappointment. When RPF was formed, I was more than willing to participate in the struggle for my right to return home.

V. I was a small girl when our family ran to Tanzania as refugees. I had my primary education in the refugee settlement. At primary seven, I was given forms to fill for secondary admission. I recorded myself as a refugee. The headmaster advised me to change my Identity to a Tanzanian because being a non citizen would limit my chances of admission. The day I joined the secondary school, the Headmistress, who was a Tanzanian of Malawi origin, called me to her office. She asked me, are you Rwandese? I said yes. She then asked 'Why did you claim to be a Tanzanian?' I told her my past experience. She changed my forms because she wanted me to benefit from UNHCR scholarship. The experience of identity crisis made me cry and I have never forgotten. Even when Tanzania naturalised us in 1978, I was always feeling that I am Rwandese, that is why I joined RPF to fight for my return.

VI. I was working for Kagera Salient Development Scheme in 1982 when my family was displaced in Uganda. Rwanda rejected us and we were put in a camp in Rwanda. I felt betrayed and in 1984 I joined NRA to acquire military skills to force my way back home.

VII. I was born in Kivu region of Congo. My grandfather was an immigrant of the 1930s, my mother was a refugee of 1959. I had my education in Congo and I am a Graduate of Lubumbashi University. During my education, I was registered as a Congolese but when it came to local community activities and access to resources like land, I was regarded a refugee. When RPF started Clandestine activities, I joined and became one of its cadres in Lubumbashi.

As may be readily seen, these experiences of human rights violations created and aroused individual consciousness, and later political consciousness, among

the refugees and propelled them to join the RPF and to struggle and return home.

During the investigations in the field, a number of officers of the Ugandan Peoples Defence Forces, formerly the NRA gave explanations which tally quite well with the information generated from former refugees now living in Rwanda as shown below in Tables 8.1 and 8.2, respectively.

Table 8.1: Responses by UPDF officers on the emergence and development of political consciousness of refugees in Uganda 1979-1990.

Response	Respondent
◻ Our experience during the bush war inspired the Banyarwanda in the NRA to organise and return home	Brigadier (Rtd) Matayo Kyaligonza.
◻ Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda gained from the education system and the seminars conducted after the NRA victory	Captain F. Bakanyebonera.
◻ The desire by some Ugandan authorities to get rid of them raised their political and collective consciousness	Lt. Francis Kulayije
◻ Some of the refugees resembled Ugandans and could not be suspected and as a result attended our cadre development courses.	W.O. II A. Lwasa.
◻ During Obote II regime, many Banyarwanda lost their property, others were killed. These violations of human rights woke them up to the fact that Uganda was not their home inspite of meaningful levels of integration achieved earlier.	Major John Kazoora.
◻ Integration in the Ugandan army provided an opportunity for refugees who had revolutionary potential, to grow and develop it.	Corporal J. Mugabi

Source: Field Data January – April 1999.

Table 8.2 Responses of former refugees on the emergence and development of political consciousness of refugees in Uganda 1979-1990

Response	Respondent
▫ Hardships in Uganda raised refugees political consciousness especially during the 1982-3 chasing away of the Banyarwanda episode	James Musoni
▫ If the 27 people could initiate the liberation of Uganda, why not us refugees in big numbers? Nothing is impossible	Hajati Aida
▫ After the NRA capture of state power we participated in many seminars organised by the Movement cadres. That improved our political thinking	Angelo R. Semwanga
▫ The anti-Banyarwanda sentiments in Uganda galvanised refugees political consciousness	Wilson Rutayisire
▫ The Sunday discussion group seminars at Makerere University changed my political thinking	Jennifer Semarinyota
▫ Cadre training at Namugongo in Uganda in 1987 helped me to critically analyse Uganda and Africa's problems.	Johnstone Busingye
▫ Political education programmes in Uganda after 1986 sharpened my political thinking.	Anne Gahongaire
▫ NRM/NRA example of liberation inspired me and raised my political consciousness.	Connie Bwiza
▫ Uganda provided a driving force to me so that I could interpret a situation and take a decision accordingly.	Augustin Iyako
▫ Working as a journalist with the army magazine, *Tarehe Sita,* in Uganda improved my revolutionary thinking.	Ndore Rurinda.

Source: Field Data May 1999

Furthermore, in Uganda in particular, the activities of the RPF, such as meetings, cultural galas, etc., disguised fundraisings and recruitment of young people into the NRA. As shall be discussed later, such activities continued and multiplied between 1987 and 1990. But the question that now confronts us is how could the Banyarwanda refugees organise inside the NRM/NRA without being restrained? Several arguments may be advanced to explain the case, namely:

(a) Secrecy, that is organising without the knowledge of the NRA leadership; (b) sympathy, that is NRA deliberately condoning RPF activities; and (c) active support from NRA. Each of these need to be explored before any conclusions are made.

From the UPDF (formerly NRA) soldiers interviewed during the research, some submitted that Banyarwanda refugees had high solidarity and were well known for being secretive. And Paul Kagame being in charge of military intelligence in Uganda recruited a number of Banyarwanda soldiers into his department. The experience gained from being spies enabled them to keep the secrets of their plans.

Although it is true that several Banyarwanda in the NRA worked under the Directorate of Military intelligence (DMI), there were other security organs that worked very closely with the DMI. For instance, the Internal Security Organisation (ISO), External Security Organisation and Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Police. Therefore it is unlikely, that Banyarwanda in the NRA could organise without being noticed at all. What was possible was that, being in high positions of the army, it was easy to utilise the army's resources without raising much dust or even being noticed that the assignment had a different purpose. As one former Army commander observed:

> It would have been very difficult to highly organise without being in Army officers' positions'

The sympathy theory has also been dismissed by some UPDF soldiers. Those interviewed, for instance Brigadier (Rtd) Matayo Kyaligonza and Major John Kazoora observed that during the bush war in the Luwero Triangle, Banyarwanda refugees were not looked at as foreigners, but as comrades fighting a common enemy. This helped them to develop military skills, and, by merit, to occupy top positions in the NRA. Having contributed to the struggle, there was less suspicion about their activities. Therefore, whatever the Banyarwanda did was not through sympathy as a marginalised group. They actually utilised their positions to have access to the NRA resources. Inspite of those denials, the argument that there was generally speaking, a soft spot and a lot of sympathy for them cannot be ruled out.

The active support from NRA theory is also alive among the UPDF soldiers who were interviewed. The argument runs that, there were individual Ugandan military officers who collaborated directly with the Banyarwanda refugees in the army to prepare for their return home by force. That all arms and logistics were gathered by senior comrades and refugee officers. While it is true that refugee officers had friends and collaborators, the gathering of arms and ammunitions by collaborators did not take place before the invasion. What happened was that refugees being in strategic positions of the army and being comrades in arms, manipulated the weaknesses in the system of defence to plan their escape from Uganda. The open support to them was after the 1990 invasion, when it was obvious that they no longer wanted to remain in Uganda. Therefore, whatever

sympathy or support they got from individual Ugandans and the government was clandestine. In fact, their invasion provided an opportunity to appreciate their contribution in the NRM/NRA struggle. The following questions aimed at tapping this appreciation were asked: (a) Do you think the Banyarwanda refugees contributed to the development of Uganda? (1) Yes (2) No (3) Don't know (b) What was your contribution to the liberation of Uganda between 1981 and 1986? (1) Positive (2) Negative.

Table 8.3 below brings out the responses.

Table 8.3: Responses on the contribution of the Banyarwanda refugees during the struggle 1981-86.

Category of Respondents (n=50)	Responses	
	Positive	Negative
UPDF/NRA Soldiers	20	Nil
Former Refugees now living in Rwanda	30	Nil
Total	50	Nil

Source: Field Data – January – May 1999.

The response to whether Banyarwanda refugees made a contribution and therefore deserved support in their quest to return home was overwhelmingly positive from both the soldiers who fought alongside the refugees and the former refugees themselves. Therefore, in addition to the manipulation of the political system, the sympathy attitude as earlier submitted contributed to their free operations in Uganda though in a clandestine manner.

But what all these explanations propel us to is the process and factors that were very conducive to the refugees empowerment within the NRA, and this will now be examined more closely. What was the nature of the process? And what specific factors were at play?

8.2 Empowerment within the NRM/NRA

Since the Banyarwanda refugees entered Uganda society in 1959, they attained not only reasonable levels of integration, as explained in Chapter Six, but, over time also acquired economic, political, and military advantages, especially during the NRM/NRA regime.

First and foremost, the refugees, obviously acquired political and military skills, especially between 1981-1990. A number of them had training in the Uganda Cadet Officers' training school. That is what people like James Kabarebe, Wilson Rutayisire, Kayumba Nyamwasa, Nyavumba John and Patrick Karegyeya went through. Some worked as Political Commissars in the army, a group to which people like Wilson Ruitayisire, Alphonse Furuma, Ndore Rurinda belonged. Ndugute Karishorisho worked as an intelligence officer in Kampala. In the 1980s he joined the Federal Democratic Movement (FEDEMU) a rebel group that was fighting the UPC government. He later joined the NRA, rose to the position of a Brigade Commander, was founder member of the RPF, retired in the 1990s and died in 1998, because of natural causes; and was put to rest in Rwanda. Still others occupied positions in the Resistance Councils and

Committees like Angelo S. Ssemwanga who was RC II Youth Secretary in Rubaga Division, Augustine Bagabo, Augustus Mutera and John Karemera. Generally, many of these refugees `graduated' as revolutionaries, thanks to their involvement in the struggle of the NRM/NRA.

Second, apart from joining the military, some refugees did well in the public and private sectors. In the civil service and business, some Banyarwanda had the freedom to trade. They educated their children in good schools, while posing as Ugandans. Examples include the family of F Rwivanga, Mohammed Majambere, Dr John Imana, Assistant Medical Officer Abodon Muberuka and Efrance Karenzi.

In order to appreciate the important contention that the Banyawanda refugees took advantage of the weaknesses of the state in Uganda to empower themselves, let me illustrate the point in a table form.

Table 8.4 below shows how Banyawanda refugees formerly, scattered in various refugee settlements and locations in Uganda acquired education, positions in the army and in the government generally, and utilised these advantages to strengthen themselves while in Uganda to form the RPF, and eventually to change the distribution of political power in Rwanda.

Table 8.4: Key factors that enabled the consolidation of the empowerment process of Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda.

Military Rank in NRA by October 1990	Position and Responsibilities in NRA	Origin of the refugee by camp/settlement and year of joining	Level of Education	Position in RPF by 1990	Position in RPF/RPA by May 2000
1. Major General Fred Rwigyema	▫ Deputy Minister for defence. ▫ Deputy Army commander ▫ One of the `27'*	Kyaka II	O'Level	Chairman, Founder Member	DEAD
2. Major Paul Kagame	Deputy Director of Military Intelligence. One of the `27'	Kyaka II	Diploma in professional Management and Business studies.	Founder member	▫ Chairman RPF ▫ President of Rwanda ▫ Major General ▫ Minister of Defence
3. Major Sam Kaka	Commanding Officer, Military police	Not known	O'Level	Founder Member	Retired Colonel
4. Major Chris Bunyenyezi	Brigade commander	Kyaka II (1982)	O'Level	Founder Member, Director of operations	DEAD
5. Major Peter Bayingana	Director, Medical Services	Not known (1984)	University	Founder member, Chief of Operations	DEAD
6. Major Steven Ndugute	Brigade Commander	Not known (1985)	O'Level	Founder Chief of Combat Operations	Retired Colonel

* The NRA bush war was launched by 37 people with 27 guns. This group is popularly known in Uganda as the Kabamba 27 (Ondoga Ori Amaza, 1998: 234-241)

Military Rank in NRA by October 1990	Position and Responsibilities in NRA	Origin of the refugee by camp/settlement and year of joining	Level of Education	Position in RPF by 1990	Position in RPF/RPA by May 2000
7. Lieutenant Nuliate	Platoon Commander	Kyaka II (1985)	Primary Leaving Examination Certificate (PLE)	Founder member	Retired Major
8. Captain Dodo Tukahirwa	Brigade Commander	Kyaka II (1981)	O'Level	Founder Member	Brigade Commander and Colonel
9. Lieutenant Kwikiriza	Brigade Political Commissar	Not known (1985)	O'Level	Founder Member	Major and Brigade Commander
10. Captain Geofrey Byegyeka	Medical Assistant General, Military Headquarters Staff	Kyaka I (1982)	A'Level	Founder Member	Colonel and Chief of Administration and Personnel.
11. Lieutenant Kanyangye	Platoon Commander	Not known (1985)	University	Founder member	Major and Ex-Mayor Kigali.
12. Lieutenant Musutu	Chief Instructor	Not known (1985)	O'Level	Founder member	Retired Colonel.
13. Lieutenant Bagabo	Company Commander	Not known (1985)	O'Level	Founder Member	Colonel, Chairman , Court Martial
14. Lieutenant Wilson Rutayisire	Brigade Political Commissar and School of Infantry, Jinja	Kyaka II (1985)	University	Founder Member	Lieutenant Colonel, Commissioner for Information, Radio Rwanda.
15. Second Lieutenant Kayumba Nyamwasa	Assistant District Administrator, Kitgum District	Not known (1985)	University	Founder Member	Brigadier, Chief of Staff

Military Rank in NRA by October 1990	Position and Responsibilities in NRA	Origin of the refugee by camp/settlement and year of joining	Level of Education	Position in RPF by 1990	Position in RPF/RPA by May 2000
16. Lieutenant Nyuvumba, J	Platoon Commander	Kahungye (1985)	A'Level	Founder Member	Colonel, Chief of Operations, Kisangani Sector
17. Lieutenant Karegyeya Patrick	Assistant Director, Counter intelligence	Orukinga (1984)	University	-	Colonel Chief of Operations and Training
18. Lieutenant Alphonse Furuma	Head of School of Political Education	Kahungye (1984)	University	Founder	Retired Major
19. Lieutenant Kalaveri	Second Brigade Commander	Kyaka II 1982	P.L.E.	-	DEAD
20. Captain Byaruhanga Sam	Brigade Commander	Luwero (Non settlement) 1982	O'Level	Founder	DEAD
21. Captain Kasumba	Brigade Commander	Luwero (Non settlement) 1981	O'Level	Joined (1991)	Brigade Commander
22. Augustine Iyako		Orukinga (1984)	University		Captain and Engineer, Ministry of Information and Television.
23. Second Lieutenant Kabarebe James	Intelligence Officer – Staff, Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI)	Orukinga (1985)	University	Founder Member	Colonel Deputy Chief of Staff
24. Sergeant Jack Nziza	Intelligence Officer, DMI Headquarters	Not known	-	Founder	-
25. Sergeant Nkurunziza	Staff Officer, DMI Headquarters	Orukinga 1985	Graduate	Joined (1991)	-
26. Second Lieutenant Kaizari	DMI Headquaretrs Registry	-	A'level	Founder	-

Military Rank in NRA by October 1990	Position and Responsibilities in NRA	Origin of the refugee by camp/settlement and year of joining	Level of Education	Position in RPF by 1990	Position in RPF/RPA by May 2000
27. Private Munyuza	DMI Headquarters Registry	Kahungye (1985)	A'Level	Founder	-
28. Corporal Ndore Rurinda	❑ Company Political Commissar ❑ Staff, Tarehe Sita Magazine	Kyaka I (1987)	A'Level	Joined (1989)	Cadre, RPF Secretariat, Captain.
29. James Musoni	-	-	University	Joined 1990	Executive Assistant to Chairman RPF.
30. Ssemwanga Angelo R.	❑ Youth Mobiliser in recruiting Banyarwanda. ❑ Youth Secretary Rubaga Parish, (LCII) Kampala.	Nakivale (1981)	Diploma Engineering	Founder	Head of Logistics RPF Secretariat.

Source: Field Data 1999.

How these refugees, and others not appearing on the Table organised the RPF after the 1990 invasion, the objectives they put forward and the whole process of execution of the war is what the next chapter shall explore.

8.3 Summary

As mentioned earlier, the Rwanda Patriotic Front was initially known as Rwanda Alliance for National Unity. The change of name was aimed at achieving a broad-based front that would focus clearly on the revolutionary military struggle that was to be launched in 1990.

The RPF cadres were mainly young Tutsi who had acquired education through the Uganda system. Most of them had joined the NRA bush war from where they acquired military experience. Some of them trained in the army school and graduated as cadet officers – basic military leadership course.

Having acquired the military and political skills from the NRM experience, the RPF cadres organised within the NRM/NRA structures until they felt confident enough to strike. The chapter established that their being in strategic positions of the NRA enabled them to take advantage of the weaknesses in the system (particularly inability to differentiate a Ugandan of Rwanda origin and a refugee of Rwandan origin) to achieve their objective. Uganda, with no system of registration of births and identification, and being in conflict and civil wars for a long time, the refugees found this society with opportunities to exploit.

On the whole, the Banyarwanda refugees achieved much more political, social and economic empowerment during the NRM/NRA regime than had previously been possible. This happened because of the weaknesses in the Ugandan political system and the level of political consciousness they had achieved through challenges and opportunities over the years in that system.

CHAPTER 9

FROM THE INVASION TO GENOCIDE 1990-1994

9.0 Introduction

This Chapter focuses on the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) organisational structure; the political programme; the political, diplomatic and military strategies employed in the conduct of the war; diplomacy during the war and the Arusha peace negotiations, the peace agreement and why it did not work.

The Chapter also discusses the final showdown and why the RPF won the war.

In order to have a deeper analysis of the above issues, it is important to re-state some of the questions raised in the statement of the problem namely: how did they organise? What were some of the major constraints in their way? What in the end, did they achieve? What made such achievements possible? One can also add, why did they strike in 1990?

9.1 The 1990 Rwanda Invasion

The desire of sections of refugees wherever they live to return to the `promised land' is not unique to the Banyarwanda refugees who lived in Uganda. But what is remarkable about the Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda was their shared awareness of being victims of historical circumstances over which they had little or no control, and in their militant determination to return to their homeland. But why, precisely, did they strike in 1990?

9.1.1 Political contradictions in Uganda and Rwanda

Several factors account for the invasion of Rwanda in October 1990. These factors are located within the political contradictions in both Uganda and Rwanda. After the capture of state power in 1986 by the NRA/NRM, many Banyarwanda refugees in the diaspora started coming to Uganda. Uganda was regarded as a second home where they could meet, hold cultural festivals, and actually plan for their future. These developments did not augur well with some sections of the Ugandan population, particularly the Baganda and Northern nationalities. The Baganda and sections of Banyankole increasingly expressed concern about the President's toleration of foreigners in important and lucrative positions, while rebels from Northern and Eastern regions were hesitant to negotiate with Museveni as long as he did not `remove these foreigners from the army'. Otema Allimadi, Obote's former Prime Minister, who eventually made peace with the NRM had taken such a position (Report of the Committee of Parliament, 1997).

Although the Banyarwanda refugee soldiers were an asset in terms of loyalty, politically they appeared as a liability to Yoweri Museveni. This was demonstrated by the anti-Banyarwanda sentiments and the response of President Museveni and the legislature at the time.

One consequence of all this was that in November 1989, Major General Fred Rwigyema was removed from his position of Deputy Minister of defence inspite of his loyalty to Museveni as a comrade and friend. This development confirmed

the suspicion of the refugees that they were no longer tolerated in Uganda. In this regard one of the respondents observed that:

> We became increasingly concerned about Museveni's moves to sideline Banyarwanda refugees in the NRA. For instance, I asked myself, `If 27 people could initiate the liberation of Uganda why not us refugees who are many and already politically conscious (*Interview with James Musoni, RPF Headquarters, Kigali).*

Indeed, as Prunier (1998:127) put it:

> If Rwigyema, after his great services to the country, and inspite of his personal friendship with the President, could not simply be a Ugandan like any other, then the path of integration was in fact a dream.

Similarly, in August 1990, the National Resistance Council (NRC) held a three day session on the fate of a number of large ranches in south-west Uganda that the state had allocated to individuals twenty years earlier, and which the NRM regime believed were under-utilised and, thus, wanted to give to landless cattle keepers.

> In a debate so politically charged that Museveni had to be chair, representatives from all over Uganda accused the government of giving land to foreigners – in this context, the Banyarwanda. The Debate exposed again the depth of anti-Banyarwanda sentiment in Uganda (Watson 1991:14).

In fact, Miria Matembe, Parliamentary Woman representative for Mbarara district, put it clearly as the debate was being wound up. She noted:

> Mr. Chairman, we are not complaining of Ugandans to be given land; we are complaining of non Ugandans - Banyarwanda – those who came as refugees to own land in this country. This is what we are concerned with. (Parliamentary Debates, (Hansard), 1990:433).

Furthermore, there was information within the refugee community in Kampala and the NRA that President Habyarimana, through his secret security force, known as *Maneko,* was working on how to assassinate some Rwandese high ranking officers within the NRA. It was alleged that two NRA officers were given two million dollars by *Maneko* so as to assassinate Major General Fred Rwigyema. This information eventually appeared in the press (*Africa Events*, December, 1990 and *Weekly Topic*, 19 October 1999). When these allegations were put to one former Army Commander of the NRA and one former RPF spokesman, their response was that, in a situation of uncertainty, there are always speculations and information to justify a position one has taken or is about to take.

What then, determined the day? Major Peter Bayingana in an interview a few days after the attack on Rwanda had this to say:

> What determined the day was the pressure from people in Uganda in high military and security places who even threatened to arrest us. We realised that whatever contributions we could have made to boost the military adroitness of NRA, we were increasingly becoming disregarded to an extent that even a man like Major General Fred Rwigyema could be easily exchanged for a few million dollars given by Habyarimana to one or two military officers. (*Weekly Topic*, 19 October, 1990).

Although, there is no evidence that the dollars actually changed hands, what is clear is that, the refugees in the NRA had already made a decision to return home but were looking for an excuse to leave Uganda as if the conditions were no longer tolerable. In fact, no one had concrete evidence that money had been given to NRA officers to eliminate Banyarwanda comrades (*interview with Major*

Rwabwoni Okwir, in Kampala; a Ugandan soldier, who deserted the army along with the RPA).

The refugees then took advantage of President Museveni's absence while on a two week trip abroad to the U.K., the USA, Belgium and Denmark.

As Bayingana further put it:

> We did not want to embarrass President Museveni, whom many of us greatly admire' (*Weekly Topic*, 19 October, 1990).

On the other hand, the internal contradictions in Rwanda politics coincided with the developments in Uganda and helped to prompt the refugees to agree that the zero hour of `exodus' had come.

In April 1990, President Habyarimana attended the Franco African Summit at *La Baule* in France. During the summit, President Francois Mitterrand gave his famous democratisation speech. Habyarimana was among those who chose to open up his country at least formally to play the democratic game. Habyarimana had been under pressure from the people of southern Rwanda who had supported Gregoire Kayibanda's first Republic and who considered themselves marginalised. Similarly, some clans from northern Rwanda, Habyarimana's home, felt marginalised and, therefore, also put up, pressure for democratisation.

In response, Habyarimana in July 1990, proclaimed his newly acquired ideology of liberalism that would turn the country to multi-party system. These

developments did not favour the RPF, because they threatened one of their best selling grievances for their struggle, namely, fighting the dictatorship of Habyarimana. Furthermore, the Rwanda – Uganda Front Committee on the Refugee Question had decided in 1990 that the Kigali government would discuss the issue directly with representatives of the refugee community, in order to prepare lists of people for repatriation. If this move succeeded, particularly in a new environment of democratisation supported by the west, the RPF would have lost another, if not the most important, selling grievance, namely, that there can be no peace in Rwanda, if more than two million Rwandese are outside the country as refugees.

9.2 The RPF/RPA as a fighting organisation

On the afternoon of Monday, 1 October 1990, a group of the RPA, in a single file led by Major Chris Bunyenyezi, sneaked their way below the Mirama hills on the Uganda side of the border; and headed for the Rwanda border post of Kagitumba. At about 2.30p.m. the RPA arrived within the range of Rwanda border guards, and shot at them, killing one and sending others into flight. Those shots opened the RPA war against the Kigali government. It was confirmed that an NRA officer, Major General Fred Rwigyema was leading the invading force.

The following day, Tuesday 2 October 1990, Fred Rwigyema perished from a stray bulletin fired by the retreating Rwandan soldiers. This information was

confirmed during the research by Major Rwabwoni Okwir who was an escort of Fred Rwigyema during the attack.

Subsequently, Rwigyema was replaced by Major Paul Kagame as new Commander of the RPA. The RPA did not only lose Rwigyema, but also Chris Bunyenyezi and Peter Bayingana in an ambush staged by the Rwanda Armed Forces a few weeks later (*Interview with Rwabwoni Okwir*). Why did the RPA which entered Rwanda as an organised force lose its leadership in so short a time? The constraints RPA faced shall be discussed later but one major point to note here is that, as soon as the attack was launched, Habyarimana mobilised the French, Belgian and Zairean troops, then in Rwanda to counteract the attack. Although the Rwandan army was small in size at the time, it was a fairly well trained army with modern equipment and foreign troops behind their lines. The RPA was, therefore, given a response it never expected. This is why an overall commander who should have been behind the battle lines, and planning strategies was involved in actual fighting at the battle front thus exposing himself to danger.

After the initial losses and disorganisation, the RPA fighters retreated to the Virunga Volcanic mountain ranges, changed strategy, and embarked on a guerilla war.

9.3 How the RPF/RPA organised politically and militarily

As already noted, individual consciousness led to political consciousness among the refugees. Participation in the NRM/NRA struggle provided an opportunity for the refugees to come together to discuss refugee fate in Uganda. Similarly, the anti-Banyarwanda sentiments galvanised the refugee consciousness that led to political and military organisation.

The RPF then launched an eight point program to guide the struggle to return home. In summary, it runs as follows:

(i) To promote national unity;

(ii) To establish genuine democracy;

(iii) To provide security for all Rwandese;

(iv) To build an integrated and self sustaining economy;

(v) To eradicate corruption in all forms;

(vi) To resettle Rwandese refugees living in exile

(vii) To devise and implement policies that promote social welfare for all Rwandese;

(viii) And to pursue a foreign policy based on equality, peaceful co-existence and mutual benefit between Rwanda and other countries. (RPF Programme, 1990).

The political programme provided issues for debate to all Rwandese in the diaspora. It was also used as an instrument for diplomacy in various international forums particularly the OAU and the UN.

Politically, after the formation of the RPF in 1987, it started organising civilian cadre courses secretly in private houses. According to Connie Bwiza, who was an RPF activist and now a member of Parliament in Rwanda, participants ranged from five to ten. These courses were held in Kampala and in Jinja in Uganda. The content of the courses included politics and philosophy. The refugee participants were taught to understand the laws that govern development and changes in society. The leaders of the courses emphasised the political economy approach.

The courses covered the history of Rwanda, and how to build a democratic state after the overthrow of the dictatorship. The courses also covered strategies of mobilisation and dissemination of ideas to other refugees in the diaspora. In short, political education was the initial strategy to consolidate the process of empowerment while still in Uganda.

After the 1990 invasion, and up to 1994 committees were set up in various host countries for refugee clandestine work. These committees were well structured and organised to handle the challenges the organisation faced. The RPF had a

political wing and a military wing. The chairman Alex Kanyarwengwe headed the RPF with two Vice-Chairmen and four commissioners below him, namely:

1st Vice Chairman – Patrick Mazimhaka

2nd Vice Chairman – Charles Murigande

Commissioner for Information – Pasteur Bizimungu

Commissioner for Mobilisation – Plataz Musoni

Commissioner for Finance – Aloysius Inyumba

Commissioner for Logistics – Dr. Emile Rwamasirabo

This committee remained in existence and in action until the capture of Kigali in 1994. Below commissioners were directors of information, youth, women etc. In refugee host countries, the RPF was represented by regional chairmen. Big regions in terms of refugee populations had two chairmen distributed as follows:

Table 9.1: The organisation of the RPF worldwide

COUNTRY	NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVES
Belgium (Head Office)	1
Uganda	2
USA	1
Burundi	2
Kenya	1
Tanzania	1
DR Congo	2
Canada	1

Source: Compiled from interviews with RPF leaders in Kigali, May 1999.

Under the regional chairmen, refugees belonged to cells as the lowest units of mobilisation both in refugee settlements and urban centers.

The military wing, namely, the RPA, initially was a small force of 2000 fighters, who carried out the attack of 1 October 1990, as recounted above. As more refugees were recruited from Rwanda's neighbouring countries, the RPA became more or less organised on the basis of the conventional structures of the military. Thus, at the top was the Chairman of the High Command – Major General Paul Kagame. The High Command comprised senior officers who commanded columns and battalions. Below the High Command were five columns each with three battalions and a battalion consisted of approximately 500 soldiers. Below the battalions were companies, platoons and sections. The columns operated in Ruhengeri sector, between Ruhengeri and Byumba sector, Byumba sector and Mutara sector. These were commanded by senior officers as they were called, Sam Kaka, G. Mbigute, J. Bagire, C. Ibingira and M. Musitu.

9.4 The Uganda factor in the organisation of the RPF/RPA

During the research, one important factor that was articulated by the respondents clearly was the role of Uganda as a favourable rear after 1990 invasion. The Ugandan population, with the exception of the nationalities of the north and parts of the east, was by and large supportive, both morally and materially, especially the border communities during the war.

Even at the level of government, Uganda was positive. The government knew that the refugees (RPF) were operating near the border but never attacked them from behind. The Uganda government indirectly guaranteed supply of logistics and food. Uganda was a meeting place for the refugees from various host countries and the governments institutions like the police and intelligence organs never restrained RPF activities. Unofficially, many senior officers of the UPDF supported the RPF. They supplied it with guns and ammunitions. Others, participated in actual fighting until the fall of Kigali.

Furthermore, Uganda provided a safe environment, where the RPF could organise sick bays for the injured. Quite often the casualties were treated in Mulago hospital, Kiseka hospital and other hospitals and clinics in Uganda without any fear of suspicions. On the whole, as one respondent put it: `Generally, Ugandans wished the RPF well'.

9.5 Diplomacy during the war

9.5.1 The role of President Museveni

The research established that there is a general agreement and consensus within the RPF that Museveni as an actor contributed immensely to the success of the RPF during the war. Apart from the initial recruitment and training of the refugees within the NRA, the appointment of Banyarwanda by merit in important positions in the management of the state, Museveni supported the RPF/RPA war without reservations. For instance, President Museveni articulated very well

the cause of the RPF in diplomatic circles – at the United Nations, at the Organisation of African Unity, regionally in East Africa, and nationally in Uganda.

As one respondent put it:

> `Museveni helped RPF to overcome diplomatic isolation'

Indeed there is evidence to support this observation. On return from the U.K., U.S.A., Belgium and Denmark, ten days after the invasion, Museveni made a statement during a press conference that encouraged the RPF. These statements as quoted in *The New Vision*, of 11 October 1990 are interesting to note and support my argument. Museveni observed:

> `These boys are very experienced militarily. I doubt very much whether they can be defeated by those troops, whether they are Rwandan, Belgian or Zaire'.

On whether the invasion was justified, Museveni noted:

> `We are no longer prepared to allow Uganda to be a prison for people who want to go back to their country'.

On 8 June 1991 while addressing Makerere University students and staff at Freedom Square, President Yoweri Museveni had this to say:

> The Rwanda government tried to isolate us by presenting the problem as a Uganda-Rwanda one but we exposed it in all the forums in Mwanza, in Gbadolite and in Dar es Salaam. Everyone says three things: Rwanda, you should accept that Banyarwanda are your people; two, have a ceasefire with rebels; and three negotiate with rebels.....The other day, President Habyarimana raised this issue in Abuja at the OAU summit and he gave me a chance to explain to the whole of Africa how the problem started. If Banyarwanda had not been living here, they would not have got caught up in civil war. They took advantage of our civil war to gain some knowledge about the use of arms and later on used that knowledge to go and try to invade their country (Museveni,1991).

Eight years later on 9 August 1998, Museveni admitted his support to the RPF openly in a meeting of heads of states as he discussed the background to the situation in the Great Lakes region. He had this to say on that occasion:

> Four thousand soldiers of the Rwandese origin in the National Resistance Army of Uganda, started organising under Fred Rwigyema. They told me of their intention to organise to regain their rights in Rwanda, which had been nullified ever since the 1959 genocide. Uganda rendered some modest financial assistance to these Rwandese soldiers and diplomatic channels such as petitioning the UN, OAU, the neighbouring countries and others, before resorting to a military struggle.

He also put it explicitly that:

> when the refugees escaped without consultation and the war progressed, Uganda decided on two courses of action. First, to help the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) materially so that they are not defeated, because that would have been detrimental to the Tutsi people of Rwanda and would not have been good for Uganda's stability. Second, to encourage the dialogue between President Habyarimana and the Rwandese in the diaspora.

This is supported by the respondents, interviewed in Kigali two of whom had this to say;

> The Government of Uganda was very positive. They knew that RPF was operating near the border. We were never interrupted or restrained. Some Ugandans supported us militarily by actual fighting (*interview, James, Musoni).*

> The Uganda Government could have sided with Habyarimana but it did not. If it were hostile the whole struggle would have been impossible or fruitless. In fact, the diplomatic front was fought by Ugandan government particularly President Yoweri Museveni (*Interview, Jennifer, Semarinyota).*

It is clear form the above that the diplomacy, strategy, material support and wise counsel of President Museveni to the RPF consolidated the empowerment gains

that had been initiated in Uganda. It is also important to note that the Ugandan government had no choice but to support the RPF since their defeat and return would have destabilised the politics of Uganda.

9.6 The contribution of women in the RPF/RPA struggle

Too often the struggles for human rights in societies are associated with men. In the case of the Banyarwanda refugees in the struggle to return home, women participated unreservedly.

Women participated in the recruitment of the youth into both the RPF and the RPA. They mobilised resources for the struggle. In many cases, those who were married would reveal their husbands' properties, particularly, cattle, so as to contribute to the struggle. Women organised cultural festivals as a method of fundraising for the war. They followed up the pledges and transmitted the funds faithfully to the finance commission (*interview, Anna Gahogaire – member of the finance commission).*

In terms of health, women were in charge of house clinics and sick bays where soldiers from the frontline would receive treatment. Where it necessitated big operations and treatment, women negotiated for quick and preferential treatment in hospitals around Kampala, under the disguise of treating Ugandan soldiers from the war zone in the Northern Uganda *(interview, Major Rose Kabuye*).

Still in the rear here in Uganda, women organised counseling centers in which those who deserted the RPA from the frontline were well attended to. After counseling, women encouraged successfully the soldiers who had deserted to return to the frontline. In this way the women contained the rate of desertions from the RPA.

The research findings established that earlier, the Women's Commission of the RPA discouraged women from acquiring military training in the NRA, because they never trusted the Ugandan army. One of the respondents alleged that the Women Commission had reports of the mishandling of women recruits in the NRA and, therefore, concluded that emancipation of women in the Uganda army was still low. This attitude led to few women refugees acquiring military skills within the NRA.

To make matters worse, when the RPF/RPA launched an attack, refugee men still discouraged refugee women to train as soldiers and engage in actual fighting except those already trained as soldiers in Uganda. It was believed that women were cowards and could not fight. Some women believed this stereo-type perception and consolidated it. However, captain Judith Mutumba rejected the perception and insisted on fighting the myth of `cowardice and non performance' *(interview, Judith Mutumba*). On the whole, however, there were few women of such determination and perseverance on the war front.

Nevertheless, women continued to play an important role in the political wing particularly in recruitment, media and communication activities; training casualty units in self help skills like sowing, repairs, carpentry, book keeping and political education. Furthermore, women supervised sanitation in war zones and generally improved the welfare of the fighters.

Women were also good at intelligence and information gathering from the `enemy' controlled zones. Women would disguise themselves as supporters of the enemy and go up to Kigali to spy on the government of Habyarimana. They established links with informers in the Rwanda system. This kept the RPF well informed of the plans of the government.

During the struggle, not everything was always well with the women mobilisers. In some cases women encountered sexual harassment, rape and unwanted pregnancies. One would find women escaping from one battalion to another, because of sexual harassment. But where such cases were brought to the attention of the leadership of the RPF, the perpetuators were severely punished. However, given the dominance of men and the nature of African culture generally, some acts were never reported by women because of fear and the `shame' that could arise from exposure.

On the other hand, some good lasting relationship developed, especially within the military wing. Some of the respondents, like Connie Bwiza, Jennifer Semarinyota, confirmed that it was not always fighting; there was time to relax,

love and reflect on one's future and the struggle generally. It is possible that the absence of women could not have delayed the success for the struggle for empowerment. Nevertheless, the RPF benefited quite substantially from the mobilisation skills of women activists.

9.7 Constraints during the RPF campaign.

The initial constraint was disorganisation at the beginning of the war. Disengagement from the NRA altered military formations within days. As a result, the chairman and overall commander of RPF got involved in both planning the fighting and the actual fighting. This made him vulnerable, and was consequently killed on the second day of the attack.

According to Augustin Iyako, the NRA's legacy of fighting without modern communication equipment proved a liability to the RPA. The NRA used letters and chits to communicate during the bush war in Uganda. When the RPA tried it, the method proved fatal for it. The terrain in Rwanda is not like the one in Uganda, where concealment was easy in the forests, bushes and marshlands. The RPA soldiers were easily exposed to the enemy while moving from one unit to the other.

Another constraint was the hostility of the population in Rwanda. The population in Rwanda was at first and for quite some time very hostile. The government had

an `excellent' propaganda machine against the RPF that made penetration very difficult.

Furthermore, after the death of the overall commander of the RPA, contributions for the struggle dwindled and this required fresh confidence building in the new leadership structure. The refugees in the diaspora were not sure of the new leadership and its capacity to manage their contributions.

Worse still, the weather conditions were hostile especially in the Virunga Volcanic ranges where some fighters froze to death. The RPA fighters had moved to the mountains far from the enemy forces of the government in order to have time to train and organise after the initial defeat.

On the external front, the RPF was not free from pressure and resistance. Indeed, the organisation had external opposition that was generated by the Anglo Francophone ideological divide. The French were most of the time behind the frontlines of the Rwandese Armed Forces (FAR). They advised and trained the Rwandan army, because they believed that the RPF whose origin was Uganda would impose Anglophone culture on Rwanda and shift the Rwandan market to the British (*inteview, Charles Murigande, Secretary General RPF*).

Similarly, President Sseseseko Mobutu of Zaire was worried of the spread of revolutionary violence in the region which could directly affect him, as it did, indeed, later. He too threw his weight behind the Rwandese armed forces.

As the RPF encountered constraints and challenges, new tactics and methods were sought and applied, as solutions to those impediments. In an interview with some of the RPF/RPA cadres in Kigali, namely, Johnstone Busingye, Augustine Iyako, Wilson Rutayisire, Anne Gahongaire, Patricia Hajebakiga and Angelo Semwanga, the following approaches were reported to have been devised.
Political education was emphasised to explain the 'just cause' of mobilisation. More cadre courses were organised to educate fighters about the internal contradictions in Rwanda. These cadre courses enabled the fighters to appreciate that Habyarimana and his fellow dictators were tired and, therefore, easily displaceable. This increased the morale of the RPF/RPA activists.

The matter of discipline was taken very seriously as a method of cultivating control, respect and determination. During the fighting, command was entrusted to experienced fighters, who were able to plan and to execute combat engagements. Furthermore, by organising the Front into commissions with specialised responsibilities, the RPF was able to raise morale of the fighters, as well as the required resources for them.

The specialised directorates and departments guarded the logistics of soldiers for appropriate and effective distribution. As the morale of the fighters increased, and more combat successes were registered, the RPF gained more backers and donors from outside Rwanda, especially among the refugees in the diaspora. Charles Murigande who was based in the USA, confirmed to me that refugees, especially in North America, were very vital in resource mobilisation and articulation of their cause at the UN.

As already noted, the population in Rwanda was very hostile towards the RPF. In response, the Front bought a Portable IKW Radio and opened up a station named 'Radio Muhavura' to counteract the negative genocidal propaganda of the government of Habyarimana. This radio was operated by Engineer Augustino Iyako, now Captain in the RPA, who had been trained at Makerere University in 1981. To have a good antenna system, in order to broadcast very far, the RPF engineers used long poles of trees tied together. The studios were put in underground bunkers to avoid heavy gun shelling of the government troops. The radio could be dismantled in a few minutes and then assembled quickly, too. This radio, broadcast activities of the RPF and sensitised the population on `real problems' of Rwanda (*interview, Augustino Iyako).*

Another method used by the RPF to soften the attitudes of the hostile population involved the abduction tactic. Here, civilians were abducted, trained as cadres, and then released. When they returned to their villages, some of them were

arrested by the government. Those who were arrested gained sympathies from their friends and relatives who in turn hated the government of Habyarimana. As the process continued, more civilians came to hate the government, and joined the RPF, as a result. This was more so with the Tutsi population and the Hutu elites in opposition (*interview, Johnstone, Busingye and Anne Gahongaire)*.

The external opposition from the French and their allies was tackled at two levels. As already mentioned, President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda was an asset to the RPF. He overcame the diplomatic isolation of the Rwanda Patriotic Front; and the international community was able to appreciate that the refugees did, indeed, have the right to return home.

Similarly, the Arusha peace talks helped the RPF to put its grievances, objectives and plans as an alternative government. But since the Arusha talks were a major diplomatic process in the RPF struggle, it is important that we examine and discuss them in more detail.

9.8 The Arusha talks[1]

One of the approaches adopted by the RPF to make its cause known internationally and to win recognition beyond the bush battles was through diplomacy. Arusha provided the forum for the RPF to break from being regarded as part of the Ugandan army – the NRA.

[1] See Appendix VII below for the Agreement that came out of these talks.

The Arusha talks began on 10 August 1992. In the delegations were the RPF, and the Rwandan government. The latter reflected three tendencies: the Rwandese opposition parties, Habyarimana's trusted men, and Hutu extremists led by Colonel Theoneste Bagasora. Each tendency had its own interests. The opposition parties, namely, *Parti Liberal* (PL), *Mouvement Democratique Republicain* (MDR) the *Parti Social Democrate* (PSD) were willing to share power with the RPF; while the *coalition pour le Defense de la republique* (CDR) and the ruling MRND were pushing for the prominence of Hutu power.

As a result of these divergent tendencies, the opposition groups were branded by the extremists as accomplices of the RPF. Thus, when Habyarimana appointed Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyarmye as the leader of the first coalition, he was under pressure from the extremists as a sell out. When the Prime Minister criticised Habyarimana as a stumbling block to implement the peace process, he was dismissed and replaced by Mrs Agatha Uwilingiyimana, a close ally of Habyarimana.

But what were the concessions at Arusha and how did they affect both the RPF on the one hand, and the Rwandan People of different tendencies, on the other? The most outstanding concessions were in terms of positions in the military, Cabinet portfolios, representation in Parliament, and the right of refugees to return home.

The Arusha accord provided that the RPF would provide 40 percent of the soldiers in the new army, but 50% of the officer corps. This did not augur well for the young Hutu who had been recruited as a response to the civil war. Such a compromise, they feared, would render many of them jobless.

The RPF was also given the portfolio of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. To the extremists, the RPF would control this key sector of the state and be in charge of the instruments of coercion. The RPF further was to have 11 out of 70 seats in parliament and 5 out of 21 Ministries. In all this the CDR which regarded itself as the legitimate power centre to defend the Hutu majority was not specifically allocated any portfolio. It is this group that eventually organised the genocide, because it felt the Arusha talks were just a means to destroy Hutu power.

When the Arusha accord recognised the right for the refugees to return home, the Hutu extremists saw this concession as a weakness on the part of the government and the opposition parties that reflected the majority of the negotiators. The population was made to believe that the Arusha talks and the accord would lead to the take over of their land and property by the foreigners who had been chased away in 1959.

Whereas Habyarimana kept the semblance of unity within Rwanda, power had actually shifted from the main ruling party, the MNRD, to the CDR.

The Arusha accord was, thus, signed on 3 August 1993 amidst disagreements among the prevailing power centers inside Rwanda. The new Prime Minister was rejected by the opposition parties; and, therefore, the peace accord could not be implemented.

On the whole, the Arusha talks had two important achievements as a diplomatic tool for the RPF empowerment. First, the RPF was able to overcome its diplomatic isolation as an extension of the NRA. The talks made the front to appear credible and a force to reckon with. Secondly, the Arusha peace talks had another significance as well. For, apart from spelling out the formula to share power, the talks gave enough time for the two sides, particularly for the RPF to prepare for the final show down.

9.9 The Genocide

A number of researches have tried to investigate how the genocide was planned and executed (African Rights, 1994; Prunier, 1995; Reyntjens, 1996; Rutinwa, 1996; Anyidooho, 1998; OAU, IPEP, 2000; Melvern 2000; Mamdani, 2001). This body of literature provides a reasonable account of what happened. However, the concern of this study here is to bring **new or additional insights** especially from the Hutu refugees who witnessed the genocide and are now living in Uganda in the very sites where the Tutsi lived between 1959-1994.

The study noted in Chapter four, that the seeds of genocide were sown during the 1959 revolution. After the revolution, it was the Hutu elites that controlled power. The calls of the first Hutu President to eliminate the Tutsi symbolised the accomplishment of Hutu empowerment.

When Juvenal Habyarimana established the second republic, he at first took a moderate path towards the Tutsi. As long as they did not seek political power, they could as well struggle in the wider society for their survival. Indeed, some Tutsi elites flourished in business both locally and internationally.

When the RPF struck in 1990, some Hutu extremists saw this as an attempt for the Tutsi to recapture power for themselves and to disempower the Hutu. Even President J. Habyarimana came to change his attitude towards the policy of reconciliation and tolerance that he had pursued. During the MRND Congress of 28 April 1991, Habyarimana called upon the Hutu to unite in the following words:

> The unity of ethnic groups is not possible without the unity of the majority. Just as we note that no Tutsi recognises regional belonging, it is imperative that the majority forge unity, so that they are able to ward off any attempt to return into slavery (Speech, at the Congress,1991)

The President's words were taken very seriously and when the CDR was formed, its president Martin Bucyana, on the occasion of launching the party on 30 October 1991, had this to say:

> We are convinced that the unity of the *Bahutu* will stop violence and will bring the excess ambitions of the minority Tutsi to their acceptable level (Speech, 1991).

Similarly, on 22 November 1992 at Kabaya in Gisenyi prefecture, Leon Mugesera, one of the Hutu extremist leaders, made public the plans of the genocide:

> You cell members, work together watch out for intruders in your cell, suppress them. Do anything you can so that nobody sneaks out. The fatal mistake we made in 1959 is that we let them (Tutsi) out of the country. Their homeland is Ethiopia. We will cut their throats and send them to Ethiopia through the short-cut, that is, river Nyabarongo (Speech, 1992).

On 8 April 1993 the Habyarimana regime inaugurated a new radio station known as *Radio Relevision Libre des Mille Collines* (RTLMC), whose main purpose was to mobilise the Hutu population to defend the Republic.

As the civil war intensified, different political groups trained and armed youth gangs as their security organs against the Tutsi invaders. The ruling party, the MRND, had the *interahamwe* (those who hit together) the CDR created *Impuzamugambi* (those with a single purpose), the MDR had the *Inkuba* (thunder); while the PSD created *Abakombozi* (the liberators). According to field findings it is these armed groups that are commonly grouped as *Interahamwe* that executed the genocide of 1994. Similarly, the RPF which pursued them and sometimes carried out revenge acts cannot be exonerated from participating in the genocide as witnesses will narrate shortly below.

But why did these armed groups not confront the RPF/RPA enemy but turned, instead to the unarmed Tutsi civilians?

One possible explanation is that when the Hutu extremists realised that they were losing the war, they turned to the Tutsi so that the RPF would have no one to rule. Mamdani (2001:215) identified two turning points in defining the shift of focus from an armed target on the battlefield to an unarmed and defenceless civilians within.

The first was the assassination of the Hutu president in neighbouring Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye. The second was the assassination of Rwanda's own Hutu president, Juvenal Habyarimana, followed shortly by the murder of the Prime Minister, Agatha Uwilingiyimana. If Ndadaye's death was taken as a prophetic lesson that the only alternative for the Hutu was between power and servitude, that there could be no power sharing between Hutu and Tutsi, Habyarimana's death was a signal that the hour to choose between power and servitude had indeed struck.

When a similar question was put to the Hutu refugees now living in Orukinga refugee settlement (Table 9.2 below) and Nakivale refugee settlement (Table 9.3 below), during the focus groups discussions, they had this to say:

I. *Abashakaga gutegeka nibo batumye abantu bafpa cyane* (meaning: those who wanted to capture state power are the ones who caused genocide).

II. *Gufpa kwa Habyarimana kwateye abantu uburakari bwinshi bituma kwicana cyane* (The death of Habyarimana angered the people – Hutu, and led them to kill massively).

III. *Mwishe Presida wacu natwe reka tubice* (The Tutsi have killed our President, therefore we must kill them).

To the Hutu refugees who were interviewed, the killing of the Hutu President was bad enough to identify the collaborators, anti-Hutu sympathisers and traitors of the Hutu nation. In their understanding, the RPF was responsible for the genocide. RPF/RPA they contend, was seen carrying out revenge in areas it controlled before the fall of Kigali.

As the events turned out, the demise of Juvenal Habyarimana in a plane crash and the commencement of the genocide, provided the RPF with a justification to continue the war, stop the genocide and to take over state power in Kigali effectively.

Table 9.2: Refugee population in Orukinga refugee settlement by 30 August 2001

Category	Zone	0-4 Years		5-17 Years		Above 18		Subtotal
		M	F	M	F	M	F	
Banyarwanda	Kifunjo	199	164	184	277	366	333	1523
Banyarwanda	Kazinga	127	173	257	207	238	267	1269
Banyarwanda	Michinga	147	182	237	230	297	362	1455
	Sub-Total	473	519	678	714	901	962	
	Grand Total	4247						4247

Source: Office of the Camp Commandant Orukinga Refugee Settlement; September, 2001.

Table 9.3: Refugee population in Nakivale refugee settlement by 30 August 2001

Category	Number
Rwandese	7516
Congolese	1093
Somalis	761
Ethiopians	22
Sudanese	43
Kenyans	68
Burundians	03
Appeal Cases	759
Unverified	415
Total	10680

Source: Office of the Camp Commandant, Nakivale Refugee Settlement, September 2001.

The experiences recounted with the Hutu refugees living in the two settlements (Table 9.2 and 9.3) indicated to the researcher that they felt betrayed by the international community and the new leaders in Kigali. To them the world did not act fast enough to stop genocide, and the RPF to some extent participated in genocide through their revenge activities. How then, did the international community behave during the genocide? This question is best answered by examining closely the respective roles of the following key and close actors of the time: the UN, Belgium, France and the OAU.

9.10 The United Nations, Belgium and France.

After the crash of President Habyarimana's jet, the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) Commander General Romeo Dallaire cabled New York, thus: `Give me the means and I can do more' (*Report*, 2000). Unfortunately the UN Secretariat frustrated this request. Instead, operations to evacuate their nationals were immediately organised by France, the US, Belgium and Italy. On 9 April 1994, Kofi Annan instructed Dallaire in writing to cooperate with both the French and Belgian Commanders to facilitate the evacuation of their nationals and other foreign nationals requesting evacuation.

> You should make every effort not to compromise your impartiality or to act beyond your mandate but may exercise your discretion to do (so) should this be essential for the evacuation of foreign nationals. This should not, repeat not, extend to participating in possible combat, except in self defence (UN Independent Inquiry, 1999:17).

When 10 Belgian Blue Helments were killed by the soldiers of the Presidential Guard, Belgium responded by withdrawing its contingent. This was a terrible blow to the peace mission.

In response to the Belgian move, the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) recommended to the Security Council two other possible options: To keep UNAMIR, minus its Belgian contingent, for a period of three weeks, or to immediately reduce UNAMIR and maintain only a token UN presence (*OAU Report*, 2000).

The Secretary General Boutros-Ghali preferred the first option and made it clear that he would proceed to the next option if no progress was made. The British representative took the lead in supporting the Belgian proposal for a total withdrawal of UNAMIR. The Clinton Administration held that there was no useful role for any peace keeping operation in Rwanda under the prevailing circumstances; in other words, it could not be effective, since making it so would involve taking real risks (OAU Report, 2000).

All these correspondences, in the face of a continued genocide demoralised the remaining UNAMIR troops to the extent that key Hutu moderate leaders were surrendered to the killers without a fight. For instance, former Chief Justice Joseph Kavaruganda and former foreign Minister Boniface Ngulinza were

abandoned by the UNAMIR to be massacred by the Hutu extremists (McKinney, 1999).

For the French, when they withdrew their forces, it was clear that they had no will to stop the genocide. Indeed, on 8 April and 9 April 1994 some 500 French troops landed at Kigali airport to evacuate French citizens as well as some 400 Rwandans, many of them linked to the Habyarimana family. No Tutsi was flown out; The result of this French action, writes one scholar.

> Is captured in the images of women, men and children who climbed the gates of the French embassy, and of those (Rwandans) who had served the French government but were left to fend for themselves in the face of genocide, while those who for years had sown the seeds of ethnic hatred and helped build a vast machinery of death were lifted to safety in French planes (*OAU Report*, 2000)

The people of Rwanda were, indeed, let down at the hour of need. In an interview with a group of Hutu refugees in Michinga Zone of Orukinga Refugee Settlement, those who had originated from Gikomero Commune in Kigali prefecture had this to say:

> The French, and the Belgians let us down. We had hoped that they would use their superior military might to stop the genocide but they did not. It appears they did not care for poor Africans, may be that is why they withdrew. (*Interview Orukinga Settlement September, 2001*).

Meanwhile, there was considerable pressure in France from civil society groups to help to stop the genocide. In response to those demands, the French government organised a humanitarian operation code named *Operation Turquoise*. France then quickly deployed troops to Rwanda which created a safe

haven for the survivors'. But this 'safe haven' also turned out to be a place where some of the extremists hid after their operations. Had this operation been organised at the beginning of the genocide, many more lives would have been saved.

According to one RPF cadre who preferred to remain anonymous, the French support was mainly for the interim government. Large numbers of Ex-FAR, and the *interahamwe* managed to escape the RPF/RPA advance by retreating to the convenience of the safe zone. France even threatened to use force against any RPF/RPA encampment on the zone (Interview, in Kigali).

9.11 The Organisation of African Unity

The OAU had been deeply involved in diplomatic initiatives before the genocide especially through the Arusha talks.

Even when the genocide started, individual personalities tried to initiate a ceasefire. The Secretary General condemned the killings in Rwanda. He issued a statement expressing his outrage at the murders of Prime Minister Uwilingimana, her colleagues, Rwandan civilians and the 10 Belgian UN soldiers.

President Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania, facilitator at Arusha, attempted to convene a fast peace conference; but it failed to materialise.

But what has been put as a failure by the OAU, is that the organisation and a large majority of African Heads of State and Governments did not unanimously and unequivocally label the war against the Tutsi `a genocide'.

This was made even worse, because at a regular Summit meeting of OAU Heads of State and Governments in Tunis in June 1994, the delegation of the genocidaire government under the interim President Sindikubwabo was welcomed and treated as a full and equal member of the OAU, ostensibly representing and speaking for Rwandan citizens.
Undoubtedly, the OAU failed morally to condemn genocide; while it also humiliated the Rwandan people by flirting with the organisers of the genocide.

The genocide has had far reaching consequences for both the dominant Tutsi government in Kigali and the Hutu, some of whom are still in exile as refugees in the neighbouring countries and beyond.

For the RPF government, the desire to bring justice to all those who participated in the genocide has not been easy. The prisons are overcrowded and yet justice demands quick trial. Attempts to create local courts, known as *Gacaca,* are yet to be seen both in intention and practice. On the other hand, the RPF has established a reconciliation commission to bring the Rwandese together. But how do you balance justice and reconciliation after genocide? How do you make empowerment to benefit all Rwandese so that the vicious circle of violence is

broken? When these questions were put to the Hutu refugees in a focus group discussion in Orukinga and Nakivale refugee settlements, some suggestions were proposed which run as follows:

I. The RPF should stop new refugee flows and the killings going on now in Rwanda. The RPF government should reconcile with its opponents like Faustin Twagiramungu, Pasteur Bizimungu, work together with them, share power according to the Arusha accord and release political prisoners. This is what will convince us to go back home (*Focus group discussion, Kazinga Zone, Orukinga, 13 September 2001*).

II. The RPF should return to the principles of the Arusha accord which provided sharing of power. The RPF violated it because of selfishness and the desire to monopolise power. There should be reconciliation between Rwanda leaders both in government and opposition. The government should stop divisions according to ethnicity and hold democratic elections (*Focus group discussion, Nakivale, 12 September 2001*).

The same questions were put to Charles Murigande, Secretary General of RPF and chairman of the inter-political parties committee in Rwanda, who made the following observation:

> Our task is to create a political environment for people to live in some peace, where they can sit together and work together. The government is committed to discouraging revenge. Justice is the business of the state not individuals. We are promoting political education so that our people understand their history, and know what went wrong (*interview with Charles Murigande, Kigali, 10 November 1999*).

When these responses are put to deeper analysis one can easily see the contradiction between establishing justice and reconciliation after the genocide. The challenge to Rwandese leaders is to strike a balance between the two so that empowerment does not only end with the Tutsi who dominate the state in

Rwanda. Otherwise, who knowns, the Hutu in DRC, in Uganda, and elsewhere may seek to repeat the RPF experience.

9.11 Summary

The invasion of Rwanda by the RPF and the nature of the struggle that ensued was not anticipated. This made the RPF to adjust to various challenging circumstances politically and militarily.

On the diplomatic front, the Arusha peace talks enabled the RPF to break out of diplomatic isolation and to put forward its agenda, too. On the other hand, the extremists in Rwanda frustrated the implementation of the accord because they believed that they were the losers in the settlement. This is why they opted for the killing of opponents as an alternative to losing power. When genocide started, many Rwandese hoped that the international community would help. Unfortunately, the UN, the French and the Belgians their historical allies, as well as the OAU did little to avert the genocide. In the circumstance, the RPF had no choice but to fight the interim government of Rwanda and to stop genocide.

Indeed, a process that started in Uganda under specific unique historical conditions ended up in both the desired objective to return home and a human tragedy – the genocide. No doubt, the empowerment process enabled the RPF/RPA to change the distribution of power in Rwanda. This power is being exercised to consolidate the political, economic and social gains for the one time

disempowered refugees of Rwanda. But, if these gains are not spread out equitably to other Rwandese the potential for renewed violence and destabilisation could easily turn into a reality sooner or later.

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

10.0 Introduction

The purpose of this study was to analyse the experiences of Banyarwanda refugees from an historical perspective with the aim of interpreting and explaining their struggle to regain their rights as citizens of Rwanda and to escape from the trials and tribulations of refugee status.

In order to achieve this purpose or the general objective, a number of questions were asked to analyse the research problem and to test the hypotheses.

As stated in the Introduction, the study focuses on the empowerment of refugees in a politically conflict-ridden host society. Therefore, to understand the empowerment process of the Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda, it was important to ask the following questions: What events preceded and necessitated the mass exodus of Rwandese refugees to Uganda? Why was there the exodus of refugees during and after the social revolution of 1959? How did the Rwanda government handle the refugee problem after the events of 1959? How were the Banyarwanda refugees received by the host community and the host government? How did they organise? What forms did their participation take? What were some of the major constraints in their way? What, in the end, did they achieve? What made such achievements possible and what were some of the pertinent general lessons from their experience? Is there a future for political

stability in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region in which all Banyarwanda can live without recourse to violence?

While answering these questions, the study focused on a central hypothesis and an auxiliary one which run as follows: In the politics of a host state, where refugees have similar social, cultural and demographic characteristics with the indigenous population, the prospects for their empowerment are considerably enhanced. What has been described as an auxiliary hypothesis then goes as follows: In a politically conflict-ridden host society, refugees are likely to manipulate the weaknesses in the social, economic and political situation as a means of their empowerment.

10.1 The findings of the research

10.1.1 Origins of the Banyarwanda refugee question.

The Banyarwanda refugees were victims of the 1959 social revolution in Rwanda. The revolution was a protracted process which sowed the seeds of politics of violence and the problem of refugees in Rwanda. The roots of the problem of Banyarwanda refugees can be traced to both pre-colonial and colonial social forces that operated in Rwanda. Colonialism distorted and vulgarised the traditional (pre-colonial) social and political structures of Rwanda. Although inequalities existed, the Banyarwanda, Tutsi, Hutu and Twa had managed to live together with minimum social conflict that never translated into

high levels of violence against each other. Colonialism, thus, consolidated Tutsi control of the society of Rwanda at the expense of the Hutu.

With, the wind of decolonisation after the Second World War, and the emergence of the Hutu counter elite through education, Tutsi power, especially at the local level, faced an enormous challenge. As events unfolded, the Belgian colonial authorities shifted their support from the Tutsi to the Hutu in the name of democracy. It was in this environment that the 1959 social revolution, which forced thousands of Tutsi into exile as refugees, occurred.

The Tutsi refugees, in the neighbouring countries were, however, not homogenous. Some were ordinary people, while others were elites, leaders and armed groups.

In Uganda, the Tutsi elites tried to force their way back to Rwanda through a guerilla group known as *Inyenzi*. However, the conditions in Uganda at the time were not conducive for their organisation and the struggle became futile. For those who wanted to organise were indeed, frustrated. On the whole, the study found out that Rwandese refugees were generally well received by the host communities in south western Uganda and the government of Uganda at the time (i.e. between 1959-1970). On the other side, the Rwandan government practiced the politics of exclusion; and as the *Inyenzi* tried a violent return, more Tutsi were massacred, while others took to exile. The Rwanda government, on its part, claimed to having no room for the return of the refugees in its polity.

10.1.2 Factors of integration and empowerment in Uganda.

The research established that the Banyarwanda refugees achieved reasonable levels of integration in the Ugandan society because of similar demographic, social, economic and cultural characteristics with Ugandan population in the parts where they settled. This integration initially was undermined by language barrier and the 'exclusion' type of life for those who were in the settlements. Furthermore, the desire to return home kept some of the refugees expectant for the conditions to improve in their country of origin in order to repatriate quickly.

But, over time, the obstacles of language were overcome because of long contact with the local community and education. Through education, Christianity and the reception of the Banyankole and the Batoro, the refugees, especially their offsprings, mastered local languages, made friends, intermarried and indeed, participated in all activities of the communities in which they lived.

These findings overwhelmingly support my central hypothesis that in the politics of the host state, where refugees have similar, social, cultural and demographic characteristics with the indigenous population, the prospects for their empowerment are considerably enhanced.

10.1.3 Factors that consolidated the empowerment process in Uganda.

From early 1960s, the Tutsi refugees or at least their leadership dreamed of returning home. Their challenge was how to realise it. Earlier, it was noted that the environment in Uganda was not conducive for organised refugee activities.

Opportunities emerged, however, in the context of the civil war in Uganda between 1981 and 1986. In fact, the violations of human rights of the Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda at various periods in Uganda's history raised their consciousness to a point that, inspite of the meaningful levels of integration alluded to earlier, return to their homeland, was believed as the only achievement that would restore their full identity and dignity.

The participation of Banyarwanda refugees in the NRM/NRA struggle enabled them to acquire political and military skills which they used to the maximum to achieve their objective of empowerment.

After the NRA capture of power in Uganda, some refugees occupied high positions in the state and this allowed them to have access to resources that were much needed for their empowerment process.

The support given to the refugees by the Ugandan government and, particularly, by President Yoweri Museveni, which included military training for officer corps outside Uganda on taxpayers money, was, beyond dispute, a fundamental empowerment facility at the time.

10.1.4 Political and Military organisation of the refugees.

The research findings show that the Banyrwanda refugees formed the RPF and the RPA when still in Uganda. This was possible because the refugees had

mastered the weaknesses in the Ugandan society. The leaders being in positions of responsibility, while others had been successful as civil servants, traders and farmers, the Banyarwanda strengthened themselves economically, socially, militarily, culturally and politically so that few Ugandans could suspect them on their plans to wage war on Rwanda except those in government who supported them. Their secretive behaviour at times eluded the Uganda security agencies on what exactly they intended to do and the timing. This is why inspite of the support they enjoyed from the Ugandan leadership, the RPF/RPA never informed their 'comrades' in the NRA that the zero hour of attacking Rwanda had come. Furthermore, because of resemblance with some Ugandans, it was difficult to differentiate who was a Munyarwanda Ugandan, and a refugee or a Munyankole of Hima sub-ethnic group in Ankole at least for those who come from outside Ankole. Therefore, I can safely conclude mindful of the auxiliary hypothesis that to a large extent refugees manipulated the weaknesses in Ugandan society as a process of empowerment.

10.1.5 Constraints during the RPF struggle.

The research established, however, that the story was not always one of success. The loss of the RPF leaders in the initial days of attack on Rwanda, limited resources, hostile external forces, as well as the hostility from the Rwandan Hutu population all derailed the struggle for sometime.

In order to overcome the constraints, the RPF engaged on a diplomatic strategy concurrently with the war through the Arusha peace talks. This gave the Front

time to mobilise more resources, to sell its political programme both locally and internationally, and to exhaust the Habyarimana regime politically and militarily.

The peace agreement that was finally reached at Arusha was never implemented because neither, the RPF, nor the various factions in Rwanda including the government (except those opposed to Habyarimana) were interested in peace.

The shooting down of Habyarimana's presidential jet provided an 'opportunity' for the Hutu extremists who knew that they could not win the war, to turn upon to the civilian population by carrying out the genocide of 1994. Indeed, by resorting to genocide, Hutu power acknowledged the success of empowerment and in this regard the genocide was a desperate act of 'a drowning person', an admission that Hutu power could not contain and defeat the RPA, hence, the turn to civilians so that an RPA victory would be in vain.

10.2 The implications of the findings

This analysis of the refugee question in Africa through a selected case study has been interesting, educational and inspiring to a young scholar like this author.

In exploring the struggle for the rights of Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda, the return to their homeland emerged as an overriding political objective. The analysis showed that return to home is not just a psychological achievement but relates to issues of power and resource sharing. To achieve power and

resources is also a process of struggle which the study has treated as an empowerment process.

Indeed, the empowerment process of these people that had its origins in Uganda was initiated by both the objective and subjective factors that intersected each other in the Ugandan society.

The research findings established that the similarities between the Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda, and their Ugandan hosts conditioned the way the refugees adjusted to living in Uganda as well as the struggle to return home to regain their birth right.

Similarly, the contradictions in Ugandan society characterised by conflicts, violations of human rights, and dictatorial policies, which contradictions were also replicated in their country of origin that had barred them from repatriation, raised their consciousness to demand and to struggle for their rights.

In the process, the refugees manipulated the weaknesses in the political, economic, social, educational and military institutions of Uganda to further their empowerment. While parading as citizens, often without their true credentials being questioned, some of the children of refugees acquired education, employment and land in Uganda to strengthen themselves. A weak, fractionated

political system lacking the proficiency and many paraphernalia of the modern state could hardly manage to keep pace with the plots and the intrigues of these refugees in relation to their set goal of a return to Rwanda.

By the time the refugees formed a viable political and military organisation in the names of the RPF/RPA, the individual refugees had already acquired meaningful levels of empowerment wherever they settled.

It is here that this study's auxiliary hypothesis comes up for confirmation. As the study has shown, these refugees clearly manipulated the weaknesses in the Ugandan society and polity to get on with their work of empowerment to its end which was a return to 'forbidden' land. In the process this was coupled with the seizure of state power, too.

The analysis also shows that refugees are not just objects of history but also subjects in their own right. Given the conditions that existed in Uganda, which can exist elsewhere, refugees have the potential of fighting for their rights particularly, the right to return home.

Furthermore, the experience of the Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda has far reaching implications. This is because, these refugees seem to be one of the largest ethnic groups in the Great Lakes region. Many Banyarwanda refugees and naturalised Banyarwanda citizens in Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya, and

DRC keep ties of blood relationships and solidarity. Therefore, a homeless Banyarwanda is not in the interest of peace in the region, generally. A permanent solution must, therefore, be sought to the Banyarwanda refugee question.

Currently, many Hutu Banyarwanda refugees are involved in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Burundi, as well as in the civil wars of these countries. If they are not integrated in their country of origin in terms of power and resource sharing, then, it is not too far fetched to fear that experience of the Rwandese refugees who lived in Uganda from 1959 to 1990 is likely to be repeated.

Therefore, the recommendations that follow, which are for action by the Rwandan government and the regional states, should be taken seriously with a positive heart if we are to have peace, security, and social justice in the region and the continent at large.

10.3 Recommendations

The research findings and the magnitude of the refugee question suggest that the state of Rwanda, its neighbours and the international community should consider seriously the following modest recommendations, by this author.

(i) Reconciliation and repatriation

The state and government of Rwanda, with encouragement from the OAU member states, should work out a political solution that promotes reconciliation and an environment for the return of all refugees.

(ii) Prevention of violent conflict from re-emerging

(a) Fundamentally, conflict emerges because of the violation of human rights and denial of access to scarce resources. Rwanda and Africa as a whole must build institutions that allow popular participation in decision making, transfer of political power from one group or generation to the other, and generally, to address the question of democracy and good governance.

(b) Since ethnicity has been politicised in Rwanda, it is high time, the state addressed the question of ethnic conflict management. On the whole, African states must learn to construct better institutions and constitutions that can accommodate ethnic differences. Forms of government like decentralisation and federalism should be studied so as to identify the possibility of recognising and accommodating ethnic diversity.

(iii) Strengthening the OAU's (AU's) ability to undertake preventive action.

(a) The OAU(AU) should seriously consider the establishment of a rapid deployment force with soldiers

from member states that are not a party or sympathetic to the parties involved in the conflict. This force should be well facilitated by both the OAU and the UN for preventive and peace making duties. Such a structure for **Pan-African intervention** would help to avoid the risk of rival interventions.

(b) The UN Security Council should go beyond the passing of mere resolutions to actual implementation as provided under Chapter Seven of the Charter of United Nations Organisation.

10.4 Suggestions for further research

The treatment of the question of politics and the refugee experience in Uganda, while focusing on the Banyarwanda refugees, compels us to focus on other broader issues of the Banyarwanda ethnic group, human rights, peace and security in Africa.

Therefore, the following broad themes are proposed as plausible for a research agenda:

(i) Comparative research on the Banyarwanda ethnic group in Uganda, Tanzania, DRC and Kenya.

(ii) Ethnic conflict management in the Great Lakes region of Africa.

(iii) The role of the UN's humanitarian agencies in response to emergencies.

(iv) Capacity-building for the OAU and the UN in order to boost their performance and efficiency in peace making and peace keeping operations.

(v) Refugees and human rights in Africa and in the Great Lakes region, in particular.

REFERENCES

A Humanitarian Agenda. New York, Oxford University Press.

Adepoju, A (1982), 'The Dimension of the Refugee Problem in Africa' Africa Affairs. 81(322)21-35

Afigbo, A.E; Ayandele, E.A; Gavin, R.J; Omer-Cooper, J.D. and Palmer, R (1986), The Making of Modern Africa: The Nineteenth Century. Vol.3, England, Longman Group Ltd.

Africa Events, December 1990.

African Rights (1994), Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance . London, African Rights.

Aga Khan, S (1971), 'The one million refugees in Africa,' Migration News. 4

Amate, C.O.C. (1986), Inside the OAU: Pan-Africanism in Practice. London, Macmillan.

Amin, Samir (1972), 'Underdevelopment and Dependency in Black Africa-origins and contemporary Forms,' in JMAS.10

Anstey, Mark (1991), Negotiating Conflict: Insights and skills for Negotiators and - Peace Makers. Juta and Co. Ltd.

Anyidooho, Henry Kwami (1998), Guns over Kigali: The Rwandese Civil War-1994. Kampala, Fountain Publishers.

Barongo, Yoramu (1998), `Problems of Integrating Banyarwanda refugees among local communities in Uganda: A study of Refugee settlements in Hoima and Kabarole Districts in Gingyera-Pinycwa (ed) (1998), Uganda and the Problem of Refugees. Kampala, Makerere University Press.

Bell, Judith (1997), How to complete your Research Project successfully. London, UBS Publishers' Distributors Ltd.

Bernard, W.S. (1973), `Indices of Integration in the American Community', International Migrations: Quarterly review of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration and the Research Group for European Migration Problems. The Hague. 11(3).

Boesch, Erust (1982), `From Expulsion to Hospitality: A psychologist's Look at the Refugee Problem', in Boesch, E and Godlschmidt, A. (eds), Refugees and Development. Baden-Baden, Nomos Vertagsgesselschaft.
Bookman, A. and S. Morgen (1988), Women and the Politics of Empowerment. Philadephis, Temple University Press.

Borrie, W.D. (1959), Cultural Integration of Immigrants. Paris, UNESCO

Bouma, Gary D. and G.B.J. Atkinson (1995), A Handbook of Social Science Research. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Brown, L and P. Selznick (1981), Sociology. New York, Harper and Row.

Bucyana, Martin, 'Speech by the President, of the Coalition for the defence of the Republic', (CDR) during the launching of the party, 1991.

Bulcha, Mekuria (1988), Flight and Integration: Causes of Mass Exodus from Ethiopia and Problems of Integration in the Sudan. Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.

Clay, Jason, (1984), The Eviction of the Banyarwanda: The story Behind the Refugee Crisis in Southwest Uganda. Cambridge, Cultural Survival.

Cohen, Roberta and Francis M. Deng (1998), Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement. Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press.

Communication from the President to the District Councils of Bushenyi, Kabale, Kabarole, Kasese, Mbarara and Rukugiri; Assembled in Mbarara Town Hall on 29 October 1982.

Coser, L. (1956), The Functions of Social Conflict. New York, Free Press.

Curtin, Philip D (1969), The Atlantic Slave Trade. Madison, University of Wisconsin.

De Lacger, L. (1961), Rwanda. Kabgayi (2 ed.)

Deng, Francis M (1998), Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. New York, United Nations Publications.

Denoon, Donald and Nyeko, Balam (1987), Southern Africa since 1800, London, Longman Group Ltd.

Destexhe, Alain (1995), Rwanda and Genocide in Twentieth Century. London, Pluto Press.

Document VIII, (1961), 'Factors in Favour of Keeping Refugees and Cattle in Ankole'. Ministry of Social Development and Labour.

Document XXIII (1962), 'Rwanda Refugees'. Entebbe, Ministry of Health.

Document XXIII (1962). 'Rwanda Refugees'. Entebbe, Ministry of Health.
Document XXIV (1962), Rwanda Refugees, Kampala, Ministry of Community Development.

Document, XXI (1962), 'Notes for Minister of Internal Affairs for Discussion on Rwanda refugees'. Kampala, Ministry of Community development.

Dodd, Robert (1982), Background notes on the Possible Reasons for the Current Uganda/Rwanda Refugee problem. Oxford, Refugee Studies Programme Documentation Centre.

Doornbos, Martin *et. al.* (1992), Beyond Conflict in the Horn. The Hague, Institute of Social Studies.

Dorsey, L. (1994), Historical Dictionary of Rwanda. London, The scarecrow press.

Eisenstadt, S.N. (1954), The Absorption of Immigrants. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd.

Fair, Denis (1996), 'Refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa: From cause to solution' Africa Insight 26(1) 36-42.

Freire, Paul (1971), Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York, Herder & Herder.

Gingyera-Pinycwa, A.G.G (ed), (1998), Uganda and the Problem of Refugees. Kampala, Makerere University Press.

Gita, Grown, S.K. (1987), Monthly Review. New York.

Grahl-Madsen, Atle (1978), `Political Rights and Freedom of Refugees; in Melander, Goran and Peter (eds), Noble African Refugees and the Law. Uppsala, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.

Habyarimana, Juvenal, 'Speech by the President during the MRND Congress', on 28 April 1991.

Hamilton, Varginia (1987), Uprooted Angolans: From Crisis to Catostrophe. United States Committee for Refugees.

Hansen, Art; Oliver, Smith; and Anthony (eds.), 1982). Involuntary Migration and Resettlement: The Problems and Responses of Dislocated People. Buolder/Colorado, West View Press.

Harrel-Bond, Barbara (1986), Imposing Aid: Emergency assistance to Refugees. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Himes, J.S. (1980), Conflict and Conflict Management. Athens, University of Georgia Press.

International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, (1999). World Disaster Report. Oxford, Oxford University Press

IPEP/PANEL (2000), Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide. Addis Ababa, The OAU Publications.

Jacobs, B.L. (1965), Administrators in East Africa: Six case studies. Entebbe, The Government Printer. (The work contains a good and substantial Chapter on the administration of the affairs of 'Refugees from Rwanda' beginning from the year 1961).

Johannson, R. (1990), 'The Refugee experience in Europe after World War II: Some Theoretical considerations' in G. Rystad (ed), The Uprooted. Lund, Lund University Press.

Kabera, John, (1990), 'Prospects of Integrating Refugees in Uganda: The case of Banyarwanda'. Unpublished paper, Kampala, Makerere University.

Kagame, A(1972), *Un abrégé de l'ethno-histoire du Rwanda pré colonial.* Butare, Editions Universitaires du Rwanda.

Kamukama, Dixon (1997), Rwanda Conflict: Its Roots and Regional Implications. Kampala, Fountain Publishers.

Kibereab, G (1996), 'Eritrean and Ethiopian urban refugees in Khartoum; what the eye refuses to see,' in African Studies Review. 39 (3) 131-178.

Kibreab, Gaim (1983), Reflections on the African Refugee Problem: A Critical Analysis of Some Basic Assumptions. Uppsala, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.

Kibreab, Grain (1985), A study of organised settlements for Eritrean Refugees in Eastern Sudan: 1967-1983. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis.

Kriesberg, L. (1973), The Sociology of Social Conflicts. Englewood Cliffs New Jersey, Prentice Hall.

Kunz, E.F. (1973), `The Refugee in Flight: Kinetic Models and forms of Displacement, International Migration Review, 7(2) 125-146.

Kunz, E.F. (1981), 'Exile and Resettlement: Refugee Theory', in International Migration Review. XV.

Lema, A (1993), Africa divided: The creation of 'ethnic groups' Lund, Lund University Press.

Lemarchand, Rene (1970), Rwanda and Burundi. London, Pall Mall Press.

Leys, Colin (1975), Underdevelopment in Kenya: The political Economy of Neo-colonialism 1964-1971. Nova Scotia, University of Nova Scotia Press.

Linden, 1 (1995). The churches and genocide: lessons from Rwanda. *Svensk Missiontidskrift* 83 (3/1995):5-15.

Lule, Yusuf (1982), Human Rights Violations in Uganda under Obote. California.

Mamdani, Mahmood (2001), When victims become killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press.

Mamdani, Mahmood (1996), Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of late colonialism. Kampala, Fountain Publishers.

Mamdani; Mahmood (1998), 'Understanding the Crisis in Kivu: Report of the CODESRIA Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo', submitted to the CODESRIA General Assembly in Dakar, Senegal.

Maslow, A. (1954), Motivation and Personality. Princeton, N.J.

Mazimhaka, Patrick (1994), 'Address by the 1st Vice President – RPF, to the 7th Pan African Congress', Kampala in Karrim, Essack (1994), The Second Liberation of Africa. Dar es Salaam, Thackers Publishers Limited.

McKinney, Cynthia (1995), `The Bloody Tricolour' in Panorama, BBC, U.K.

McKinney, Cynthia (1999), Newsletter from U.S. Congresswomen.

Melvern, Linda (2000), A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide.

Ministry of Internal Affairs Annual Report 1971.

Mugesera Leon, 'Speech by the executive Committee member of MNRD', during political rally at Kabaya in Gisenyi, 22 November 1992.

Mujaju, A.B. (1989), `International Conflict and its International context, in Rupesinghe, K. (ed), *Conflict Resolution in Uganda.* Oslo, International Research Institute.

Murindwa, Rutanga (1994), 'People's Anti-colonial struggles in Kigezi under Nyabingi Movement, 1910-1930' in Mamdani, M and Oloka-Onyango, Joe (ed), Uganda: Studies in Living Conditions, Popular Movements and Constitutionalism. Kampala, JEP and CBR.

Museveni, Y.K. (1998), Background to the Situation in the Great Lakes Region Statement by the President of the Republic of Uganda on Uganda's Involvement in the Wars of the Great Lakes Region, Delivered in Harare, Zimbabwe.

Museveni, Yoweri (1991), 'Building Uganda for the Future: Address to Makerere University students and staff at Freedom Square', 8 June 1991.

Mushemeza, Elijah D. (1998), `Refugees and International Relations: The case of Uganda and her neighbours 1960-90' in Gingyera Pinycwa, A.G.G. (ed), Uganda and the Problem of Refugees. Kampala, Makerere University Press.

Myers, Norman and Jennifer, Kent (1995), Environmental Exodus: An Emergent Crisis in the Global Arena. UNEP, Documentation Centre.

New Vision, 11 October 1990.

Newbury, Catherine (1988), The Cohension of oppression: Clientship and ethnicity in Rwanda 1860-1960. New York, Columbia University Press.

Newland, K. (1996), 'Refugees, the Rising Flood', in World Politics. Guilford, Conn, Dush Publishing Group.

Nkundabagenzi, F. (ed), (1961), Rwanda Politique 1958-1960 Brussels, CRISP.

Nnoli, Okwadiba (1986), Introduction to Politics. Ibadan, Longman.

Nyerere, J.K. (1979), `Speech to the Conference on Refugees in Africa', Arusha, Tanzania.

Nzongola-Ntalaja, George (1996), 'Crisis in the Great Lakes region', Southern Africa Political & Economic Monthly, 10(2) 5-7.

Nzogola-Ntalaja, George (1998), From Zaire to the Democratic Republic of Congo. Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstutet.

OAU (2000), at www.oau-auo.org on the International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. .

Omer-Cooper, J.D. (1988), The Zulu Aftermath: A nineteenth century Revolution in Bantu Africa. England, Longman Group. Ltd.

Ondoga Ori Amaza, Godfrey (1998), Museveni's Long March: From Guerilla to statesman. Kampala, Fountain Publishers.

Parliament of Uganda, Parliamentary Hansard Debates

Parliament of Uganda 'Report of the Committee of Defence and Internal Affairs on the War in Northern Uganda', Kampala, 1997.

Patton, M.Q. (1980), Qualitative Evaluation Methods. Beverly Hills, Calif, Sage Publications.

Pezullo, C. (1994), Grassroots organizations operating together in sisterhood. (GROOTS).

Pottierm, Johan (1991), 'Review of Catherine Newbury, The Cohesion of oppression'. Cleintship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860-1960, Journal of Peasant Studies. 18(2) 346-347.

Powersland, P.G. (1995), `History of Migration in Uganda' in Richards, A.I. (ed). Economic Development and Tribal Change: A study of Immigrant labour in Buganda. Cambridge, W. Heffer & Sons Ltd.

Powesland, G.F. (1973), `History of the Migration in Uganda', in Richards (ed.), Economic Development and Tribal change: A study of Immigrant Labour in Buganda. Nairobi, Oxford University Press.

Pruitt, D.G. and J.Z. Rubin (1986), Social Conflict: Escalation, stalemate, and Settlement. New York, Random House.

Prunier, Gerald (1995), The Rwanda Crisis 1959 – 1994: History of Genocide. Kampala, Fountain Publishers.

Prunier, Gerald (1998), `The Rwanda Patriotic Front' in Christopher Clapham (ed): African Guerillas, Kampala, Fountain Publishers.

Reyntjens, F. (1996), `Rwanda: Genocide and Beyond', in Journal of Refugee Studies, 9(3) 240-251.

Reyntjens, Filip (1994), L'*Afrique des Grands Lacs en crise.* Rwanda, Burundi: 1988-1994. Paris, Editions Karthala.

Richards, Andrey, 1 (ed.) (1973), Economic development and Tribal Change: A study of Immigrant Labour in Buganda. Nairobi, Oxford University Press.

Rodney, Walter (1972), How Europe underdeveloped Africa. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Publishing House.

Rose, P(1981), `Some Thoughts about Refugees and the Descendants of Theseus', International Migration Review, 15(1-2) 8-15.

Rutinwa, B. (1996), `Beyond Durable Solutions: An Appraisal of the New proposals for Prevention and Solutions of the Refugee crisis in the Great Lakes Region', in Journal of Refugee Studies 9(3) 312-325.

Rwandese Patriotic Front, `Summary Overview of the RPF's Political Programme' n.d., n.p.

Sebahara, P. (1998), `The creation of ethnic division in Rwanda, in The Courier ACP-EU No. 168, 86-87.

Sellstrom, Tor, and Wohlgemuth (1997), The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, study 1, Historical Perspective: Some explanatory factors. Sweden, Nordic Africa Institute.

'Speech by the Mbarara District Council Chairman to Councilors, County and sub-county chiefs' in Kamukuzi Hall on 4 November 1982.

'Statement of the Democratic Party on the Displaced Banyarwanda in South Western Uganda', Kampala, DP headquarters.

The Control of Alien refugees Act (1960), Chapter 64 of the Laws of Uganda, 1964 Edition.

The Economic Intelligence, (1995).

The minority Rights Group, (1982), Uganda: Report No. 66.

'The OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa' (September 10, 1969).

'The Organisation of African Unity Charter' 1963.

The RPF (1990), Political Programme, Kigali, RPF Headquarters.

The Uganda Times Newspaper (1982), Kampala

The United Nations (1985), The United Nations at Forty. New York, United Nations Publications.

The United Nations (1988), The International Bill of Human Rights. New York.

The United Nations, Independent Inquiry of the Genocide in Rwanda. December, 1999.

The Weekly Topic, 18 October 1985.

The Weekly Topic, 19 October, 1990.

The World Almanac and Book of Facts, (2000), World Almanac Books.

The World Bank (1989), Sub Saharan: From crisis to Sustainable Growth. Washington D.C.

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (1991), Guidelines on the Methods of Evaluation of the Socio-Economic and Demographic consequences of Refugees in African countries. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

UNHCR (1997), The State of the World Refugees 1997-1998;

UNHCR (1989), Refugees. No. 66.

UNHCR (2000), The State of the World Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda.

UNHCR, The State of World Refugees 1997-1998.

Van der Meeren, Rachel (1996), 'Three Decades in Exile: Rwandan Refugees 1960-1990' Journal of Refugee Studies, 9(3) 252-267.

Vansina, J (1962), *L'evolution du royaume Rwanda, dés origins 1900.* Brussels Academic Royale des Sciences d'outre-Mer (ARSOM).

Vassall-Adams (1994), Rwanda: An agenda for International Action. Oxford, Oxford Publication.

Wallerstein, I.W (1965), Social change: The colonial Situation. New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

Watson, Catherine (1991), Exile from Rwanda: Background to an Invasion. Washington D.C. the US Committee for refugees.

Weekly Topic, 19 October 1990.

Welcome Speech by L.R. Makatu, Chairman of Mbarara District Council, 29 October 1982.

Winter, Roger (1983), Refugees in Rwanda and Uganda, the Banyarwanda Tragedy. US Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey.

Young, C. (1978), `Zaire: The Unending Crisis,' Foreign Affairs, Fall, 169-185.

Zarembo, Alan, J. (1982), 'Explaining the 1990 Invasion of Rwanda: Domestic Pressures or Foreign Policy Interest? Government Honours Thesis. Unpublished work.

Zolberg, A. and Suhrke, A. (1984), 'Social Conflict and refugees in the Third World: The Cases of Ethiopia and Afghanistan'. A paper presented at the Centre for Migration and Population Studies, Havard University, 22 March.

Zolberg, Aristide R; Astri, Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo (1989), Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World. New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

APPENDIX I

Interview schedule for former refugees now living in Rwanda

Date of Interview: Name of Interviewee

Venue: Position

1. Age

    1. 20 – 29
    2. 30 – 39
    3. 40 – 49
    4. 50 – 59
    5. Above 60

2. Sex

    1. Male
    2. Female

3. Level of formal education and where it was attained.

Level	Country
1. Primary	
2. Secondary ('O'Level)	
3. Post Secondary (A'Level)	
4. University	
5. Other (Specify)	.....

4. What language do you speak?

    1. English
    2. French
    3. Runyakitara
    4. Luganda
    5. Swahili
    6. Kinyarwanda

5. What is your religious affiliation?

   1. Catholic
   2. Protestant
   3. Islam
   4. Orthodox
   5. Other
      specify.....

6. Were you employed while you were in Uganda?

   1. Yes
   2. No

7. Where were you employed and in what position?

Place of employment	Position

8. What was your occupation in Uganda between 1980 – 1990?

   1. Freedom fighter
   2. Student
   3. Peasant
   4. Private entrepreneur
   5. Other
      specify.....

9. What was your role in the Obote I regime?

   .....

10. What was your role in the Amin regime?

    .....

11. What was your role in the Lule and the Binaisa regimes?

    .....

12. What was your role in the Obote II regime?

    .....

13. Did you have any problem or conflict with the community you lived in? If yes what type of conflict? YES NO

If yes, what type/types of conflicts are you referring to?

.....

14. What was your contribution to the liberation of Uganda between 1981 and 1986?

.....

(i) Positive (2) Negative.

15. How did your stay in Uganda improve your knowledge and skills in politics?

.....

16. How did your stay in Uganda improve your knowledge and skills in military science?

.....

17. How did your stay in Uganda improve your economic status?

.....

18. Did you participate in the RPF struggle? If not why?

.....

19. How did you help to organise RPF politically and militarily?

.....

20. What constraints or problems did you encounter?

.....

21. What was Uganda's contribution to the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) struggle?

.....

22. Did the government of Uganda help RPF in any way?

.....

23. What do you consider as the most fundamental achievements of RPF as a political organisation?

.....

24. Is there a future for the Great Lakes region in which all Banyarwanda can live in peace without recourse to violence?

.....

25. What in your view can be done to resolve the refugee question in the Great Lakes region?

.....

APPENDIX II

Questionnaire for the UPDF (formerly NRA) Soldiers

Tick any that is appropriate

1. Respondent code: .....

2. Sex: Male.....1
   Female.....2

3. Age: 20 – 29
   30 – 39
   40 – 49
   50 – 59
   Above 60

4. Level of formal education attained

   1. Never attended school
   2. Primary
   3. Secondary
   4. Post Secondary
   5. University
   6. Other (Please specify).....

5. In your opinion, what are the causes of forced migration in contemporary world politics.

   .....

   .....

   .....

6. Do you think the Banyarwanda refugees contributed to the development of Uganda?

   1. Yes
   2. No
   3. Don't know

7. What is your view on the Banyarwanda refugees' contribution during the National Resistance Movement struggle (NRM)?

   1. Negative
   2. Positive

   Explain.....

8. How were the Banyarwanda refugees recruited into the National Resistance Army (NRA)?

   1. Forced by the unfavourable political climate
   2. Voluntary
   3. Combination of the two
   4. Other considerations

   Explain your choice.....

9. What were the reasons behind the persecution of the Banyarwanda refugees between 1982 and 1983 in Uganda?

   1. Political
   2. Economic
   3. Both
   4. Other

   Explain your choice.....

10. Do you share the view that the human rights of the Banyarwanda ethnic group in Uganda were violated between 1959 and 1990.

    1. Yes
    2. No

    Explain your choice.....

11. How could the Banyarwanda refugees organise inside the NRM/NRA without being restrained?

    .....

    .....

    .....

12(a) Could you explain the factors that enhanced the refugees 'integration' in the Uganda society.

.....

.....

(b) What are the factors that initially inhibited their integration?

.....

.....

13. It has been said that the Banyarwanda refugees acquired political, social, economic and military advantages (Empowerment) in Uganda. What is your view?

.....

.....

14. It is alleged that the Banyarwanda refugees in the NRA used their positions to prepare an invasion of Rwanda. What is your view?

.....

.....

15. Is there a future for the Great lakes region in which all Banyarwanda can be in peace without recourse to violence?

.....

.....

APPENDIX III

Interview Schedule for Banyarwanda (Tutsi) refugees in settlements (of 1959-1990)

1. How old are you?

   1. 20-29
   2. 30-39
   3. 40-49
   4. 50-59
   5. Above 60

2. Where did you first settle after crossing the Rwanda-Uganda border?

   .....

3. How were you received in Uganda?

   .....

4. Do you have children?

   1. Yes
   2. No

   (a) How many of them?

5. Have they received some education?

   .....

   (b) Up to what levels?.....

6. Who pays their tuition fees?.....

7. Did other refugees settle outside the settlement?.....

8. If yes, how did they acquire land/areas in which they settled?

   .....

9. Were you in the settlement between 1980 and 1983?

   1. Yes
   2. No

10. Did you feel you were being persecuted?

    1. Yes
    2. No

11. If yes, how did you personally react?

    .....

12. Did any of your children join the NRA during the 'bush' war?

    .....

13(a) If yes, where are they now (1) UPDF (2) RPF (3) Missing

(b) If they joined (1) and (2) what positions do they hold today?

.....

14. What contribution did you make to the struggle for the return of the refugees to Rwanda between 1990 and 1994?

    (1) Food (2) Money (3) Other (Please specify).....

15(a) Why didn't you return to Rwanda after the war?

.....

(b) What do you consider to be the best solution to the problem of other Rwandese still living out as refugees.

16. Do you intend to apply for the Ugandan citizenship?

APPENDIX IV

Focus group discussion guide for Local population near the settlements of Orukinga, Nakivale, Kyaka 1 and Kyaka 2.

1. What is the name of this village, parish, sub-county and District?

   .....

2. Which is the nearest refugee settlement?

   .....

3. Were you the resident of this village between 1980 and 1985 & 1986-90?

   .....

4. Did you notice any refugee movements from the settlement to other areas?

   .....

5(a) Did you interact with any of them, before they left?

   .....

(b) Do you think some of them joined the NRA 'bush' war?

   .....

(c) If it is true that some joined. What age range of refugees mainly joined the NRA before 1986 and after?

   1. 10-19
   2. 20-29
   3. 30-39
   4. 40-49

6. Have you seen any of the refugees you have mentioned since 1990?

   .....

7. What income generating activities did the Banywaranda refugees have in and outside the settlements?

.....

8. Did their children have education in government schools, including the university?

.....

9. Were some of the Banyarwanda refugees employed by the government of Uganda?

.....

10. Did they own property like land outside the settlement? If they had, how did they acquire the land?

.....

11. Are you aware of any leaders of the former Banyarwanda refugees, who was in the UPDF/NRA and used to come to the settlement regularly?

.....

Can you name them?.....

12. What was the cause of the conflict between the Uganda government and the Banyarwanda ethnic group between 1982 and 1983 in Uganda?

.....

13. Did you have any conflicts with the Banyarwanda refugees and Banyarwanda ethnic group generally? If you had, what were the causes of the conflict?

.....

14(a) Did the Banyarwanda refugees easily integrate in the set up of your area?

.....

(b) What factors inhibited their integration in your village?

.....

15. It has been said that the Banyarwanda refugees took advantage of the weaknesses in the Ugandan society as a method of strengthening themselves politically, economically and militarily. What is your view?

.....

.....

APPENDIX V

Interview Schedule for Opinion leaders in the five districts of Uganda.

1. Age

    1. 30 - 39
    2. 40 - 49
    3. 50 – 59
    4. Above 60

2. Level of formal education attained

    1. Never attended school
    2. Primary
    3. Secondary
    4. Post Secondary
    5. University

3(a) Could you explain the factors that enhanced the Banyarwanda refugees integration in the Ugandan society?

.....

(b) What are the factors that initially inhibited their integration?

.....

4. What were the reasons behind the persecution of the Banyarwanda refugees between 1982 and 1983 in Uganda?

.....

5(a) Who was involved in the persecution exercise?

.....

(b) How was it carried out?

.....

6. What were the effects/consequences of persecuting and chasing the Banyarwanda from your neighbourhood and the district generally?

.....

7(a) What do you consider as gains which the Banyarwanda refugees got from the Uganda society.

.....

(b) Do you think such advantages assisted them to return to Rwanda?

.....

8. What do you consider to be the best solution to the problem of the Rwandese still living out as refugees.

.....

APPENDIX VI

Focus group discussion guide for Banyarwanda (Hutu) refugees in the settlements (1990-2001)

1. Which part of Rwanda did you come from?

   .....

2(a) Did you come straight to Uganda?

   .....

(b) If you did not come to Uganda first, where did you run to?

   .....

3(a) How were you received in Uganda?

   .....

(b) Who received you? And when did you come to this settlement?

   .....

4. Were you in Rwanda when the genocide started?

   .....

5. What caused the genocide?

   .....

6. How did you survive genocide if it started when you were still living in Rwanda?

   .....

7. What problems did you face during your movement from Rwanda to Uganda.

   .....

8. How can Rwandese people break the vicious circle of violence?

.....

9. What do you consider to be the best solution to the problem of other Rwandese still living out as refugees.

.....

APPENDIX VII

PEACE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA
AND
THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT

The Government of the Republic of Rwanda on the one hand, and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the other;

Firmly resolved to find a political negotiated solution to the war situation confronting the Rwandese people since 1st October, 1990;

Considering and appreciating the efforts deployed by the countries of the Sub-region with a view to helping the Rwandese people to recover peace;

Referring to the numerous high-level meetings held respectively at Mwanza, United Republic of Tanzania, on 17th October, 1990, in Gbadolite, Republic of Zaire, on 28th October, 1990, in Goma, Republic of Zaire, on 20th November, 1990, in Zanzibar, United Republic of Tanzania, on 17th February, 1991, in Dar-es-Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, on 18th February, 1991and from 5th to 7th March, 1993;

Considering that all these meetings aimed first and foremost at establishing a ceasefire so as to enable the two parties to look for a solution to the war through direct negotiations;

Noting the N'SELE Ceasefire Agreement, of 29th March, 1991 as amended in GBADOLITE on 16th September, 1991 and at ARUSHA on 12th July, 1992;

Reaffirming their unwavering determination to respect principles underlying the Rule of Law which include democracy, national unity, pluralism, the respect of fundamental freedoms and rights of the individual;

Considering that these principles constitute the basis and consistency of a lasting peace awaited by the Rwandese people for the benefit of the present and future generations;

Noting the Protocol of Agreement on the Rule of Law signed at Arusha on 18th August, 1992;

Considering that the two parties accepted the principle of power-sharing within the framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government;

Noting the Protocols of Agreement on Power-Sharing signed at ARUSHA respectively on 30th October, 1992, and on 9th January, 1993;

Considering that the conflictual situation between the two parties can only be brought to an end through the formation of one and single National Army and a new National Gendarmerie from forces of the two warring parties;

Noting of the Protocol of Agreement on the integration of Armed Forces of both Parties, signed at Arusha on 3rd August, 1993;

Recognizing that the unity of the Rwandese people cannot be achieved until a definitive solution to the problem of Rwandese refugees is found and that the return of Rwandese refugees to their country is an inalienable right and constitutes a factor for peace and national unity and reconciliation;

Noting the Protocol of Agreement on the repatriation of Rwandese refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons, signed at ARUSHA on 9th June, 1993;

Resolved to eradicate and put a definite end to all the root causes which gave rise to the war ;

Have, at the conclusion of the Peace Talks held in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, between 10th July, 1992 and 24th June, 1993 as well as Kinihira, Republic of Rwanda from 19th to 25th July, 1993 under the aegis of the Facilitator, His Excellency-Ali Hassan MWINYI, President of the United Republic of Tanzania, in the presence of the Representative of the Mediator, His Excellency, MOBUTU SESE SEKO, President of the Republic of Zaire as well as Representatives of the Current Chairmen of the OAU, His Excellency Abdou DIOUF, President of the Republic of Senegal, and Hosni MUBARAK, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Secretary General of the OAU, Dr. Salim Ahmed SALIM, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Dr. Boutros Boutros GHALI and Observers representing the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Burundi, the United States of America, France, Nigeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe;

Calling the International Community to witness;

Hereby agree on the following provisions.

Article 1: The war between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front is hereby brought to an end.

Article 2: The following documents are an integral part of the present Peace Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front:

I. The N'SELE Ceasefire Agreement of 29th March, 1991 between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front , as amended in GBADOLITE on 16th September, 1991 and at ARUSHA on 12th July, 1992;

II. The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law, signed at ARUSHA on 18th September, 1992;

III. The Protocols of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government, signed at ARUSHA respectively on 30th October, 1992 and on 9th January, 1993;

IV. The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons, signed at Arusha on 9th June, 1993;

V. The Protocol Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the integration of Armed Forces of the two parties, signed at ARUSHA on, 3rd August, 1993;

VI. The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Miscellaneous Issues and Final Provisions signed at Arusha on 3rd August, 1993.

These entire documents are attached as Annex.

Article 3: The two parties also agree that the Constitution of 10th June, 1991 and the Arusha Peace Agreement shall constitute indissolubly the Fundamental Law that shall govern the Country during the Transition period, taking into account the following provisions:

1. The following articles of the Constitution shall be replaced by the provisions of the Peace Agreement relating to the same matters. The Articles in question are: 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75 paragraph 2, 77 paragraphs 3 and 4, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88 paragaph 1, 90, 96, 99, 101.

2. In case of conflict between the other provisions of the Constitution and those of the Peace Agreement, the provisions of the Peace Agreement shall prevail.

3. The Constitutional Court shall verify the conformity of Laws and Orders in Council with the Fundamental Law thus defined. Pending the enactment of the law on the Supreme Court, the existing Constitutional Court shall remain composed of both the Court of Cassation and the State of Council. The Presiding Judge of the Constitutional Court shall assume the presidency.

Article 4: In case of conflict between the provisions of the Fundamental Law and those of other Laws and Regulations, the provisions of the Fundamental Law shall prevail.

Article 5: The Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front undertake to make every possible effort to ensure that the present Peace Agreement is respected and implemented.

They further undertake to spare no effort to promote National Unity and Reconciliation.

Article 6: The two parties agree on the appointment of Mr. TWAGIRAMUNGU Faustin as Prime Minister of the Broad-Based Transitional Government, in accordance with Articles 6 and 51 of the Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government.

Article 7: The Transitional Institutions shall be set up within thirty seven (37) days following the signing of the Peace Agreement.

Article 8: The current Government shall remain in Office until the Broad-Based Transitional Government is established. The maintenance of that Government does not mean that it can encroach on the mandate of the Broad-Based Transitional Government being established.

The current Government shall, in no case, take decisions which may be detrimental to the implementation of the Broad-Based Transitional programme.

Article 9: The "Conseil National de Developpment" (CND) shall remain in Office until the Transitional National Assembly is established. However, as from the date of signing the Peace Agreement, it shall not enact laws.

Article 10: The present Peace Agreement is signed by the President of the Republic of Rwanda and the Chairman of the Rwandese Patriotic Front, in the presence of:

- The Facilitator, His Excellency, Ali Hassan MWINYI, President of the United Republic of Tanzania,
- His Excellency, Yoweri Kaguta MUSEVENI, President of the Republic of Uganda; Observer country;

- His Excellency Melchior NDADAYE, President of of the Republic of Burundi, Observer country;
- The Representative of the Mediator, His Excellency Faustin BIRINDWA, Prime Minister of Zaire;
- Dr. Salim Ahmed SALIM, Secretary General of the OAU;
- The Repesentative of the Secretary General of the United Nations;
- The Representative of the Current Chairman of the OAU;
- The Representatives of other Observer countries: Germany, Belgium, United States of America, France, Nigeria and Zimbabwe;
- The delegations of the two parties.

Article 11: The present Peace Agreement shall come into force upon its signing by the parties.

Done at Arusha, on the 4th day of the month of August, 1993 both in French and English languages, the original text being in French.

HABYARIMANA Juvénal
Major -General

President of the Republic of Rwanda

KANYARENGWE Alexis
Colonel

Chairman of the Rwandese Patriotic Front

In the presence of the Facilitator
Ali Hassan MWINYI

President of the United Republic of Tanzania

In the presence of the Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations

Mr. Vladmir PETROVSKY
Under-Secretary General
Director General of the United Nations
Office at Geneva

In the presence of the Secretary General of the OAU

Dr. Salim Ahmed SALIM

APPENDIX VII B

TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL

PEACE AGREEMENT

BETWEEN

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA

AND

THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT

The Government of the Republic of Rwanda on the one hand, and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the other;

Firmly resolved to find a political negotiated solution to the war situation confronting the Rwandese people since 1st October, 1990;

Considering and appreciating the efforts deployed by the countries of the Sub-region with a view to helping the Rwandese people to recover peace;

Referring to the numerous high level meetings held respectively at Mwanza, United Republic of Tanzania, on 17th October, 1990, in Gbadolite, Republic of Zaire, on 26th October, 1990, in Goma, Republic of Zaire, on 20th November 1990 in Zanzibar, United Republic of Tanzania, on 17th February, 1991, in Dar-es-Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, on 19th February, 1991 and from 5th to 7th March, 1993;

Considering that all these meetings aimed first and foremost at establishing a ceasefire so as to enable the two parties to look for a solution to the war through direct negotiations;

Noting the N'SELE Ceasefire Agreement, of 29th March, 1991 as amended in GADOLITE on 16th September, 1991 and at ARUSHA on 12th July, 1992;

Reaffirming their unwavering determination to respect principles underlying the Rule of Law which include democracy, national unity, pluralism, the respect of fundamental freedoms and rights of the individual;

Considering that these principles constitute the basis and consistency of a lasting peace awaited by the Rwandese people for the benefit of the present and future generations;

Noting the Protocol of Agreement on the Rule of Law signed at Arusha on 18th August, 1992;

Considering that the two parties accepted the principle of power sharing within the framework of a Broad Based Transitional Government;

Noting the Protocols of Agreement on Power Sharing signed at ARUSHA respectively on 30th October, 1992, and on 9th January, 1993;

Considering that the conflictual situation between the two parties can only be brought to an end through the formation of one and single National Army and a new National Gendarmerie from forces of the two warring parties;

Noting of the Protocol of Agreement on the integration of Armed Forces of both Parties, signed at Arusha on 3rd August, 1993;

Recognizing that the unity of the Rwandese people cannot be achieved until a definitive solution to the problem of Rwandese refugees is found and that the return of Rwandese refugees to their country is an inalienable right and constitutes a factor for peace and national unity and reconciliation;

Noting the Protocol of Agreement on the repatriation of Rwandese refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons, signed at ARUSHA on 9th June, 1993;

Resolved to eradicate and put a definite end to all the root causes which gave rise to the war;

Have, at the conclusion of the Peace Talks held in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, between 10th July, 1992 and 24th June, 1993 as well as Kinihira, Republic of Rwanda from 19th to 25th July, 1993 under the aegies of the Facilitator, His Excellency Ali Hassan MWINYI, President of the United Republic of Tanzania, in the presence of the Representative of the Mediator, His Excellency, MOBUTU SESESEKO, President of the Republic of Zaire as well as Representatives of the Current Chairmen of the OAU, His Excellency Abdou DIOUF, President of the Republic of Senegal, and Hosni MUBARAK, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Secretary General of the OAU, Dr. Salim Ahmed SALIM, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Dr. Boutros Boutros GHALI and Observers representing the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Burundi, the United States of America, France, Nigeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe;

Calling the International Community to witness;

Hereby agree on the following provisions.

Article 1: The war between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front is hereby brought to an end.

Article 2: The following documents are an integral part of the present Peace Agreement concluded between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front:

I. The N'SELE Ceasefire Agreement of 29th March, 1991 between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, as amended in GBADOLITE on 16th September, 1991 and at ARUSHA on 12 July, 1992;

II. The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Rule of Law, signed at ARUSHA on 18th September, 1992;

III. The protocols of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Power-Sharing within the Framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government, signed at ARUSHA respectively on 30th October, 1992 and on 9th January, 1993;

IV. The protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Repatriation of Refugees and the Resettlement of Displaced Persons, signed at Arusha on 9th June, 1993;

V. The Protocol Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the integration of Armed Forces of the two parties, signed at ARUSHA on, 3rd August, 1993;

VI. The Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on Miscellaneous Issues and Final Provisions signed at Arusha on 3rd August, 1993.

These entire documents are attached as Annex.

Article 3: The two parties also agree that the Constitution of 10th June, 1991 and the Arusha Peace Agreement shall constitute indissolubly the Fundamental Law that shall govern the Country during the Transition period, taking into account the following provisions:

1. The following articles of the Constitution shall be replaced by the provisions of the Peace Agreement relating to the same matters. The Articles in question are: 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75 paragraph 2, 77 paragraphs 3 and 4, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88 paragraph 1, 90, 96, 99, 101.

2. In case of conflict between the other provisions of the Constitution and those of the Peace Agreement, the provisions of the Peace Agreement shall prevail.

3. The Constitutional Court shall verify the conformity of Laws and Orders in Council with the Fundamental Law thus defined. Pending the enactment of the law on the Supreme Court, the existing Constitutional Court shall remain composed of both the Court of Cassation and the State of Council. The Presiding Judge of the Constitutional Court shall assume the presidency.

Article 4: In case of conflict between the provisions of the Fundamental Law and those of other Laws and Regulations, the provisions of the Fundamental Law shall prevail.

Article 5: The Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front undertake to make every possible effort to ensure that the present Peace Agreement is respected and implemented.

They further undertake to spare no effort to promote National Unity and Reconciliation.

Article 6: The two parties agree on the appointment of Mr. TWAGIRAMUNGU Faustin as Prime Minister of the Broad-Based Transitional Government, in accordance with Articles 6 and 51 of the Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front of Power-Sharing within the framework of a Broad-Based Transitional Government.

Article 7: The transitional Institutions shall be set up within thirty seven (37) days following the signing of the Peace Agreement.

Article 8: The current Government shall remain in Office until the Broad-Based Transitional Government is established. The maintenance of that Government does not mean that it can encroach on the mandate of the Broad Based Transitional Government being established.

The current Government shall, in no case, take decisions which may be detrimental to the implementation of the Broad-Based Transitional programme.

Article 9: The "Conseil National de Development" (ND) shall remain in Office until the Transitional National Assembly is established. However, as from the date of signing the Peace Agreement, it shall not enact laws.

Article 10: The present Peace Agreement is signed by the President of the Republic of Rwanda and the Chairman of the Rwandese Patriotic Front, in the presence of:

- The Facilitator, His Excellency, Ali Hassan MWINYI, President of the United Republic of Tanzania,
- His Excellency, Yoweri Kaguta MUSEVENI, President of the Republic of Uganda; Observer country;
- His Excellency Melchior NDADAYE, Persident of the Republic of Burundi, Obsever country;
- The Representative of the Mediator, His Excellency Faustin BIRINDWA, Prime Minister of Zaire;
- Dr, Salim Ahmed SALIM, Secretary General of the OAU;

- The Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations;
- The Representative of the Current Chairman of the OAU;
- The Representatives of other Observer countries: Germany, Belgium, United States of America, France, Nigeria and Zimbabwe;
- The delegations of the two parties.

Article 11: The present Peace Agreement shall come into force upon its signing by the parties.

Done at Arusha, on the 4th day of the month of August, 1993 both in French and English languages, the original text being in French.

HABYARIMANA Juvenal
Major general

KANYARENGWE Alexis
Colonel

President of the Republic of Rwanda

Chairman of the Rwandese Patriotic Front

In the presence of the Facilitator
Ali Hassan MWINYI

President of the United Republic of Tanzania

In the presence of the Representatives of the Secretary General of the United Nations

In the presence of the Secretary of the OAU

Mr. Vladmir PETROVSKY
Under-Secretary General

Dr. Salim Ahmed SALIM
Director General of the United Nations Office at Geneva.