Thesis

By

ONAH, EMMANUEL IKECHI

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS, NIGERIA.

CODESRIA

Trans-border Ethnic Hegemony and Political Conflict in Africa : a Comparative Study of the Tutsi of Central Africa and the Fulani of West Africa

NOVEMBER 2006

TRANS-BORDER ETHNIC HEGEMONY AND POLITICAL CONFLICT IN AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE TUTSI OF CENTRAL AFRICA AND THE FULANI OF WEST AFRICA.

BEING A
Ph.D. THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS, NIGERIA.

By

ONAH, EMMANUEL IKECHI
REG. NO.: 979008130

SUPERVISORS:

1.   PROF. REMI ANIFOWOSE,

2.   DR. DERIN OLOGBENLA,
SENIOR LECTURER.

NOVEMBER 2006

i

DEDICATION

This THESIS is dedicated to

MY FATHER

MR PAUL E. ONAH

Who inculcated the love of education into all of us, his children in the very beginnings and continued to demand its actualization ever afterwards;

and

MY WIFE

MRS BLESSING N. ONAH

Whose love, understanding and encouragement ultimately made possible this fulfillment of my lifelong quest for knowledge.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is to the Glory of God Almighty that I hereby acknowledge the assistance received from various individuals on the way to my acquiring the Ph.D. At various times, it seemed as if the very end had come to the programme. But in His mercy, I was always able to trudge on. All thanks therefore go to Him.

Several individuals have a place in this effort. First, I must have to acknowledge the assistance received from the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). Their Small Grant for Thesis Writing, which was awarded me in 2003 for this research made it largely possible for me to embark on the travels (see p.15) without which this work could not have been conclusive. I thank them profusely and hope that the awards would continue to be available to needy and qualified African budding scholars.

Of particular note in my acknowledgements is my Supervisor, Prof. Remi Anifowose. A foremost political scientist, he adopted me as his academic son, starting from when I was pursuing the M.Sc programme in the department. This relationship which is continuing beyond the Ph.D programme, has been of tremendous positive significance to my intellectual development. Infact that my doctoral research topic is in the area of political conflict is a tribute to his influence.

In a similar vein, I thank my second supervisor, Dr Derin Ologbenla from the bottom of my heart. He has been a mentor 'from of

old'. He was my supervisor during my M.Sc programme and has continued to show so much interest in my academic fulfilment throughout this Ph.D programme.

Dr S.O. Akinboye must be specially acknowledged here. He has been our departmental P.G Representative through much of my programme. But on several occasions, he has gone beyond this to personally take up matters concerning me. That my programme is coming to an end now and not later is much to his credit.

Dr Ayo Akinbobola, who was the PG Representative at the start of my programme was also of immense help to me. It was even in his class of 'Comparative Polities of Africa' at the M.Sc level that I got the initial insights into my doctoral research topic. He has continued to show interest in my academic progress ever since.

Prof Alaba Ogunsanwo has been like a father to me. The interest he has shown in my academic progress has been a challenge to me throughout this programme. But even more than this, he has encouraged me in other aspects of life beyond the strictly intellectual, and it is much to his moral and material encouragements that I have been able to finish this programme.

Dr Mrs I. S. Agiobu – Kemmer of the Department of Psychology, UNILAG, has a special mention. At a time serious methodological issues cropped up to threaten my very research effort, she appeared like an angel to straighten things out for me. Although serving as the Sub-Dean of the P.G. school, she nevertheless found time in her very busy schedule to hold numerous sessions with me at which she sharpened

iv

my skills in research reporting and presentation. The insight I got from these sessions has not only made my work more standard but has broadened my entire research outlook.

My colleagues from the Political Science department deserve some mention. Ferdinand Ottoh has been a brother and colleague. As are Godwin Okeke, Tola Odubajo and Mrs M. Quadri. Two colleagues have even been major benefactors to me throughout this programme. Mr Isuwa B. Dogo and Mr Daniel Nwomeh have gone to every length – moral, material and financial, to see that I successfully completed this programme. I will always owe them a debt of gratitude.

There are other colleagues in this programme who have been of tremendous help to me. Mr Austin Agugua of the Dept of Sociology and Mr Charles Umeh of the Department of Psychology have both been friends and teachers to me. In many sessions, these men took me through research methods and this in no small measure helped with my research presentations.

There is another group of benefactors whom I cannot afford not to mention here. All of them have supported me throughout the programme by moral encouragements, but their financial help has been, more importantly, very immense. Space may not allow the details of their help to be given here, but suffice it to say that without the assistance of these friends, the programme could never have been carried through.

In this regard, I thank Mr Charles Nwodo Jr, Mr Charles Okechukwu Okereke, Mr Cosmas Odoh, Hon Samuel Odumegwu and

Mr Mickey jay Ugwu profusely. it is much to their individual credits that the dream has today come true. Mr Nick Ugwuoke and Mr Frank Pana Aninwike are also mentioned here for all their moral support, as are Mr Ugochukwu Ngwoke, Mr. Eugene Nwachukwu and Mr Hilany – Anozie Ele. Great friends all.

This work is dedicated partly to my wife, Mrs Blessing Onah. But our children are also very much part of this effort. I wish to thank them – Ifunanyachukwu Angela and Onyedikachukwu Peter, for all their patience with Daddy while the programme lasted. Their insistent demand for attention even when I had pressing schedules to meet was ironically a major impetus for 'finishing this programme quick'. I only hope I can make up for the lost time together in the many years to come. In the same vein, Fidelis Eze, my brother-in-law is hereby acknowledged for all his untiring efforts towards making my schedules light while this programme lasted. Mr S.O. Adefarakan of the P.G. School has also shown helpful personal interest in my programme.

Finally, the very many typists who helped with this work – Friday, Mrs Chukwu, Seun, etc are also here acknowledged. The demand for thoroughness could be irritating no doubt, but the final production of this work is as much everyone's achievement.

I thank everyone sincerely.

Emma Onah
Lagos
24 – 11 – 2006.

SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS

CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that the Thesis:

TRANS-BORDER ETHNIC HEGEMONY AND POLITICAL CONFLICT IN AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE TUTSI OF CENTRAL AFRICA AND THE FULANI OF WEST AFRICA

Submitted to the
School of Postgraduate Studies
University of Lagos

For the award of the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (Ph.D.)
is a record of original research carried out

By

ONAH, EMMANUEL IKECHI
in the Department of Political Science

Onah, Emmanuel I	*(signature)*	23-11-06
AUTHOR'S NAME	**SIGNATURE**	**DATE**
emu Anifuwese, Prof.	FOuu Anifuwese	23/11/06
1ST SUPERVISOR'S NAME	**SIGNATURE**	**DATE**
Dr. Darin Olaybenla	*(signature)*	23/11/06
2ND SUPERVISOR'S NAME	**SIGNATURE**	**DATE**
Prof. R-T. Aninyele	R-7. A	23/11/06
1ST INTERNAL EXAMINER	**SIGNATURE**	**DATE**
J. O. Akisoye	Akisoye	23/11/06
2ND INTERNAL EXAMINER	**SIGNATURE**	**DATE**
A.B. AGBAJE	*(signature)*	23 November 2006
EXTERNAL EXAMINER	**SIGNATURE**	**DATE**
r. Eno Blankson Hope	Enohupe	23/11/06
GS REPRESENTATIVE	**SIGNATURE**	**DATE**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LISTS OF TABLES

LISTS OF FIGURES AND ILLUSTRATIONS

TRANS-BORDER ETHNIC HEGEMONY AND POLITICAL CONFLICT IN AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE TUTSI OF CENTRAL AFRICA AND THE FULANI OF WEST AFRICA.

ABSTRACT:

The phenomenon of the trans-border ethnic group in Africa owes its origin to the partition of the continent by the European colonial powers in the years following the Berlin Conference of 1884-5. But despite partition, members of the fractions of trans-border ethnic groups in Africa have continued to relate with each other across the borders, such that events and conflict in one country involving a fraction of the trans-border ethnic group soon draw in the other fractions in other countries on the side of their kin.

In the years following colonialism, the various ethnic groups on the continent, including those partitioned across countries, were expected to integrate into the states to which they belonged. This was not however, the case as the various new states were soon ravaged by ethnicity. As a result, members of the various ethnic groups that constituted the states became more attached to their ethnic groups, in opposition to other such groups in the states, and often to the detriment of the very states.

The Tutsi and the Fulani are two trans-border ethnic groups partitioned into the countries of Central Africa and West Africa respectively. As is shown by this study, the manner of partition of the two groups was such that their fractions constitute minorities in almost all the countries where they appear. It has also been seen that the respective fractions did not have much access to power and other socio-economic opportunities in the various countries where they live, moreso in the case of the Tutsi in Central Africa. Using the Political Systems theory in conjunction with the theory of Hegemony and the Conflict theory as the frameworks for this study, it was found that group solidarity among the fractions of the two groups respectively was high and attachment to the respective states was low.

The fractions showed a tendency to agitate for power in their respective countries. But state power is sought only as a means of maintaining group hegemony, as a way of ensuring group survival and as a way of maintaining group contact across borders. Hegemony however brings about conflict. Thus, no sooner is a move towards hegemony made by members of the fractions of the minority trans-border ethnic group than the various countries and regions where they live degenerate into conflict and violence, as the other ethnic groups rise in resistance to the hegemony of the fractions of the trans-border group.

The solution to these conflicts emanating from the tendency of trans-border ethnic groups to institute hegemonies over their countries and regions of abode lies, not in keeping their fractions apart, as the various countries where they live have continued to do, or in keeping the members of the fractions away from power, as other ethnic groups in the various countries have continued to do. Instead, policies must be deliberately put in place that will ensure the continued but harmonious intercourse of the fractions of trans-border ethnic groups across borders, as well as ensure that members of the fractions have relative access to power and the other socio-economic opportunities available in the various countries where they live.

CHAPTER ONE.

INTRODUCTION.

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY:

This work is a study of trans-border ethnic groups in Africa and how continued relations among their fractions across the countries where they live, despite the existence of international borders, have led to conflict in their regions of abode on the continent. Specifically, the work is a study of the Tutsi ethnic group whose fractions live in the countries of the Great Lakes region of Central Africa, and the Fulani ethnic group who straddle the countries of West Africa. The Tutsi and the Fulani are both trans-border, partitioned ethnic groups. Partitioned ethnic groups abound on the continent of Africa, and this situation could be directly traced to the Berlin Conference of 1884 – 1885, at which the continent was divided among the major European Powers of the time.

In many cases, the partition did not conform to the existing geographical and cultural boundaries and ended up bifurcating many ethnic groups between different countries. In the years following the partition of Africa, various fractions of the trans-border ethnic groups on the continent have had no alternative than to live within the boundary of the inherited post-colonial borders. Among trans-border ethnic groups however, this fact of partition has continued to inflict psychological torture on the members and this has prompted them to continue relating across the borders as if nothing has changed, though with attendant problems.

As Dr. Abdirashid Ali Shermaarke, himself a member of one of the partitioned ethnic groups in Africa and former President of Somalia put it:

> Our misfortunes do not stem from the unproductiveness of the soil, nor from a lack of mineral wealth... No. Our misfortune is that our neighbouring countries, with whom, like the rest of Africa, we seek to promote constructive and harmonious relations, are not our neighbours. Our neighbours are our Somali kinsmen whose citizenship has been falsified by indiscriminate boundary 'arrangements'. They have to move across artificial frontiers to their pasturelands. They occupy the same terrain and pursue the same pastoral economy as ourselves. We speak the same language. We share the same creed, the same culture and the same traditions. How can we regard our brothers as foreigners? (Samatar, 1984:155).

This study was inspired particularly by the events in the Great Lakes region of Africa, which have held world attention for close to two decades now, since Yoweri Museveni at the head of a rebel army that included a significant number of Tutsi combatants, captured power in Uganda in 1986. The political crises in the majority of the Central African countries of the Great Lakes region, namely, Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (D.R.Congo) and to some extent, Uganda, are traceable to the Tutsi ethnic group and their suffering and ambitions (Thom, 1999). Despite their minority status in all the countries mentioned above, the Tutsi have somehow managed to capture the reins of power in a majority of those countries, and are still staking for power in the remaining ones.

It is this situation that has produced the Rwandan crises, culminating in the 1994 genocide in that country and the coming to power of the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in that

year, and the coup in Burundi that brought the Tutsi back to power in 1996 and which has heightened the ethnic war in that country ever since. The Tutsi problem is also at the root of the events in the Democratic Republic of Congo, leading to the ouster of Mobutu Sese Sekko and the ascendance of Laurent Kabila to power and the fresh rebellion in the Congo by Tutsi forces. Despite the numerous peace efforts made over the years, the situation in these countries still has the potential for a conflagration in East, Southern and Central Africa.

In West Africa, political turbulence has been the norm for some time now, and, although many of the crises are not exactly traceable to the Fulani, there are many similarities between the Fulani and the Tutsi of Central Africa, including a long history of political domination of their neighbours (Ajayi and Crowder, 1971; Martin and O'Meara, 1987). This has raised the possibilities of the former ultimately getting embroiled in the various conflicts in West Africa with the prospects of the degeneration of the conflicts into full-blown violence as in Central Africa.

The Fulani ethnic group is indigenous to a number of countries, namely, Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea, Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Gambia, Mali, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Sudan. Although they are minorities in all these countries, they have nevertheless succeeded in maintaining positions of political dominance in a number of them. For instance, the Fulani have played a dominant role in Nigeria's affairs over the years. In the country's First Republic, there seemed to have been Fulani

resurgence, after their defeat by the British in the process of colonisation.

The Fulani scion, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello clearly emerged the most powerful Nigerian politician of the period, with the result that many other prominent politicians of that time owed their ascendancy to their relationship with Bello and other Fulani Emirs in Northern Nigeria (Whitaker, 1970), who were also very powerful in the scheme of things and have continued to be so even up to the present. In the Second Republic, a Fulani, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, was Nigeria's President. In the present Fourth Republic, another Fulani, Alhaji Abubakar Atiku, is the Vice President. Even the failure of the botched 3rd Republic has been attributed partly to the exclusion of the Fulani in the Abiola-Kingibe Presidential ticket, which made the group led by Shehu Yar A'dua (a Fulani) to subvert their victory (Nwomeh, 2001).

Similarly, many other countries of West Africa have come under Fulani control, including Niger, Mali, and Cameroon, which have either had Fulani rulers at certain times, or have been ruled by Fulani-related peoples. In Guinea, the politics of the country has been defined over the years by attempts of the Fulani to capture power and efforts of other ethnic groups to prevent them from attaining their objectives (Ingham, 1990). In many other countries, even when they have not provided the top leader, the Fulani have dominated the various facets of government especially in the public bureaucracies, and this has been a major factor in the continuing disquiet over the national question in these countries.

In both the Fulani and Tutsi cases, fractions of the two groups in the various countries where they live seem to be more concerned with the interests of the respective larger ethnic groups than with the fate of their countries of abode, with the result that whenever one fraction is involved in conflict in one country, other fractions are drawn in on their side, often to the detriment of the respective states. This is especially the situation in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa where attacks on the Tutsi in one country have often produced reverberations and retaliations in the other countries where the fractions of the ethnic group live, leading to the conflagrations that have marked the recent history of that region.

In West Africa, the situation is not as clear-cut, but even here, for instance, the recent troubles in Mauritania involving the killings of some Fulani of that country provoked violent reactions in neighbouring Senegal where the Fulani also live (Ba, 1998). It is the conflict situations that have emerged in the two regions of Africa, which have given rise to the need for this study.

The work argues the thesis that continued relations among members of trans-border ethnic group in Africa and the hegemony of their fractions over their countries and regions of abode are sources of conflict in various parts of Africa, and the resolution of these conflicts must take into account this fact of the partition of these groups into different states as well as the need for continued relations among the fractions of the trans-border ethnic groups across the borders of the states. It is the hope that the findings from the study could be helpful in

preventing both the escalation of those conflicts as well as the spread of such conflicts to the other regions of Africa.

1.2   STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM:

Although the partition of ethnic groups in Africa was brought about by colonialism, these divisions were nevertheless upheld by the inheritor independent states of Africa. As a result, there is hardly a country in Africa today that does not contain at least one ethnic group that is divided between it and other countries. The Fulani and the Tutsi, on whom the present study is specifically based, are only but two of the several trans-border ethnic groups that dot the African continent. In the years following partition, however, these trans-border ethnic groups have continued to relate among themselves, as if the borders did not exist.

Yet, despite the large number of trans-border ethnic groups on the continent and the continuing relations among their fractions across the boundaries of the independent states of Africa, there has not been much interest on the matter. Scholarly efforts to unravel the affinity of trans-border ethnic groups in Africa and its implications for the state system have been scanty. Even then, almost all such efforts up to the present time have been concentrated on studying as distinct groups, the individual fractions of these ethnic groups in the respective countries where they live. The present study was therefore designed to rectify this situation.

This research was thus concerned with investigating why members of trans-border ethnic groups impose their hegemony over their countries and regions of abode in Africa and the relationship between these hegemonies and political conflict in the countries and regions of the continent. The research also investigated why there are continued relations among the fractions of trans-border ethnic groups across the borders of African states and what the implications are for national integration in those states.

1.3   AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY:

The general aim of the present study was to investigate the factors that lead trans-border ethnic groups to establish political hegemonies in their countries and regions of abode and the conflicts that result from such hegemonies. Specifically, the study has the following objectives:

1. Examine how the desire for the well-being of members of trans-border ethnic groups affects the attitude of their fractions to power in the various countries where they live.

2. Investigate how the dominance of trans-border ethnic groups over other ethnic groups in a country and/or region produces conflict in these countries/region where members of the group live.

3. Determine the effects of continued relations between members and fractions of trans-border ethnic groups across borders on national integration in African states.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS:

The work sought to answer the following questions:

1. Why do members of partitioned ethnic groups seek for power across the various countries where they live?

2. How does the quest for dominance by fractions of partitioned ethnic groups influence conflict in their countries/region of abode?

3. What are the effects of continued relations among members of a partitioned ethnic group across borders on their integration into their country of abode or their larger ethnic group?

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY:

A major significance of this study lies in the fact that many African countries have within their borders ethnic groups like the Fulani and the Tutsi, who are divided between countries. A detailed study of the attitudes of the Fulani and the Tutsi to ethnic solidarity vis-à-vis national integration in the countries where they live provides useful insights towards explaining the attitudes of similar groups in other countries of Africa. It has already been pointed out that trans-border ethnic groups also exist outside Africa, and although they do not come within the scope of this study, the findings here will nevertheless go a long way in enhancing comparative studies of the phenomenon of trans-border ethnic identity and relations in Africa and the other regions of the world.

Moreover, the study of the tendency of the trans-border ethnic groups to continue to relate across borders and also to institute political hegemony in their regions of abode and the consequent political conflict, and, violence especially in Central Africa, will go a long way in assisting policy makers with a better understanding of events in their respective regions and thus enhance relevant knowledge and skill for crisis management and also in finding permanent political solutions to the reoccurrence of such ethnic squabbles. And since both ethnic groups are minorities in all the countries where they appear, this study will help in finding ways of consolidating democracy, which will not only ensure majority rule but also guarantee human rights, liberty, rule of law, good governance, and development for all in Africa, including the trans-border, minority peoples.

This work particularly enables the detailed study of the Tutsi and Fulani ethnic groups, especially considering their strategic importance in their regions of abode. Scholarly efforts to unravel the Tutsi, and Fulani, trans-border affinity and its implications for the international state system have been scant. Even the very few works that attempt such a trans-border study are either mostly of geographically exclusive groups or do not approach the issue from the perspective of unravelling the effects of trans-border ethnic affinity on national integration and conflict in respective states.

This is in fact particularly curious, considering the enormous influence wielded by the Fulani on West African affairs, and especially in the case of the Great Lakes region of Central Africa where "despite

the enormity of crises the region has gone through as a result of Tutsi trans-border affinity, the only way one finds reference to the trans-border issue is in a journalistic, descriptive sense...there is little on the matter in the way of good social science" (P. Uvin, personal communication, September 4, 2001), hence this present work.

1.6   OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS:

The following terms are used in this study in the context described below:

- **Trans-border Ethnic Group** – this refers to an ethnic group that cuts across international boundaries i.e. whose members are indigenous to more than one country.

- **Trans-border Ethnic Minority Group** – this refers to a trans-border ethnic group whose members are minorities in all the countries where they appear.

- **Partitioned Ethnic Group** – this refers to a trans-border ethnic group, but is used as such to show that the division was as a result of the partition of Africa by the erstwhile European colonial powers.

- **Fraction of the Trans-border/Partitioned Ethnic Group** – this refers to members of a trans-border/partitioned ethnic group in any given country.

- **Arbitrary/Artificial Partition** – this refers to the division of an ethnic group between two or more countries without the consent or involvement of members of the ethnic group, usually by the

colonial powers but sustained by the inheritor independent states of Africa.

- *Transhumance* –the periodic and non-permanent movement of persons from one geographic or economic region to another within a country or between two countries

- **Regional/Political Hegemony** – this refers to the establishment of political dominance by a trans-border ethnic group in a majority of the countries where its fractions live, usually involving the increasing cohesiveness of the fractions of the trans-border ethnic group and the effective exclusion of the other ethnic groups from legitimate and or commensurate participation in the commanding heights of government in the respective countries.

- **Boundary/Border** – this refers to the line of demarcation between two countries as established by international law and the treaties or agreements establishing the boundaries.

- **Borderland/Border Region** – this refers to the area close to the boundary usually defined, as in the case of Europe, as 20 square kilometres.

- **Great Lakes Region** – this refers to the area in Central Africa around Lakes Victoria, Kivu and Tanganyika, namely, Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, and Tanzania (see Appendix 2, Fig 4).

- **Political Conflict** – this refers to hostilities and the distress that result from the   struggle for, and the use of, political power, sometimes involving force.

- **Political Violence** – this refers to the use of (and in some circumstances, the threat   of the use of) physical force by an individual, group of people or the state, with the intention of changing or modifying the existing power structure, or the behaviour of actors in the political system, and which invariably leads to injury or death to persons and damage or destruction to property.

1.7   SCOPE OF THE STUDY:

This study covers all those countries of the Great Lakes region of Central Africa where fractions of the Tutsi ethnic group live. These are Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Uganda. There are ethnic constellations very similar to the above countries in parts of Tanzania and Kenya. However, to facilitate a concrete work, Rwanda and Burundi are used as case studies.

The study also covers all the West African countries where the members of the Fulani ethnic group live namely, Nigeria, Senegal, Guinea, Niger, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, Mauritania, Guinea Bissau, Cameroon, Benin, and Burkina Faso, Ghana, Togo and Sudan. Two of these, Senegal and Mauritania, are used as case studies. The study examines the political events from the period preceding independence to the present-day in these countries as they concern the Fulani and the Tutsi ethnic groups respectively vis-à-vis other ethnic groups.

This research had a number of limitations though. The vast area which the study covers posed a number of difficulties, including terrain, and distance. Then there was the related problem of cost, including transportation and accommodation costs. Added to this is the fact that the countries in which the field research was conducted speak French, a language different from the English spoken by the researcher, thereby necessitating the use of facilitators. This was cumbersome and added to the cost outlay.

There was also the security problem. A number of the countries where the study population live are in conflict, especially in the Great Lakes region. The implication of this is that the study had to be confined to the areas of relative safety, and even then, respondents were ever cautious and suspicious, something that could all have affected the representativeness and reliability of the findings.

1.8   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:

1.8.1 Study Location and Sites:

This study was undertaken in Senegal and Rwanda. Senegal is situated at the western end of West Africa. It is bordered to the north by Mauritania, to the east by Mali, to the west by Gambia, and to the south by Guinea. The country has an estimated population of 9 million. This population is composed of the following ethnic groups: the Wolof, the Fulani, the Serer, the Diola, the Mandingo, and the Bambara, etc. The Fulani are largely found in the Senegal Valley (*Fleauve*) area (see Appendix 2 Fig. 5), at the border with Mauritania.

Rwanda is located in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa. It is bordered to the north by Uganda, to the south and west by Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo respectively, and to the east by Tanzania. The country has an estimated population of 7 million. This population is composed of three ethnic groups, namely, the Hutu, the Tutsi, and the Twa. The Tutsi live side by side with the Hutu across the country (see Appendix 2 Fig. 6).

1.8.2 Study Population:

This study covers the Fulani of West Africa. The Fulani are a trans-border ethnic group whose members are found in at least 15 countries of the West Africa region (see Appendix 2 Fig. 3). They have an estimated population of 15 million. The study also involved members of the Wolof ethnic group of Senegal and the Moors of Mauritania, both neighbours to the Fulani. The study also covers the Tutsi of the Great lakes region of Central Africa. The Tutsi are a trans-border ethnic group whose members are found in at least four countries of the Great Lakes region (see Appendix 2 Fig. 4). They have an estimated population of 6 million. The study also involved members of the Hutu ethnic group of Rwanda and Burundi, neighbours to the Tutsi.

1.8.3 Sample and Sampling Procedure:

The researcher visited the study locations in Senegal and Rwanda while utilizing a research grant by the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). In both countries, respondents were selected according to the following criteria:

1. Participants must be members of the study group.

2. Participants must be members of neighbouring group to the study group
3. Participants must be males of age 18 – 51
4. Participants must be females of age categories 18 – 51
5. Participants must have participated in at least one of the crises involving the study group
6. If not, participants must have witnessed at least two such incidents.

In Senegal, a total of 75 participants were obtained from various work places in Dakar as follows:

1. Ministry of the Armed Forces - 13 respondents;
2. Cheick Anta Diop University – 25 respondents comprised of 16 students and 9 staff;
3. Ministry of Tourism – 13 respondents;
4. Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization – 13 respondents, and
5. Ministry of National Education, Technical and Vocational Training – 11 respondents.

The remaining 19 respondents were obtained at the *Fleauve* area, comprising local administration officials (7 respondents), Muslim clerics (6 respondents), and farmers at the Senegal River bank (6 respondents).

Access to all these places was facilitated by a letter of introduction from my Department with three of the initial contacts acting as my guides. **Table 1.1** below shows the sample obtained in Senegal. Note that some of the respondents were of Mauritanian origin but resident in Senegal.

Table 1.1: Age and Sex distribution of Participants from Senegal and Mauritania.

Country	Ethnic Group	Sex Distribution			Age Range			
		Male	Female	Total	18-30	31-45	46-51	Total
1 Senegal	1. Fulani	37	10	47	25	17	5	47
	2. Wolof	15	8	23	12	7	4	23
	Total	52	18	70	37	24	9	70
2. Mauritania	1. Fulani	9	2	11	7	2	2	11
	2. Moors	11	2	13	7	4	2	13
	Total	20	4	24	14	6	4	24
	Grand Total	72	22	94	51	30	13	94

In Rwanda, an initial 26 respondents were interviewed at the Kigali Institute of Science, Management and Technology (KIST) comprising of members of staff (7) and students (19). The rest of the Rwanda participants were obtained using three facilitators from this batch. Thirty-nine participants were obtained from various workplaces, namely:

1. Ministry of Internal Affairs –11;
2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Cooperation– 7;
3. Ministry of Local Government and Social Affairs –9;
4. Ministry of Education – 7, and
5. Military Police – 5.

The remaining thirty participants were obtained in Butare, comprising of six staff and fifteen students of the National University of Rwanda (21), local administration officials (6), and Border Patrol Police (3). **Table 1.2** below shows the sample obtained in Rwanda. Note that some of the sample came from Burundi but are resident and working in Rwanda.

Table 1.2: Age and Sex distribution of Participants for Rwanda and Burundi.

Country	Ethnic Group	Sex Distribution			Age Range			
		Male	Female	Total	18-30	31-45	46-51	Total
1 Rwanda	1. Tutsi	41	11	**52**	25	18	9	**52**
	2. Hutu	15	7	**22**	13	4	5	**22**
	Total	**56**	**18**	**74**	**38**	**22**	**14**	**74**
2. Burundi	1. Tutsi	9	2	**11**	7	2	2	**11**
	2. Hutu	7	3	**10**	4	4	2	**10**
	Total	**16**	**5**	**21**	**11**	**6**	**4**	**21**
	Grand Total	**72**	**23**	**95**	**49**	**28**	**18**	**95**

1.8.4 Research Design:

This research was carried out using a multi method approach involving Library research and Focus group discussions.

i. Library Research – This involved the collection of data and information from primary sources such as government publications and gazettes, and private records, reports of workshops, seminars, and international and non-governmental organizations. It also involved the collection of data from secondary sources such as books, journals, magazines and newspapers. In this regard, libraries in Nigeria, Senegal and Rwanda were utilized for the research as well as the Internet.

ii. Focus Group Discussion – This involved individual and group discussions with people in the places of study. These consisted of focused interviews, which implies that the "questions asked are focused on specific aspects" of the study (Asiwaju, 1976: 280), as shown by the discussion guide (see Appendix 1). The method of Focus Group discussion has the advantage of enabling the researcher to interact meaningfully with the group under study. According to Bryman (as

cited in Haralambos and Holborn, 2004: 906), the method "offers the researcher the opportunity to study the ways in which individuals collectively make sense of a phenomenon and construct meaning around it".

Focus Group discussion was adopted so as to elicit information more readily from respondents since some of the issues under study have security implications, such as allegiance to country/ethnic group, and issues of group conflict. Because of this also, the questions were designed to be semi-structured/open ended so as to allow for follow-ups.

1.8.5 Research Instruments:

A Discussion Guide comprising two forms (Forms FGQ1 and FGQ2) was prepared for the study. The Discussion Guide contained a total of 14 semi-structured questions. Form FGQ1 contained 10 questions meant for members of the Fulani and the Tutsi ethnic groups while Form FGQ2 contained four questions meant for the Moors / Wolof / Hutu ethnic groups (see Appendix 1). The questions asked centered on the variables under study. These variables are:

1. Continued relations among the fractions of the trans-border ethnic group across countries.
2. The quest for dominance among fractions of trans-border ethnic groups in the various countries where they live.
3. Domination and the conflicts that result between the fractions and other ethnic groups in their respective countries, between the fractions and the states where they live, and, between the various states with fractions of the trans-border ethnic group.
4. Trans-border relations and the integration of the fractions into the larger ethnic group (ethnic solidarity), or the various states where they live (national integration).

1.8.6 Procedure:

Respondents were interviewed either as individuals or in groups (mostly between 3 - 11 participants). Members of the different ethnic groups were interviewed separately. Interviews took place at venues chosen or known to the respondents. This helped to bolster the trust between the researcher and the respondents. The researcher usually started the discussions by telling the respondents what the research was all about. He then told them what he already knew about the subject matter of the research. In many cases, the respondents came in at some point to either clarify or elaborate on the issues as set out by the researcher. Where this was not the case, the researcher himself asked for clarifications or elaborations.

Then he posed questions to individual or group respondents as the case may be, and responses were tallied for groups where views were similar or for individuals where views differed. In cases where responses were not clear enough, follow up questions were asked and clarifications made to enable the respondents give clear answers.

1.8.7 Data Analysis:

The data gathered from the focus group discussions were analyzed using descriptive statistics, namely, frequency counts and percentages. This was done in line with the variables under study and guided by the research questions. Similarly, data gathered from library sources were analyzed qualitatively using the method of content analysis.

CHAPTER TWO.

LITERATURE REVIEW.

2.1   THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE:

This work is primarily about trans-border ethnic groups in Africa and the impact of the continued relations among their fractions across borders on national integration and political conflict. Trans-border ethnic relations exist as a result of the division of ethnic groups into fractions across borders. The division of ethnic groups between countries can arise out of a number of situations. Fractions of an ethnic group could be dispersed as refugees when members of its population flee to other countries in an attempt to avoid wars or political persecution. There are many such refugee populations in Africa living in other countries different from their countries of origin, such as Liberian groups in many countries of West Africa.

An ethnic group could also be dispersed when significant parts of its population migrate to other countries in search of economic and other social opportunities. There are also known cases of such Diaspora on the African continent, such as Igbo communities across West and Central Africa. Then, there is the case of partition, whereby a number of ethnic groups particularly in Africa were arbitrarily and artificially divided by colonial powers between two or more countries.

In each case, patterns of relations exist between the various fractions of the divided ethnic groups. This work aims at studying the issues arising out of the third type of situation above, i.e. the patterns of relations among fractions of ethnic groups arbitrarily and artificially

divided between two or more countries. These ethnic groups thrown up by the European partition of Africa have been rightly called "peoples of two worlds" (Phiri, 1984:117), those ethnic groups partitioned across the borders of Africa and whose fractions lie on two or more sides of given borders, but whose peoples belong to none of the two worlds - to neither one state nor the other – but belong to themselves.

Apart from the Fulani and the Tutsi, other partitioned ethnic groups abound on the African continent, including the Zaghawa of Darfur Region of Sudan and Chad, and the Dioula of Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. Others include the Chewa and Ngoni partitioned across the Zambia, Mozambique and Malawi borders; the Kakwa divided between Uganda and the Sudan; the Ovimbundu of Namibia and Angola; the Fang of Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Cameroon; the Yoruba of Nigeria, Benin and Togo; the Ewe of Ghana and Togo; and, the Kongo of D.R. Congo, Republic of Congo and Angola;

Others are the Somali who are divided between Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti; the Wolof of Senegal and Gambia; the Hausa who straddle West Africa; and, the Hutu who straddle the Great Lakes region of Central Africa. Trans-border ethnic groups also exist outside Africa, such as the Kurds of Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey; the Basques of France and Spain; the Tamils of Sri Lanka and India, and, the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and Pakistan, but these do not come within the scope of this present study.

The Tutsi and the Fulani are two examples of trans-border ethnic groups in Africa who live side by side with other ethnic groups in their

areas of abode. In other words, unlike many other trans-border groups on the continent, the two are characterized by a lack of geographical exclusivity. But despite the numerous partitioned groups that abound in Africa, and the problems associated with partition, literature on the subject, especially the phenomenon of trans-border affinity and hegemony and its implications for the international state system have been scanty. This research was therefore designed to fill this gap in our knowledge of trans-border ethnic groups in Africa.

2.2   OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE:

This research work is essentially concerned with trans-border ethnic relations and hegemony and the effects of these on national integration and political conflict in Africa, particularly with regards to the Tutsi and the Fulani ethnic groups. The issues of national integration and ethnic solidarity on the African continent have received considerable attention from authors even if most of these have not been focused on trans-border ethnic groups.

Among the works dealing with these issues is Wallerstein (1965). The author observes that tribe is both functional and dysfunctional in the integration process in the new states. He identifies four ways in which tribal loyalty may help national integration, namely: loyalties to tribal groups interfere less with national integration than loyalties to the extended family; and, the tribal groups represent in the urban setting a major means of resocialisation, offering the individual a wide network of persons who could retain him and guide him in the ways of urban life

as well as recruit him into non-tribal nationalistic groupings and facilitate mobility and social contacts.

Tribal associations also help to facilitate individual occupational mobility; and, the tribal group serves as an outlet for political tensions. The dysfunctional aspects of tribalism, according to Wallerstein are, that tribal groups are still particularistic in their orientation and diffuse in their obligations; and, tribal roles are sufficiently segregated from the occupational and political roles because of the extensiveness of the tribal group, hence the familiar problems of nepotism and corruption.

Another work in the category of Wallerstein's is Klineberg and Zavalloni (1969). Here, the authors study the attitudes of students in six African universities, with particular emphasis on the relative importance for them of national and ethnic identity respectively, and the relationship of such identity to other relevant attitudes. These include the attitudes towards intermarriage, the degree of identification with Africa as a whole, the importance attached to ethnic structure and traditional culture, the willingness to make sacrifices for one's country, the stereotypes held about Africa and Europeans, and the relative preference for foreign countries.

After undertaking a socio-psychological study of a sample of individuals from six African countries, the authors found that in general, national integration is accepted and even highly valued. But they also found that ethnic loyalties still play an important part, though in varying degrees, in different nations, in different ethnic groups within a given nation, and between individuals within each group. And

comparing the frequency of national versus ethnic membership as the preferred social identity among respondents, the authors found that in all the countries studied, nationality appears more frequently than ethnic membership.

Miles (1994) also arrives at a somewhat similar conclusion. In his book, the author concerns himself with the issues of ethnic identity and national consciousness among the Hausa of Nigeria and Niger, and citizenship and identification with the respective countries by the members of the Hausa trans-border ethnic group. His methodology consisted of a field survey of hundred people in each of two neighbouring Hausa villages, one in Niger and the other in Nigeria, involving the administration of self-identity questionnaires. His findings indicate a pattern of expressed preference for nation- state over ethnic affiliation among the Hausa.

The above three books are representative of the many such works that followed the attainment of independence by African states and the orchestrated efforts at nation- building on the continent. The above books under review are infact separated by time, not content. The aim of many such works was therefore to encourage national integration in the new African states and down play the ethnic factor.

This perhaps explains why Wallerstein was obviously very concerned with the contributions of ethnicity to national integration and why Klineberg and Zavalloni, despite asking questions pertaining to the preference of members of given ethnic groups for their kin across borders over members of other ethnic groups within their own

countries, curiously downplayed the responses in their subsequent analysis. These findings cannot hold in the face of the obvious solidarity among fractions of trans-border ethnic groups in Africa to the detriment of national identification.

In fact, despite the elaborate attempts to prove otherwise, many accounts in Miles' work show clearly that solidarity among kin to the larger ethnic groups is stronger than their attachment to the nation-states where they fall in. A case in point is that of the chief of Yardaji in Niger Republic who when told that a new coup d'etat had just brought General Sani Abacha to power in Nigeria, replied that there was no problem with that 'as long as he's Hausa'

Another book in this genre is Smock and Bentsi-Enchill (1976). In the work, covering certain aspects of the integration process in nine countries, the authors agree that despite the commitment of most national leaders to instill a sense of national identity, the allegiance of a large portion of African peoples to particularistic ethnic groups still surpasses their loyalty to the national community. They further point out that ethnic irredentism of groups attempting to overcome existing political divisions has sometimes caused internal conflict and created friction and occasional violence between states, although they also argue that the preservation of some loyalty to ethnic groups is not necessarily incompatible with national integration.

If Miles' work is primarily concerned with the impact of partition on Hausaland in the independence era, Asiwaju (1976) is concerned with the impact of colonial policies on the partitioned peoples of Africa,

in this case, western Yorubaland, divided between Nigeria and Benin. The study specifically examines the French and British colonial administrations as they operated simultaneously in a Yoruba locality of similar pre-colonial conditions.

The study examines the two regimes from the viewpoint of the subject people's perception of well-known French and British colonial policies, especially as they related to the machinery of government, indigenous chieftaincy institutions, civil obligations, economic development and education. The author found that differing colonial policies have created gaps between fractions of the Yoruba ethnic group on either side of the inter-colonial boundary. Western Yoruba life thus bears definite marks of differing colonial experience, although the various groups on both sides of the 1889 boundary are still in active communication.

The above book by Asiwaju could be situated within works in the general area of 'borderland studies', as are indeed a few other books that have tried to study a number of the trans-border ethnic groups in Africa. Borderland studies tend to emphasize the factor of the human populations inhabiting the borders and the policy options necessary for the advancement of these border peoples. The next book in this category is Asiwaju (1984). In this study of partitioned Africans, the authors point out that these groups were often divided arbitrarily, with the boundaries cutting across well- established lines of communication involving a sense of community and shared legacies.

The dividing authorities, the colonial powers, then set to work, actively promoting the further division of these groups in ways intended to pull the fractions of the groups in the respective territories further apart, and to integrate them more into the respective states. Yet, as the various authors found, despite all these divisive influences, which have continued into the post- colonial periods, trans-border Africans have tended to ignore the boundaries and carry on relations across them as in the days before partition.

The case studies contained in the book covering a number of partitioned African culture areas generally confirm this reality. Some of these case studies are of particular relevance to the present study. In his study of the Kakwa divided between Uganda and the Sudan, Adefuye (1984) found that the British attempt to partition the people did not affect the people's feeling of brotherhood towards one another. In spite of their location in Uganda and Sudan, the Kakwa retained their ethnic identity in disregard for the boundary imposed by the colonial authorities.

Thus when Idi Amin, a Kakwa from Uganda became the head of the Uganda army around 1964, he used his position to place his Kakwa kin in control of the Anya-Nya guerrilla movement pressing for the rights of the non-Arabised peoples of the Southern Sudan. From this time onwards, a Ugandan factor was never absent in the Sudanese civil war. By 1971 when the Kakwa Idi Amin finally seized power in Uganda, it became clear that a Sudanese factor also existed in Uganda's power struggles.

The Kakwa from both sides of the divide were active participants in the various plots that culminated in Amin's ascension to power and the Southern Sudanese continued to be a strong factor throughout Amin's reign. By late 1973, of the twenty four top military positions in Uganda, only three were held by persons who were neither Southern Sudanese nor Kakwa in origin. Amin in turn continued to help the Southern Sudanese rebellion, particularly the Kakwa inside the movement throughout his regime. Even when he was overthrown, it was through Sudan that General Amin made his escape. And ever since his overthrow, it is noteworthy that the only major threats to the Ugandan government have come from the Southern Sudan.

In another study, of the Chewa and the Ngoni astride Zambian boundaries with Malawi and Mozambique, Phiri (1984) shows that the division of ethnic groups by state boundaries creates the situation, which compels subsequent cross- border social relations among members. Under such conditions, ethnic loyalty as an obstacle to the achievement of modern state formation and its integrative functions assumes an international posture. The author then goes further to argue that this trans-frontier ethnic loyalty poses many problems for the international state system among which is the fact that services provided at the expense of a state for its own share of partitioned ethnic groups are often made inadequate by the inevitable infiltration of kinsmen from adjacent states whose governments have not contributed to their cost.

In his own work, Touval (1984) points out that the partitioning of cultural groups has confronted the independent African states with two major problems, namely: what attitude to adopt towards partition and the boundaries inherited from the colonial period; and, what attitude to adopt when the solidarity within a partitioned group leads to the involvement of those who live in one country in the affairs of a neigbouring state. According to Touval, confronted with these problems, most African states, almost all multi-ethnic, have reacted by supporting the status quo with regards to inherited boundaries, their pluralistic character creating among them, a reciprocal respect for the boundaries.

He observes however, that in a few cases, some partitioned groups dominated a state or wielded so much influence within a state that the state identified with their ethos, thus becoming virtually a nation-state. When such a situation prevailed, and when in addition, some vital interests of the group were affected by the partition, the group harnessed the state to pursue an irredentist policy. In some instances, partitioned groups have facilitated the spillover of domestic strife across boundaries, thus, adding an international dimension to domestic conflict. In other situations, where such a partitioned group is in opposition in one country, they have usually utilized their ethnic links on the other side of the international border to obtain sanctuary, base of operations, and even active support.

There are other works in the category of borderland studies. Asiwaju and Adeniyi (1989) focuses on Africa's international boundaries with particular reference to the lands and local communities directly

impacted by the borders. According to Adejuyigbe (1989), in his contribution to the volume, borderlands may be characterized in terms of location - usually the farthest from the core areas and the capitals; interaction patterns - may be peaceful or conflicting, but usually in two ways. These are interaction with the core of the respective political units, and second, interaction between the two border areas on either side of a particular boundary; transitional characteristics – zones of change, resulting from mutual developments on either side of the border.

In his contribution to the volume, Momoh (1989) identifies three types of borderlands, namely, the minimal, zero, and maximal borderlands. Maximal borderlands are those in which the people on both sides have some affinity, unlike the minimal borderland where there is no affinity between the border peoples, and the zero borderlands where the borderland peoples are diametrically opposed· The author argues that to the citizens on the maximal borderlands, ethnic homogeneity and ancestral links are thicker than the political sovereignty and heterogeneity of the states.

In another contribution, Asiwaju (1989) observes that the socio-economic space generated by borders is immensely wider and far less easy to define than the statutory or the administrative dimension. Yet, border communities are left without infrastructures like reliable transportation systems and other modernization influences that normally help socio-economic integration of parts with the whole. He therefore advocates among others, the adjustment of relevant laws and

procedures within the concerned national systems that stand in the way of co-operation between the regional and local authorities in adjacent border regions so as for these nations and regions to be able to profitably utilize the available economic space in the borderlands.

Another book (Nugent and Asiwaju, 1996), continues with this general theme of the wide socio-economic space generated by borderlands. The authors acknowledge that the African boundary is a paradox - they divide and unite, are barriers and junctions, walls and doors. While states have sought to emphasize the function of the boundaries as lines of seclusion, ordinary Africans have continued to behave as if state boundaries are permeable. But the continued survival of the African boundary despite all the pessimism of the initial post-colonial periods shows that the way forward actually lies in the tapping of the numerous opportunities for development, which the boundaries offer.

The authors recommend that rather than trying to fashion new sets of boundaries by the splintering of existing units, according to some national uniformity of culture, it would be more helpful to think in terms of reducing the practical impact of existing boundaries, to alter their functions from those of barriers to conduits. This alternative scenario will involve governments merging some (and ultimately all) of their sovereignty in order to forge regional integration.

Suhrke and Noble (1977) is a study of the role of ethnicity in international conflicts. Here, the authors attempt to answer some relevant questions: do ethnic links that cut across state boundaries

serve as channels for outside participation in internal ethnic conflicts? Or, are such ethnic ties subordinated to other considerations by interested outside parties? More generally, the authors ask what the significance of ethnic factors is in determining foreign involvement or non-involvement in a domestic ethnic conflict? And, do these factors suggest particular forms of external response?

After examining the relevant issues, the authors then assert that trans-border ethnic ties may influence the policy of outside parties toward ethnic conflict. But such external involvement is likely to reflect differences in the strength of ethnic ties, and also the amount of resources controlled by kin elsewhere. The cases discussed in the book, ranging from Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and the Kurdish conflict in Iraq, to Lebanon, the Eritrean- Ethiopian conflict, the Kazakhs in China and the Muslims in the Philippines and Thailand, demonstrate that cross-boundary ethnic ties rarely are unambiguous sources of partisan support.

These ties are potentially most significant when they link either one or both of the local protagonists to outside majorities, who are likely to be in a position to render support of some magnitude. In situations where the links involve minorities in both (or all) states, ethnic ties, however strong, are likely to be subordinated to other considerations. Under this circumstance, giving aid to kin engaged in rebellion in another state clearly identifies the supporting minority group as potential rebels in their own state, and hence, encourages retaliation from the dominant majorities, individually or collectively.

The work of Saideman and Ayres (2000) attempts to answer the all-important question of why ethnic groups desire union with kin elsewhere or want to become independent. The authors considered five distinct explanations for separatism among ethnic groups: the nature of the group itself; characteristics of the group's kin; contagion processes; ethnic security dilemmas; and the end of empire (state failure). The authors tested fifteen hypotheses and found that ethnic kin seem to play a powerful role in influencing the desires of ethnic groups.

The existence of separatist kin provides strong incentive for a group to desire union. Separatist kin also increases the likelihood that a group is secessionist, suggesting that secessionism may be contagious among ethnic kin. The authors further found that neither political nor economic discrimination is important, suggesting that differences in political and economic power and security do not directly drive the desires of groups to secede.

Similarly, state failure did not lead groups to desire independence or secession. This may be because, smaller groups were more secure in the old system when larger minority groups did not have the opportunity to prey upon them, and second, the old order was better at repressing groups so that they lost their ability to organize or express their demands. It was also found that contagion is ambiguous as a cause of separatism, as it was not shown conclusively that groups are strongly encouraged by the protest of their kin elsewhere.

The authors then tried to distinguish for secessionism and irredentism. They found that dominant kin nearby is more significant

for irredentism as a group whose kin dominate a neighbouring state has a significantly higher probability of irredentist desires. Second, group concentration matters for secessionist desires but not for irredentism. Since secessionists must lay claims to a particular slice of territory, relatively concentrated groups are significantly more likely to desire independence.

It was also found that rebellion consistently matters for secessionism, although it can also be a consequence, as groups wanting independence are probably more likely to be repressed thereby increasing the level of conflict between the group and the state. Lastly, they found that some factors are less important for separatism than usually argued: relative size of group (Brown and Bosswell, 1987), a group's ethnic distinctiveness (Bonacich, 1972), economic and political differences (Sigleman and Miles, 1977), and, regime type (Muller, 1985).

A good attempt at explaining ethnic conflicts in Africa is made by Nnoli (1998). According to the author, conflict is an integral aspect of social existence and social progress. By conflict is meant the contradictions arising from differences in interests, ideas, ideologies, orientations, perceptions and tendencies, at the level of society, individual, group, institution or nation; as well as in inter-personal, inter-group, inter-institutional and international relations. Conflict is ubiquitous in society, and could be conceived of in positive or negative terms. As a positive phenomenon, conflict, when resolved, helps to push society forward toward increased humanity.

There can be no progress without conflict and conflict resolution. What is problematic about conflict is its overflowing into violence. And this is the consequence of the inability or failure to accommodate and resolve contradictions in society through arrangements and procedures that eliminate their negative effects and maximize their positive effects. The author points out that ethnic conflicts in Africa is often perceived of in negative terms, although this aspect of ethnic conflicts is only a recent phenomenon, something that could be traced to not earlier than the colonial period although it has been aggravated in the post-colonial period.

In the pre-colonial period, ethnicity was not problematic in the various nationalities of Africa as the environment then was conducive to integration or assimilation of the various ethnic groups or at least cooperation among them. For instance, most of the ethnic groups that interacted with each other at that time were of similar origin and shared a number of economic, cultural and environmental experiences. Moreover, when nationalities conquered others, they subordinated them to their own authority, and assimilated them or were assimilated by them. In the case of assimilation, there was no linguistic/cultural exclusiveness. In the case of subordination, the conqueror did not permit competition with the conquered group. Thus, ethnic conflict did not develop.

Colonialism led to the fragmentation of the inherited pre-colonial process of integration and assimilation of ethnic groups. It brought the various ethnic groups under one political administration through a

process which was quite arbitrary – the same ethnic group was split into parts administered by different colonial powers or under different administrative units run by the same colonial power, and different ethnic groups were brought together in new administrative units by the different colonial powers.

This situation was further reinforced by the fragmented and disarticulated nature of the colonial economy, in addition to numerous other colonial policies such as urbanization policies, which encouraged ethnic enclaves and the formation of ethnic associations; the fragmentation of the colonial economy along regional enclaves isolated from each other; and, the classification of ethnic groups and the colonial insistence that official forms should carry information about the ethnic origin of individuals. The net effect of such fragmentation and polarization of populations along ethnic lines was increased ethnic consciousness and the possibilities of ethnic conflicts. By the time African countries attained independence, some of them had reached the threshold of irreversibility of ethnic tension.

State power in the new African countries was the greatest route to wealth as well as the highest guarantee of security. The struggle for it was thus intense, and in this struggle, the 'emergent petty bourgeoisie', which inherited power from the colonialists inevitably split into factions. The basis for such splits was often ethnic. And in the resulting warlike political contests, appeals to ethnic sentiment became legitimate. Thus, in the post-colonial period in Africa, ethnic emotions and violent ethnic

conflicts have been generated by the various factions of the ruling petty bourgeoisie as they scrambled for lucrative access to political power.

A number of authors have attributed the development of ethnic identities and the consequent conflict to modernization. According to Moshin (2000), the construction of political identities is a necessary corollary of the process of modern state building and is 'naturally' divisive as well as hegemonic. The author argues that the construction of one identity denotes the separation of the group/community from the other. In the context of the modern state, it results in the hegemony of the dominant identity over the weaker ones. A natural consequence is the formulation of rationales and development models by the state that alienates as well as marginalizes the weaker communities.

Consequently, at a certain period, the weaker communities come to adopt the rhetoric and politics of the new politicized identities for themselves. It is as such obvious that the construction of group identities produces group consciousness, which ultimately lead to group prejudice. And as has been pointed out by LeVine and Campbell (1967), in situations where there is intensive contact between different groups, such as has accompanied the movement toward more centralized political and social organizations, group consciousness and prejudice can be a major obstacle to the creation of effective political institutions encompassing a broader spectrum of social forces.

According to Huntington (1968), group consciousness not only leads to prejudice but also ultimately leads to group conflict. Ethnic or religious groups which had lived peacefully side by side in traditional

society become aroused to violent conflict as a result of the interaction, the tensions, the inequalities generated by social and economic modernization. Modernization thus increases conflict among traditional groups, between traditional groups and modern ones, and among modern groups. Many, if not most, of these conflicts at one time or another, erupt into violence.

Rothchild (1991) has identified a number of factors that lead to deep chasms between distinct identity groups in the same society. According to him, the factors in operation that produce these intense political attitudes and commitments are likely to reveal a heavy emphasis on subjective, mainly psychological, concerns. These factors include: a fear of re-stratification and the loss of political dominance; an assertion of group worth and place; and, the existence of negative remembrances and images.

They also include the determination to resist a controlling group's effort to spread its language, culture, or religion; and evidences of a sense of superiority on the part of a politically or economically dominant minority. He also identifies the rivalries over such distributive goods as cabinet appointments, civil service recruitment and regional allocations as further factors that produce ethnic conflict in Africa.

In a work which deals with the development of post-colonial ethnic conflict in Africa, Blanton, David and Athow (2001) argue that explanations of ethnic violence in Africa as resulting from deprivation-based grievances which emphasize economic, political, and social deprivation or discrimination as sources of ethnic strife, are empirically

inadequate. Instead, they propose that the structural configuration of ethnic groups, specifically the type of ethnic stratification foisted on a society by colonialism, pose different likelihood and forms of post-colonial ethnic conflict.

Great Britain and France employed different styles in the administration of their colonies and this affected the structure of inter-ethnic relations in the society they left behind. The French adopted the style of cultural assimilation and administrative centralization. This meant that African institutions were largely ignored and new models introduced based on what obtained in France, while French language and education were made the exclusive visas to the new system. Most who acquired the new ways did not do so as members of ethnic groups, although one or two ethnic groups ultimately dominated, largely by the chance of maybe the capital falling within their homeland and thus giving them more access to French education.

At independence, it was the new elite that captured power from the French, and a preponderance of these could be from an ethnic group, which now becomes dominant. But those groups who were relatively excluded often discovered that they could not mobilize for redress as the French centralized colonial structure would have supplanted their leaders and undermined their mobilizing structures as part of the general rule of subordinating African institutions to the French. The French colonial system approximated a ranked system.

For the British, they depended much more heavily upon local elites to manage the affairs of the colony in a system of indirect rule,

which preserved the pre-colonial traditional institutions of the various ethnic groups. As long as the elite of each group complied with British rule and preserved order among their own constituents, they were not subjugated to the authority of rival ethnic groups. The British actually discouraged the creation of a single dominant ethnic group, such that often while one group prevailed in administration, another was dominant in the military, and so on.

With independence however, competitive ethnicity emerged in which those ethnic groups who succeeded to control the machinery of the state actually proceeded to use it to subordinate other groups. But since the British system left intact each group's leadership, its authority structures, and its institutions of social organization, those groups so excluded from control of the state still had the, and often used their, capacity to mobilize their members for collective action, including both violent and non-violent opposition activities. This situation in British colonies suggested an unranked system.

Thus, the authors submit that the British and French colonial legacies contributed both to the frequency and intensity of post-colonial ethnic conflict. The French strategy of assimilation and centralization contributed to the development of a ranked system of ethnic stratification that undermined local authorities and social institutions. British reliance on the network of traditional authorities and institutions suggested an unranked system of ethnic stratification that also left these traditional authorities and institutions intact. Ethnic minorities in former British colonies were more able to organize for

political action than their French counterparts and thus were more likely to rebel. For the same reasons though, mobilization in the latter, when it takes place, is more likely to take a militant form from the start, as conventional non-violent activity was pre-empted by the ability of the dominant group to monitor and suppress it.

Azam (2001) also examines the nature of conflicts in Africa. According to the author, ethnic problems are only one aspect of political violence in Africa. Generally, he considers violent conflict as a failure of the state to provide for its people. 'Ethnic capital' ensures the provision of these facilities and needs. For this to occur successfully, society must be organized in a somewhat 'federation of ethnic groups' whereby members of the political elite are actually delegates of kin or ethnic groups sent to collect high and regular incomes from the government and the formal sector for funding transfers in favour of those who stayed behind in the village and rural areas.

The state in Africa is thus an agency for redistribution. Two types of interlinked redistribution systems are entailed. The first is a system of transfers within the ethnic or kin groups whereby the rich migrants are supposed to remit a large part of their income back to the village on a regular or contingent basis. The second is a system of redistribution between the ethnic groups through their elite or via the government budget, whereby the state is supposed to share the public resources with the people.

When the benefits of public expenditure are distributed broadly, the 'delegates' of the ethnic groups can usually obtain renewed support

for the state from their people. But should these elite fail to ensure such remittances from the state to the ethnic base, rebellion could ensue, as in the example of the Tuareg movement in Mali and Niger in the early 1990s. When the elite from one or several ethnic groups is excluded from sharing the state bounty, violent conflict is likely to arise, as exemplified by numerous conflicts in Africa, such as the Mau-Mau insurgency in Kenya in the 1950s and the insurgency in Sierra Leone in the 1990s.

Gurr (1990) sets out the outlines of a general theory of communal conflict. According to him, intense communal conflict in multiethnic African societies is most likely in these circumstances: where there are two or more dyads of communal groups with historically based hostilities; where ethnic identities are highly salient and have not yet been significantly diluted by cross-cutting identifications with newer class, corporate, or associational groupings.

Intense communal conflict also occur where there are substantial inequalities across ethnic groups in income, status, and access to political power; where disadvantaged groups in the aggregate are relatively large compared with advantaged groups; when political and economic inequalities are reinforced by discriminatory patterns of social behavior and public policy; when government and policies are controlled by members of a dominant minority or majority ethnic group; and, when no or only few conflict-reducing mechanisms are in place.

Whatever are the causes of conflict in Africa, the case of the Great Lakes region of Africa is peculiar. Here, the Tutsi ethnic group is

embroiled in violent conflicts in virtually every country where they live. There is a large volume of literature that study the Tutsi trans-border ethnic group, owing largely to these numerous conflicts in which they have been involved in the various countries of the Great Lakes region of Central Africa.

Curiously however, most of the many works on the Tutsi, including Prunier (1995), Uvin (1997), and Lemarchand (1994), do not capture the very nature of the violent conflicts involving them as resulting from the trans-border division of the Tutsi and the subsequent struggles between their fractions and other contending ethnic groups. Instead, events are treated in a localized manner in the different countries where they have taken place, and their cross-border dimension is mentioned only in incidental terms.

Uvin (1999) is a good example of this lapse. The author agrees that Rwanda and Burundi are two countries with the same ethnic composition, geography, history, religion and language. But he argues that the dynamics that led to massive violence in the two countries are "textbook cases of entirely different processes", and proceeds to treat the two countries as different cases.

Thom (1999) fares better, at least in noting that to understand Congo – Zaire's 1996-97 civil war, a useful starting point will be the 1990 Tutsi invasion of Rwanda from Uganda, thus suggesting that the events in the Great Lakes region are all tied to the Tutsi problem. In actual fact, however, the events date back much earlier, and involve more countries than are mentioned above, but the focus of the paper

under review (patterns of military conflict in Africa) and the size (33pp.) could not have allowed a detailed study along the lines which the present work intends to.

In their work, Bhavnani and Backer (2000) try to explain variations in the scale of ethnic conflict, using data from Rwanda and Burundi. They found that the scale of violence varies considerably across episodes and that interethnic trust influences patterns of conflict. Communities exhibiting high degrees of trust generally experience intense violence that subsides rapidly, in contrast to the persistent, moderate violence characteristic of less trusting communities. The authors also found that stronger genocidal norms exacerbate ethnic violence.

In a very outstanding study, Mamdani (2002a) sets out to explain the violence between the Tutsi and the Hutu in Rwanda in the context of a wider regional 'citizenship crisis'. According to him, it was the racialization of Tutsi and Hutu identities by Belgian colonialism that set the stage for the continuing violence between the two groups. He argues that it was the language of race that was propounded to define insiders and outsiders, distinguishing those 'indigenous' from those 'alien'. Colonialism invented this categorization as a way of justifying Tutsi privilege. From then onwards, Tutsi privilege became the privilege of a group identified as Hamitic.

Tutsi privilege was thus an alien privilege, and the degradation of the Hutu, the degradation of the native. These categories were enforced through state-issued identity cards that proclaimed the holder's race, a

segregated education system that amplified the supposed racial distinctions, and the exclusion of Hutu from the priesthood and local governments. The author goes on to point out that this language of race functioned to underline the difference between the indigenous and the alien even after colonialism gave way.

In the colonial vocabulary, only natives were classified as 'tribes', and as 'ethnic groups' in postcolonial Africa. Non-natives- those not considered African, were tagged as races. Tribes were thus neighbours; races were strangers. In this context, ethnic violence, as between neighbours, is not ever about the legitimacy of the presence of the others, but often about a transgression of borders. With the alien race however, the very presence of the group can be considered illegitimate, and its claim to power an outright usurpation.

The 1959 Rwandan Revolution, in which the majority Hutu overthrew the Tutsi monarchy and sent thousands of Tutsi fleeing into exile, reinforced the notion of Tutsi as aliens. Then the 1990 invasion of Rwanda by exiled Tutsi from Uganda and the pressures of a Tutsi Diaspora population in Congo combined to further the notion that the Tutsi were foreign and produced the common acceptance by the Hutu population that the Tutsi had to be eliminated as a race.

It is this reason of racialization of identities that explains why political violence between races, or directed against an alien race, is likely to take the form of a genocide. The aftermath of the 1994 genocide was the emergence of Tutsi Power in Rwanda. But according to the author, this Tutsi Power 'was shaped by a diasporic sense of obligation

for all Tutsi globally', and it is in this sense that the growing crisis of citizenship in the countries of the region, particularly in eastern Congo and Uganda (and Burundi) can be analyzed and understood.

For the Fulani, there are also a number of publications. These concentrate on two broad aspects of the people. The first group of writers are mainly concerned with the ethnography of the Fulani. In this category are such authors as Stenning (1959), Dupire (1962), Dupire (1970), Reisman (1977). As already indicated, the focus of the above works is the history and social organization of the Fulani. They generally agree that the Fulani are a race that originated from the east, specifically, the result of the intercourse between local Senegambian people and incoming Berber groups. Subsequently, they dispersed to the places where they now live. These authors also point out that the Fulani have a highly stratified society that corresponds roughly to a five layer hierarchy including the Islamic aristocrats (torodbe), the middle class, the lower middle class, the lower class, and, lastly slaves.

The second category of writings on the Fulani includes, Stenning (1957), Bruijn and Dijk (1995), Bruijn and Dijk (1997), Azarya, Breedveld, Bruijn and Dijk (1999), Bassett (1994). These are latter works and are mainly concerned with the nature of Fulani pastoralism and the changing ways of life of Fulani pastoralists. Most of the writings in this category point out that because of the changing climatic conditions in the Fulani traditional areas, nomads have been forced to move east and south in search of graze. Often, this migration means

that they have to live among new people as well as take up new ways, including commercial herding and cultivation of cereals.

The problem with most of these works however, and that is why the present work is necessary, is that they do not treat the trans-border nature of the Fulani and how the fractions cooperate to seek and gain power in the societies where they live. Even where the available works treat such important issues as conflicts involving the Fulani, it is often as they concern the confrontations with host communities over competition for increasingly scarce resources such as grazing space. They do not always touch on the Fulani quest for political power in their countries of abode and how this often brings about conflict and violence between them and other ethnic groups in these various states.

The information available on the Internet is not much different in this regard. There are a large number of sites devoted to issues concerning the Tutsi and the Fulani respectively, as are those for Central Africa and West Africa, including Fisher (1996), Young (2000), Orville (2004a), Orville (2004b) and Iro (2005). But works therein are largely descriptive and historical, and almost all reflect what is available in published form. They rarely analyze the events they describe, especially in the direction that the present work has set out to do nor do they even attempt to look at the trans-border nature of the relations and conflicts that involve the two peoples under study.

2.3   JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PRESENT STUDY:

The present study is therefore justified in many respects. First, the review of existing literature, which we have undertaken, shows that

existing literature do not cover the various issues involved in the present work. These issues include the relations among fractions of trans-border ethnic groups across Africa's international borders, and the effects of these relations on national integration and political conflict on the continent. No one book has treated all these issues, and even those works that have treated one or more aspects of the topic have either not been exhaustive or have approached the issues involved from an unsatisfactory perspective.

It has earlier been pointed out that the great majority of works on ethnic solidarity and national integration have been so overtly concerned with fostering the latter that they have almost invariably come up with conclusions suggesting that ethnic solidarity on the continent was either on the retreat or was not strong in the first place. Yet, such ethnic solidarity has continued to remain the major issue facing African countries, and the major factor hampering national integration, as well as causing conflicts within and between African countries.

Even those works in the category of borderland studies which generally recognize the salience of trans-border ethnic relations on the continent, have had the shortcoming of not moving further to examine the effects of such relations on national integration on the continent. Nor have such works examined the influence of these trans-border ethnic relations on the numerous conflicts, which have existed in Africa over the years. Even those few works which have tried to examine the relationship between ethnicity and political conflicts in Africa and

elsewhere have generally failed to recognize the trans-border nature of many of these ethnic conflicts, or even the seeming pattern of these conflicts as resulting from the tendency of trans-border ethnic groups in Africa to maintain a hegemony over the various countries in which they live.

Moreover, most of the existing works have not undertaken concrete studies of trans-border ethnic groups in Africa. This is in fact particularly curious, considering the enormous influence wielded by trans-border ethnic groups on the various regions of Africa, particularly, the Fulani on West Africa affairs, and especially in the case of the Great Lakes region of Central Africa, where despite the enormity of crises the region has gone through as a result of Tutsi trans-border affinity, one hardly finds reference to the trans-border issue.

Almost all existing relevant literature also have the shortcoming of using inappropriate theoretical frameworks of analyses. From the perusal of such works, it is easily obvious that two such frameworks have been often used: the authors of the radical persuasion have adopted Marxist perspectives (Nnoli, 1978; Ake, 1981), while the liberal school of authors has generally adopted the modernization and institutional approaches (Bonaacich, 1972; Brass, 1985). Despite the wide gap between these two perspectives, there is an important sense in which they are similar, and herein lies their greatest shortcoming-both perspectives implicitly assume that ethnicity is instrumentalist.

Both schools of thought assume that ethnicity is only a tool, utilized by ethnic 'entrepreneurs' to mobilize people who share some

commonalities for the purpose of advancing their selfish purposes. For the Marxists, this purpose is the attainment of class objectives, while for the Liberals, the purpose of ethnic mobilization is the gaining of advantages in securing the benefits of modernization. In this sense, in which ethnicity is seen as instrumentalist.

But by seeing ethnicity only as instrumentalist, most existing works fail to understand that the phenomenon is also primordialist – its features are given and permanent. And it is only in this primordialist perspective that the trans-border nature of ethnicity among partitioned peoples can be appreciated, which is why the analytical frameworks to be used in the present study would have to recognize ethnicity as both primordialist and instrumentalist.

Existing literature in the area of the present study have also suffered from the use of wrong methodologies. For instance, except for a few (eg. Miles,1994), many other such works were not conducted through field surveys and as such, their conclusions have mainly derived from (often-opinionated) analysis of existing works and secondary reports. Most works in this area have also generally suffered from the authors' tendency to see ethnicity as an elite phenomenon. Ethnicity is most often mistakenly perceived as existing concretely only among the elite of the various groups who could then proceed to mobilize and manipulate the mass of their people along ethnic lines whenever they so choose or the circumstances dictate.

Thus, research on ethnicity is usually conducted among the elite while the masses are ignored as tools in the ethnic game. There is no

doubt that the elite of the various groups have played important roles with regard to the ethnic phenomenon, but to take the phenomenon as only an elite affair is certainly wrong. Such view fails to take account of the fact that in certain circumstances, ethnic feelings have not only been instantaneous, but ethnic struggles have been waged by the mass of the people, sometimes even against their leaders. A correct method of enquiry in ethnic studies will thus have to involve not only the elite, but also the masses, an objective which the present study sought to achieve.

Lastly, there is further justification for the present study in its prospects to contribute to knowledge. This work involved a scholarly review of existing works, fieldwork and the formulation of new insights pertaining to the issues under study. Africa, and indeed elsewhere, is dotted with groups, who like the Tutsi and the Fulani, are divided across borders. A detailed study of the Tutsi and Fulani will therefore lead to a better understanding of every other such group in wherever countries they may live.

Moreover, the comparative nature of the study of the Tutsi and the Fulani, and their political hegemonies, will certainly contribute to a better understanding of the events in their respective regions and thus, help in providing solutions to the social problems engendered by the domination of geo-political regions by trans-border ethnic groups.

2.4   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:

As has been shown by the overview of existing literature, the subject matter of this research is extensive, covering such broad issues

as ethnicity, national integration and political conflict. Then, the phenomenon has different dimensions. It is therefore difficult to find a framework that will explain these broad issues at one and the same time. This is why three such frameworks are used in an eclectic manner in the present study, and which will complement each other in enhancing the analysis. These are the Political Systems theory, Hegemony theory, and Conflict theory.

i. Political Systems Theory:

The first of these theoretical frameworks, which will serve as the background theory, is the Political Systems theory. This theory derives from the General Systems theory, which constitutes an effort to find a basic correlation between all areas of knowledge (Frankel, 1973). The Political Systems theory owes its beginnings to the behaviouralist movement in political science that argues that it is necessary to study not only parts and processes in isolation, but also the dynamic interaction between those parts and processes (Taylor, 1978).

Morgan (1984) defines a system as a set of component parts which together can perform some purposeful activity. David Easton is the most prominent theorist associated with systems analysis in political science. His works (as cited in Wiseman, 1966) set out the general framework of the political systems theory. Easton is concerned with how authoritative decisions are made and executed in a society. This takes place through interrelated activities within the political system but distinct from the environment.

The political system consists of those "identifiable and interrelated institutions and activities in a society that make authoritative decisions (or allocations of values) that are binding on society" (Anderson, 1979:17). The political system is made up of inputs and outputs. Inputs refer to the injections into the system of some information or resource, consisting of demands and supports. Demands are the claims made by individuals and groups on the political system for action to satisfy their interests. Support is rendered when groups and individuals obey laws and accept the decisions and actions of the authorities made in response to demands.

Memory consists of the facilities and processes by which information is stored and recalled. A decision is the commitment, based on an analysis of available information and capabilities, to take some action vis-à-vis the environment. Output is the system's decisions, policies and action. Demands are usually converted into outputs, and these may produce new demands and so on, usually through the process of feedback. Feedback refers to new information about the results of the previous action, and on the basis of which the system can start the cycle all over again.

Fig 1: Diagrammatic Representation of the Political System:

Inputs		Outputs
Demands	Political System	Decisions
		Or
Supports		Policies
	Feedback	

(Environment on left and right sides)

Source: Wiseman (1966: 120).

It is possible to conceive of the political system at various levels. At the international level, we have the international political system. We also have the national political systems, as well as sub-national political systems. What the foregoing implies is that each of the above systems is itself composed of units or sub-systems which are themselves systems. Thus, the international system consists of states as the major units or sub-systems. At the national level, these states are systems of their own, and are also composed of units in the form of lower level governments and institutions.

A system presupposes equilibrium, and this equilibrium can only be achieved when a system and its sub-systems perform according to expectation. For instance, the international system is expected to maintain peace and co-operation among states, but these states are also expected to fulfill their international obligations, as well as their obligations to their citizens. It follows therefore that the failure of any one actor to meet its expectations could lead to disequilibrium in the entire political system. This then is the context in which the present

study is approached. The international political system, which is composed primarily of states, expects that these states should have the unquestioning loyalty of its citizens.

Yet, several of these states contain within their borders, ethnic groups including those partitioned across their borders with other states. These states are expected to satisfy the demands of the various ethnic groups within their territories (including their own fractions of the partitioned ethnic groups). Many of these states have not been able to satisfactorily address the demands of their component groups, who have consequently proceeded to withdraw their support from the state in varying degrees (Enemuo, 1991).

In the case of partitioned groups who have often obtained support in times of need and base of operations and sanctuary in times of trouble, from their kin on the other sides of the borders, members have usually become more inclined towards the larger ethnic group. This primary allegiance of members of fractions of trans-border ethnic groups to the larger group rather than their states of abode brings disequilibrium to the political system.

The application of the Systems theory to trans-border studies is very apt. As observed by Strassaldo (1977), to think in terms of system is to think in terms of boundaries and environment. This is because every system has boundary and the idea is logically built into all definitions of systems. The idea of systems in boundary is hinged on three factors, namely, every social system has a spatial dimension; secondly, border scholars have identified a system within the

contiguous boundaries of states; lastly, is the non-spatial concern of border scholars based on the assumptions in systems theory that a system is not only made up of parts but also relationships and interactions among them and their attributes. In a system, spatial and functional boundaries interact and intersect each other in a complex and variable fashion.

By using the Political Systems theoretical framework of analysis, it is possible to show why the partition of ethnic groups across borders has adversely affected national integration in the respective African states, and why the various fractions of the trans-border ethnic groups have continued to pay primary allegiance to their larger ethnic group instead of the states in which they live. It is also possible to see why these fractions have usually been drawn into conflicts and events in countries other than their own involving their kin.

This analytical framework thus enables us see that what has been described as the 'trampling of the borders underfoot' by fractions of trans-border ethnic groups (Davidson, 1987:19), is actually the withdrawal of group support from a system which almost everywhere in Africa has proved incapable of satisfying the demands and expectations of these various fractions of the partitioned groups.

ii.   **Hegemony Theory:**

An ethnic group that is shut out of the commanding heights of a society soon engages in struggle to secure a share in the scheme of things. According to Brass (1985), ethnic groups are engaged in a continuing struggle in societies that have not developed stable

relationships among the main institutions and centrally organized social forces. This struggle is led by elites of the various ethnic groups and is usually over state power, state resources, and local control. Elites of an ethnic group who seek to gain control over, or who have succeeded in gaining control over the state must either suppress and control their rivals, or establish collaborative alliances with other elites. Most often, a group that gains control over the state and establishes alliances with other ethnic groups ultimately institutes hegemony over the rest of society.

Hegemony refers to "the political forging – whether through coercion or elite bargaining – and institutionalization of a pattern of group activity in a state and the concurrent idealization of that schema into a dominant symbolic framework that reigns as common sense" (Laitin, 1986:19). It is "the social control exercised by a group through which it imposes its will on society without the use of force" (Falola and Ihonvbere, 1985:238-9). When a hegemonic order prevails in a social formation, the supremacy of the social group is established, maintained and reproduced through consent over other social classes and groups. This domination is imposed through the penetration of all aspects of society and manifested in the general acceptance of the world-view of the dominant group and the interpretations that this group gives to social reality.

According to Gramsci, "the supremacy of a social group is manifested in two ways: as 'domination' and as 'intellectual and moral leadership'. A social group is dominant over those antagonistic groups it

wants to 'liquidate' or to subdue even with armed force, and it is leading with respect to those groups that are associated and allied with it" (as cited in Fontana, 1993:141). "Domination is the use of force to project power and to shape people into acquiescence in new power relations, status distributions, and new forms of material and cultural production" (Ake, 2000:119). 'Intellectual and moral leadership' is what Gramsci refers to as hegemony, and whose principal constituting elements are consent and persuasion. "A social group or class can be said to assume a hegemonic role to the extent that it articulates and proliferates throughout society, cultural and ideological belief systems whose teachings are accepted as universally valid by the general population" (as cited in Fontana, 1993: 140).

Hegemony thus necessarily implies the creation of a particular structure of knowledge and a particular system of values. The social group or class that is capable of forming its own particular knowledge and value systems, and of transforming them into generally and universally applicable conceptions of the world, is the group that exercises intellectual and moral leadership. Hegemony is thus conceived as the vehicle through which the dominant social groups establish a system of 'permanent consent' that legitimates a prevailing social order by encompassing a complex network of mutually interwoven ideas.

Volgy, Imwalle and Corntassel (1997:210) state that hegemonic power can be viewed from two different perspectives. One is through the concept of structural power and the other is relational power. Structural power refers to "the capability and willingness of the

'hegemon' to create essential rules, norms, and modes of operation for the (political) system". The hegemon enjoys structural power through its capacity to determine the terms on which societal values are satisfied and to whom they are made available. Relational power refers to "the capabilities of the hegemon vis-à-vis other actors in the system, and its ability to get others, by persuasion or coercion, to do what they would not otherwise do".

These authors then conclude that it is quite possible for the hegemon to simultaneously maintain its structural power while its relational power increases or diminishes. Changes in relational hegemonic capabilities have effects on the degree of normative concurrence with hegemonic leadership on the part of the other actors in the system, and this affects the stability of the political system. When normative concurrence is low, the hegemon often resorts to force in order to maintain allegiance. In other words, when hegemony diminishes, domination takes over. But as Ake (2000) has argued, because domination is coercive, often, people find this form of social control threatening and resist determinedly, especially as domination is usually associated with the relative absence of any adequate system of justice and the rule of law capable of inspiring popular confidence.

The above perspective of hegemony is applied for analysis in this work. It enables us see that it is within the political system that the struggle of ethnic groups for control takes place, and this often times, ultimately leads to conflict. The perspective also enables us see that the tendency of fractions of the minority trans-border ethnic group to

impose hegemony over their regions of abode leads to instability and conflict in the political system. It is this attempt to impose hegemony over other groups - the resort to domination that leads to violence in these regions.

According to Gramsci, a socio-political order, the 'integral state', is characterised by a hegemonic equilibrium based on a "combination of force and consent, which are balanced in varying proportions, without force prevailing too greatly over consent" (as cited in Fontana, 1993: 141). Thus, a social group or class whose power is based more on the coercive apparatus of the state cannot achieve a lasting rule over society. When force prevails over consent, and domination obtains in society, conflict and violence ensue, resulting from the resistance of the other ethnic groups in the various countries where the trans-border ethnic group exercises control, to such domination.

iii.   Conflict Theory:

The resulting conflict of groups as explained above is actually over systemic benefits and who will control its distribution. This situation is explained in this work using another theory, the Conflict theory. Conflict theory sees the political system as a network of interpersonal and inter-group influence, and as "the arena in which conflicting interests are played out" (Collins, 1975:295). Society has two faces – consensus and conflict. Consensus produces systemic equilibrum, but when this breaks down, conflict results. According to Dahrendorf (1959:165), society is held together by the authority structure.

Authority itself is enforced constraint. In every social organization, some positions are entrusted with a right to exercise control over other positions. This ensures effective coercion in society. It is the differential distribution of authority that is the determining factor of systemic or social conflicts. Authority essentially refers to positions and roles and not to the individuals who occupy them. As such, authority has structure and implies super-ordination and sub-ordination. Those who occupy higher positions of authority are expected to control those in lower positions who are now their subordinates.

Control thus arises from the expectations attached to positions, and because of the legitimacy of authority, sanctions can be brought to bear against those who do not comply. Authority is also not constant. Thus, a person of authority in one setting may not be in a position of authority in another setting. Because authority is hierarchical, it is within each system, dichotomous. Thus, there are those in positions of authority and those that are not or are in positions of subordination. These two groups are marked by interests common to each group and contradictory to the other in substance and direction.

This contradiction produces a 'conflict of interests' in society, whereby those in dominant positions seek to maintain the status quo while those in subordinate positions seek change. A major variable in this conflict of groups is the resources that the different actors possess (Collins, 1975). In a situation of inequality, the groups that control resources are likely to try to exploit those that lack resources. It is also likely that those groups with resources, and therefore authority and

power, will ultimately impose their idea systems on the entire society. The legitimacy of authority is as such, precarious, as those who hold authority and those who do not are always playing out their interests, sometimes even when the actors are not conscious of those interests.

It is thus around interests that social groups coalesce. Interest groups are those that hold common interests, but those that engage in group conflicts are 'conflict groups'. The structural origin of group conflicts must be sought in the arrangement of social roles endowed with expectations of domination or subjection. In other words, wherever there are such roles, group conflicts are to be expected. Differentiation of groups engaged in conflicts usually follows the lines of differentiation of relevant roles in the exercise of authority.

It is those roles that form the focus of any conflict, which objective becomes the retention / replacement of the role structure and/or personnel of that society. Once conflict groups emerge, they engage in actions that lead to changes in the social structure. When the conflict is intense, the changes that occur are radical, often leading to a new group capturing the authority structure. When the conflict is accompanied by violence, structural change could even occur.

Conflict theory is thus able to direct us to both the nature of societal conflicts as well as the direction of such conflicts. It becomes possible to see that in societies marked by inequality, those who possess resources will seek to dominate while those that lack resources will seek to obtain them. It is this difference in interests that produce conflicts. It is also in this wise that the resulting conflicts are actually

conflicts of interest. Conflict theory also directs us to the resolution of conflicts. It enables us understand that conflicts do not normally result in the destruction of the societies in which they occur. Instead, after a time, a conflict abates, or is resolved or is transformed.

All conflicts "follow their own courses and stages, and usually terminate in the reconciliation of the communities concerned (Otite, 1999: 6). This restores society to some degree of order that permits it to continue to exist, even if in a changed form. Conflict resolution aims at intervention, usually by third parties, to change or facilitate the course of a conflict. Conflict resolution provides the opportunity for others to interact with the parties concerned, with the aim of reducing the scope, intensity and effects of conflicts. It also enables the parties to conflicts to meet at other fora or in situations other than the conflict arena, to try to consider other approaches and alternatives to the issues at stake.

Conflict resolution is usually conducted through such techniques as problem-solving workshops, interactive problem-solving meetings, third party consultations, and collaborative analytical problem-solving exercises (Mitchell, 1993). Other writers have identified other modes of intervention. These include facilitation, mediation, counseling and therapy, organizational development, conciliation, quasi-political procedures, informal tribunals, arbitration of several types and criminal and civil justice systems (Wilmort and Hocker, 1998). Others still are compromise and adjudication.

Conflict resolution processes usually take the form of meetings and face-to-face contacts of third parties as facilitators and the parties

to conflict. During formal and informal meetings, conflict resolution exercises permit a re-assessment of views and claims as a basis for finding options to crisis and to divergent points of view (Otite, 1999). Workshops and meetings organized to tackle conflicts are expected to alter the perceptions, images and attitudes of the parties in conflict and widen their range of options (Mitchell, 1993).

Such and other efforts usually result in agreements, understandings, recommendations and arrangements aimed at correcting the problems that led to the conflict or removing the situation that make for its aggravation. In plural societies though, such as this study is concerned with, conflict resolution can be quite complex. This is because of the sharp cultural differences that often exist in such societies. Cultural differences mean differences in values and interests among the cultural groups in the society.

But as Otite (1999) has pointed out, although culture is a marker of social differences, it should not be regarded as an obstacle to conflict resolution in multi-ethnic or multi-cultural societies. Instead, decoding the cultural milieu is an important key to conflict resolution because it reveals the value placed on resources and the strength and centrality of symbols associated with it. And it is by paying attention to the intricate culture questions that even the most seemingly irresolvable conflicts can be broken down, and solutions adduced.

From the foregoing, it is clear therefore, that the above three theories are adequate for the explanation of the phenomenon under study. From the explanations then, our theoretical framework of

analysis is that when a political system is in disequilibrum and output of welfare goods and services can not match the demands of the various ethnic groups in the country, fractions of partitioned ethnic groups in various countries are likely to utilize the resources of the larger group to gain power in these countries and then proceed to institute their dominance.

This leads to opposition from other ethnic groups in the countries and produces conflict between the various groups in which those in power seek to retain it while those outside power strive for change. Once such conflicts break out, their resolution will only lie in recognizing and taking into consideration, the trans-border nature of some of the ethnic groups involved.

CHAPTER THREE.

THE STATE SYSTEM AND CONFLICTS IN AFRICA.

3.1. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL STATE SYSTEM:

States refer to all sovereign, recognized, legal entities with a central government exercising jurisdiction over a specified group of people and territory (Hammond and Shaw, 1995). According to Young (1976:67), the term 'state' is applied to any form of human government exhibiting at least some rudimentary signs of centralization and continuity. Calvert (1986:17) refers to the state as "a community organized for political purposes, which is in legal terms independent of any higher authority".

Philosophers have since the ages tried to explain the origins of the state. The views in this regard could be broadly divided into five, namely, the social contract theory, the divine right theory, the force theory, and the evolutionary theory (Appadorai, 1968). The fifth is the revolutionary theory or the Marxist theory of the state. The issue of the origins of the state is tied with the related issue of the purpose of the state. In other words, what is the purpose of political organization?

The views of philosophers in this regard can be classified into two (Appadorai, 1968). The first are those who argue that the sate is a means to an end, including Aristotle, Locke, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Harold Laski. These agree that the end of the state is a better life for the individual – ensuring the development and advancement of the individual, the preservation of his property, life

and liberty. The second view is exemplified by Hegel, and holds that the state is an end in itself.

According to this view, the individual is only a part of the state, which actually is the aggregation of all individuals in its territory. Society has its own purposes of preservation, expansion and perfection, distinct from and superior to those of the single individuals composing it. It therefore carries out the dictates of universal reason and is thus impelled by its very nature and destiny to seek its own perfection, making use of the individual in the process, who must subordinate his own ends to those of the state and society.

But despite the long history of philosophical interest in the origins and purpose of the state, the idea of the modern state only assumed shape and form beginning with the thoughts of Machiavelli in the sixteenth century (Sabine, 1973). The precursors of the modern state extend back to the Greek polis and beyond (Young, 1976), and have included the city- state and the country- state (Appadorai, 1968). The city-state as a form of political organization prevailed and reached its height in ancient Greece and Italy- Athens, Sparta, Rome. It was also found in medieval Europe- Venice, Florence.

The city-state was an organized society of men dwelling in a walled town, with a surrounding territory not too large to allow all its free inhabitants periodically to assemble within the city walls to discharge the duties of citizenship. The Greeks called their state, polis, originally meaning a fortified position on a hill to which the inhabitants of the surrounding country could run for refuge on the approach of an

enemy, but in time coming to mean essentially a state in which the life of the people was focused on the central city.

Ultimately however, the city-state suffered decay and then declined. The reasons for this included internal quarrels among the large number of city-states, inability by any of these small city- states to withstand attack by powerful country-states, and expansions which weakened the ability of the city-states to manage their affairs and defend their territories and subjects. By A.D 476, Rome, which had by then transformed from a city-state through a republic to an imperial and despotic empire, finally collapsed.

This also marked the start of the medieval period in Europe, which lasted till A.D 1500. The essential feature of the medieval period was feudalism, a system of vassalage, in which the emperor was seen as God's vassal, the king his vassal, who also then maintained a system of vassalage under him, including princes, dukes, and other nobles. The system revolved around land holding, and each vassal received his dominion, including all its land, as fief to be held on conditions of loyalty to his lord.

Although the vassal owed his lord a number of obligations, each vassal nevertheless became a virtual sovereign in his domain. This rendered difficult the formation of strong national governments as each country was split up into a vast number of practically independent principalities. Confusion and anarchy was bound to set in, and even though the Catholic Church, and then the Holy Roman Empire (which at its zenith included within its territory most of the area of present –

day Europe) provided some unity, the medieval concept of a universal empire supported by a universal church ultimately broke down.

The final event that led to this collapse of the old society was the situation that culminated in the Thirty Years War, which ended with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. In place of the medieval forms of the state arose the modern state, which embodied the major features of the new situation that had developed in the course of the war (Nnoli, 1986). The new situation involved the emergence of a central bureaucracy and an army which had suppressed all local and external centres of power within a given territory and which had the loyalty of the population within that territory.

This transfer of loyalty of the people to the state led to the development of cohesion within the population and their marked differentiation from other peoples. The Treaty of Westphalia recognized this new situation and sought to regulate the relationship between states on that basis. It thus provided that only sovereign states could engage in international relations, and for this purpose, all sovereign states were equal. And for purposes of recognizing a state as an actor in international relations, it must have a definite geographical territory, with a definite population, and effective military power devoid of internal and external rivalries.

This new state system based on the Treaty of Westphalia lasted until certain events rendered the provisions unrealistic. The first was the French Revolution of 1789 and the fallouts that accompanied it. The population at large participated in that event, and consequently became

an important element in the politics of Europe and thereafter demanded to be consulted in political matters. The revolution also led to the development of citizen armies as opposed to the mercenary armies of feudal Europe, as well as the use of propaganda to solicit mass support for government policies.

Those states with citizen armies and where mass support for public policy existed became stronger. This was in addition to the then new technological revolution which occurred unevenly across Europe and which produced discrepancies in power among the states of Europe. The result was that states were no longer equal in power. The technological revolution further made improved communications possible, enabling some states to permeate others more easily and very subtly. The net effect of these developments was that the state system as set out in Westphalia became eroded.

The sovereignty of states was even further reduced at the end of the Second World War, with the formation of the United Nations Organization (UN). The charter of the United Nations Organization and the activities of its agencies added new dimensions to the international system, providing for other actors in the international state system different from states, including individuals, international organizations and non-governmental organizations. Moreover, the UN adopted certain resolutions that reduced from state power, including provisions on human rights and the rights to self-determination.

In addition, the UN and its agencies freely operated in several countries without much restriction, further reducing from the power of

states. In the 1970s and beyond, the activities of the Multi-national Corporations, which transcended states but were essentially based in their parent countries contributed to the further erosion of the state system by blurring the boundaries separating states. In the present time, globalization has become the prevailing phenomenon. But by "permeating boundaries and turning the world into a global village" (Scholte, 2000: 15-16), globalization has greatly also reduced the state system as set out in Westphalia.

The present reality is that sovereignty now retains the form but not the substance of its Westphalian existence. Equality of states, territorial integrity, and non-interference are no longer the reality of international relations but rather the ideals now advocated by the less powerful to prevent the powerful from suppressing them. Nevertheless, the Westphalian concept of the state continues to be retained, especially in its legal form, and particularly in Africa where states, ever since the introduction of the modern state system into the continent, have remained the most important actors in the international system.

3. 2. HISTORY AND NATURE OF THE STATE IN AFRICA:

The modern state system was introduced into Africa by European colonialism. Contact between Europe and Africa dated much earlier than the 19th century though, but until formal colonization was introduced into the later by the former, Africa was largely organized in societies. These societies ranged from the sophisticated Ethiopian empire and the empires of the Western Sudan to the small communities

of Bozo fishermen and nomadic Fulani herdsmen, as well as the hunting groups of pigmies in the Congo forest (Rodney, 1972).

There is now considerable agreement that pre-colonial Africa had states and state systems, although many of these differed essentially from the European model (Davidson, 1992; Herbst, 2000). Some African societies had even attained statehood, by European standards, at the time of the European colonization of Africa. Thus, the Ethiopians, the Hausa and even some Yoruba groups, among others, had definitely developed state systems in the pre-colonial period. Other pre-colonial African peoples could however be said to have been stateless at the time, including the Igbo, and the Khoisan hunter – gatherers of the Kalahari Desert.

Herbst (2000) has identified the control of territory as the major difference between the European and pre-colonial African state models. In the pre-colonial period, boundaries were defined according to how far a state could extend its power. Boundaries reflected the nature of state power in that period of Africa's history -fragmented and constantly changing according to the varying fortunes of the different political units in a given neighborhood. In modern Europe however, boundaries did not just reflect how far power could extend, but rather how far power could be broadcast. States and the state system were tied to the control of territory.

In pre-colonial African polities, power was not based on control of land. Power was exercised over people instead. The state in pre-colonial Africa essentially exercised authority and sovereignty over its people.

Thus, it was possible to see situations where the people belonged to a given state, although the land inhabited by those subject peoples laid outside the control of the given state. It is this lack of firm territorial control in pre-colonial times that has led many analysts to argue that pre-colonial Africa had neither states nor state systems (Jackson, 1990; Hobsbawn, 1987).

In reality however, states did exist in pre-colonial Africa. In fact, Basil Davidson (1992: 53-63) has extensively traced the processes through which, by 1750, the powerful nation-state of Asante had secured effective control of the whole of what would become, two centuries later, the modern Republic of Ghana. Asante was not exceptional in these respects. "It functioned on principles of constitutionalised delegation and devolution of executive power, and of inherent checks and balances, such as may be seen at work under different appearances in the history of a whole range of contemporary polities, (including) those of the Mossi, of the Yoruba, of the Mandinka, and of others in West Africa and of polities in other regions of the continent".

With the incursion of Europeans, however, the nature of the African society was transformed. Initially, Europeans were able to pursue their purposes in Africa, as traders or as missionaries, without needing or desiring to make formal encroachments on the territorial sovereignty of African states. What the European powers needed at that time were at the most, secure maritime stations, from where, trade and other activities by Europeans were carried into the interior. Thus, these

European powers only held small coastal colonies in Africa then, and these were actually leases held only at the pleasure of the African landlord —the Chiefs.

As European activity developed and progressed inwards into the hinterland over the years, conflicts inevitably arose between the nations involved, especially France and Britain, but also between these and other European nations, particularly Germany. European officials were claiming "incompatible rights" by virtue of treaties with African rulers, or of their own military and naval action (Hargreaves, 1984:20). By 1884, the 'elbowing' resulting from this scramble for the coasts had extended to eastern and south- western Africa, and the Berlin Conference of that year and the next, was convened to bring a little order into these inter-European rivalries.

According to Katzenellenbogen (1996), before 1884, European powers had already been grabbing pieces of Africa for many years and many boundaries had been set. The Berlin Conference was convened largely because Germany wanted to bring the process under some measure of agreed international control and limit further British expansion in Africa. In addition to seeking to ensure neutrality and free trade in Africa irrespective of the powers directly controlling particular colonial possessions, Germany also wanted the Conference to establish clear criteria for international recognition of territorial claims.

The Berlin Conference of 1884-5, however, only succeeded in dampening the scramble for Africa in that it actually refrained from setting any precise territorial boundaries. These came later in the form

of unilateral declarations and bilateral or multilateral agreements, some of the latter being based on agreements reached prior to the conference (Howard, 1976). One of the principles set out in the Conference's Final Act was however that the validity of territorial claims in Africa by the European powers was to be based on effective occupation of the territories (Young, 1994).

Although this principle actually referred specifically and only to the effective occupation of the coasts (Katzenellenbogen, 1996), subsequent agreements based on the principle, such as the Anglo-French 'Arrangement' of 10 August 1889, were a recognition that the old system of free trade imperialism in Africa would have to be replaced by one involving fixed colonial boundaries (Hargreaves, 1984: 21). British and French diplomatists finally sat down in Paris to draw lines, which would keep them apart in the areas of colonial conflict. From metropolitan viewpoints, it did not particularly matter where the boundaries were set, so far as they excluded other competing powers from their areas of interest.

Although geographers were available to advise, European knowledge of the geography of Africa at that time was still rudimentary. Thus, the line drawn up by the French in 1889 under 'expert advice' and with the aim of excluding Britain from the upper Niger basin was later discovered to have a precisely contrary effect. Even the attempt to allocate territory along some natural features like a watershed could not work, as most topographical features could not be identified on the ground in the form envisaged.

An example of the above was the Anglo-German Agreement, which accepted the Rio del Rey as the Nigeria – Cameroon boundary. This later proved to be an estuary receiving several small streams, instead of a single river. The effect of this ignorance on the part of the colonial masters still reverberates to this day. And as a result of such 'mistakes', several chiefdoms, ethnic groups and historical and cultural areas were bisected (Anene, 1970; Hargreaves, 1984).

Formal colonialism was introduced into the African territories mostly in the years between 1894 and 1896 following pressures from groups in France and Britain and other European countries demanding strong action to protect supposed national interests in Africa. And it was on these imprecise boundaries that those colonial regimes were imposed. Subsequent European diplomacy could only secure a few adjustments· These adjustments include the 1904 Anglo-French Convention, which amended the Anglo-French Treaty of 1890, and which redefined the Anglo-French frontier in Sokoto so as to facilitate the movement of caravans between Nigeria and Niger. This was further amended by a 1906 Treaty, which tried to rearrange the colonial possessions in conformity with pre-colonial realities.

The second example is the present boundary between Ghana and Togo, which emerged from a repartition of the original border between the Gold Coast and German Togoland in 1919 by the British and the French, after the First World War which Germany lost, along with her territories. This new frontier relied heavily on natural features such as rivers as identified on the German Sprigade map of 1:2000,000, to

partition Eweland between the two territories. There were agitations for a redress of this anomaly, and work was carried out between 1927 and 1929 on the possibilities of modifying the frontier line.

Ultimately, a number of the anomalies were not resolved because of the inability of the two sides to reach agreement, and Eweland remain divided between the British and French territories to this day. Another example of a boundary that was adjusted is Mauritania's frontier with Mali. In 1944, the Eastern Hodh Cercle of Mauritania was detached from Mali (then French Soudan) and annexed to Mauritania for administrative purposes. However, in 1963, this annexation was altered in the Treaty of Kayes, which returned a long stretch along the border to Mali (Hargreaves, 1984; Nuggent, 1996; Gerteiny, 1967).

Thus, apart from these minor adjustments, most African boundaries still reflect the arbitrary compromise of the two decades following the Berlin Conference of 1884-5. A major result of European colonization of Africa was that Africa became organized along the lines of the European nation - state system. The emphasis of this state system on territoriality meant that the colonial boundaries, arbitrary as they were, were nevertheless maintained and enforced by the colonial authorities. These boundaries were largely ultimately inherited by the African states at independence, and they continue to form the basis on which these states exist and operate today.

3.3. AFRICAN STATES, ETHNICITY AND THE NEED FOR NATIONAL INTEGRATION:

The acceptance of the European nation-state model and the retention of the colonial boundaries by those who inherited power at independence in the various states of Africa immediately posed a number of problems. One of these was that the inherited boundaries made the extension of power over the territories of the respective states difficult (Herbst, 2000). In most cases, the periphery – the border areas, were far removed form the centre – the capital.

The immediate result of this situation was the emergence of two mutually reinforcing problems. The first was that the new states were unable to collect taxes from the outlying areas, mainly because they could not afford the number of personnel required to effectively cover their territorial spaces. The second was that because of this inability to collect taxes and the resultant paucity of funds, the states were unable to provide the services that their peoples had been promised in the heady days of the independence struggle (Herbst, 2000).

Confronted by these problems, the approach that the new states adopted was, first, to depend more on the collection of customs duties. But although this accounted for a significant portion of the states' revenues in the early periods, it could not however solve their revenue problems. The other option was aid from the metropolitan countries. But the conditionalities often attached to these transfers from abroad ultimately only served to weaken these new states and make them even less able to discharge the obligations that the mass of the African peoples expected of them.

Apart from the above problems, there was also the problem of the various boundaries enclosing within them, a number of ethnic groups, some of who were coming into contact for the first time only during the colonial period. This created the problem of ethnicity, which afflicted almost all African states at independence and has continued to afflict them to this day. There was also a related problem to the above - the fact of many of the state boundaries in Africa cutting across established ethnic and geo-political entities, fractions of which now fell into different states.

It was to be expected that at independence, the state boundaries would have been adjusted to reflect their 'natural' lines, but this was not to be. In fact, these boundaries were not only retained, but the borders were very tightly maintained. Clapham (1999) has argued that the continued retention of these borders was due to the nature of the states that were created within them and also the nature of the boundaries that African statehood implied, and identifies two broad kinds of relationship between a state and its boundaries.

The first category is the boundaries that are created by states. Here, the state, as a community of united people, precedes the boundary which now reflects where the jurisdiction of the state comes up against the jurisdiction of other neighboring states, and could as such, be adjusted as the need may be without necessarily affecting the identity of the state which lies within it. This is the case of the inter-state boundaries in Europe. The other category is the boundaries that

create states. This is the type that exists in Africa. Here, the boundaries come first, and the state is then created within them.

The boundary is thus central to the identity of the state that lies within it and actually constitutes the raison d'etre for its right to exist. Any change in the boundary therefore, fundamentally alters the very basis for the existence of the state that it encloses. This explains why African state boundaries were so rigorously maintained, because they defined and legitimated the power structure and politics that grew up within the post-colonial African states.

The enforcement of these borders however, did not deter the ethnic groups through which the boundaries passed from relating with each other. In the years following partition, these trans-border Africans kept up their ethnic ties despite the imposed boundaries. But this continued ethnic relations across the postcolonial African borders posed its own problems, which ultimately detracted from the interests of the very state system on the continent. Faced with all the above problems, it was obvious from the beginning that the new states desperately were in need of consolidation.

The means that these states generally adopted for consolidating power was the instrument of national integration. The very manner of bringing the nation-states into being in Africa thus necessitated the objective of national integration. National integration has been defined as the process of unifying a polity into a harmonious state (Duverger, 1972). This involves two aspects, first, the elimination of the

antagonisms dividing the society, and second, the development of solidarities among the various groups constituting the society.

Coleman and Roseberg (1964:9) define national integration as the "progressive reduction of cultural and regional tensions and discontinuities...in the process of creating a homogenous political community". And Etzioni (1965:4) has argued that a community is integrated when "it has effective control over the use of the means of violence; it has a centre of decision-making capable of affecting significantly the allocations of resources and rewards; and, it is a dominant focus of political identification for a large majority of politically aware citizens".

The colonial entities were a far cry from these ideals however. Having brought the disparate ethnic groups together in one political entity, even the colonial masters had realized that the survival of their state-making enterprise depended so much on these groups staying together. But their method for achieving this objective was often self-defeating, because, among other things, "they engendered centrifugal tendencies" (Ake, 2000:98). The colonial state relied heavily on force to subjugate the indigenous peoples and to carry out its mission, and this projected a threatening image and induced some of its subjects to regard the colonial regime as a hostile force.

Many of the people were driven to traditional solidarity groups such as ethnic or national groups. And these solidarity groups became centres of resistance and means of self – affirmation against the colonizer's integrative policies and acculturation, as well as networks for

82

survival. In the years following independence, the leaders of the new states had set out to create unity among the disparate groups. The objective of this unity was to engender the integration of the groups into the structures and institutions of the new nations-states.

This stage of the process of national integration actually started with the efforts at nation- building by the anti-colonial nationalist leadership in Africa. Young (1976) has argued that the anti-colonial leadership had sought to demonstrate that their claims to inherit the authority of the colonial territorial state carried the sanction of the populace at large. It was in seeking this mandate that the anti-colonial leadership began the process of transforming the often-arbitrary colonial state into a nation.

In the heady days of the nationalist struggle, the mass of the people of Africa had sincerely hoped that freedom from colonial rule would usher in a new era of basic rights and freedoms that were not available to them under colonial rule. As Cabral (1979:241), himself a leader of the African liberation struggle has pointed out, "the people did not fight for ideas, but for peace, material benefits, and a better future for their children". Ade-Ajayi (1982) argues also that for Africans, the hope of independence entailed a catalogue of specific wants.

The task of national integration was far from complete at the time of independence. But when they achieved victory, the nationalist elite acquired title to the state, which then became the tool for the completion of the nationalist project. The very first step they took therefore was to inundate their new countries' constitutions with

provisions invariably calculated to engender allegiance from the groups constituting the polity. In some cases, even the mere mention of 'ethnic group' and other such 'divisive appellations' was outlawed.

There was, however, a wide gulf between prescriptions and practices, and it was not long before it became apparent that these elite had no intention to carry out what they themselves had laid down. The liberal democratic provisions of the constitutions were either ignored or brazenly flouted, and within only few years of independence, a good number of these countries had turned into one-man or one – party despotisms, or to full-blown military dictatorships. For the most part, within a decade of independence, the leaders became fascinated with 'politics as a lucrative career' and what followed was a rat race for personal material gains in power and wealth.

Before long thus, it became clear to all and sundry that the dreams and hopes of independence were not going to be realized. By the turn of the second decade of independence, the state in every part of Africa was not performing, and society was generally deteriorating. In fact, after over three decades of independence, programmes of national integration and nation building, and control of state structures by her citizens, the African state is yet to enjoy widespread automatic allegiance of her citizens. Today, so many years after independence, the reality is that the objective of national integration has been far from achieved in most of the African states.

Instead, in place of the expected national integration, the continent has witnessed chaotic disintegration of state and society in

many countries. In response to this non-performance, civil society has exercised a number of options, including withdrawal, and, sustained opposition (Enemuo, 1991). In either case, ethnicity has provided the alternative attraction. And in both cases, the existence of fractions of the ethnic group in more than one country is an added impetus for the elevation of the larger ethnic group as the focus of political allegiance over and above the individual state.

Disenchanted with the system of things, the first preference of the members of the trans-border ethnic group has been the creation of a homeland, a nation-state in the real sense of the word, exclusively for the larger ethnic group. Examples include the case of the Somali before the events leading to the collapse of the Republic of Somalia, and also the case of the Kongo in south-Central Africa (Touval, 1984).

However, partly because the international system always tends towards the status quo, and mainly because of the opposition to the creation of such a homeland by the states where the fractions of the trans-border ethnic groups live, it has not been possible for the groups to achieve their preferred objective. Instead, they have had to pursue their solidarity largely within the scope of the existing state system, with far reaching consequences for the state system and the states in Africa.

3.4. TRANS-BORDER ETHNIC RELATIONS AND POLITICAL CONFLICT IN AFRICA:

The colonial regimes realized early on what problem the division of ethnic groups between borders could pose to their state- building

project, and set out immediately to contain it. The strategy was two pronged. It consisted first, in efforts by the colonial masters to subdue their subjects and to integrate them even forcefully, into their new territorial polities. New values were imposed on the people, new languages were introduced, and new laws were enforced within the new borders.

Second, even more effort was made to discourage and destroy trans-territorial contacts, especially among people of the same ethnic group. Many of the colonial laws required that only minimal contact be maintained (if at all) between the peoples of different territories. The objective was to disrupt contact permanently among these similar, trans-border peoples, and possibly create different identities for the various fractions across the borders.

This objective was achieved partly. For instance, in the Great Lakes region of Africa, many Hutu and Tutsi groups in Tanzania and Uganda largely do not go by that name any longer, and in some cases, like the Hutu group in Uganda who are now called the Kiga ethnic group, the groups have completely assumed new identities (Young, 1976). But despite such limited success by the colonialists, on the whole, their divide and rule tactics as it pertained to trans-border ethnic identification and relations was a failure.

In most cases, partition and the subsequent divisive colonial policies did not affect the peoples' feeling of brotherhood towards one another, and the various fractions of the partitioned groups in the different countries continued to see themselves as members of larger

ethnic groups. In fact, the great majority of the divided peoples especially in the years after independence, acted very much as if the frontier lines did not exist (Renner, 1984; Morton, 1984), and the supposedly sacred frontiers of the nation-states were 'trampled underfoot' by these borderland peoples (Davidson, 1992: 13).

Clapham (1996: 55) has attributed this challenge to the African boundary by the partitioned peoples on the continent to the manner in which certain classificatory categories thrown up by colonialism were interpreted by those concerned. It was colonialism that created states and threw up ethnic groups in the manner we now know them. Thus, when defined in primordial terms, it was possible for members of partitioned ethnic groups to see their ethnicity as preceding (conceptually, if not historically) the state and therefore deserving of more allegiance than the states in which their fractions lie, hence their continued relations despite the state borders.

This continued relations among divided peoples across borders as if the borders did not exist have posed a continuing problem to the nation-state system in Africa: it has adversely affected the integration of countries in which they exist. The various trans-border ethnic groups have continued to integrate more into the larger ethnic groups and less into the nation-states into which they fall. And, this attitude on the part of the trans-border peoples was reinforced by the nature of the new state system introduced into Africa by the Europeans, whereby the major part of the periphery of the new states practically remained in very little contact with this core.

Left 'to their own design', the people living in the peripheries constantly criss-crossed the borders to trade, to socialize and to work. The minimal contacts these peoples had with the state arose only when the state needed something from them. And these contacts were often hostile – conscription, taxation, enforcement of national laws and boundary mechanisms, including currencies and citizenship regulations, and anti-smuggling measures. As such, the border peoples have often reacted in a hostile manner to the state.

Such hostility has usually taken the form of active disobedience including dodging of drafts, kidnapping and killing of state agents and officials, and crossing over to the other sides of the borders (Herbst, 2000). This hostility that has characterized the relations between the state and the trans-border peoples has been a major cause of political conflict in Africa.

3.5   CONFLICTS AND THE STATE SYSTEM IN AFRICA:

The African state system seems to have been marked by crises and conflicts right from inception. After the wars of conquest, which generally marked the start of colonialism on the continent, another round of crises emerged with the decolonization process. In places like Algeria, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, and, South Africa, the conflict was between the native population and the colonizers. Many of these territories had 'settler' regimes, and it was only after much struggle and violence that the indigenous peoples eventually evicted the colonizers and or gained independence.

There were other countries like Angola and Mozambique where the independence struggle threw up ideologically contending forces among the nationalists. With one of those forces emerging victorious at independence in each of the countries (MPLA in Angola and FRELIMO in Mozambique), the departing colonizers joined forces with those who lost out to unleash a new round of hostilities against the new governments, with the wars lasting for several years and involving heavy casualties. The wars only ended recently and the countries are yet to recover from the effects. In Western Sahara, the war of independence against Morocco is still continuing and heavy tolls are still being recorded.

Another round of conflicts were witnessed in some African states shortly after they attained independence. Here, the attainment of independence from the colonizing regime seemed to have removed the common cause on which the independence struggle was anchored. What followed was the appearance of "regional, personal, and programmatic divergences" among the nationalists (Zartman, 1989: 13). Internal schisms soon emerged and in the ensuing struggle, the winners either killed off their opponents or forced them into exile. They then consolidated power, in the name of some ideology or clearly in the name of their ethnic group or region.

In a number of countries, this situation immediately produced an open challenge from those who lost out or others belonging to their ideological persuasion or ethnic or regional grouping. In Nigeria, such a situation led to a confrontation between the Eastern Region and the rest

of the country that culminated in the secession of the East from Nigeria to form an independent Biafra, and a subsequent three-year war that ultimately ended in defeat for the new republic and its re-incorporation into Nigeria. In the Congo, it was the Shaba Province that proclaimed the independence of Katanga that also failed after a civil war; while in Sudan, the war between the South and the rest of the country under the northern Muslims has now lasted for more than thirty years.

The highest number of conflicts in Africa has been internal conflicts though i.e. conflicts that occur within the confines of individual African states. And by far the greatest cause of this sort of conflicts has been ethnicity, i.e. conflicts between two or more ethnic groups within a country. This is distinct from trans-border ethnicity, which involves fractions of one or more ethnic groups living in two or more countries. We have already seen how colonialism brought together disparate groups, some of whom were coming together for the first time ever, into the same territories which later became sovereign states.

For as long as colonialism lasted, the regime ensured that these groups lived in relative peace. But once the colonialists left, the differences between these groups came into the open. Many of the independence leaders started being perceived in ethnic terms, and opposition to them soon emerged, also on ethnic terms. Open confrontations soon flared, and those who won often proceeded to consolidate their power in the name of their ethnic groups while despoiling the ethnic groups of their opponents.

Even where the Military came to 'resolve' the differences, it is significant that in most cases, the ethnic group of the coup leaders were often different from those of the civilian leaders they were replacing. In a few cases though, this was not the case as the former only came to save their ethnic group from ultimately loosing power as a result of the weaknesses of their civilian kin. In the decades following the attainment of independence by African states, a lot of them have also witnessed wars as a result of the confrontations between those ethnic groups within the states who were in power and those others who were not in power or were out of it.

It was such ethnicity as above that was at the roots of the post-independence wars in Chad, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo (Brazzaville), Central African Republic, Djibouti, Guinea Bissau, Zimbabwe, and, Liberia. Even the civil wars in Nigeria, Sudan, Congo (Zaire), and, Uganda were also largely ethnic, while the war in Somalia has similarities with ethnic (clan) wars. Most of the wars cited above have ended, but some are still continuing (Sudan, Somalia, Burundi), and many new ones are still emerging, including the Tuareg uprising (Mali and Niger), and the war in Dafur (Sudan) among others.

Trans-border ethnicity has also produced conflicts in various parts of Africa. These conflicts have largely been boundary and territorial conflicts. Examples of trans-border conflicts include those between, Algeria and Morocco; Somalia and Ethiopia and Kenya; the Benin-Niger dispute over Lete Island; the Mali-Burkina Faso border disputes; the Ewe border claims between Ghana and Togo; Libyan

annexation of northern Chad and occupation of northern Niger; and, Uganda's claims on its neighbors and her temporary annexation of the Kagera Salient.

In recent years, starting from the late 1980s and early 1990s, this catalogue of crises on the continent has been reinforced by the economic downturn that hit the continent to endanger the very fate of the African state system. Always contending with their petty wranglings and internal squabbles and the conflicts that these generate, almost all the states of Africa were not able to give much attention to the economic development of their societies. Resources were wasted on conflicts and grandeur, and through corruption and mismanagement, while much was also siphoned into the private accounts of the leaders, often outside of Africa.

In addition to the above, other internal causes also contributed to make the African condition almost unmanageable at this time, as the United Nations Secretary-General noted in a 1998 report to the Security Council:

> The nature of political power in many African states, together with the real and perceived consequences of capturing and maintaining power, is a key source of conflict across the continent...Where there is insufficient accountability of leaders, lack of transparency in regimes, inadequate checks and balances, non-adherence to the rule of law, absence of peaceful means to change or replace leadership, or lack of respect for human rights, political control becomes excessively important and the stakes become dangerously high. This situation is exacerbated when, as is often the case in Africa, the state is the major provider of employment and political parties are largely either regionally or ethnically based.

The situation finally came to a head when African states came face to face with mounting debts which they could not pay, with these states being unable to provide or maintain even the most basic of necessities to their citizens. With political instability increasingly the norm in the majority of African states, situation very often led to wars, as in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The result was a phenomenon which has been dubbed 'state failure' (Ottoh, 2004), and which although emerged earlier, finally crystallized in the 1990s on the African continent.

The major indices of state failure are far-reaching economic decline, widespread poverty among the citizens, deep and widespread conflicts, massive deterioration in the standards of living and a total decay in the infrastructural base of the country. State failure in Africa is a vicious cycle. Conflicts first emerge in these states, and because these conflicts do not go away quickly, infrastructures deteriorate and standards of living decline leading to widespread poverty and general societal decline. Then because of this sorry state of affairs, old conflicts intensify and new ones emerge, leading to a further worsening of the state of affairs.

The result of this vicious cycle is a descent into anarchy. According to Rotberg (2002), failure for a nation-state looms when violence degenerates into all-out internal war thereby causing standards of living and infrastructure to decline, and when the greed of rulers overwhelms their responsibilities to better their people and their surroundings. At this stage, the nation-state can no longer deliver positive political goods to their people. The government looses

legitimacy, and in the eyes and hearts of a growing number of its citizens, the nation-state itself becomes illegitimate.

In the last two decades, most of the states in Africa have moved more or less towards failure although only a handful of them actually failed. These included Sudan, D.R. Congo, Angola and Burundi. Countries like Rwanda, Liberia and Sierra Leone even exceeded ordinary failure and moved towards total collapse for some time, and Somalia actually collapsed. A collapsed state is the extreme version of a failed state, one in which even the government itself disappears and there is a total vacuum of authority.

When a state collapses, sub-state actors take over. They then control regions and sub-regions, build their own local security apparatuses and sanction markets and other economic arrangements, and even establish some form of international relations. Within the collapsed state prevail disorder, anomic behavior and other kinds of anarchic mentality and dangerous entrepreneurial pursuits (Rotberg, 2002). Fortunately, it does appear that state failure in Africa is not an irreversible phenomenon, as has been shown in the cases of Rwanda and Sierra Leone. Here, as in many other African states, there is a noticeable trend towards recovery as the state gradually rediscovers its mission.

Two factors have combined to bring about this seeming new commitment. The first is the unease and turmoil that has characterized almost every African state, arising from the agitations by the people for the state to live up to its billing. This has brought about numerous

riots, demonstrations, and revolts in many of these African states in the past few years. The second reason has been the pressure from outside of Africa, mainly by the donor countries and agencies of the West and other multilateral bodies and the United Nations Organization. All these have in the recent past, made their aids, loans and assistance to African states conditional on the improvement of state practices by these countries.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, these local and outside pressures combined to spurn the various Structural Adjustment Programmes in numerous African countries, but which in the end, almost everywhere, failed. This has however not stoped the efforts at reforms and presently, the emphasis is on democracy and increased democratization, economic liberalization, good governance and human rights. This has involved elections and separation of powers, due process, privatization and commercialization, deregulation, openness and transparency, and guarantees of fundamental human freedoms across the various countries of the continent.

CHAPTER FOUR.

THE TUTSI IN CENTRAL AFRICAN POLITICS.

4.1 THE GEO-POLITICAL OUTLINE AND PEOPLES OF CENTRAL AFRICA:

The Great Lakes region of Central Africa refers to the area of central East Africa whose borders are, in the west, the Central African rift valley, running from Lakes Albert, Edward, Kivu, to Tanganyika; in the south, a line running eastwards from Malagarasi River to Mwanza Bay (Lake Victoria); in the east and north, Lakes Victoria and Kyoga. It is a highland area covered with savannah and occasional forest. In the high altitudes of the Congo – Nile divide, the forest is thick and dense.

This environment is neither too humid (because of the elevation which is above 3000 feet), nor too dry (because of the latitude which is between 3 degrees north and 5 degrees south). The area is suitable for cattle rearing as well as for cultivation, and its openness permits easy population movement. The favourable environmental condition was largely responsible for the migration of many groups into this interlacustrine area during the last two or three millennia.

The early migrants included pygmy hunters who were also in the other forests of the equatorial region. Bantu – speaking agriculturists also emigrated early from the Congo basin into the area. Ethiopid nomadic pastoralists from the north came later and entered the uplands by crossing the Victoria Nile between Lakes Albert and Kyoga (Maquet, 1970). The agriculturalists were the groups that assimilated these Ethiopid waves when they came.

By the end of the 19th century, the people of the interlacustrine region were made up of ten kingdoms and three segmentary societies (Mafeje, 1991). These kingdoms were Bunyoro- Kitara, Toro, Buganda, Busoga, Ankore, Buha, Buhaya, Buzinza, Rwanda and Burundi. The segmentary societies were Bwamba, Rwenjura and Kigezi. The kingdoms and societies all spoke Bantu languages.

Some of the kingdoms consisted of an admixture of peoples, including Bunyoro, Ankore, Rwanda, Burundi, Buhaya, Buha and Buzinza, while others showed high levels of homogeneity, including Buganda and Busoga. There are several affinities and resemblances among the heterogeneous formations of Bunyoro, Ankore, Rwanda, Burundi, Buhaya, Buha and Buzinza. But as Mafeje (1991: 19) has pointed out, "any attempt to evolve an ordered history of the rise of these kingdoms meets with difficulties at every turn".

Nevertheless, it is accepted that the first processes of political centralization occurred in Bunyoro, around the 15th century. It was here that a ruling dynasty was established by the Tembuzi. This Batembuzi dynasty was however supplanted by the Chwezi, who are believed to be the ancestors of the pastoral Bahuma (known elsewhere in the region as Bahima and Batutsi) aristocrats. It was the Bachwezi who introduced cattle herding into the society. These invaders, on arrival imposed themselves on the Bantu-speaking agriculturists whom they met.

In time however, the Bachwezi were chased out by the Babito, a group of Luo speakers who invaded from north of the Nile. Driven out of

Bunyoro, the Bahuma dynastic pastoralists continued in a southwesterly direction where ecological conditions were ideal for cattle herding. Subsequently, they reappeared as conquering herders in Ankore, Rwanda and Burundi, and spreading up to Buhaya, Buha, and Buzinza, during the 16ᵗʰ century. All these societies were agriculture based, and as the herders moved, they introduced the cattle into the societies, which soon became prestige goods.

Soon, cattle was surrounded with all sorts of rituals, and this mystique was enough to give the pastoralists a privileged position, such that whoever had large herds of cattle was assured of an elevated social status. With time, the agriculturalists, known in Bunyoro as the Bairu, provided the agricultural base of society and other services, while the pastoralists, relieved of any onerous duties but controlling the prestige goods, elevated themselves and soon turned their possession into a mechanism for political control and ritual mystification (Mafeje, 1991).

It was through this process that the pastoralists established themselves as overlords in Ankore, where they are known as Bahima, and in Rwanda and Burundi, where they are known as Batutsi, (the cultivators in Rwanda and Burundi are known as Bahutu). As in Bunyoro, land was plentiful in the areas of migration of the pastoralists. To satisfy their grazing needs, they did not have to encroach on occupied land. The necessity for military confrontation between the cultivators and herders did not therefore arise. This is probably why there is no evidence yet that the pastoralists established their political supremacy in the area through military conquest (Mafeje, 1991).

In terms of political organization, the kingdoms of the interlacustrine region displayed some variations. Mafeje (1991) has classified these into one-kingdom tribes, multi-kingdom tribes and unitary kingdoms with a tribal caste system. Buganda exemplified the first category while Busoga, Buhaya, Buzinza and Buha fell into the second category. Ankore, Rwanda and Burundi fit into the third category. Bunyoro and Toro consisted of single kingdoms, but here, the differences between the pastoral Bahuma or Bahima and the agricultural Bairu was so watered down that they virtually lost their ethnic connotations.

Even in the multi-kingdoms of Buhaya, Buzinza, and Buha, the difference was so fluid that the terms, Bahinda, Bahima, Batutsi and Bairu came to denote only differences in status. This was the situation that existed in the interlacustrine region by the time the Europeans made their entry into the area. When they came, the societies, and their evolutionary processes, were of course disrupted. The whole of the area was carved up into territories, each held by particular colonizing authorities provided by the countries of Europe.

In the ensuing partition, Rwanda and Burundi fell to (first) Germany, and later (after the First World War) the Belgians. Bunyoro, Toro, Ankore, Buganda and Busoga were put together in what came to be the colonial territory of Uganda under the suzerainty of Great Britain. Buha, Buhaya and Buzinza became part of the territory of Tanganyika, which was first administered by Germany, but reverted to the British after 1914.

4.2. HISTORY AND PARTITION OF THE TUTSI IN CENTRAL AFRICA.

The term, Tutsi, today refers to one of the ethnic groups that live in the countries of the Great Lakes region of Central Africa. According to ethnologists, the Tutsi are 'Hamitic' pastoralists who had come to the area of their present abode from the North. Ethnological accounts describe the Tutsi as generally tall, well built, dark skinned and with aristocratic features. Many writers have considered them to be intelligent, gifted in leadership but rather reserved.

Other writers have also considered them as bellicose, domineering and pitiless, characteristics which could be tied to the travails that they must have had to overcome in the past to be able to settle in their present abode (Rutake and Gahama, 1998). Today, the Tutsi are found among a number of more populous groups, with whom they live in the same geographical locations. In Rwanda and Burundi, the Tutsi live alongside the Hutu ethnic group.

Writers who have argued that the Tutsi came from the East say that when they got to their present location, the population they met was living by agriculture. These agricultural groups lived mainly in autonomous villages in which all the inhabitants belonged to a few patrilinages and the economy was not very much above the subsistence level. Inside the village, social order was maintained and conflicts solved by the kinship heads whose authority was based on their position in the lineage. Maquet (1991) has described how, as several pastoral Tutsi bands settled among the peasant Hutu villages following their migration into the Great Lakes area, many incorporative processes occurred.

Whereas there was no social stratification in the warrior bands and in the peasant villages, the new society was made of two hierarchised layers: the Tutsi group became the superior stratum, and the Hutu group, the inferior. With stratification, the members of the Tutsi ethnic group now commanded an amount of social power much greater than the peasants, and their opportunities to obtain what they wanted or to get things done were much better than those of the Hutu.

The process of incorporation also produced another feature – that of the feudal institution called 'ubuhake'. It was a relationship created when a Hutu offered his services to and asked protection from a Tutsi. If the latter accepted, a permanent link was created between himself (called Shebuja or Lord) and the Hutu (called Garagu or dependant). Although this relationship subsequently guaranteed the Hutu his security, the system was actually very favourable to the Tutsi as it organised the exchange of a non-economic value – protection, for goods – beans, peas, other agricultural produce, and services. Mafaje (1991), however, argues that this was rather a 'tributary' relationship, and that exchange in that economy was for use value.

The incorporation also produced a new political organisation. The new society was divided into rulers and subjects, and the authority of the Tutsi rulers over the Hutu subjects was sanctioned by the possibility of the use of physical force. The political structure that emerged out of this new organisation was complex. At the top was the King (Mwami), who was regarded as sacred and was mystically

identified with the society itself. The King had theoretically unlimited power.

The King was assisted by a group of people living near the palace-the court, which functioned as a central government. He was represented by appointees in the regions, whose main duty was to collect tribute, with the help of several armies who could implement the King's orders. The court, the administration, and the armies were equally complex organisations (Maquet, 1991). Each was a pyramidal structure with offices at different levels. All those who belonged to these political structures could command the use of coercion and benefit from the taxes paid by the population.

But although the new society was divided into rulers and subjects, the barrier between the Tutsi and the Hutu layers did not coincide with the line separating rulers and subjects – while all the rulers were Tutsi, not all the Tutsi were rulers. In other words, some Tutsi were equally subjects of the Tutsi overlords. In fact, notwithstanding the social stratification that resulted from the incorporation of the Tutsi pastoralists into the Hutu villages, the two groups essentially continued to remain the same.

The two groups shared the same language and cultures, worshiped the same God, obeyed orders from the same rulers, and above all, occupied and still occupy the same geographic space. They lived together in habitats dispersed on hillsides. They maintained very close relationships through exchange and trade in all types of products and also through other social links. Moreover, the basic element of

social organisation among the groups was the clan, into which, the entire population of the area inhabited by both the Tutsi and the Hutu was organised.

Another theory of origins of the Tutsi as an ethnic group says that at the early times, Tutsi existed (as did Hutu and also the Ganwa or Princes), but they referred only to social classifications or castes (Tordoff, 1997). Tutsi, Hutu (and Ganwa or Princes) were then mere labels under which there were lords and serfs, the rulers and the ruled, without any significant prejudice to birth. In fact, the words connoted, not origin but social condition and property, especially in the number of horned animals. Whoever was a chief or was rich was often called Tutsi, and Hutu meant any man with a master.

In that respect, any individual could at that time present himself as Hutu to any other individual better off than himself. According to Twagiramutara (1998:112-3), the word Tutsi meant "people owning several head of cattle, at least around seven or eight". At that early time, any Tutsi without any cattle or divested for any reason of his bovine wealth would be demoted to the social category of simple peasant and was thus compelled to join the category of farmers. Once assimilated and absorbed into that Hutu social environment, he would thenceforth marry off his children into his new social milieu.

By so doing, members of such a family and lineage, originally Tutsi, would be considered as Hutu after a few generations. Conversely, the rich Hutu that managed to own large cattle herds would therefrom be subjected to cattle tax and exempted from the flurry of

subsistence levies imposed on peasants and thereafter regarded as Tutsi. According to Mamdani (2002b: 14), the process of a Hutu shedding his 'Hutuness' was called "kwihutura", while the process whereby an impoverished Tutsi family lost its status was known as "gucupira".

Whatever their origins, these inoffensive categorisations – Tutsi, Hutu, etc, remained for as long as there was no external interference in the affairs of the area. Problem arose however when the colonialists came to the area, (first Germany and later the Belgians). These harmless and fluid social classifications then became gradually transformed into ethnic categories. The transformation was a long process that ultimately replaced clanic identity with ethnic identity as the main basis of reference in the identification of people.

Thus, by 1930, Belgian colonial policy in their Central African territories of Burundi and Rwanda (both inhabited mainly by the Tutsi and the Hutu), required that all natives should carry identity cards with ethnic references. Between 1930 and 1956, the colonial administration undertook censuses in the area to classify the population in ethnic groups to be reflected on their identity cards. All those who owned at least ten heads of cattle were counted as Tutsi.

Thus, the Hutu who were rich in cattle and land were labelled Tutsi and the Tutsi who were poor in terms of cattle ownership were labelled Hutu (Rutake and Gahama, 1998). The ultimate result of all these colonial policies was the consolidation of ethnic differences and identification. Following particularly the censuses, the classification of

the Tutsi (and the Hutu and the Twa who were essentially Pygmies and hunters and gatherers) as ethnic groups became entrenched.

Today, the Tutsi are found in Burundi and Rwanda (where they constitute about 14% of the population as against the Hutu who make up 85% and the Twa who are 1% of the population). They are also found in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo, parts of south – western Uganda, and, some north – western parts of Tanzania (Mamdani, 2002a).

4.3. TUTSI SOLIDARITY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE STATES OF CENTRAL AFRICA:

We have seen how the Belgians used the censuses to introduce and entrench internal divisions in Rwanda and Burundi. In Congo, it was essentially the same story. And the same was also true of the British colonial objective in its territories of Uganda, and Tanzania. This was in an effort to divide the peoples of the given territories. Even more effort was made to discourage and destroy trans-territorial contacts, especially among people of the same ethnic group. The objective was to disrupt contact permanently among these similar peoples, and possibly create different identities for the various fractions across the borders.

Notwithstanding such designs by the colonialists however, on the whole, their divide and rule tactics as it pertained to Tutsi trans-border ethnic identification and relations was a failure. The various fractions of trans-border ethnic group in the different countries of Central Africa continued to see themselves as members of a larger ethnic group. They have thus continued to relate with each other across the borders. This

continued relations has in turn engendered solidarity among the various fractions in the different countries.

Thus, events affecting a fraction of the ethnic group in one state often triggered reactions from their kin in the other states, as shown by events in the neighbouring states of Rwanda and Burundi. The history of Rwanda and Burundi respectively, for instance since independence has been that of violence and massacres. As both countries have been led by Hutu and Tutsi respectively, the massacre of Tutsi in Rwanda often resulted in reprisals against the Hutu in Burundi. Such massacres also forced a large number of Tutsi to seek refuge in neighbouring countries, and it was usually among their kin in those countries that they obtained sanctuary.

Burundi and Rwanda were historically separate kingdoms. Politics in Burundi up to the colonial period differed slightly from that in Rwanda. In the latter, power was held by members of a dominant group, the Tutsi, but in Burundi, those who held power were members of favoured Tutsi families, the Ganwa. Competition between the Ganwa induced them to seek the support of both Hutu and Tutsi, and this helped to attenuate ethnic tensions. In Rwanda, succession battles were more vicious and divisive.

During Belgian rule, which lasted from 1916 to 1962, Burundi and Rwanda were put in a joint Ruanda – Urundi Territory. The territory was under the authority of a single Governor, and had a single capital, Usumbura. Burundi and Rwanda however remained distinct, each with its own colonial hierarchy, with a Resident at the top. The

Belgians adopted a policy of indirect rule, and the native administrations of the two parts were completely separate.

The Rwandan King and the Burundian King were head respectively of the African hierarchy of his own area. Below the respective kings were a few tens of chiefs and a few hundreds of sub-chiefs. Both parts thus retained their separate identity, such that when colonial rule was about to end, both parts refused to merge in independence, in spite of a United Nations General Assembly advice that they formed a single independent state (Maquet, 1970).

As independence approached, a number of events occurred which ultimately culminated in some important changes in the Great Lakes countries of Rwanda and Burundi. In 1959, the Hutu of Rwanda, feeling left out of power, revolted. The events that led to this revolution started with the sudden death in 1959 of the Rwandan King, Mutara Rudahigwa, in Bujumbura. The mysterious conditions surrounding his death, and the uncertainties of royal succession, coupled with the growing political tensions associated with the approaching independence, combined to polarize the politics of the day.

The King's half brother succeeded him, but he lacked political experience and was seen as fully in the hands of conservative elements at the court and therefore an attempt to perpetuate an oppressive monarchical rule which had been consolidated under colonial rule (Newbury and Newbury, 1999). Hutu revolts started as a result and following this, the Tutsi monarch, or Mwami, was deposed in 1961 and

fled to Uganda. A Republic was then proclaimed under Gregoire Kayibanda, a Hutu.

Burundi meanwhile continued as a monarchy, although the country also quickly degenerated along ethnic lines. Many of the majority Hutu community became sensitive to the implications of majority rule in neighbouring Rwanda. Meanwhile, fleeing immigrants from Rwanda further strengthened Burundian Tutsi convictions that their own survival lay only in their maintaining power (Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972). Many of the Rwandan exiles settled in Burundi, and in Uganda, where they largely found refuge among their kin.

On a number of occasions, these exiles attempted to fight their way back to power in Rwanda. But while these invasions were beaten back, they nevertheless produced backlashes, which not only affected those of their ethnic kin who remained in Rwanda, but also impacted on those in the other neighbouring countries, particularly Burundi. In 1972, largely due to the tensions generated from across the borders, the most tragic and dramatic of the killings in Burundi occurred.

The crisis started as a big number of Hutu, co-ordinated by some fellow Hutu from the army, massacred thousands of Tutsi essentially in the southern part of the country. Very quickly, the army and government security services moved in to halt the killings. However, their intervention went well beyond stopping the bloodshed since most Hutu businessmen and those having any level of responsibility in the civil service and the army were also killed, not only in the parts of the

country where the rebellion had struck but throughout the whole country.

As before in Rwanda, large numbers of exiles, this time Hutu, fled Burundi to neighbouring countries. Just as before, the genocide and the subsequent emigration triggered off reactions in neighbouring countries (Rothchild, 1991; Lemarchand, 1974). In Rwanda, this slaughter of Hutu in neighbouring Burundi and the influx of refugees served to exacerbate tensions. Here, the Hutu acting through "Committees of Public Safety", blacklisted and massacred Tutsi in the country, in what was seen as an opportunity for the Hutu to eliminate the Tutsi in Rwanda once and for all (Newbury and Newbury, 1999).

In 1973, Burundian refugees from Zaire and Tanzania attacked Burundi. They were repelled, but at a great cost as such abortive incursions gave rise to retaliation against the Tutsi in Rwanda and then the Hutu in Burundi. In fact, the social upheaval in Burundi during 1972-73 not only laid the foundation for the coup d'etat that brought Juvenal Habyarimana, another Hutu, to power in the country in 1973, but also foistered an increase in anti-Tutsi sentiments in Rwanda (Corey and Joireman, 2004).

The new regime in Burundi over time progressively limited Tutsi access to state schools and government jobs through a quota system. The Habyrimana government also failed to resolve the thorny issue of resettlement of returning refugees, especially returning Tutsi who had fled earlier episodes of violence in the country to live abroad. Many of these 'Rwandans abroad' were largely treated as second-class citizens in

their countries of exile, and most lived on the margins. Yet, the Rwandan government refused to allow the repatriation of these refugees (Newbury and Newbury, 1991).

In 1982, the pressures on the refugees reached a peak in Uganda where many Rwandan Tutsi who fled ethnic violence in their homeland in 1959 had established themselves. The second Obote government in that year expelled thousands of these Rwandans. Many fled to northeastern Rwanda, where they were crowded into refugee camps for up to three years. But with the Rwandan government refusing to acknowledge the right of the Tutsi refugees to live in the country, most were eventually sent back to Uganda.

Back in that country, many of the Tutsi exiles supported the rebel National Resistance Movement (NRM), whose army, the National Resistance Army (NRA), fought to overthrow the second Obote government between 1981 and 1986. This rebel movement operated largely in the Luwero Triangle, and was popular among the Tutsi in Uganda. When in January 1986, the NRA finally overthrew the Obote regime, about a quarter of the 16,000 guerrillas were Rwandan Tutsi (Mamdani, 2002a). Led by the Hima, Yoweri Museveni, it was hardly surprising that one of the major aims of the NRM would be to resolve the Tutsi question.

Before then, the big question in Uganda was the issue of citizenship. The problem itself was a legacy of colonialism, which linked citizenship rights to ancestry. By defining migrants as not indigenous, it thereby deprived them of political rights. Mamdani (2002b: 17-18) has

described how, "every time NRA guerrillas liberated a village and organized an assembly, they confronted a challenge: who could participate in the assembly? Who could vote? Who could run for office?"

The NRA resolved this dilemma by redefining the basis of rights from ancestry to residence. Every adult resident of a village was allowed to participate in the village assembly. When finally the NRA came to power in 1986, this notion of rights was translated into a nationality law. From this time onwards, anyone with a 10-year residence in the country had the right to be a citizen. With this, the refugees of the 1959 Rwandan massacres were now considered Ugandans.

With the NRA victory also, many of ethnic Tutsi participated in the transition of the rebel army into the regular Ugandan Army, some rising to very high positions. Some other Rwandan refugees still were well placed in the new Ugandan administration. Soon however, the fact of so many 'foreigners' occupying influential positions in the Ugandan government began to irritate many Ugandans. This sentiment largely led to the new government's first major crisis in 1990.

The 1990 political crisis faced by the NRM in Uganda was also partly triggered by the attempt of the Ugandan government to honour one of the 10 points in its guerrilla programme, namely, the pledge to redistribute absentee land to pastoralist squatters (Mamdani, 2002b). When it came to actual implementation, the question arose: Who should get the land? The new nationality law, earlier enacted in 1986, was called into question. Many Ugandans mobilised with the aim of excluding the Rwandan refugees as non-citizens.

In the resulting crisis, an extra-ordinary session of the parliament was called by the government, lasting for three days. At the end of its deliberation, the citizenship law was changed from the 10-year residence to a new requirement which provided that to be recognized as a citizen, one must show an ancestral connection with the land by proving that at least one of the grand parents was born in the territory that later became Uganda. This, once again, effectively precluded the 1959 Rwandan refugees from Ugandan citizenship.

It was against this background that the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) was formed from amongst the Rwandan exiles, including those, like Fred Rwigyema and Paul Kagame, who had occupied high positions in the Ugandan government. In October 1990, the very next month after this resolution, the RPA invaded Rwanda. The invasion was thus the high point of the citizenship crisis in Uganda. In the aftermath of the RPA invasion of Rwanda, many Tutsi from Congo crossed the border to join the invading army (Mamdani, 2002a). Many other Tutsi, especially from Burundi (but also from other places where they lived) streamed into Rwanda at this time also to join the rebels (Uvin, personal communication, 2001).

It is also generally known that President Museveni of Uganda gave the RPA active support throughout their campaign in Rwanda. In the aftermath of President Museveni's support for the RPF in Rwanda and the Tutsi elsewhere in the region, ethnic solidarity has been adduced as the reason for his actions. Museveni's Bahima origins are often cited as

'proof' that he is probably a Tutsi or that he is a "'natural'" ally of cattle-keeping groups" (Kassimir, 1999: 668) in the Great Lakes region.

At around the time of the RPA invasion of Rwanda in 1990, Burundi was however, undergoing political liberalisation, which ultimately resulted in the democratic election of Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, as President on July 10, 1993. Meanwhile, once in power, the new Burundian President and his cabinet started taking measures, which soon threatened the privileges of some interest groups, especially the army, which continued to be Tutsi – dominated. In the night of 21 October 1993, members of the army killed the President in an abortive coup d'etat.

Although the President was replaced by another Hutu, Cyprian Ntaryamisa, the country nevertheless plunged into the longest, deadliest and costliest mayhem of its history. Thousands of Tutsi were killed by their fellow neighbour Hutu in a massacre, which as in the past, led to repression by the army, adding to the killings and making thousands of Hutu innocent victims. Many Hutu fled to Rwanda where they were crowded into refugee camps in southern Rwanda and from where they were to take part in the anti-Tutsi war in that country and the unfolding genocide there.

Events in Burundi, once again contributed to the fears and anxieties among the political class in Rwanda. Here, after the initial RPA advance, which produced anti-Tutsi killings between 1990 and 1992, a stalemate ensued, and subsequent talks between the Rwandan government army and the rebels resulted in a power sharing agreement.

The Agreement, known as the Arusha Accords, among other provisions, stipulated a new army of about twenty thousand, in which elements of the RPA would fill fifty percent of the officer corps and forty percent of the rank – and – file positions.

Hardliners in the Habyarimana regime in Rwanda opposed the Arusha Accords, and in the aftermath of the events in Burundi, these Rwandan hardliners held up the death of Ndadaye as an example of what was likely to happen in Rwanda if the RPA was allowed to share power. The hardliners believed that Habyarimana had given up too much to the Rwandan Patriotic Front. The Arusha Accords provided that the RPF were to hold five ministries out of twenty, including the important Ministry of the Interior, and eleven of seventy seats in parliament.

More importantly, the provisions concerning the merging of the two armies made them almost equal. But the RPA had about 15,000 soldiers while the Rwandan Army (FAR) had about 40,000 soldiers. The effects of the merger would thus be borne more by the FAR, which would have had to demobilize about 2/3 of its soldiers. In the economic climate that prevailed and the political manoeuvring that followed, the hardliners were able to draw on the deep insecurities among the military in implementing their strategy to undermine the Arusha Accords (Newbury and Newbury, 1999).

Thus, before the power-sharing agreement could be implemented, the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi (Habyarimana and Ntaryamisa) both Hutu, were killed near Kigali on April 6, 1994 in a plane crash,

suspected to have been arranged by the Hutu extremists opposed to the negotiated peace that they saw as selling out Hutu interest (Thom, 1999: 94). The killing of Tutsi in Burundi followed this accident but the quick intervention of the Tutsi dominated army ensured that the violence did not escalate.

In Rwanda however, the death of President Juvenal Habyarimana as a result of the accident set off the infamous, nearly instantaneous mass killing of Tutsi (and moderate Hutu) by Hutu extremists throughout the country that is generally known as the Rwandan genocide, in which nearly a million people died. It also re-ignited the civil war in which the RPA finally drove the government out of the Rwandan capital on July 4, 1994 (Thom, 1999), effectively installing a Tutsi government in the country.

Subsequent events after 1994 even show more clearly the salience of the ethnic factor in the political history of the region. Shortly before the collapse of the Hutu regime in Rwanda in 1994, many Hutu began fleeing the country into eastern D.R. Congo. Ultimately, an estimated 1.2 million Hutu took up residence in Zairean refugee camps. Among these Hutu refugees were armed members of the former Rwandan army, and the *Interahamwe* consisting of organised militia groups that had operated in Rwanda shortly before the fall of the Hutu government.

These two organisations almost immediately melded together to form one insurgent force with the ultimate objective of invading Rwanda. The threat of an armed Hutu insurgency launched into

Rwanda from eastern Zaire behind a screen of refugees, many of whom were seen as perpetrators of genocide, was taken with deadly seriousness in Kigali (Rwanda's capital). Furthermore, there was already a threat of genocide against Tutsi communities in Congo, known in that country as Banyamulenge, and Rwanda would not stand by and watch that happen. The Banyamulenge were eventually expelled in 1996.

With the Tutsi in such a precarious situation, the Tutsi leaders of the region decided to act before the effective date of the expulsion from Congo and before the planned invasion of Rwanda. By this time, Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi, had staged a successful coup in Burundi, effectively restoring Tutsi hegemony in that country. Under the aegis of an alliance, which consisted largely of local Tutsi fighters, and elements of the Rwandan and Ugandan armed forces as well as other Tutsi from Burundi, the Tutsi finally confronted the then Zairean army.

Between October 1996 and March 1997, the Alliance forces seized control of eastern Congo (the area where the Tutsi of Congo live) and were soon making for Kinshasa, which they finally captured on 18 May 1997 (Thom, 1999). The Alliance then installed a new government under Laurent Kabila. However, less than a year later, the Tutsi leaders of the region, feeling that the government of Kabila was not doing enough to protect their interest in the country (including preventing Hutu attacks on Rwanda and Burundi from Zaire), instigated another military campaign in 1998 against the Congolese government.

The rebellion is still continuing, and which is aimed at driving out the regime in D.R. Congo (Laurent Kabila has since died and has been replaced by his son, Joseph), and replacing it with another, more amenable to Tutsi interests in the region. And even though fighting has now ebbed, following a series of peace initiatives, the Alliance forces still control the eastern part of D.R. Congo, which is the area where the Tutsi of Congo live.

Today, instability reigns in the Great Lakes countries as the Tutsi continue to struggle to attain their ambitions in the region. As the events in the countries of the Great Lakes region show, the partition of the ethnic group into different countries has not destroyed the links among their fractions and has not stopped them from seeing themselves as one. Their attachment to the larger ethnic group remains strong. On the contrary, their attachment to the states in which they live is evidently weak, and in matters concerning the ethnic group, members defend their interests irrespective of state boundaries.

Even when the fractions of the ethnic group seek for power in their various countries, or secure it, the ultimate aim is to use it to serve the interests of the larger ethnic group, even outside the particular border. Thus, state power is used by the fraction of the ethnic group that possesses it to expropriate the resources of the country and exclude the members of the other ethnic groups from such resources.

State power is also used by the various fractions of the trans-border ethnic group in the different states to repress the members of

other ethnic groups when ethnic violence flares up both within and outside its borders, and also to secure asylum and refuge for members of their own ethnic group when circumstances drive them out of their countries of abode. The state and state power thus become instruments useful only to the extent that they can be used to further ethnic solidarity and the interests of the larger ethnic group.

4. 4. TUTSI HEGEMONY AND POLITICAL CONFLICT IN CENTRAL AFRICA:

The political history of the area of the Great Lakes region of Central Africa is a chronicle of the hegemony of the Tutsi ethnic group over the other peoples of the area. When they first came to the area and settled among the agricultural communities, there was already a dynasty exercising overlordship over the region. We have already seen how between the 13th and 14th Centuries A.D., the Tutsi supplanted the (A)batembuzi dynasty and established the (A)bachwezi dynasty. Even then, the region remained largely a myriad of small, independent polities for a long time.

Eventually, these polities were subordinated within larger power structures under Tutsi rulership. It was out of this coalescence that Burundi and Rwanda emerged. Both were kingdoms ruled by the Tutsi ethnic group, although with slight variations between them. Brief mention has already been made of the political structure of Burundi and Rwanda in the period before colonialism. A more detailed explanation will suffice here.

In Burundi, the socio-political hierarchy had the King at the top, with a class of princes (the Ganwa). Under this layer were two levels of Tutsi. Those at the royal court (the Tutsi-Banyaruguru) were socially higher than the ordinary pastoralists (the Tutsi-Hima). The Hutu occupied the lower level of society, with the Twa at the bottom. This Burundi hierarchy allowed a number of lower groups, including the Hutu, to be involved in the exercise of power.

In Rwanda, the socio-political hierarchy was much more abrupt and sharp. At the very top were the King and the other Tutsi. The Hutu occupied the lower echelon while the Twa were at the bottom of the society (Uvin, 1999). Unlike in Burundi, the hierarchy in Rwanda hardly permitted any fluidity. It was thus under such conditions of hegemony that the colonisers came to the area, first the Germans, and later the Belgians.

The Belgians administered the two kingdoms as part of the Ruanda – Urundi Territory. They adopted the principle of indirect rule by which they ruled through the kings of the two parts of the Territory. But this only served to entrench the hegemony of the Tutsi in the area. Thus, by the 1950s, thirty one out of thirty-three members of the *conseil superieur du pays* were Tutsi, as were all forty-five *chefs de chefferies* and 544 of 559 sub-chiefs.

Moreover, the colonial regime reserved education and jobs in the administration almost exclusively for the Tutsi. Political, social, and even economic relations became more unequal and biased against the Hutu and the power of the Tutsi greatly increased (Uvin, 1999). Under

conditions such as above, the struggle for independence from colonial rule was for the other ethnic groups as much a fight against Tutsi hegemony. It was as such an ethnic struggle.

In Rwanda, where socio-political divisions were sharp, the independence struggle was definitely anti-Tutsi as it was anti-Belgian. In late 1959 when the Hutu of that country revolted, hundreds of Tutsi were killed and many others fled the country. Expectedly, Legislative elections in 1960 and 1961 were won by PARMEHUTU, an anti-Tutsi, 'Hutu Power', party. Subsequently, the Tutsi monarch was deposed and the monarchy overthrown. More Tutsi, including the previous power-holders fled the country.

In Burundi, the relative inclusiveness of the power structure helped to attenuate ethnic tensions, and the monarchy survived the colonial period. A royalist and bi-ethnic party, UPRONA, led by Prince Louis Rwagasore, won the elections both before and after independence. However, even in Burundi, politics was not devoid of ethnic connotations, owing largely to the contagion from Rwanda. Rwagasore was soon killed by the opposition, and UPRONA fell apart in internal conflict.

In 1966, a successful coup overthrew the Burundi government, but this was also led by a Tutsi-Hima, Colonel Micombero who proceeded to put the Tutsi firmly in control. From 1966 to 1993, the Tutsi minority tightly held political and economic power in Burundi. They monopolised almost all positions of importance in the country, including the higher levels of the UPRONA single party, the full

command structure of the army, the police and security forces, and the judicial system.

The measures by the Tutsi to retain power in Burundi and their various attempts to regain power in Rwanda all resulted in violence. In Rwanda where between 1961 and 1990, Tutsi refugees severally attempted to return to power militarily, many Tutsi were subsequently killed. For instance, in early 1962, more than 2000 Tutsi were killed and in 1963 about 10,000 more died. During this time also, between 140,000 and 250,000 Tutsi survivors fled Rwanda.

In Burundi, Hutu resistance to Tutsi hegemony usually resulted in pogroms of Tutsi officials, to which the Tutsi-dominated army usually reacted by massacring many more Hutu. As Uvin (1999) has pointed out, the struggle for state power in Burundi and Rwanda was because of the advantages it conferred on the holders. The state was the main source of enrichment and power in society. For the Tutsi, it became the sole vehicle to retain (Burundi) or regain (Rwanda) their privileges.

Beyond this however, state power enabled the Tutsi to maintain contact with their kin in the other countries as well as come to each other's aid in times of need. Thus, following the events in Rwanda, Burundi became the haven for the Tutsi of the region. Burundi served as sanctuary for other Tutsi displaced from Rwanda, and also served as base for many subsequent attempts by the Rwandan Tutsi to regain power.

Tutsi attempt at hegemony within this period was however not restricted to Burundi and Rwanda. Many Tutsi lived in a number of

other countries, particularly Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In times of peril, many more Tutsi also ran to these two countries. With time however, the Tutsi in these other countries came to be resented by the local populations. The resentment soon became apparent in Uganda when the second Obote regime expelled them in 1982.

The complications that followed this expulsion (Rwanda refused to accept them) apparently led to a new realisation among the Tutsi of the region. This realisation was that they needed power to survive. From this time onwards, the Tutsi became predisposed to capturing power in the different countries where they resided. This quest for power was the reason why many Tutsi in Uganda joined the Museveni rebellion and ultimately became a very important factor in the war that overthrew Obote and brought Yoweri Museveni to power.

They subsequently utilised this advantage to extract numerous concessions in Uganda. But this also produced so much resentment among the local populace that it only dissipated when a majority of the Tutsi in that country moved on with the Rwandan Patriotic Army, RPA, to recapture power in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994. The RPF has since re-established Tutsi hegemony in Rwanda and now takes on the moral obligation for the welfare of the Tutsi Diaspora. In the aftermath of their ascension to power in Rwanda in 1994, the RPF had maintained that it would rule according to the provisions of the 1993 Arusha Accords.

The Arusha Accords had provided for power sharing among the parties and ethnic groups in the country. But it was not long before it became apparent that the government was on the road to 'Tutsization' and 'RPF-ization'. Reyntjens (2004) has graphically described how through the combination of a doubtful 'meritocracy' and the exclusion of the elite of the Hutu ethnic group, the right to govern has been delivered to the elite of the Tutsi in Rwanda. According to the author, this 'Tutsization' and the consolidation of the RPF on the system were quite spectacular at most levels of the state.

By 1996, the Tutsi had, the majority of the MPs (45 out of 74), four out of the six Supreme Court presiding judges, over 80 percent of mayors, most permanent secretaries and university teachers and students, almost the entire army command structure and the intelligence services. By March 2000, even the government itself had become Tutsized. Whereas the 1994 government included twelve Hutu and nine Tutsi, in 2000, twelve of the ministers were Tutsi while eight were Hutu.

In fact, by mid-2000, this Tutsization had permeated every echelon and facet of national life. Thus, out of a total of 169 of the most important office holders, 135 i.e. 80 percent were RPF/RPA and 119, about 70 percent, were Tutsi. It is also estimated that over 80 percent of mayors and university staff and students were Tutsi. Moreover, even urban Rwanda was increasingly being Tutsized, as many of the returnee ex-refugees have settled in these towns and cities where they became the majority, with all the socio-economic and political reality that this

entails. In a country where the Tutsi number about 14 percent of the total population, the hegemony of the group cannot be in question.

Tutsi resolve at regional hegemony is even more clearly brought out by the events in the D.R.C. In 1992, a new wave of trouble flared in that country when a Tutsi was appointed Prime Minister, in which many Tutsi lost their lives. This trouble continued, albeit in subdued forms, till 1996 when the government of the country finally expelled the Tutsi from that country, claiming that they were 'more Rwandan that Zairean'.

By this time further complications had been introduced into the matter by the influx into eastern DRC of numerous Hutu fleeing Rwanda in the aftermath of the war and genocide there. Many of these immediately joined in the persecution of the local Tutsi in the area, and were also known to be planning an invasion of Rwanda from their base in eastern Congo. In addition, President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire apparently had Hutu sympathies, and the international community would not act to remove the armed Hutu threat from eastern Zaire (Thom, 1999).

Regional leaders, who were by now almost all Tutsi or related to the Tutsi (it was at this time that the Tutsi Pierre Buyoya retook power in Burundi), then formulated a home grown plan for a military campaign designed to- break the militants' hold over the refugees, return those refugees to Rwanda, destroy the ex-Rwandan army and its allies, ensure the safety of the indigenous Tutsi in Zaire, and possibly eliminate the unsympathetic Mobutu government in Kinshasa.

The culmination of this plan was the swift military campaign in which troops of the small Tutsi-led rebel alliance (the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire, ADFL-CZ) sped over the vast territory of Zaire, famed for its impassable roads and impenetrable forests, and dispatched the regime of one of independent Africa's most durable leaders. Although a non-Tutsi (Laurent Kabila) was installed as the new leader of D.R. Congo, he surrounded himself initially with Tutsi officials.

But Kabila soon fell out with his Tutsi benefactors when the later felt he was not doing enough to protect their interest in the region. As a result, a new, largely Tutsi rebellion broke out in 1997, and although fighting has reached a stalemate, amid numerous and continuing efforts at peace, the Tutsi forces of the Rally for Democracy, RCD, (consisting of factions supported by Rwanda and Uganda respectively) significantly continue to hold on to the control of the eastern part of the country, where their kin live.

Even when a peace deal in 2002 led to the formation of a transitional government a year later, the threat of civil war remained. Infact, later that year 2003, a dissident General, Laurent Nkunda left the army and launched his own low-level rebellion, saying arrangements for DRC's transition to democracy was flawed and excluded the minority Tutsi community. The transition process eventually led to democratic elections in 2006, the first since independence. But even as President Joseph Kabila was to be sworn in after the elections, Ugandan military officials claimed at least 12,000

people had crossed into their country to flee fighting between the Congolese army and forces loyal to General Nkunda ("DR Congo", 2006: 21).

The attempt by the Tutsi of Central Africa to impose their hegemony on the region has produced backlashes in these various countries though. Writing about the behaviour of the Rwandan army in eastern Congo and the way in which Congolese Tutsi (the Banyamulenge) were instrumentalised, Reyntjens (2004: 207) argues that, "a latent anti-Tutsi feeling rapidly grew stronger, leading to ethnogenesis: previously unrelated groups began to view themselves as part of two larger categories, 'Bantu' and 'Hamitics', and began thinking of these categories as necessarily hostile to one another".

Soon after the RCD over-run the eastern Congo, 'mai-mai' militias arose from among the local population to confront the Movement. Even prominent 'indigenous' chiefs in North and South Kivu provinces of eastern Congo are known to be actively cooperating with the 'mai-mai' militias to resist the perceived foreign occupation (Tull, 2003). In Burundi, the FDD emerged from a split in FRODEBU to wage a brutal war with the government ever since 1996. More than 200,000 people, comprising Hutu and Tutsi, have been killed in the war, through which the Hutu hope to capture power from the Tutsi.

Even an internationally brokered peace accord, by virtue of which the Hutu have recently taken their slot in a rotational transitional presidency, has not led to a cessation of hostilities in Burundi. Recently however, in July 2005, elections were held under the terms of the Peace

Accord, in which the FDD overwhelmingly emerged victorious with 59 seats in the Legislature. The FRODEBU and UPRONA had 24 and 10 seats respectively, with seven seats going to the other parties. But peace is yet to return to the country.

In Uganda, the Lords Resistance Army, LRA, has waged an even more brutal war against the government with the sole purpose of capturing power from the Hima ruling group. Even in Rwanda, although the RPA came to power in 1994, the war in that country has not actually come to an end. Until recently, attacks by the ex-FAR and the Interahmwe were often reported in different parts of the country with heavy human and material costs.

4.5 FIELD STUDY / SURVEY OF THE TUTSI AND HUTU OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI:

This research also involved a field study. In order to conduct empirical research of the phenomenon under study, a field trip was undertaken to Rwanda, during which Focus Group Discussions were held with a number of Tutsi and Hutu respondents (see methodology). The purpose was to gauge the feelings of the study population about the issues at stake and to confirm the findings from the documentary research.

During the discussions, participants were asked questions based on a Question Guide (see Appendix 1). The questions covered the various variables under study and were in line with the research questions of this study. Participants were asked some questions aimed at finding out why members of partitioned ethnic groups seek for power

across the various countries where they live. The answers are summarized in Tables 4.1 – 4.4.

The participants were also asked questions aimed at finding out how the quest for dominance by fractions of partitioned ethnic groups influence conflict in their countries and regions of abode. The answers are presented in Tables 4.5 – 4.8. Then the participants were asked some questions aimed at finding out the influence of continued relations among members of partitioned ethnic groups on their integration into either their larger ethnic groups or their countries of abode. The results are summarized in Tables 4.9 – 4.13 below.

Table 4.1: Percentage and frequency of participants aware that their kin are living in other countries:

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that is aware of kin in other countries	%	No. not aware of kin in other countries	%
Tutsi	Rwanda	52	51	98	1	2
	Burundi	11	11	100	-	-
	Total	63	62	98	1	2

The result shows that 98% of all the participants are aware of the existence of their kin in other countries while 2% are not.

Table 4.2: Percentage and frequency of participants' views on how to ensure group well-being in countries of abode and continued relations among members across borders:

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that believe in capture of power by group in various countries of abode	%	No. that believe in members coming together in one country	%
Tutsi	Rwanda	52	49	94	3	6
	Burundi	11	10	91	1	9
	Total	63	59	94	4	6

The result above shows that 94% of the Tutsi believe that their well-being will be guaranteed through the capture and retention of power in their various countries of abode while 6% believe that their well being will be better guaranteed through irredentist arrangements.

Table 4.3: Percentage and frequency of participants' views on what group's attitude should be to kith and kin/others whenever they have power in any country:

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that see power in the hands of group in one country to be used for all members of group in all countries	%	No. that see power in the hands of group in any country to be used for all ethnic groups in that country	%
Tutsi	Rwanda	52	42	81	10	19
	Burundi	11	9	82	2	18
	Total	63	51	81	12	19

The result shows that 81% of the Tutsi are of the view that power should be used for the collective interest of their larger ethnic group while 19% are of the view that power should be used for the collective interest of all the ethnic groups in a country.

Table 4.4: Percentage and frequency of participants who believe the Tutsi of their country work for the interest of their larger ethnic group rather than for their country of abode:

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that perceive Tutsi as concerned more for group interest	%	No. that perceive Tutsi as concerned more for interests of country	%
Hutu	Rwanda	22	20	91	2	9
	Burundi	10	9	90	1	10
	Total (Hutu)	32	29	91	3	9

The result shows that 91% of the Hutu participants see the Tutsi of their country as wont to act for their group interest while in power rather than for the general good. 9% of the Hutu see the Tutsi of their country as concerned more with the general good.

Table 4.5: Percentage and frequency of participants' views on what to do if other ethnic groups oppose them while in power in any country:

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that believe group should fight to retain power	%	No. that believe group should dialogue / find accommodation with others	%
Tutsi	Rwanda	52	50	96	2	4
	Burundi	11	10	91	1	9
	Total	63	60	95	3	5

The result shows that 95% of the Tutsi will prefer to fight to retain power while 5% believe that the group should dialogue / find accommodation with others.

Table 4.6: Percentage and frequency of participants' views on the attitude to adopt to hostile states in which they live:

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that believe group should oppose/fight hostile state and take power	%	No. that believe group should relocate to another country where they have power	%
Tutsi	Rwanda	52	41	79	11	21
	Burundi	11	9	82	2	18
	Total	63	50	79	13	21

The result shows that 79% of the Tutsi believe that the group should oppose the state and try to change government while 21% will want to relocate to another country where the group is in power.

Table 4.7: Percentage and frequency of participants' views on what to do if kin are attacked or are involved in conflict in their states of abode:

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that will fight alongside kin	%	No. that are indifferent	%
Tutsi	Rwanda	52	36	69	16	31
	Burundi	11	7	64	4	36
	Total	63	43	68	20	32

The result shows that 68% of the Tutsi will want to fight alongside their kin while 32% will be indifferent.

Table 4.8: Percentage and frequency of participants' views on what to do if the Fulani/Tutsi capture power in their country:

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that will oppose/fight them	%	No. that will allow/support them	%
Hutu	Rwanda	22	20	91	2	9
	Burundi	10	7	70	3	30
	Total (Hutu)	32	27	84	5	16

The result shows that 84% of the Hutu participants will oppose the Tutsi if the latter capture power in their country of abode and fight to remove them, while 16% will allow and support the Tutsi when they are in power in their country.

Table 4.9: Percentage and frequency of participants who interact more with kin in country/across borders than with others in the country:

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that interact more with kin in country/across borders	%	No. that interact more with others in country	%
Tutsi	Rwanda	52	42	81	10	19
	Burundi	11	9	82	2	18
	Total	63	51	81	12	19

The result shows that 81% of the Tutsi interact more with their kin in country/across borders while 19% interact more with members of other ethnic groups in the country of abode.

Table 4.10: Percentage and frequency of participants' feelings of attachment to the larger ethnic group/country of abode:

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that is ordinarily more attached to larger ethnic group	%	No. that is ordinarily more attached to country	%
Tutsi	Rwanda	52	35	67	17	33
	Burundi	11	8	73	3	27
	Total	63	43	68	20	32

The result shows that 68% of the Tutsi are ordinarily more attached to the larger ethnic group while 32% are ordinarily more attached to the state.

Table 4.11: Percentage and frequency of participants' feeling of attachment to country/larger ethnic group, if members of the ethnic group have favourable political conditions and socio-economic opportunities within a country:

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that is more attached to country of abode	%	No. that is more attached to larger group	%
Tutsi	Rwanda	52	27	52	25	48
	Burundi	11	7	64	4	36
	Total	63	34	54	29	46

The result shows that 54% of the Tutsi will be more attached to the state if political and socio-economic conditions are favorable while 46% will remain more attached to the larger group on the same condition.

Table 4.12: Percentage and frequency of participants' feeling of attachment to country/larger group, if members of the ethnic group are a minority group within a country:

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that is more attached to larger ethnic group	%	No. that is more attached to country	%
Tutsi	Rwanda	52	36	69	16	31
	Burundi	11	8	73	3	27
	Total	63	44	70	19	30

The result shows that 70% of the Tutsi will remain more attached to the larger ethnic group if members of the ethnic group are in the minority in the country while 30% will be more attached to the state on the same condition.

Table 4.13: Percentage and frequency of participants' perceptions of Tutsi attachment to their country/ larger ethnic group

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that believe the Tutsi of their country are more attached to their larger ethnic group	%	No. that believe the Tutsi of their country are more attached to the country	%
Hutu	Rwanda	22	22	100	-	-
	Burundi	10	10	100	-	-
	Total (Hutu)	32	32	100	-	-

The result shows that 100% of the Hutu participants believe that the Tutsi are more attached to their larger ethnic group than their country of abode.

CHAPTER FIVE.

THE FULANI IN WEST AFRICAN POLITICS.

5.1. THE GEO-POLITICAL OUTLINE AND PEOPLES OF WEST AFRICA:

West Africa refers to the region of Africa comprising the countries from Mauritania and Senegal to the West and up to the western borders of Chad and Cameroon to the East. The area covers roughly from 5° to 25° north latitude and from 17° west to 15° east longitude. The area covers some 2.4 million square miles. From its western to its eastern extremities the distance is some 1, 750 miles. Its north- south distance is over 1,350 miles. Its latitudinal position is between the Equator and the Tropic of Cancer, and this ensures that West Africa is an area of relatively high temperature throughout the year.

However, there are a few isolated plateaux and highlands such as the Fouta Jallon mountains, the Guinea Highlands, the Jos Plateau, the Adamawa, Bamenda and Cameroon Mountains that are generally above 4,000 feet and therefore have much lower temperatures throughout the year (Mabogunje, 1971). The West African environment is characterized by broad and extensive east-west climatic belts, which contrast sharply from south to north. Unlike the climate however, the relief of West Africa has shown greater stability, with its major features being the generally low elevation and the wide level of surface.

Historically, the area of present day West Africa has witnessed the rise of many important and large empires, including Mali, Ghana, Ashanti, Songhay, Mossi and Sokoto. Most of these had however collapsed much before the arrival of colonialism. Following the colonial

partition of the area, West Africa is today comprised of about sixteen modern states, namely, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Mali, Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Niger, Cape Verde and Mauritania.

The peoples of West Africa can be distinguished into two broad categories, namely, the Savannah and the Forest Negroes. The former, in general, tend to be tall in stature and dark brown in skin colour. They include the Soninke, the Malinke, the Bambara, the Mossi, the Hausa and the Kanuri (Mabogunje, 1971:15-32). The Soninke, Malinke and Bambara belong to a group, which together are referred to as Mandingoes or Mande-speaking people. The group is known to have established some of the ancient West Africa empires including Ghana and Mali.

These groups are today found largely in Guinea, Mali, Cote d' Ivoire and Burkina Faso. All the Mandingo groups are generally tall and slender in build with fine features, full beard and light skin colour. Agriculture is the primary occupation among them, and animals are kept more for prestige than for economic reasons. West of the Mandingo area and extending to the Atlantic Ocean are the Senegambian groups that include the Fulani/Tukulor, the Wolof and the Serer (Murdock, 1959).

The Tukulor today occupy the middle Senegal region, and are believed to be the product of Berber invaders and Negro groups in the territory of present day Mauritania, hence the name Tukulor, which in its French rendering, 'Toucoulor', is roughly a corruption of the word for

'two colours'. The Tukulor and the Fulani are closely related. In fact, the Tukulor and Fulani could be said to be synonymous with each other. They speak the same language, have the same culture and customs, and have the same social organization.

If anything, the two terms seem to denote only occupational differences. Used as a distinct term, 'Tukulor' refers only to the sedentary Fula (Fulfude) speaking people on the two sides of the river Senegal who are today mainly agriculturalists and marabouts, as distinct from their 'Peul'/Fulani kin on the river banks and elsewhere who are almost exclusively nomadic herders. Even then, both groups are still collectively referred to as the Haalpular, which simply means 'Fula speaking people.

This is why in this work, the two terms and others like them such as 'Fulbe', 'Haalpular' and 'Peul' are used as referring to one and the same people, who will be simply called the Fulani, except where otherwise indicated. The Tukulor accepted Islam by the eleventh century, and were already vigorous proselytizers, especially among their close neighbours, particularly the Wolf and the Serer. All three groups integrated the milking of cattle with their farming system, perhaps a testimony to their exposure to Berber influence.

In the headwaters of the Volta River, in the present day Burkina Faso, are found numerous small ethnic groups, among which are the Mossi. The Mossi are an agricultural people although cattle play a very limited role in their economy. East of the Mossi are the Hausa who are a Negro and culturally homogenous group found in a number of West

African countries including Nigeria, Niger, Benin. Islam was introduced into Hausaland in the 14th century. By the 16th century, the Hausa were part of the Songhay Empire. Thereafter, Hausa states flourished until finally they were conquered by the Fulani. The Hausa are farmers and rearers of stock as well as traders and artisans.

Further east are the Kanuri, the Kanembu and the Barghirmi who occupy the Chad Basin. North African influence is very evident among these groups – Arab among the Kanuri and Berber among the Kanembu. These groups are all islamised, a further evidence of North African influence. South of the Kanuri are numerous small ethnic groups, including the Junkun and the Tiv.

Most of these groups are largely pagan, and are located mainly in the Benue river valley and the Plateau regions of Nigeria. Mostly warlike, a number of these groups, particularly the Junkun were able to build states, including the Junkun state of Kororofa, which in the seventeenth century made extensive conquests in the Hausa country and continued to terrorize the Fulani even in later times.

The Forest Negroes include the more than five hundred ethnic groups fragmented across the forest areas of the southern belt of West Africa. They include the Igbo, the Edo and the Yoruba, of modern day Nigeria, the Fon, and the Ashanti of present day Ghana (Greenberg: 1999). A number of the more important groups had evolved highly organized political structures before the colonial period. The Edo of mid-western Nigeria had established a nation-state that conquered and subjugated most of the neighboring groups by the sixteenth century.

137

West of the Edo, in present day western Nigeria and extending to the southwestern part of northern Nigeria and the southeastern part of present day Benin Republic are to be found the Yoruba. These people had also evolved an extensive political organization before the advent of colonialism based on the existence of kingdoms, each under an Oba or divine king.

The Igbo, who occupy the southeastern part of Nigeria had no centralized political organization above the locality. The Fon occupied much of present day Benin Republic and had also developed some sophisticated political organization in the pre-colonial period. They have remained largely pagan even to this day. West of the Fon are the Ashanti of present day Ghana, and who are among the Akan – speaking peoples. The Ashanti practice matrilineal descent. Political organization among the Ashanti was already developed by the time of colonialism, though decentralized, and was based around the Asantehene, who was the paramount ruler of the Ashanti federation.

Besides the above ethnic groups, there are numerous other groups in West Africa, who possess less complex cultures but who reveal an appreciable measure of cultural homogeneity. These include the Kru who are found in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire. The Kpelle are found in Liberia and neighbouring Guinea, while the Mende and the Temne are to be found in Sierra Leone.

5.2   HISTORY AND PARTITION OF THE FULANI IN WEST AFRICA.

The Fulani are scattered throughout the Western Sudan from Cameroon in the east to the Senegal in the West, and extending up to Mauritania, Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Fulani ethnic group may be described as a Caucasoid group with strong Negroid intermixture. They live among such populous groups as the Soninke, Malinke, Hausa and Mossi. Others are dispersed among the many small ethnic groups of the Voltaic and Plateau Nigerian areas (Mabongunje, 1971). Their language, Fulfude, is nigritic and is closely related to those of the Serer and the Wolof of the Senegambia.

Fulani essence or ethos is embodied in the Pulaku. Pulaku binds every Fulani to a certain code of conduct irrespective of where he is resident. The Pulaku code of conduct consists of loaded values and expectations, by which every Fulani is expected to be honest, modest, patient, courageous, self-denying, generous, humble and vigilant. He is not expected to be greedy, panicky, to interfere uninvited or express pain, pleasure or anger or to behave in a disgraceful manner.

According to Abubakar (cited in Sanusi, 2000), Pulaku is a code whose essential elements are, semtende (shyness), munyal (patience), hakkrlo (care and forethought), doutare (obedience), mangingo (respect for elders), yerduye (trust), chusu (courage), and ainoldina (strict observance of religion). Strict observance of Pulaku is expected of every Fulani and violations can earn sanctions or a fine. Furthermore, the chief of every Fulani clan is not only supposed to be the embodiment of Pulaku but also its guardian.

All over West Africa, ranging from Mauritania to Cameroon, the Fulani are known by different names by the people among whom they reside. The Hausa call them Fulani or Fillani, Europeans generally call them Fula, but the French also call them Peul, Pular or Toucoulor. In Senegambia, the Fulani are called Fulakunda or Halpulaar. The Kanuri call them Pulata, while the Tiv call them Igoi. The Fulani however call themselves Pullo for singular and Fulbe for plural. In addition, the Fulani distinguish themselves from non-Fulani, whom they call Kado for singular and Habe for plural (Mokoshy, 1993).

For reasons, which border on economic and occupational activities, the Fulani have been often considered as several ethnic groups rather than one in many of the countries where they live, and even in some cases treated differently. This can be seen in Senegal, Guinea and Mauritania where the Fulani are classified according to their occupations. The nomads are called Peul, the clerics are called Torodo, and the fishermen among them are called Subalbe, and Laube is the name given to the carpenters, all considered as complete independent ethnic groups. In Nigeria, the Fulani are also divided into sedentary (town) and nomadic (cow) Fulani (Mokoshy, 1993), or the "Bororoje" and the "Wuro" Fulani (Takaya, 1987:17).

The Fulani are however, divided into two main classes: the aristocratic Wodabe, meaning 'reds', who are nomadic herdsmen, and the balebe, meaning blacks, who form the various castes in the Fulani society, and who are mainly sedentary. The Fulani have a highly stratified society that corresponds roughly to a five layer hierarchy.

These are the Islamic aristocrats (torodbe); the middle class, including the fishermen, farmers, warriors and administrators; the lower middle class, which includes the skilled craftsmen and craftswomen like smiths, woodworkers, leatherworkers, singers; the lower class, comprising the servants and manual labourers including freed slaves; and, lastly slaves.

The origin of the Fulani has been a matter of considerable conjecture and has led to many theories and legends. Scholars have even invoked anthropological or religious arguments to explain their origin. Some say that the Fulani were 'Tziganes' expelled from Europe in the fifteenth century by the Mongolian invasion. Others say they are the 'Pelasgian' whom classical writers describe as the early people of Greece, or Persian Pehlvi, or Nilotic Hyksos, or Leuco-Ethiopians (Gerteiny, 1967:89). Murdock (1959) suggests that the ancestral Fulani came from the middle Senegal area and were the product of intermixture between the Tukulor in this area and incoming Berbers from the north.

Whatever their origin however, it is now believed that they are descended from the East. The Fulani homeland is believed by many writers to be between the present day eastern part of Senegal and the western area of Mali. Between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, they spread eastward. They spread across the Sudan, at first only taking over lands not suited to agriculture. The Fulani were largely pastoralists, and for this reason, their expansion caused no alarm to their neighbours and host communities who actually welcomed them

for the manure their cattle provided on the farms and for the milk and dairy products, which could be exchanged for agricultural products.

Moreover, the Fulani seem to have migrated in family rather than tribal units, as was then customary (Gerteiny: 1967). In the absence of a mass movement, no significant armed opposition to their migrations was recorded. Today, they are spread from Senegal to Gambia, southern Mauritania, Guinea and Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, northern Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon. Fringes of their dispersion are also to be found in northern Sierra Leone, Ghana, Benin and even as far as the Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.

The population of the Fulani in these various countries is however, contentious. However, Westerman and Bryan (1952) and the World-Wide Church Organization (undated) have given the following figures for the Fulani in their countries of abode:

Country	Westerman and Bryan	W.W.C.O.
Benin	25,000	80,000
Cameroon	275,000	500, 000
Cote d' Ivoire	52,000	-
Gambia	50,000	25,000
Guinea	960,000	2,100,000
Guinea Bissau	108,000	100,000
Mali	720,000	500,000
Mauritania	-	100,000
Niger	269,000	400,000
Nigeria	2,025,000	5,000,000
Senegal	250,000	1,200,000

Source: Mokoshy (1993: 94).

These figures are obviously outdated, in addition to the fact that figures are not provided for several countries where the Fulani live.

For the most part however, the Fulani are ethnic minorities in the various countries where they live. Only in a few discontinuous areas do they constitute the dominant element in the population, including the Senegal valley of Senegal and Mauritania, Fouta Jallon in Guinea, Massina in Mali, and Sokoto, Bauchi and Adamawa in northern Nigeria (Mabogunje, 1971). At the start of their dispersion, few of the pastoral Fulani were Muslim. The great majority of their population was pagan. However, a significant proportion of the Fulani population was sedentary, even engaging in agriculture, and many of these sedentary Fulani had converted to Islam.

In their migration, the pastoral Fulani were accompanied by some of their sedentary and more Negroid kinsmen. The pastoral Fulani were generally of tolerant disposition, even when they were Muslim. Their sedentary brothers were however less tolerant of the infidel. The sedentary Fulani were usually better educated and more sophisticated in political matters, and it was this group that foistered the political interest of the whole group by military aggression often in the form of Jihad or holy war. It was in this way that the Fulani have become politically dominant in many areas of West Africa (Mabogunje, 1971).

Fulani communities were essentially wet season camps composed of a number of agnatic lineages of a clan. Each clan or lineage group had its own leaders (ardo) who were organised in a hierarchy "based on their relationship to some putative clan ancestor" (Hickey and

143

Thompson, 1981: 215-216). The pastoral Fulani has the family as the basic productive unit. The compound family is made up of a man, his wives and his children. This is the unit that owns and tends the herd. During the dry season, the Fulani have to move in search of viable grazing. At such time, several agnatically – related families live and move together.

Co-operation among the lineage is less intensive than within the individual family, but it is very important nevertheless. It is this co-operation that enables a family with inadequate personnel for tending of its herd to borrow help from other families within the lineage. In the same vein, a family with insufficient herd to support its personnel can borrow cattle from the lineage (Horton, 1971). In recent times however, owing largely to new realities, including natural disasters and increasing sedentarianism, there have been tremendous changes in Fulani society.

According to (Bruijn and Dijk, 2003:293), "the old family – based type of pastoralism we know from ethnography has given way, to new forms of livestock keeping and ways of organizing livestock production and pastoral livelihoods". Many pastoralists are now also cultivators. Many others have had to sell large parts of their herds to obtain cereals for survival. Large numbers of animals have also been bought by sedentary cultivators, urban merchants and civil servants who see the investment as purely business and have had to engage cheap herding labour from among the pastoral Fulani.

A cattle owner contracts with one or more shepherds to guard his animals. The cowboy is usually paid in milk although he could also be paid in cash or cattle. By selling the milk, he eventually has a chance to own his own herd (Gerteiny, 1967). The growth of commercial herding among the Fulani has led to enormous outflow of young men from the original herding family economy into the commercial sector. Bruijn and Dijk (2003) have described how this male exodus from the average Fulani pastoral family has led to a dislocation of the traditional society.

The separation of husband and wife leads to a decrease in fertility and high child mortality in the now single – parent households following the departure of the able – bodied family members. Women also experience increasing difficulties in finding a spouse, as there is a lack of young men. Women thus, frequently resort to unions of their second choice (polygynous, poor husband) in order not to be dependent on their parents or brothers.

But even the latter face increasing poverty as their sons or younger brothers have also left to try their luck elsewhere and there is consequently a shortage of labour in all the family units. Bruijn and Dijk (2003) sum up that there is now a tendency among the Fulbe to split up into increasingly smaller units that may never re-unite again. Young men disappear for good and do not send any remittances, and this can create a second wave of destitute people leaving to go to the towns.

The Fulani political system depended on a complex military organisation and was based on Islamic teachings on administration and

the relationship between conquerors and the conquered (Mabogunje, 1971). This was buttressed by an elaborate system of tax collection. Lands seized from conquered peoples became state property. Government among the Fulani was essentially theocratic. Communities who submitted voluntarily and accepted Islam were spared from being enslaved.

Others were enslaved or reduced to serfdom and required to labour on lands owned by the state. When conquered territories were already well organised politically, Fulani rulers simply replaced the traditional rulers and in most cases, other aspects of the indigenous political organisation were largely adopted.

5.3 FULANI SOLIDARITY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE STATES OF WEST AFRICA:

We have seen how the colonial powers in Africa made strenuous efforts to integrate their subjects into the new territories that they created. This was also the case in the area commonly called the Senegambia, the region lying between the rivers Gambia and Senegal (Mboge, 1974). Here, the ethnic composition of the polities existing before the arrival of the colonial powers consisted largely of the same ethnic make up. When the colonialists came however, as elsewhere in Africa, they divided up these polities among themselves, without regard to natural or national boundaries.

They then constituted these various entities into new polities, often breaking existing polities, and amalgamating separate segments into new entities. Subsequently, the colonial authorities sought to enforce

the new boundaries. Renner (1984) has graphically described how the colonizing powers tried to emphasize the separateness of their new entities in the Senegambia. In areas where two contiguous territories were administered by different powers, as in the case of the Gambia (Britain) and Senegal (France), the British and the French proceeded to institute and maintain distinctions between their possessions.

Even in other areas where the two adjoining territories were administered by the same colonial power, as in the case of Senegal and Mauritania, both of which were French territories, the colonial power nevertheless sought to keep the territories distinct. Here, the Fulani of the Senegal River Valley were divided into two, with the segment on the northern shore lumped into the modern state of Mauritania, with their kin on the southern bank of the river, ceded to Senegal.

For a long time after the French conquest of the area, this division did not jolt the indigenous people. This was primarily because the political history of the Mauritanian territory was until after the Second World War, intimately connected with that of French West Africa. Until 1946, Mauritania and Senegal were jointly administered. Mauritania was administered from Saint Louis in Senegal and it was only in 1958 that a new capital on Mauritanian territory, Nouakchott, was built. Even after this date, Mauritania continued to be administratively and economically dependent on Senegal until the eve of independence (Gerteiny, 1967).

While the two territories remained jointly administered, the people of the Senegal River valley area lived, as it were, in the better of

two worlds. The Fulani people were the major part of this population, with up to 52 per cent of the population. They could face Dakar, whenever they felt conditions in Senegal were favourable, and they regularly turned north, to Mauritania, whenever the conditions there appeared better. As such, the people continued to have the feeling of oneness, which had existed for ages before colonialism.

In fact, the river valley had over the centuries played major roles in empires such as Ghana, Mali, and Tekrur, but always as a separate entity within each empire (Gerteiny, 1967). As it seemed, colonialism was just a chip of the old block. The situation was even enhanced by the racial make-up of the countries. Senegal was a black country, and the Fulani on the two sides of the river could meld into the population in this country without a trace of their origin. It was in this way that many otherwise Mauritanians came to work in Dakar and in the various administrative units and departments of Senegal.

In the case of Mauritania, it was racially divided between the blacks and the Moors. At the start of colonialism, the blacks had a head start with Western education and indeed for a long time, it seemed the authorities were inclined towards the black population. It was from among these blacks, a predominant part of which was Fulani, that most of the administrative personnel for Mauritania were recruited. A significant number among them came from across the river. This situation at the beginning of the colonial period in the Senegal River valley area had definite implications for the two nations of Senegal and Mauritania.

From the beginnings, citizens of either country on the border could assume at will, the citizenship of the other country. The people of the Senegal River valley were thus conscious of their being one irrespective of the imposed borders and actively co-operated across these borders. According to Gerteiny (1967: 88), "the Senegal River has never been recognized by these groups as a boundary; even today, the boundary is regarded by the people (of the River valley area) as a technicality." When therefore, the move towards independence started in the two territories, the Fulani of the two banks of the Senegal River adopted the same attitude to parties on the two sides of the border.

In Mauritania however, the politics leading to independence clearly had a racial character. Between 1946 and 1950, three political parties were created, the Union generale des originaires de la vallee du fleauve (UGOVAF), the Union progressiste mauritaniene (UPM) and the Entente mauritaniene (EM). The UGOVAF, created in 1946 at Dakar, was dominated by the Fula speaking people of the two banks of the river (Ba, 1998). In the 1951 legislative elections, the party presented Dr Hamath Ba, a Fulani, as its candidate. The party lost to the UPM, but it is instructive that shortly after this, Dr Ba departed for Dakar where he settled (Ba, 1998).

Meanwhile, Morocco was laying claims to Mauritania, and this was supported by a large number of Moors in Mauritania. Opposed to this tendency was the proposal for a federal system in the French West African territories put forward by Leopold Senghor of Senegal, and supported by the Blacks of the river valley. In furtherance of this

position, the Blacks created a new party, the Bloc democratique du Gorgol (BDG) which became affiliated to Senghor's Senegalese Bloc and even canvassed for the reattachment of the right bank to Senegal (Ba, 1998).

The BDG was led by the Fulani, Ba Mamoudou Samba Boli. On March 31, 1957, Blacks of Mauritania again created a new party, the Union of the Natives of the Valley (UGOF) in Dakar, to fight for their interests. The party advocated a federation, if not the partitioning of the country between the Moorish north and the Blacks of the south. In the end, however, the colonial authorities in Mauritania handed over power to the Moors, on November 28, 1960.

The new President was Mocktar Ould Daddah, of the Mauritanian Coalition Party (PRM), which metamorphosed from the UPM. By this time however, owing to the differential reception of Western education by the two divides of the country, the Mauritanian civil service as well as the educational sector were firmly in the hands of the black population. At around the same time, power was also transferred to indigenous hands in Senegal. Here, it was Leopold Sedar Senghor, a Wolof, who assumed the presidency. But in this case, the Fulani were considerably well positioned in the power structure, even producing the first prime minister of the country, Mamadou Dia.

Meanwhile, in Mauritania, Mocktar Ould Daddah on assumption of office set out to reposition the racial structure of the country. Actions taken in this regard included the emphasis placed on Arabic as the language of official communication and the restriction of Black access

to official positions. Before then, French was the sole official language and this was almost the exclusive preserve of Blacks, especially the Fulani, who also dominated the administration and civil service. With the new policies, these Blacks, including the Fulani of the Senegal River valley were adversely affected.

This situation has led to a number of conflicts in the country, as the Blacks sought to resist what they saw as discriminatory laws directed against them. Major troubles have been recorded in 1966 and 1989 (Ba, 1998). The 1966 troubles actually had its origins in the 1965 government decrees which made the teaching of Arabic compulsory in all primary and secondary schools in Mauritania. On January 4, 1966, Black students of the Nouakchott High School revolted and went on strike for an indefinite period.

Nineteen of the students published a 'Manifesto of the 19', denouncing the oppression of black Mauritanians. Supported by the Black community, the situation soon degenerated into violent clashes between Blacks and Moors all over the country, leading to several deaths. The government reacted repressively and tension remained high in the country. Outside the country, the situation also produced reactions. In Senegal, clashes were reported especially in the river valley areas and in Dakar where Moors were attacked. Eventually, the government backed down and agreed to bilingualism (French/Arabic).

Between 1966 and 1989, several other 'minor' troubles were recorded, in 1978, 1980, 1986 and 1987. Many of these were Black protests against government measures aimed at consolidating the

Arabo-Berber domination of the Mauritanian state and the marginalization of the Black Mauritanian population. As before, the government always reacted repressively and this usually reverberated across the borders. In fact at a time, the disquiet on the Senegalese side of the borders became so loud that President Senghor of Senegal threatened to support Black self-determination if the discrimination did not stop (Ba, 1998).

In 1989, the biggest of the troubles occurred. A clash in April of that year between Senegalese peasants and Mauritanian herdsmen over the island of Dounde Khore led to the intervention of the Mauritanian National Guard, resulting in a number of deaths and the arrest of some Senegalese. Even before the Senegalese government could react, some youths in Dakar, sensing that the whole thing was a Moorish provocation, rioted and looted the shops of Arab Mauritanians. Then in a swift reaction, Mauritanian militia unleashed an orgy of killing and looting against Blacks in the country. As news of this event reached Dakar, the Senegalese unleashed their own pogrom on Moorish traders in their country.

As settlement, the two countries agreed to a reciprocal repatriation of their nationals from each other's territory. But the Mauritanian authorities used the opportunity to expel many of its Black population (reaching up to 10% of the country's total population), from the cities and also from the River Valley area. These were banished into Senegal, after being dispossessed of all their belongings and particulars. A great proportion of these consisted of Fulani herdsmen who were also

dispossessed of their livestock of large herds of cattle, sheep and goats. (Ba, 1998). The events also led to a two-year closure of the common borders of the two countries.

More than any other such event, the 1989 conflict served to bring home to the peoples of the river valley, their common destiny. The deportations showed these people that particularly the Mauritanian state did not see them as part of the nation, but rather that they belonged somewhere else. Then the closure of the borders proved to the people on the two banks of the Senegal River that it was impossible to separate them from each other.

Ineffective as the closure was, it was a painful order that ultimately only served to show the people that they were one as they continued through informal means to criss-cross the borders. It was a realization among the people, as Gerteiny (1967: 88) observed much earlier, that they "form a community that is neither Mauritanian nor Senegalese, a community belonging to neither nation, yet a community that is part of both countries, a potential if not de facto state within a state".

Till date, the Fulani of the Senegal River Valley have continued to criss-cross the banks of the river. As Gerteiny (1967) has observed, with their neighbours and relatives on the other shore of the Senegal, they move freely from one side of the river to the other. Seasonal variations also account for much of this transhumance in the river valley. This is true to popular image and mainstream ethnography, which has the Fulani as a group of nomadic pastoralists

undertaking transhumance in response to seasonal and spatial variations (Bruijn and Dijk, 2003).

People interviewed on the banks of the river severally maintained that graze is scarce in Mauritania. Reason for this has to do with the period of rains on the two sides of the river. Whearas rains start earlier in Senegal, the dry season starts earlier in Mauritania. It is therefore at this period of the rains that transhumance is highest on the Mauritania – Senegal axis. At this time, herders move from the area further north from the riverbank, particularly from the regions of Trarza, Brakna, Gorgol, and Guidimakha, all in Mauritania. Some of those interviewed in Senegal said they were from towns around Kaedi and Boghe on the southerly side of Mauritania up to those more northerly as Saye, Sabualla, and even up to Aleg.

Their destinations are usually towns in the Fleuve region of Senegal. Matam, Podor, Dagana, Bakel and other adjoining towns such as Thille Boubacar, Demet, Thilogne and Dianddi are the major receiving towns, but often, these southern bound herders continue to as far as the Casamance region. This is also a river region (the Gambia River), but another reason for this choice of destination is that it is also an area where the Fulani are found in their numbers. Those coming from the north are thus assured of favourable reception among their kin.

At its peak, many hundreds of people cross the border in a single day. Some respondents interviewed in Senegal said that with same families living on the two sides of the river, each oftentimes having farms on either side, it was impossible to keep the people from crossing the borders. Another source told me

that there are even instances of people on one side who would put food on the fire and quickly cross over the river to buy the ingredients on the other side. With such a situation, it was no wonder that even when the borders were closed in 1989 for two years, informal crossings continued between the two countries.

There are other reasons also that account for transhumance among the Fulani over the river Senegal and throughout West Africa. People have continued to cross the borders to visit families and worship together. This is especially true of members of the various Islamic Brotherhoods, who regularly cross over on important days of the Islamic calendar, especially the Tobaski or the Magal of the Mouride Brotherhood. The Brotherhoods particularly have come to serve as important networks of alliance among the Fulani of Senegal and Mauritania, and also throughout West Africa and beyond. All the four main Muslim Brotherhoods in Senegal are also found in Mauritania.

Two of them, the Laye Order and the Mouride Order arose in Senegal. The Qudriyya Order arose in Mauritania. These three Orders, which are very active in both countries, have come to serve not only religious purposes, but also as agencies of mobilization. Usually led by Fulani clerics, the youthful members of these Orders have often been among the first to rise in times of protest, even when the issues at stake are not strictly religious, but instead concern the welfare of the people on the two sides of the border, as happened over the expulsions carried out by Mauritania following the 1989 troubles (Ba, 1998). The fourth Order, the Tijaniyya Order, has ties to Algeria and is spread throughout West Africa.

5.4 TRANS-BORDER FULANI RELATIONS, HEGEMONY AND POLITICAL CONFLICT IN WEST AFRICA:

The history of West Africa is a chronicle of the rise and fall of great empires. These empires included Tekrur, Songhay, Ghana, Mali and Sokoto. Many of these encompassed large geographical areas and embodied practices, which only point to very developed cultures even at those early periods. A number of these were Fulani empires, such as Tekrur and Sokoto, but even in many of the others, the Fulani also played prominent roles (Ajayi and Crowder, 1971). Fulani history is as such a record of their attempts at instituting or consolidating their hegemonies over the areas where they lived. It is also a record of their attempts to resist or adjust to the hegemonies that ruled over them.

But inasmuch as the Fulani are now mostly associated with great West African states of yore, it must be pointed out that Fulani herdsmen actually started their dispersal through the Savannah long after the creative period of state formation in this zone. However, as they dispersed, existing Savannah states were conquered, Islamised and reorganized by Fulani dynasties.

This movement must have been led by sedentary Fulani from the ancient Negro states of the Senegal valley, although their pastoral kin must have also played a part in the conquests (Horton, 1971). The latter were often disgruntled by the attempts of the states to pin them down to fixed abodes and subject them to heavy tributes and thus, eagerly responded to the call of the former in the hope of a better lot and in the name of a common language and culture.

The first of the Fulani states was Tekrur, which was founded in the Senegal Valley area around the eleventh century. It was from here that "the 'Takarir of the Arabs', or the 'Toucouleur of the French' spread during the centuries over large parts of the Sudan, along with their 'Fulani' kinsmen"(Levtzion, 1971:136), themselves having moved into this 'fertile crescent' earlier as a "result of the disintegration of the first medieval empires of West Africa and the progressive drought of the Sahara" (Ba, 1998: 239-240). According to Ba (1998), between the twelfth and the fourteenth centuries, there was a movement of Fulani dynasties from Tagent, Hodh and Assaba in the north towards the Senegal valley due especially to pressure from the Songhai.

The Songhai also sought to dominate the Fulani Kingdom of Fouta Kingui in the sixteenth century but were fiercely opposed by Tenguella Geudal and others. In 1512, Tenguella died and was succeeded by Koli Tenguella who then freed the valley area from Songhai and Mali. He created the Deniyankobe dynasty, which ruled the Kingdom of Fouta Toro from 1512 to 1776. Meanwhile, a revolt had occurred in Futa Jallon in 1725. Here some Islamic reformers led by Alfa Ibrahim b. Nuhu successfully rose against the pagan rulers of the state and established an imamate.

Then in 1776, the Torodo movement arose in Futa Toro, led by Thierno Souleymane Bal. The reformers overthrew the Deniyankobe monarchy and established a theocratic state system under the command of Almamy Abdoul Kader Kann (Suret-Canale, 1971). This was the beginning of Almamydom in the area. Later still, another Fula

imamate was founded at Bundu, between Futa Jallon and Futa Toro, at the end of the eighteenth century by Malik Sy (Suret-Canale, 1971).

In the nineteenth century, great revolts swept the length and breadth of the Western Sudan. These were the Jihads, which were in the main, led by the Fulani. These revolts, carried out in the name of Islamic reformation, were also largely due to the economic grievances held by the Fulani against their Sudanic host communities, who often saw them as strangers and discriminated against them in matters of land ownership and rights of trade (Omer-Cooper et al, 1968).

The most far-reaching and successful of these jihads, in terms of spread and size of conquest, was fought in Hausa land. This Jihad, led by Uthman dan Fodio, a Fulani of the Toronkowa clan, was fought between 1804 and 1859. It established an Islamic theocracy under the Fulani over the whole of Hausaland and beyond, an area that roughly corresponds to the whole of modern day Northern Nigeria (Abubakar, 1980).

The jihads fought in the area of the Senegambia also had enduring results. In 1817, a jihad was started in Masina by Seku Ahmadu, which led to the establishment of an Islamic empire that embraced the whole of the river region between Jenne and Timbuktu and some areas to the east and west (Hunwick, 1966). The empire founded by Seku Ahmadu lasted till 1862, when it was broken up by Alhaji Umar, who led another jihad. Umar launched his jihad in 1851, and by 1864 when he was killed in battle, his empire already covered a large area including Segu, Kaarta and Masina.

It was only the French who broke up this empire when they began to move into the interior as from 1878 (Hunwick, 1966). Meanwhile, Almamydom, which had been instituted in Fouta Toro in 1776 continued to be in place till 1881 when French colonisation put an end to this theocratic system. Even then, the anti-colonial resistance, which Almamydom inspired, only ended in Fouta Toro in 1908(Ba, 1998). Thus, on the eve of colonization, the West African space was dominated by Fulani hegemonies.

Ekeh (1996:47) has pointed out that this was possible because "the Fulani were the first self-conscious ethnic group in West Africa, possessing vast networks of relationships among themselves and maintaining political ties with the rulers of the host communities", which they soon utilized to take over these states. According to the author, this ethnic consciousness was probably the result of "their itinerant herding occupation that compelled them to rely on, and negotiate for, the transhuman resources of diverse agricultural communities on whom they depended on seasonal basis" (Ekeh, 1996:47-48).

When colonialism came, the West African space was divided up among the colonial powers. The Senegal Valley area was divided between the two French territories of Senegal and Mauritania. Those on the bank of the river were lumped with the Moors further north of the bank in Mauritania, while those on the southern bank became part of Senegal. In Senegal, the Fulani lost their hegemony, although as

pointed out earlier, they were fairly represented in the power structure of the new state.

But more significantly, power in Senegal came to be largely exercised through the Muslim brotherhoods (Behrman, 1970). There are four main 'Muslim brotherhoods' in Senegal. The largest of the four, the Mouride order arose in Touba, Senegal, under the famous Marabout, Amadou Bamba. The order

has more than two million followers in the country. Marabouts of Fulani origin are also known to have founded the most important brotherhoods among the Wolof, who came to be the politically dominant ethnic group in Senegal. Through these brotherhoods, the Fulani have come to exercise a lot of controlling influence on the leadership of the country.

In Mauritania, colonialism employed different standards for the sedentary Blacks along the river and the nomadic Moors up north that discriminated against the former. A direct administration was created for the Blacks and an indirect one for the Moors. In addition, the Moors were exempted from taxation and conscription while the Blacks were not only taxed heavily, but were subjected to conscription and numerous other discriminatory policies (Ba, 1998). But notwithstanding the pro-Moor policy of the colonial authorities, the Blacks actually progressed in the period. They embraced French education, and their consequent monopoly of the French language enabled them to dominate the new administration and civil service of the country (Young, 1976).

But the French were nevertheless determined to elevate the Moors over the Blacks. Concerted efforts were thus made to convince the Moors to imbibe French ways. In one of such attempts to convince Moors to send their children to colonial schools, a French inspector of schools on a visit to the area of the Hodh was recorded to have told them, "if you do not ensure the education of your children, the Blacks will continue to take all the good posts and we will continue to see the Black doctor ordering the Moorish nurse"(Ba, 1998: 242). At another time, during the 1946 legislative elections, the Governor of the territory was quoted to have warned the Moors that, "Blacks are actively organizing in the river valley. If you do not mobilize your men and your wives for these elections, they will win and then rule 'this country which belongs to you'"(Ba, 1998: 242).

With policies and officials like these, it was clear that colonialism in Mauritania preferred the Moors. But while it lasted, the discriminations against the Blacks remained subtle. When however, power was ultimately transferred to the Moors at independence, in a process that itself was not free from pro-Moor manipulation by the French as we saw in the earlier section, official discrimination against the Blacks assumed a brazen character. The Moors on inheriting power immediately took steps to break the advantage, which French education had conferred on the Blacks.

The first action was a switch to Arabic as the national language, as we have already seen. Then a policy was promulgated assigning only 25 percent of most public posts to the Black community. With most of

the educated population belonging to the Black community, the reaction there was predictable. The situation has led to conflict on several occasions, especially each time such discriminatory policies have been enacted. And as Ba (1998: 243) has noted of some of these recurrent troubles, "in 1986, senior civil servants from the Fulani ethnic group were arrested, and from 1987 to the present day, many Fulani have been summarily executed and deported from the country".

The situation is still rife as the Moors continue to insist on rolling back the Fulani access to government in Mauritania and the latter continue to resist this 'scorched earth policy'. We saw earlier how each of these troubles has ultimately drawn in the Blacks of the south bank of the river in Senegal. In the 1970s, Senegal even threatened to support self-determination among Mauritania's Blacks. Then after the 1989 conflict, the borders between the two countries were closed.

Diaw and Diouf (1998:262) also point out a present conflict between Senegal and Mauritania, over the economic development programme on the River Valley "that seeks to exclude neighbouring populations of the same ethnic group resident in the different countries". All these only go to prove our contention in this work that the desire for power or the attempt to resist it by fractions of a trans-border ethnic group brings about conflict, between the fractions and their respective states, and between the various states where the fractions live.

This contention is also borne out by events elsewhere in West Africa, where the Fulani factor is ever-present in politics. In Nigeria,

colonialism first defeated the Fulani rulers of the Sokoto caliphate, but soon afterwards, returned power to the group in what came to be known as Northern Nigeria. This they did, first, through the adoption of indirect rule, through which the colonial officers administered their territory through the erstwhile Fulani rulers who were restored in a nominal relationship with the former but with full powers over their Habe subjects.

Even when definite steps were taken towards independence, conscious efforts were made by the colonialists to prop the Fulani up in 'modern' terms so as to inherit leadership. Independence, as Ekeh (1996) has observed, created new political minorities in Nigeria, many of which were historically dominant minorities, including the Fulani. But the author has traced at length how the latter, inspite of their demographic minority status in postcolonial Nigeria, have nevertheless managed to actually extend their power and influence to an area far beyond the areas they conquered with the force of arms some 200 years ago.

This area is today conterminous with modern Nigeria. According to the author, "using tools historically attributed to elite managers of political power who emphasize covert rather than overt influences and who exercise power in a latent rather than manifest manner, the Fulani aristocracy has been able to subordinate governance in Nigeria, including military rule, to its authority" (Ekeh, 1996: 53). He further argues that the one important source of power of the Fulani aristocracy

is "that common tool of every successful ruling minority that its rivals lack, its organizational abilities".

The author then enumerates the devices of power control that the Fulani have used to stay in power in Nigeria. To start with, there is the ability of so many of its ethnic stock to organize for power in a coordinated manner and over time. It is this fact that has enabled the Fulani, in postcolonial Nigeria, to manipulate three salient realities of Nigerian society to consolidate and expand their power in the country. First, it has cleverly assumed the ultimate responsibility for the welfare of the Islamic religion in Nigeria.

By this, it put itself in the position to represent that religion in the unending and ever present struggle between it and Christianity for the 'soul of the nation', and has thus, remained within the echelons of power throughout the country's recent history. The ethnic group has also consistently sought to speak for the entire north of the country, with their spokesmen giving the impression that their mission is to protect the region from being overwhelmed by the south. In this guise, the group has orchestrated the differences between the North and South, insisting that the former has a right to the leadership of the country.

It has done this while supplying the captains of administration and promoting those other Northern elite who have been amenable to Fulani leadership (Takaya and Tyoden, 1987). They have further persuaded their majority hosts, the Hausa, that the interests of the two are tied and thus successfully subordinated Hausa nationalism to

Fulani interests, thereby enabling them to rule Nigeria under the guise of a nebulous 'Hausa-Fulani' majority grouping.

This Fulani hegemony in Nigeria has been very apparent since after the country's civil war in 1967-70. In these years, they have provided both civilian leaders as well as military leaders of the country. But even at other times when the group has not provided the top leader of the country, it has nevertheless managed to maintain what Ekeh (1996: 57) has called "veto power" over the country, whereby the members of the group have controlled whoever holds the top position of the land and other members have also occupied strategic positions in the economy and government of the country.

There have been other times though, when the Fulani have been under the threat of losing their hegemony over Nigeria. At such times however, the group has often acted to try to return the situation back to status quo. When in 1993, Chief M.K.O. Abiola (a Yoruba) was clearly on the road to winning the country's presidency at the general elections, the results were promptly annulled, in a move in which the late General Musa Yar'Adua (a political godfather of Fulani origin) was prominent.

But although Abiola was scuttled, Fulani hegemony over the country has not been the same ever since. Succeeding military regimes were not Fulani nor conceivably Fulani-directed, and although current Vice President Atiku Abubakar is a Fulani, it may not make great sense to argue that President Olusegun Obasanjo's regime is beholden to the Fulani ethnic group. But more significant is the fact of many hitherto dominated groups in the North of Nigeria rising against these overlords.

Ilorin, the northern Yoruba emirate conquered by the Fulani just before the advent of colonialism, is a typical example of this disenchantment. Ilorin was initially an outpost of the old Oyo Empire. But a rebellion by the Oyo military governor of the town led to the intervention of the migrant Fulani there, first on the side of the mutineers. Eventually, the Fulani turned against the Aare Onakakanfo whom they killed and took over power. In the reality of the present seeming Fulani loss of power in the country, the indigenous Yoruba of Ilorin have suddenly found their voice and have been campaigning to throw out Fulani suzreinity over their area.

In the Northern part of the country, some local groups have similarly been confronting the Fulani whom they accuse of having taken over their land on which their cattle now graze. In the past few years, there have been riots, killings and counter-killings between local agricultural people and migrant Fulani herdsmen throughout Northen Nigeria. But inasmuch as these troubles indicate a growing challenge to Fulani hegemony, facts emanating from the conflicts show more importantly that the Fulani have networks of alliance across West Africa and these are constantly involved in their local troubles in every part of the sub-regon.

Between 2004 and 2005 in Adamawa state, villages like Kwarafa, Gidan Rimi, Bomni and Kpashan, all in the Mayah District of Demsa Local Government Area were sacked by foreign nationals believed to be Fulani. Similar incidents also occurred in Dumne town and surrounding villages within the period. Trouble usually started when

these Fulani cattle rearers bring their cattle to graze in peoples farms to the displeasure of the local farmers. But attempts to chase them away from the farms have led these foreigners to unleash violence on the local populace, killing and maiming them, and setting their farms ablaze.

In all these cases, the foreign Fulani, referred to as Bororo, were said to be co-habiting with the local Fulani population, who provided them with accommodation and hospitality. In a number of cases, the local Fulani population have been victims of reprisal attacks and in some few other cases, these local Fulani, fearing reprisal attacks by the indigenous population, have fled to other locations (Molomo, 2005).

The Plateau area of the country has similarly been on the boil ever since troubles broke out there in 2001 between Fulani herders and other locals. One of the numerous Panels of Inquiry set up by the government after one of the disturbances in Plateau state was repeatedly told by some of the local people that testified that the violence have involved a "massive inflow of Fulani warlords from other states and other countries". These warriors were alledgedly coordinated by an organization, Miyetti Allah, which is said to be the umbrella body of all Fulani herdmen throughout Nigeria and beyond (Peter-Omale, 2002:13).

In times of trouble involving the Fulani in any part of the sub-region, bodies like the Miyetti Allah are believed to be the rallying points that moblize and deploy warriors as necessary. All these not only show the existence of Fulani solidarity and hegemony in West Africa, but also go to prove the contention in this work that ethnic hegemony is

implicitly unstable and destabilizing, as other ethnic groups usually rise in opposition to the hegemonic group. Often, this leads to intractable conflict and violence as the hegemonic group strives to retain its domination.

The situation in Nigeria may not have reached anywhere near this scenario, but even this does not in any way suggest that the situation is abating or may not indeed degenerate. Infact, if anything, the attitude of the ruling Fulani aristocrats of the area only suggests that the troubles seem set to continue for sometime. This attitude is typified by the famous statement attributed in 1953 to Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, the most significant Fulani leader in modern Nigeria.

On that occasion, while opposing a 'Southern' demand for immediate independence for Nigeria on the floors of the Federal House of Representatives, Bello had remarked, "The mistake of 1914 has come to light..."(Bello, 1962: 133), referring to the amalgamation of the North and South into the country of Nigeria in that year by the British, and giving the impression by that singular statement that had the British not intruded into the affairs of the area (or would the situation change), the Fulani would have continued their 'march to the sea'

5.5 FIELD STUDY / SURVEY OF THE FULANI/WOLOF/MOORS OF SENEGAL AND MAURITANA:

A research trip to Senegal was undertaken where Focus Group Discussions were held with a number of Fulani, Moors and Wolof respondents, aimed at gauging the feelings of the study population as it related to the research questions as well as confirming the findings from

the documentary research. During these discussions, participants were asked questions based on the Question Guide for this study (see Appendix 1). These questions, as earlier pointed out, covered the variables under study and were in line with the research questions.

Participants were asked some questions aimed at finding out why members of partitioned ethnic groups seek for power across the various countries where they live. The answers are summarized in Tables 5.1 – 5.4. The participants were also asked questions aimed at finding out how the quest for dominance by fractions of partitioned ethnic groups influence conflict in their countries and regions of abode. The answers are presented in Tables 5.5 – 5.8.

Then the participants were asked some questions aimed at finding out the influence of continued relations among members of partitioned ethnic groups on their integration into either their larger ethnic groups or their countries of abode. The results are summarized in Tables 5.9 – 5.13 below.

Table 5.1: Percentage and frequency of participants aware that their kin are living in other countries:

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that is aware of kin in other countries	%	No. not aware of kin in other countries	%
Fulani	Senegal	47	46	98	1	2
	Mauritania	11	11	100	-	-
	Total	58	57	98	1	2

The result shows that 98% of all the participants are aware of the existence of their kin in other countries while 2% are not.

Table 5.2: Percentage and frequency of participants' views on how to ensure group well-being in countries of abode and continued relations among members across borders:

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that believe in capture of power by group in various countries of abode	%	No. that believe in members coming together in one country	%
Fulani	Senegal	47	42	89	5	11
	Mauritania	11	9	82	2	18
	Total	58	51	88	7	12

The result above shows that 88% of the Fulani believe that their well-being will be guaranteed through the capture and retention of power in their various countries of abode while 12% believe that their well being will be better guaranteed through irredentist arrangements.

Table 5.3: Percentage and frequency of participants' views on what group's attitude should be to kith and kin/others whenever they have power in any country:

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that see power in the hands of group in one country to be used for all members of group in all countries	%	No. that see power in the hands of group in any country to be used for all ethnic groups in that country	%
Fulani	Senegal	47	25	53	22	47
	Mauritania	11	7	64	4	36
	Total	58	32	55	26	45

The result shows that 55% of the Fulani are of the view that power should be used for the collective interest of their larger ethnic group while 45% are of the view that power should be used for the collective interest of all the ethnic groups in a country.

Table 5.4: Percentage and frequency of participants who believe the Fulani of their country work for the interest of their larger ethnic group rather than for their country of abode:

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that perceive Fulani as concerned more for group interest	%	No. that perceive Fulani as concerned more for interests of country	%
Wolof	Senegal	23	12	52	11	48
Moors	Mauritania	13	11	85	2	15

The result shows that 85% and 52% of the Moors and the Wolof participants respectively see the Fulani of their country as wont to act for their group interest while in power rather than for the general good. 48% and 15% of the Wolof and the Moors respectively see the Fulani of their country as concerned more with the general good.

Table 5.5: Percentage and frequency of participants' views on what to do if other ethnic groups oppose them while in power in any country:

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that believe group should fight to retain power	%	No. that believe group should dialogue / find accommodation with others	%
Fulani	Senegal	47	30	64	17	36
	Mauritania	11	10	91	1	9
	Total	58	40	69	18	31

The result shows that 69% of the Fulani will prefer to fight to retain power while 31% believe that the group should dialogue / find accommodation with others

Table 5.6: Percentage and frequency of participants' views on the attitude to adopt to hostile states in which they live:

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that believe group should oppose/fight hostile state and take power	%	No. that believe group should relocate to another country where they have power	%
Fulani	Senegal	47	32	68	15	32
	Mauritania	11	9	82	2	18
	Total	58	41	71	17	29

The result shows that 71% of the Fulani believe that the group should oppose the state and try to change government while 29% will want to relocate to another country where the group is in power.

171

Table 5.7: Percentage and frequency of participants' views on what to do if kin are attacked or are involved in conflict in their states of abode:

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that will fight alongside kin	%	No. that are indifferent	%
Fulani	Senegal	47	28	60	19	40
	Mauritania	11	6	55	5	45
	Total	58	34	59	24	41

The result shows that 59% of the Fulani will want to fight alongside their kin while 41% will be indifferent.

Table 5.8: Percentage and frequency of participants' views on what to do if the Fulani capture power in their country:

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that will oppose/fight them	%	No. that will allow/support them	%
Wolof	Senegal	23	10	43	13	57
Moors	Mauritania	13	12	92	1	8

The result shows that 92% and 43% of the Moors and the Wolof participants respectively will oppose the Fulani if the latter capture power in their country of abode and fight to remove them, while 57% and 8% of the Wolof and Moors respectively will allow and support the Fulani when they are in power in their country.

Table 5.9: Percentage and frequency of participants who interact more with kin in country/across borders than with others in the country:

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that interact more with kin in country/across borders	%	No. that interact more with others in country	%
Fulani	Senegal	47	29	62	18	38
	Mauritania	11	8	73	3	27
	Total	58	37	64	21	36

The result shows that 64% of the Fulani interact more with their kin in country/across borders while 36% interact more with members of other ethnic groups in the country of abode.

Table 5.10: Percentage and frequency of participants' feelings of attachment to the larger ethnic group/country of abode:

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that is ordinarily more attached to larger ethnic group	%	No. that is ordinarily more attached to country	%
Fulani	Senegal	47	29	62	19	38
	Mauritania	11	8	73	3	27
	Total	58	37	64	21	36

The result shows that 64% of the Fulani are ordinarily more attached to the larger ethnic group while 36% are ordinarily more attached to the state.

Table 5.11: Percentage and frequency of participants' feeling of attachment to country/larger ethnic group, if members of the ethnic group have favourable political conditions and socio-economic opportunities within a country:

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that is more attached to country of abode	%	No. that is more attached to larger group	%
Fulani	Senegal	47	27	57	20	43
	Mauritania	11	7	64	4	36
	Total	58	34	59	24	38

The result shows that 59% of the Fulani will be more attached to the state if political and socio-economic conditions are favorable while 38% will remain more attached to the larger group on the same condition.

Table 5.12: Percentage and frequency of participants' feeling of attachment to country/larger group, if members of the ethnic group are a minority group within a country:

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that is more attached to larger ethnic group	%	No. that is more attached to country	%
Fulani	Senegal	47	28	60	19	40
	Mauritania	11	8	73	3	27
	Total	58	36	62	22	38

The result shows that 62% of the Fulani will remain more attached to the larger ethnic group if members of the ethnic group are in the minority in the country while 38% will be more attached to the state on the same condition.

Table 5.13: Percentage and frequency of participants' perceptions of Fulani attachment to their country/ larger ethnic group

Ethnic Group	Country	Total	No. that believe the Fulani of their country are more attached to their larger ethnic group	%	No. that believe the Fulani of their country are more attached to the country	%
Wolof	Senegal	23	13	57	10	43
Moors	Mauritania	13	11	85	2	15

The result shows that 85% of Moors and 57% of the Wolof participants believe that the Fulani are more attached to their larger ethnic group than their country of abode, while 15% of Moors and 43% of the Wolof believe that the latter are more attached to their country of abode.

TRANS-BORDER ETHNIC HEGEMONY AND POLITICAL CONFLICT: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATIONS IN WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA.

6.1 TRANS-BORDER ETHNIC SOLIDARITY AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATIONS IN WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA:

This study so far shows that the Tutsi ethnic group of Central Africa and the Fulani ethnic group of West Africa respectively have continued to exhibit ethnic solidarity despite the borders of the nation-states into which they have been partitioned. We saw that this trans-border solidarity among the fractions of the respective ethnic groups largely transcend the attachment of the members to the respective states in which they live. We also saw how at most times when there were conflicts in one country involving a fraction of the trans-border ethnic group, their kin in the other countries were drawn in on their side and in defiance of the international state system.

In the case of the Tutsi ethnic group, we saw how all the attempts by the colonial masters to push them apart failed. In the years following partition, the members of the various fractions continued to relate with each other across borders almost as if the borderlines did not exist. In the aftermath of partition, the Tutsi were put into the countries of Rwanda, Burundi, D. R. Congo and Uganda. In the years leading up to and following independence, we have seen how these countries almost became hostages to the ambitions and travails of the Tutsi. In the case of Rwanda and Burundi, we saw how events in one country immediately reverberated in the other. Massacres of Tutsi in Rwanda (where they

had lost power following the events leading up to independence) produced retaliations in Burundi (where the ethnic group continued to retain power after independence).

In this regard, three events are noteworthy. The first is the revolution of 1959 in Rwanda during which the Tutsi monarchy was overthrown and many Tutsi fled the country. This resulted in the takeover of the Rwandan government by the Hutu ethnic group. The contagion of republican ideas from Rwanda immediately reverberated across the borders to Burundi. The majority Hutu became sensitive to the implications of majority rule, while the dominant Tutsi became convinced that their survival lay only in their retaining power. Thus, although Burundi continued briefly as a monarchy, the country soon degenerated along ethnic lines, with the Tutsi holding out the country as their bastion.

In 1972-73, there were massacres of Hutu in Burundi, first in 1972 as retaliation for Hutu killings of some Tutsi and then as reprisals following an attempt by Hutu exiles to invade the country in 1973. These events immediately triggered off killings of Tutsi in Rwanda and ultimately set the stage for a coup that brought a hardline Hutu regime to power in that country. Then in 1993, events in Burundi once again contributed to the happenings in Rwanda. It was in that year that a political liberalisation programme led to the democratic election of Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, as President of Burundi. But just three months into office, Ndadaye was killed in an abortive coup.

Although Ndadaye was replaced by another Hutu, the country nevertheless plunged into a mayhem in which Burundian Hutu massacred their fellow Tutsi and were in turn massacred by the Tutsi dominated army of the country. In Rwanda meanwhile, peace talks following the Tutsi invasion of the country in 1990 had started yielding results at the time of Ndadaye's election in Burundi and subsequent assassination. The Arusha Accords that resulted from the talks provided for power sharing between the Rwandan government and the RPA rebels.

But in the aftermaths of the events in Burundi, hardliners in the Rwandan government held up the death of Ndadaye as the result of Tutsi intrigue and treachery and an example of what was likely to happen in Rwanda if the RPA was allowed to share power with the Rwandan government. To prevent the coming into effect of the Accord, the hardliners are believed to have killed the Rwandan President (together with the new President of Burundi) in a plane crash, an event that ultimately set off the infamous Rwandan genocide of 1994.

During these incidents, it is significant that those who fled always sought refuge in those parts of the other countries where their kin lived. In Burundi, Tutsi refugees always found sanctuary among their kin throughout the country. In Uganda, Tutsi refugees mostly settled in Hima country. And in D.R. Congo, they settled in the part of the country, the region of the Kivus, which is where the Banyamulenge live. It is true that conflicts sometimes flared up between the locals and the refugees, owing largely to competition for scarce resources, but in the

main, the refugees were well received by their kin, so much so that almost in all cases, the refugees soon melded into the local population and in some instances as in Uganda, even sought naturalization.

In the case of the Fulani ethnic group, the story was the same. As elsewhere in Africa, the colonialists partitioned the Fulani into a number of countries throughout West Africa and even beyond. But this fact, and other divisive devices by which the colonialists expected to draw a wedge between these fractions across borders ultimately failed. In the years following colonialism and independence, the Fulani not only continued to see themselves as one but also continued to relate among their fractions as if the state borders did not exist. Just as in the case of the Tutsi, events involving a fraction of the Fulani in any of the countries to which they had been partitioned always drew in members of the other fractions in other countries on the side of their ethnic kin.

Events in the Senegambia amply demonstrate the salience of ethnic solidarity in the relations among the fractions. At the start of colonialism, the people of the Senegal River Valley area continued as if nothing had changed. But as Senegal and Mauritania assumed distinct identities, the River Valley people, among whom the Fulani predominated, saw the development as an opportunity to better their lot. Not for them the talk about national integration; instead, the people turned to any direction where the prospects appeared better. Thus, whenever Senegal appeared brighter, the people of the River Valley moved to Dakar and other cities in the country in search of opportunities. Similarly, whenever the situation in Mauritania appeared

better, the people from the two sides of the valley moved up North to take their chance.

As the countries moved towards independence, we saw how the people of the valley continued to act as one. Especially in Mauritania, their political parties were always led by the Fulani, and it is conceivable that their major backing came from Senegal. In fact, it is very instructive that these parties were either formed in Dakar or their leaders seemed to always operate from there. These parties also regularly championed proposals put forward by Dakar, often in preference and opposition to those formulated in Nouakchott. Then we also saw how conflicts on one side of the border almost always drew in ethnic kin from the other side. Killings of Blacks in Mauritania were regularly retaliated on Moors in Senegal.

And we saw how even in Nigeria, there are continuing suspicions that other Fulani outside of the country are involved in many of the troubles involving local Fulani. What the foregoing shows is that fractions of the Fulani and Tutsi ethnic groups respectively have continued to show solidarity in the years following partition. This finding tallies with the results of earlier studies about pastoralists and their ways of life. Many writers have held that the pastoral way of life predisposes an ethnic group to group loyalty, over and above their loyalty to the territory where they live.

Writing about the Fulani, Paden (1986: 57) had observed that part of 'their pastoral heritage' "is not to be attached to a particular piece of land, but to loyalties within the broader community". In the

179

same vein, Horton (1971:106) argues that pastoralists are immensely conscious of being in but not of the societies that give them grazing rights. According to him, "when a group of farmers divides a tract of land, the resultant pieces still remain physically together and hold their owners in spatial proximity. When however pastoralists divide up a herd, nothing stops cattle and owners from moving apart".

The findings of this study also tally with the findings of many earlier studies. The study shows that members of ethnic groups partitioned across the countries of Africa are ordinarily more attached to the larger ethnic group than the state in which they live (Phiri, 1984). In the early years of partition, this feeling led many of such ethnic groups to attempt to breach the state arrangements on the continent and demand for unification in states of their own (Touval, 1984). Although this has not worked, nevertheless, this feeling has been reinforced in recent years by the obvious failure of the states in which these groups live to provide adequately for their members, leading them to look beyond the state and towards the larger ethnic group for succour (Enemuo, 1991; Clapham, 1996).

Members of fractions of partitioned ethnic groups who are contented with the political and socio-economic arrangements in their country are likely to be more attached to the country than the larger ethnic group (Miles and Rochefort, 1991). Those who are minorities in their countries of abode are usually more attached to the larger ethnic group than the states in which they live (Ekeh, 1996). The above

findings are also confirmed by the result of the Focus Group Discussions held in the study locations.

The findings show that a majority of participants have not only continued to interact with kin across borders, but are ordinarily more attached to the larger ethnic group than their country of abode, a fact well known to their neighbouring ethnic groups. The findings also show that the allegiance of members of trans-border ethnic groups to the larger ethnic group vis-à-vis the state is influenced by the size of their fractions and their living conditions in their various countries of abode.

6.2 TRANS-BORDER ETHNIC HEGEMONY AND POLITICAL CONFLICT: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATIONS IN WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA:

This study has also shown how the political history of West and Central Africa are respectively the chronicles of the hegemonies of the Fulani and the Tutsi. Tutsi hegemony in Central Africa dates to pre-colonial times. When colonialism came, the Belgian administrators of the territories of Rwanda and Burundi largely retained the Tutsi monarchy through an indirect rule system. Tutsi hegemony lasted in the two territories throughout the colonial period, but in the run-up to independence, the monarchy was overthrown in Rwanda and the Tutsi removed from power there. In Burundi however, the monarchy survived for a time after independence, and even when it was overthrown, the Tutsi still retained power in the country. In the scenario of the ethnic group having lost power in Rwanda, the Tutsi of Burundi consolidated the country as a bastion of their hegemony.

For many years after losing power in Rwanda, the Tutsi of the country made several attempts at regaining it. These attempts were largely led by exiles that fled to neighbouring countries after past episodes of killings in Rwanda. Many settled in Burundi, but many others also settled in Uganda and D.R.Congo. It was from these countries that those invasions were launched into Rwanda. For more than three decades the attempts flopped, but by 1990, there seemed to have been a new realization on the part of the Tutsi of the region that their survival only laid in their securing power in the respective countries where they lived, such that today, almost all the countries of the region are ruled by the Tutsi or Tutsi-related people.

The first event that led to this realization occurred in Uganda, where the Rwandan Tutsi became unwelcome even after contributing heavily to the victory of the NRA guerrillas there. We have seen how this event almost directly led to the 1990 invasion of Rwanda by Tutsi exiles that in 1994 ultimately led to the restoration of Tutsi power in Rwanda. In the invasion, Tutsi elements from every country where they lived joined. And when the RPF attained power in Rwanda, they immediately assumed responsibility for all Tutsi everywhere. In 1996, when the Tutsi of D.R. Congo became threatened, it was then that the Tutsi leaders of the region apparently moved to institute a hegemony over the region.

The Tutsi of the region put up an alliance consisting of local Congolese Tutsi elements as well as fighters of the Rwandan and Ugandan armed forces and other Tutsi from Burundi, and under this

aegis, finally confronted the then Zairean army, which they ultimately defeated in May 1997. But when these leaders realized that the new leadership in the Congo was not amenable to Tutsi interests in the region, they soon sponsored another rebellion there and which is still continuing, aimed at replacing the country's leadership with Tutsi or Tutsi-friendly elements.

In the case of the Fulani, their hegemony in West Africa also dates to pre-colonial times- to the tenth and eleventh centuries when their first state, Tekrur, was founded in the Senegambia. The Fulani went on to create several other states throughout the region now known as West Africa, including the Hausa states of present day Northern Nigeria, which they conquered in the famous Jihad of Uthman dan Fodio between 1804 and 1859. When the colonialists came on the scene, they defeated these states. The French particularly went about breaking up the Fula states they met on the scene and also consciously worked to destroy the influence of those states on the society, especially Almamydom.

In the British territory of Northern Nigeria, the story was different. Here, the Fulani states which the colonialists had earlier defeated were curiously restored in an indirect rule system that even gave the Fulani rulers much more power over their Habe subjects than they ever had before the coming of the British. Lord Lugard, the formulator of British colonial policy in the area at this period was obviously very impressed with the Fulani. Writing in 1902 after he had largely conquered the Fulani emirates, Lugard observed, "I believe myself that the future of

the virile races of this protectorate lies largely in the regeneration of the Fulani" (Okonta, 2000:7).

His wife, Lady Lugard was even more impressed: "the ruling classes in the North are deserving in every way of the name of cultivated Gentleman; we seem to be in the presence of one of the fundamental facts of history, that there are races which are born to conquer and others to persist in conquest" (Logams, 1987: 48). With a mindset as above, it was no wonder that the British proceeded to consciously transfer power to Nigerians in an arrangement that enabled the Fulani to have 'veto power' in the new country.

Elsewhere in West Africa however, the European colonialists did not favour the Fulani in the handover of power. We have already seen how in Senegal and Mauritania, power eluded the Fulani at independence. In the other countries of West Africa, the story was the same. Even in Guinea and Mali where they have relatively high population strengths ("Languages of", 1990), they could not secure power at the onset. In fact, in Guinea, we have already alluded to the fact that politics there since independence has been determined largely by the attempts of the other ethnic groups to exclude the Fulani from power. The Fulani have since independence gained power at different times in countries like Niger and Mali though, and are still striving for power in many other countries.

It is significant that such power whenever it is attained is used for the interests of the group wherever they may be even more than it is used for every body in the particular country. This finding agrees with

the findings of earlier studies in this area. In fact, it is this need for group well-being among members of partitioned groups in the face of obvious hostility of the state that has led to the desire among their fractions to capture power in their various countries of abode. This they often do by utilizing the networks of alliance of the group across the countries (Ekeh, 1996; Adefuye, 1984; Mamdani, 2002a). With power in the hands of the group, they then control the borders of the various states and can open up the resources of these states to the benefit of the members of the larger group everywhere. This finding is also confirmed by the results of the Focus Group Discussions held in the study locations.

However, the overt concern for group interests by members of partitioned ethnic groups while in power often brings the fractions in conflict with other ethnic groups in the respective countries. This is also in agreement with earlier studies. Because the former are concerned for the well being of the members everywhere to the detriment of other ethnic groups in the country, these other ethnic groups soon rise in opposition (Adefuye, 1984).When conflict breaks out in one country between a fraction of a partitioned ethnic group and either another ethnic group in the country or the state itself, other fractions of the group in other countries are soon drawn in. And if one or more fractions of the partitioned ethnic groups control power in their states, such states are eventually mobilized into the conflicts involving kin in other countries (Suhrke and Noble, 1977; Touval, 1984).

Events in D. R. Congo clearly illustrate the above contentions. We have seen how the Tutsi helped President Museveni, a Tutsi-related Hima, to rise to power in Uganda and how he in turn was instrumental to the Tutsi recapturing power in Rwanda. Then we saw how, when the Tutsi became threatened in the Congo, Tutsi leaders of the Great Lakes region hatched a plot that culminated in a Tutsi-led Alliance getting power in the country. It is true that eventually, a regime took power in D.R. Congo that was not amenable to Tutsi interests but it must be pointed out that at the start, the Tutsi already had decided to hoist their kin over the Congo.

Other circumstances only intervened in the course of the campaign to derail this original plan ("Kabila must", 1997). At the start of the guerrilla war to oust the Mobutu regime in the then Zaire, the rebel alliance-the ADFL-CZ, was composed of the National Resistance Council for Democracy (NCRD), the National Congolese Movement (MCM), the Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Zaire (RMLZ), the Alliance for the Defense of the People (ADP), which was the only Tutsi party of the lot, and the Peoples Revolutionary Party (PRP). NCRD was led by Andre Kisase Ngandu, a Tetela, who was also the Commander-in-Chief of the ADFL.

Most Congolese preferred Kisase as a 'genuine Zairean'. But Rwanda and the Banyamulenge wanted instead, Deogratias Bugera, the Tutsi leader of the ADP. In the ensuing intrigue, Kisase suddenly disappeared in early January 1997, with the Alliance being cagey as to the cause of his death. Kisase's supporters say he was assassinated by

his own Banyamulenge escort on 6 January 1997 in the Virunga Park. His body was then burnt.

It was in the confusion that followed Kisase's murder, that Laurent Kabila, who had earlier only been designated the Alliance 'Spokesman' declared himself leader. It was then in this situation that the Alliance entered Kinshasa in May 1997, and the members could do nothing else than install a new government under Kabila. But once the Tutsi of the region realized that Kabila was not about to dance to their tunes, they soon instigated another round of conflict that is continuing to this day.

6.3. DISCUSSION:

The study shows that the fact of partition has not prevented members of trans-border ethnic groups in Africa from continuing to relate among themselves as kin across borders. Almost all respondents indicated awareness of the existence of kin in other countries, and many of these people have continued to interact with kin across the borders of the independent African states where they fall in. This tallies with findings of earlier works such as Asiwaju (1976) and Asiwaju (1984). It is this continued relations among members of fractions of trans-border ethnic groups that enables partitioned peoples to know the plight of their kin everywhere and cooperate with each other in improving their fate in the countries where they live.

The study has found that the concern to ensure group survival and continued contact among fractions is very fundamental in the desire of members of partitioned ethnic groups to capture power in their

various countries of abode. The various fractions seek for power in their countries primarily because it ensures their survival, and also because it guarantees them continued contact with other fractions across the different borders. This tendency towards hegemony is clearly more prevalent among these partitioned peoples than irredentist ambitions. This is so especially as the members of the two groups under study are minorities in all the countries where they live, a fact which members were fully conscious of.

Participants believed that the state system would not allow them come together in a country of their own. Instead, it was easier for them to strive for power in their respective countries. This they do by utilizing the networks of alliance within the larger group. This corroborates findings by Ekeh (1996) that trans-border ethnic groups in Africa have networks of alliance among their fractions which they utilize to gain or retain power in their countries of abode, and to resist power in those countries whenever it is used by other ethnic groups to marginalize them or to curtail their contact with other fractions across the different borders.

And when they gain power, partitioned peoples have not often been constrained by the borders as they usually use such power for the benefit of all their peoples irrespective of their countries of origin, a fact which is very much known to their neighboring ethnic groups in the various countries as shown by Table 6. The Fulani of Senegal seem to be more liberal in this regard, as is even recognized by their neighboring Wolof, and this is attributable to their low experience of conflict with

neighbours and their high level of cooperation with the majority Wolof ethnic group in the country (Behrman, 1970).

The relationship between the quest for power by members of partitioned ethnic groups and conflict in the countries and regions where they live is demonstrated in the study. The tendency among the fractions of trans-border ethnic groups to dominate the countries and regions where they live and to resist the domination of others in these countries and regions brings them into conflict both with the state and with other ethnic groups in the respective countries.

Thus, when they are not in power and the state is hostile to them, they will fight to remove the government. When they are in power and others rise in opposition to them, they will fight to retain power at all cost. When kin are attacked or involved in conflict in their countries, members from other countries will come to their assistance and fight alongside them.

In the same manner, members of neigbouring ethnic groups, deeply suspicious of the Fulani/Tutsi of their countries, expressed readiness to fight the latter whenever they are in power in their country. The result is often political violence, which once it develops in one country, soon spreads to other countries where the fractions of the respective trans-border ethnic groups live, as has also been variously demonstrated by Ba (1998) and Mamdani (2002). But it must be pointed out here that as has been shown by Tables 7-10, experience of conflict is a significant factor in the predisposition of a group to more conflict.

Continued relations among partitioned peoples ordinarily makes members more attached to their larger ethnic groups, as is shown by Table 12. This is also corroborated by findings by Phiri (1984:117) that trans-border peoples are 'peoples of two worlds' who exist in two or more countries but 'belong' to none of these countries but to themselves. However, the reality of the state system under which these peoples now exist is also significant in their affinities. Thus, the size of the fractions vis-à-vis the size of other ethnic groups in the particular countries, as well as the political and socio-economic conditions under which they live in the countries are also determinants of their levels of integration into the state or the larger ethnic group respectively.

In the case of the Tutsi and the Fulani, their fractions are minorities in all the countries where they live. This demographic fact also ordinarily tends to restrict their access to power in the respective countries. Then, there is the fact that in almost all the countries where they live, the Tutsi especially, and to some extent the Fulani are faced with unfavourable political and socio-economic conditions. The result, as the research has shown, is that members of the fractions of the two ethnic groups have tended to integrate more into the larger ethnic group than the respective states in which they live.

6.4. THEORETICAL DEDUCTIONS/SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE:

6.4.1 THEORETICAL DEDUCTIONS/SUMMARY OF FINDINGS:

From the foregoing, we can make the following summary of findings/theoretical deductions:

1. Members of ethnic groups partitioned across the different countries of Africa, are deeply aware of their partition and continue to relate with each other across the borders of these countries.

2. The need for the well-being of members of partitioned ethnic groups leads their fractions to strive for power in the various countries and regions of Africa where they live.

3. Political dominance by fractions of a trans-border ethnic group over their countries and regions of abode leads to political conflict, between the individual fractions and other ethnic groups and states where they live, and between neighboring states with fractions of the trans-border ethnic group.

4. Fractions of a trans-border ethnic group who are minorities and/or lack access to power and other socio-economic opportunities in their respective states are attached more to the larger ethnic group than the respective states in which they live.

5. Fractions of a trans-border ethnic group who are majorities and have access to power and other socio-economic opportunities in their respective states are integrated more into their respective states than the larger ethnic group.

6.4.2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE:

The study has made a number of contributions to knowledge. These include the following:

1.   It has been shown that continued relations among members of trans-border ethnic groups in Africa and the hegemony of their

fractions over their countries and regions of abode are sources of stress and conflict on the continent.

2. The study has given a new insight into the nature of ethnic relations and national integration in countries and regions where trans-border ethnic groups live.

3. This work has enabled a detailed study of the Tutsi and the Fulani trans-border ethnic groups, especially their attitudes to power and the conflicts that have resulted in the various countries where they live.

4. The study has demonstrated that the resolution of trans-border ethnic conflicts must take into account the fact of the partition of the ethnic groups into different states as well as the need for the continued relations of their members across the borders of the states.

5. The study has provided a number of recommendations and policy options aimed at resolving the problems emanating from the continued solidarity and hegemony of trans-border ethnic groups in Africa, and also improving the practice of conflict management and resolution on the continent.

6. The research has also advanced the study of comparative politics and government in Africa.

6.5 IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY FOR POLICY/POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS:

This study has enabled us to see the conditions under which trans-border ethnic solidarity and hegemony thrive. It has shown the

relationship between the hegemony of trans-border ethnic groups in Africa and political conflict in the countries and regions where these groups live. It has also shown the influence of continued relations among fractions of trans-border ethnic groups across the borders of African states on national integration in those states. The study has demonstrated that fractions of such groups are driven to the larger ethnic group when conditions obtaining in their individual countries are such that they are deprived from meaningfully participating in the affairs of the state.

When these groups are effectively prevented from involvement in the commanding heights of the economy and politics of any one of the countries in which they live, the tendency is always for them to see the larger ethnic group as the alternative, hence their increased attachment to the group and solidarity with other fractions in the other countries. Then, if the exclusion becomes more pervasive and formal, the fractions soon become attracted to seeking for power and possibly instituting hegemony over the whole countries where the live. This is usually with the aim of ensuring that the needs of the members of the group are taken care of in the country.

What this means is that for the fractions of the trans-border ethnic group to be integrated more into the states in which they live, they have to be content with those states. For them however, to be content with the states means that those states must primarily satisfy the basic and other needs of the members and fractions of the larger

ethnic group. To do this however, there are policy options, which the states must undertake.

A major implication of the foregoing concerns the attitude of the state and the trans-border ethnic group to each other. As this study has established, the reality of the state system is in direct conflict with the existence of the trans-border ethnic group. While the fundamental objective of the state is the creation of national integration among its citizens, that of the trans-border ethnic group is the solidarity of the larger group. For the one therefore, to achieve its objective completely, then the other has to give.

Yet the reality of the African history is that both phenomena have come to stay. In fact, despite the numerous assaults on the frontiers of African states, they have nevertheless continued to serve as the basis on which inter-state relations are conducted. And notwithstanding the increased scope and power of the state, the trans-border ethnic groups have refused to go away. It is thus very important that both state actors and ethnic leaders recognize the basic fact of our history, that both of them – the state and the trans-border ethnic group – have come to stay.

Once this recognition is achieved, then both the state and the trans-border ethnic group can actually reinforce each other. Bold steps can then be taken to resolve the dichotomy between the interests of the two and achieve national integration and political stability in those states where fractions of trans-border ethnic groups exist.

1. The first recommendation in this regard involves the specific states where the fractions of the trans-border ethnic group live. The

major factor that produces disenchantment among fractions of the trans-border ethnic group in the countries where they live is the lack of access to the state apparatus and the opportunities this implies, and the lack of attention from the state in terms of providing those tangible indices of governance such as welfare services and infrastructure. Whenever this situation obtains, the members look for succour across the borders.

To redress this therefore, the states must necessarily provide those services and facilities necessary for the good life to its trans-border peoples. The states must also have to necessarily liberalize their political and economic systems and structures, such that all its citizens, irrespective of the ethnic grouping, could participate effectively. This could be done through the following:

i.   The economy could be liberalized through deliberate policies of deregulation and privatization, such that those who control the heights of government may not necessarily use it to control the economy. Thus, investors from wherever will be given the favourable conditions to engage in business, and the profit motive and not the state, will be the major if not the sole determinant of who stays and who folds up. This way, the violent contest for power would be minimized, as the state would cease to be the 'gateway to wealth'.

ii.   Political liberalization in the situation of trans-border ethnicity could be best brought about through democracy. In this case, it must involve a multi-party system such that every group that so feels could form parties to represent their interests in the political arena.

This multi-party democracy must also involve periodic elections, such that the possibility of changes of government is guaranteed. Other provisions such as rotation and zoning of offices are also necessary to reassure all and sundry that every office in the land is attainable.

iii. To further give these the desired effect, arrangements must be deliberately built into the political system that provides for alliances between parties as the basis for the formation of governments, and then for some types of decisions to be arrived at only by consensus. This arrangement will ensure that although the majority may have its 'way', the minority's 'say' must be taken into cognizance in arriving at some types of decisions.

iv. In this regard, the constitution and political system must contain other necessary consociational arrangements. This must include proportional representation in the country's decision-making institutions such as the parliament, civil service, army etc, such that every group is at least assured of relative presence in those bodies. This will be without prejudice to application of merit as a criterion for recruitment into a country's institutions for those who ordinarily have excellent credentials. The consociational arrangements must also involve the decentralization of government and the devolution of powers between central or higher level governments and local or lower level governments.

v. This will mean the division of the country into entities and tiers according to population. Here, deliberate efforts will be made to ensure that a proportional number of such entities are created in areas

where the trans-border ethnic groups are concentrated, especially the dispersed ones like the Tutsi and the Fulani, such that their members will predominate in those areas where they live. This way, these trans-border peoples can mobilize the structures of such entities for participation in the issues of the day at national levels.

vi. The democracy that is advocated here however, must be one that is characterized by good governance and justice. Good governance will ensure that efficiency is brought to the management of the affairs of state such that available resources are used for the greatest good of the greatest number of the people. Justice on the other hand, will ensure that every citizen and group within the state is treated most fairly such that complaints of marginalization by ethnic groups, especially the trans-border ones will not arise. It thus follows that when those states that have fractions of trans-border groups are democratic, and are also further marked by good governance and justice, there will be contentment amongst the members of the various fractions of the trans-border ethnic groups in the different countries where they live.

2. The second set of actions necessary for national integration and political stability in those states harbouring trans-border ethnic groups will involve co-operation between the states hosting the fractions of the trans-border ethnic group.

i. These states must co-operate to simplify the boundary function of their common borders. It has been proved that when boundaries are made to serve strictly as lines of exclusion, they become

more prone to subversion by members of trans-border ethnic groups. Thus, to reduce the agitation among the trans-border ethnic groups about their partition and also reduce the tensions between the states sharing the common borders, the function of boundaries, as lines of division, should be reduced to allow relatively easy contact among members of the trans-border ethnic groups. This way, such contact could be made to remain positive and productive and not assume political dimensions.

ii.   These states could further co-operate by allowing members of the trans-border ethnic groups access to services and facilities like education, health-care and agricultural services on their sides of the border without discrimination based on country of origin.

iii.   The states must also cooperate in the formulation of policies that have direct impact on their trans-border peoples and their border regions. The goal must be to harmonize these policies to the benefit of the partitioned peoples. This way, it will essentially not matter to the member of the trans-border group on which side of the border he finds himself since he is as well-off as any other kin even on a different side of the border.

3.   The next set of actions towards national integration and political stability in states with trans-border ethnic groups will involve the trans-border ethnic groups themselves. In the circumstances of the prevailing state system, members must be able to define their sentiments in terms of objective interests. If their present states are able to provide them with all they require in terms of socio-economic needs and political

rights, and the various states sharing fractions of the ethnic group are ready to co-operate in ensuring that various fractions of the trans-border ethnic group have free contact and intercourse among themselves, then the members of the group must be ready to accept the status quo and work towards promoting it.

4. The last set of actions with regard to the question of national integration of trans-border ethnic groups and political stability in the countries where they live will involve the international system. The Tutsi and the Fulani are rather marked by their territorial dispersion and cannot be located within a distinct geographical space. In this case, the fractions of trans-border ethnic groups live together with other ethnic groups in their areas of abode, and this geographical characteristic makes it impossible to work towards any purely exclusivist formula.

Instead, in addition to carrying out those actions as have been outlined above and which are amenable to them, the international system will be required to work towards regional political and economic integration in those regions where this sort of trans-border ethnic groups are found, with the ultimate objective of removing the present state borders as we know them and incorporating the various ethnic groups and states into a larger entity.

For a start, the issue of citizenship must be resolved in these regions in such a way that rights are available to everyone who resides in a particular country. In West Africa, the example of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a step in this direction.

ECOWAS is meant to bring about the political and economic integration of the peoples and countries of the West African sub-region (Okeke, 2001).

Already, movement of persons across the borders has been simplified for all West Africans, and it is obvious that this has neutralized the situation whereby groups like the Fulani would have had to undergo harrowing procedures before relating with their kin on different sides of the border. It only remains to be said that ECOWAS must move forward to implement the other provisions for full integration of the sub-region in its charter, including full citizenship rights to all residents of any given country in the region. In addition, the body must ensure that such issues as grazing rights for nomads and pastoralists like the Fulani are harmonized throughout the West African region.

In the Great Lakes region of Central Africa, a lot needs to be done. It is curious that even after the region fell to the rulership of Tutsi and Tutsi – related leaders, there is still no move towards formal regional integration. It is conceivable that a lot of the conflicts afflicting the region till this day could have been ameliorated by such cooperation. What needs to be done urgently is for the countries of the region to come together with a view to simplifying some of the thorny issues that have plagued the area. In this regard, one important issue that must be resolved is that of nationality and citizenship rights, which must be harmonized on the basis of residence across the countries of the region for relative peace to obtain in the Great Lakes.

CHAPTER SEVEN.

CONCLUSION.

7.1. SUMMARY:

This work has been a study of trans-border ethnic groups in Africa. The work is a study of the Tutsi ethnic group whose fractions live in the countries of the Great Lakes region of Central Africa and the Fulani ethnic group who straddle the countries of West Africa. The study covered all the countries of the Great Lakes region of Central Africa namely, Rwanda, Burundi, D.R. Congo, and Uganda. Two of these, Rwanda and Burundi were however used as case studies. It also covered the about 15 counties in West Africa where the Fulani live, with two of these, Senegal and Mauritania serving as case studies.

The study was interested in investigating the factors that lead trans-border ethnic groups to establish political hegemonies in their countries and regions of abode and the conflicts that result froms uch hegemonies. Specifically, the study had the following objectives: examining how the desire for the well-being of members of trans-border ethnic groups affects the attitude of their fractions to power in the various countries where they live, investigating how the dominance of trans-border ethnic groups over other ethnic groups in a country and/or region produces conflict in these countries/region where members of the group live, and determining the effects of continued relations and networks of alliance between members and fractions of trans-border ethnic groups across borders on national integration in African states.

Three theories were used for explanation in the study. The political systems theory sees the political system as consisting of demands and outputs. The system is in equilibrum when the output matches the demand, otherwise, there will be systematic disequilibrum, which could then lead to conflict and violence. The hegemony theory argues that hegemony exists when a dominant group gains control of society and maintains this supremacy through the consent of or force over others. The conflict theory sees the political system as the arena in which conflicting interests are played out. Conflict arises due to the differential distribution of authority and resources, with those at advantage striving to maintain the status quo and those at a disadvantage seeking for change.

The theoretical framework of the study is thus that when a political system is in disequilibrum and output of welfare goods and services can not match the demands of the various ethnic groups in the country, fractions of partitioned ethnic groups in various countries are likely to utilize the resources of the larger group to gain power in these countries and then proceed to institute their dominance. This leads to opposition from other ethnic groups in the countries and produces conflict between the various groups in which those in power seek to retain it while those outside power strive for change. Once such conflicts break out, their resolution will only lie in recognizing and taking into consideration, the trans-border nature of some of the ethnic groups involved.

Three questions were asked, and these centered on the quest for power among fractions of trans-border ethnic groups in the various countries where they live, domination by these fractions and the resulting conflicts between them and other ethnic groups and the states, and, continued relations among the fractions of the trans-border ethnic group across countries and the integration of members into either the larger ethnic group or their country of abode. The methods of Library reseach and Focus Group Discussions were used for the study.

Chapter two was devoted to Literature Review. Relevant works reviewed included those on ethnicity and national integration, and works on borderland studies etc. The overview of existing literature in the area of the present study showed that they did not cover the various issues involved here. It was seen that no one work treated all the relevant issues, and even those works that treated one or more aspects of the topic were either not exhaustive or have approached the issues involved from an unsatisfactory perspective.

In Chapter three, the state system in Africa was examined. The history of the state system was traced, from the ancient city-states of the Greek Polis and medieval Europe to the country-states, which took form in the medieval period and has survived to the present. The Treaty of Westphalia set the basis for the modern state system that has obtained ever since. In recent times though, certain realities have eroded the system of the Westphalian state.

It was this Westphalian model of the modern state that was introduced into Africa following the events that culminated in the Berlin

Conference of 1884-5. At that Conference, the major European powers of the time partitioned Africa among themselves. These partitions were often arbitrary, but notwithstanding, it was the territories so partitioned that eventually gained independence as the modern states of Africa.

But the manner of partition threw up territories which contained different ethnic groups, some of them coming together for the first time ever. The territories also contained a number of ethnic groups that were partitioned with other territories. When therefore the territories became independent from the colonialists, the first feature of the new states i.e. multiplicity of ethnic groups, gave rise to ethnicity which was immediately debilitating to the new states. This brought about the need for national integration in those states.

By national integration, the states sought to unify the polity into a harmonious society. But the methods used to seek this goal were not effective, and coupled with the non-performance of the African states in fulfilling the needs of its citizens, the new states of Africa were not able to overcome ethnicity or to attain national integration. In situations where fractions of an ethnic group existed in one or more other countries, the failure of the state led to members of the trans-border ethnic group in the country having recourse to the larger group for succor.

It also led to the elevation of the larger group as the focus of political allegiance over and above the individual state. This was a source of further stress to the African state system as continued trans-border affinity often led to conflict, between the state and the fraction of

the trans-border ethnic group living within its borders, between that fraction and other ethnic groups living in the state, and between the state and other states in which the other fractions of the trans-border ethnic group live.

Chapters four and five are empirical. To conduct this section of the study, research trips had to be undertaken to the areas of study, Rwanda in the case of the Tutsi and Senegal in the case of the Fulani, during which among others, field discussions were conducted. The two chapters cover the two groups (chapter 4 for the Tutsi of Central Africa and chapter 5 for the Fulani of West Africa). The chapters sketched the geo-political outlines of Central and West Africa respectively, and the histories of the Tutsi and the Fulani groups, with particular attention to the partition of and continued relations among the fractions of the respective groups.

Then the solidarity of these respective fractions as well as the attachment of the fractions to their respective states was discussed. Lastly, the attitude of the groups to power and hegemony in their countries and regions of abode, and the conflicts that have involved the groups as a result of their solidarity and hegemony were also discussed. It was found that in the two cases, there were continued relations among the fractions of the two groups in their respective regions. In each case, events and conflicts in any one country involving a fraction of the trans-border ethnic group soon drew in their kin on the other sides of the border on the side of their ethnic kin.

It was also found that when the fractions were denied access to power and the other social opportunities that exist in any given country, the tendency was for the affected fraction to agitate for power in that country. When this deprivation is widespread, the fractions have reacted in a coordinated fashion to take power in many or all of the countries where they live, thereby imposing a hegemony over the region. Often, this hegemony brings about conflict and violence, arising from the determined opposition of the other ethnic groups in the various countries where the fractions of the trans-border ethnic group have taken power.

In Chapter six, the situations in Central Africa and West Africa are analysed and compared based on the findings in chapters four and five. As already pointed out, it was observed that events in the two regions under study as pertaining to the Tutsi and the Fulani respectively, amply demonstrate the salience of ethnic solidarity in the relations of fractions of partitioned ethnic groups, often over and above their attachment to the countries of abode. It was also observed that the groups showed a tendency to institute hegemony over their countries and regions of abode, which in turn, resulted in widespread conflict and violence, resulting from the opposition of the other ethnic groups in the countries and regions to such hegemony.

This was more so in Central Africa, but only because of the differing circumstances faced by the respective groups in their countries and regions of abode.

7.2. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY:

The present study has been about the phenomenon of the trans-border ethnic group, with the Tutsi and the Fulani trans-border ethnic groups whose fractions are spread across Central Africa and West Africa respectively as case studies. The study has tried to examine the attitude of fractions of these groups to national integration and group solidarity, and also to hegemony and political conflict, in the countries and regions where they live. But although this study is comprehensive and conclusive, it is by no means an exhaustive study of the phenomenon of the trans-border group as it relates to national integration and political conflict.

There are still so many aspects of the phenomenon that need to be studied. Even some aspects of the trans-border ethnic minority groups, which pertain to the groups like those studied here, will still need to be studied for us to have a fuller knowledge of the phenomenon of the trans-border ethnic group. It is for this reason that we recommend that more study be conducted in the following areas.

The first is the study of the situation where fractions of a trans-border ethnic group are minorities in their countries of abode, but unlike the Tutsi and the Fulani, are not pastoralists, and are not dispersed. Are they likely, for instance, to demand for unification? What happens when unification will guarantee such a group a majority status in any one country? What happens when unification will not possibly guarantee them such a majority status?

It is this type of study that will concretely show the importance of, for instance, the pastoral factor, in determining the attitude of trans-border ethnic groups to solidarity and national integration, and hegemony and conflict, in the countries and regions where their fractions live. It is also recommended that studies are needed of the situation whereby fractions of a trans-border ethnic group are majorities in two or more countries where they live e.g. the Hutu, and the Hausa of Nigeria and Niger, etc. What happens for instance, when one of the fractions does not have access to power in the country of abode, or when all the fractions lack power in their various countries, such as has pertained to the Hutu of Central Africa?

We also need more studies of the situation whereby fractions of a trans-border ethnic group are less than absolute majorities in the two or more countries where they appear, but are not minorities in any of the countries e.g. the Yoruba of Nigeria and Benin Republic. What happens where unification of the fractions will guarantee the group a majority status in any one of the countries? Will the fractions then demand for unification, and what will be the attitude of the various fractions as well as the other ethnic groups in the affected countries to such possible unification?

Finally, studies are also needed to unravel the situation whereby one of the fractions of a trans-border ethnic group constitutes a majority in one of the countries where the group appears, but other fractions are minorities in the other countries e.g. the Ewe of Togo and Ghana. Related to this is the situation whereby more than one fraction

are majorities in two or more countries where they live, but at least one or more of the other fractions are minorities in the other countries e.g. the Somali of Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya.

What are the conditions under which fractions of trans-border ethnic groups become irredentist and when do they demand for unification? What are the conditions under which fractions of trans-border ethnic groups demand for a homeland for the larger group? And what are the conditions under which individual fractions of the trans-border ethnic group demand for self-determination and nationhood? The above issues need to be tackled for us to have full knowledge about the phenomenon of the trans-border, partitioned ethnic group in Africa.

7.3. CONCLUSION:

This has been a research effort into the phenomenon of the trans-border ethnic group in Africa using the Tutsi ethnic group and the Fulani ethnic group as case studies. The study has made a number of contributions to knowledge. The study also made a number of recommendations. These policy recommendations cover the trans-border ethnic groups themselves, the states in which their fractions live, and the international system itself. It is hoped that if put into effect, it will be possible to resolve the problems emanating from the continuing solidarity and hegemony of trans-border ethnic groups, especially in this era of democracy and regional integration.

REFERENCES

Abubakar, S. (1980). The Established Caliphate: Sokoto, the Emirates and their Neighbours. In O. Ikime (Ed.). *Groundwork of Nigerian History*. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books.

Ade-Ajayi, J. F. (1982). Expectations of Independence. *Daedalus*, 111, 2.

Adefuye, A. (1984). The Kakwa of Uganda and the Sudan: The Ethnic Factor in National and International Politics. In A.I. Asiwaju (Ed.), *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884–1984* (pp.51-69). London and Lagos: C Hurst and University of Lagos Press.

Adejuyigbe O. (1989). Identification and Characteristics of Borderlands in Africa. In A. I. Asiwaju and P.O. Adeniyi (Eds.). *Borderlands in Africa: A Multidisciplinary and Comparative Focus on Nigeria and West Africa* (pp. 27-36). Lagos: University of Lagos Press.

Ajayi, J.F.A. & Crowder, M. (Eds.). (1971). *History of West Africa* (vol.1). London: Longman.

Ake, C. (1981). *A Political Economy of Africa*. New York: Longman.

Ake, C. (2000). *The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa*. Dakar: CODESRIA.

Anderson, J. E. (1979). *Public Policy – Making* (2nd ed.). New York: Holt, Reinehart and Winston.

Anene, J.C. (1970). *The International Boundaries of Nigeria*. London: Longman.

Anifowose, R. (1982). *Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The Tiv and Yoruba Experience*. Enugu: Nok Publishers International.

Appadorai, A. (1968). *The Substance of Politics*. Madras: Oxford University Press.

Asiwaju A.I. (1989). Borderlands: Policy Implications of Definition for Nigeria's 'Gateway' State Administrations and Local Governments. In A.I. Asiwaju and P.O. Adeniyi (Eds.). *Borderlands in Africa: A Multidisciplinary and Comparative Focus on Nigeria and West Africa* (pp. 63-84). Lagos: University of Lagos Press.

Asiwaju, A.I. & Adeniyi, P.O. (Eds.). (1989). *Borderlands in Africa: A Multidisciplinary and Comparative Focus on Nigeria and West Africa*. Lagos: University of Lagos Press.

Asiwaju, A.I. (1976). *Western Yorubaland Under European Rule, 1889-1945: A Comparative Analysis of French and British Colonialism*. London: Longman.

Asiwaju, A.I. (Ed.). (1984). *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884 –1984*. London and Lagos: C Hurst and University of Lagos Press.

Azam, J. (2001). The Redistributive State and Conflicts in Africa. *Journal of Peace Research, 38*, 4, 429-444.

Azarya, V., Anneke, B., Bruijn M., & Dijk H. (1999). *Pastoralists under Pressure? Fulbe Societies confronting Change in West Africa.* Leiden: Brill.

Ba, O. M. (1998). The State, Elites and Ethnic Conflict in Mauritania. In O. Nnoli (Ed.). *Ethnic Conflicts in Africa.* (pp.235-258). Dakar: CODESRIA.

Bassett, T. J. (1994). Hired herders and herd management in Fulani pastoralism (Northern Cote d'Ivoire). *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines,* XXXIV(1-3),147-174.

Behrman, L. C. (1970). *Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal.* Cambridge: University Press.

Bello, A. (1962). *My Life.* Cambridge University Press.

Bhavnani, R. & Backer, D. (2000). Localized Ethnic Conflict and Genocide: Accounting for Differences in Rwanda and Burundi. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44,* 3, 283-306.

Blanton, R. T., Mason, D., & Asthow, B. (2001). Colonial Style and Post-Colonial Ethnic Conflict in Africa. *Journal of Peace Research, 38* (4), 473-491.

Bonacich, E. (1972). A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labour Market. *American Sociological Review, 37,* 547-559.

Brass, P. (Ed.). (1985). *Ethnic Groups and the State.* London and Sydney: Croom Helm Ltd.

Brown, C. & Boswell, T. (1997). Ethnic Conflict and Political Violence: A Cross – National Analysis. *Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 25,*111-130.

Bruijn, M. & Dijik, H. (2003). Changing Population Mobility in West Africa: Fulbe Pastoralists in Central and South Mali. *African Affairs,* 102.

Bruijn, M. & Dijk, H. (1995). *Arid Ways: Cultural Understandings of insecurity in Fulbe Society, Central Mali.* Amsterdam: Thela Publishers.

Bruijn, M., Beek, W & Dijk, H. (Eds.). (1997). *Peuls et Mandingues: Dialectique des constructions identitaires (The Fulani and the Mandingo: Dialectics of Identity Construction).* Paris: Karthala.

Cabral, A. (1986). *Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings.* New York: Monthly Review.

Calvert, P. (1986). *The Foreign Policy of New States.* Great Britain: Wheatsheaf Books ltd.

Clapham, C. (1996). *Africa in the International System: The Politics of State Survival.* Cambridge: University Press.

Clapham, C. (1999). Boundaries and States in the New African Order. In D. C. Bach (Ed.). *Regionalisation in Africa*. Oxford: James Currey.

Coleman, J. S. & Roseberg, C. (Eds.). (1964). *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Collins, R. (1975). *Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory Science*. New York: Academic Press.

Correy, A. & Joireman, S. F. (2004). Retributive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda. *African Affairs*, 103.

Dahrendorf, R. (1959). *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*. California: Stanford University Press.

Davidson, B. (1987). *African Nationalism and the Problems of Nation- Building*. Lagos: Nigeria Institute of International Affairs.

Davidson, B. (1992). *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and The Curse of the Nation –State*. New York: Random House.

Diaw, A. & Diouf, M. (1998). Ethnic Group Versus Nation: Identity Discourses in Senegal. In O. Nnoli (Ed.). *Ethnic Conflicts in Africa*. Dakar: CODESRIA.

DR Congo President to be sworn in. (2006, December 14). *Vanguard*, p.21.

Dupire, M. (1962). *Peuls nomads: Etude descriptive des Wodaabe du sahel Nigerien (Fulani Nomads: A Descriptive Study of the Sahel Wodaabe of Niger)*. Paris: Institut d'Ethnologie.

Dupire, M. (1970). *Organisation sociale des Peuls (Social Organization of the Fulani)*. Paris: Plon.

Duverger, M. (1972). *The Study of Politics*. Nairobi: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd.

Ekeh, P. P. (1996). Political Minorities and Historically Dominant Minorities in Nigerian History and Politics. In O. Oyediran (Ed.). *Governance and Development in Nigeria* (pp. 33-63). Ibadan: Agbo Areo Publishers.

Enemuo, F. C. (1991, September). The State, Civil Unease and the Challenge of Peace- Building in Africa. *Africa Notes*, pp.1-5.

Etzioni, A. (1965). *Political Unification*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Falola, T. & Ihonvbere, J. (1985). *The Rise and Fall of Nigeria's Second Republic, 1979-84*. London: Zed Books Ltd.

Fisher, 1. (1996). Hutu and Tutsi Ask: Is a Unified Rwanda Possible?. Retrieved October 17, 2005, from http//www. Globalpolicy.org/security/issues/Rwanda 9.htm

Fontana, B. (1993). *Hegemony and Power: On the Relation between Gramsci and Machiavelli*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Frankel, J. (1973). *Contemporary International Theory and the Behaviour of States*. London: Oxford University Press.

Gerteiny, A. G. (1967). *Mauritania*. London: Pall Mall Press.

Greenberg, J.H. (1949). Studies in African Linguistic Classification. *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, V.

Gurr, T. R. (1991). Theories of Political Violence and Revolution. In F. M. Deng & W. I. Zartman (Eds.). *Conflict Resolution in Africa*. (pp. 153-189). Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute.

Hammond G. T. & Shaw B. P. (1995). Conflict, the Rise of Nations, and the Decay of States: The Transformation of the International System? *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, XV, 1.

Haralambos, M. & Holborn, M. (2004). *Sociology: Themes and Perspectives*. London: Collins.

Hargreaves, J.D. (1984). The Making of the Boundaries: Focus on West Africa. In A.I. Asiwaju (Ed.). *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884-1984*. London and Lagos: C. Hurst and Company, University of Lagos Press.

Herbst, J. (2000). *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Hickey, J. V. & Thompson, W. E. (1981). Politics and Emergence of Alhajis among the Bokkos Fulani. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, XVI, 3-4.

Hobsbawm, E.J. (1987). *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914*. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson.

Hocker, J. L. & Wilmot, W. W. (1998). *Interpersonal Conflicts*. Boston: McGraw Hill.

Horton, R. (1971). Stateless Societies in the History of West Africa. In J. F. A. Ajayi & M. Crowder (Eds.). *History of West Africa*. vol.1. London: Longman Group Ltd.

Howard, A.M. (1976). The Relevance of Spatial Analysis for African Economic History: The Sierra Leone – Guinea System. *Journal of African History*, 17.

Huntington, S. P. (1968). *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press.

Hunwick, J.O. (1966). The Nineteenth-Century Jihads. In J. C. Anene & G. Brown (Eds.). *Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Ibadan:Ibadan University Press.

Ingham, K. (1990). *Politics in Modern Africa: The Uneven Tribal Dimension.* London: Routledge.

Iro, I. (2005). The Characteristics of the Fulani. **Retrieved October 17, 2005, from http://www.gamji.com/fulani3.html**

Jackson, R. H. (1990). *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and The Third World.* Cambridge University Press.

Kabila Must Watch His Back. (1997, June). *New African,* p. 353.

Kassimir, R. (1999). Reading Museveni: Structure, Agency and Pedagogy in Ugandan Politics. *Canadian Journal of African Studies,* 33, 2 and 3.

Katzenellenbogen, S. (1996). It Didn't Happen at Berlin: Politics, Economics and Ignorance in the Setting of Africa's Colonial Boundaries. In P. Nugent & A. I. Asiwaju (Eds.). *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities.* Edinburgh: University of Edinbourgh.

Klineberg, O. & Zavalloni, M. (1969). *Nationalism and Tribalism among African Students: A Study of Social Identity.* Paris /The Hague: Mouton.

Laitin, D. D. (1986). *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change Among the Yoruba.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Languages of Sub-Saharan Africa. (1990, January-February). *The Courier,* p.119.

Lemarchand, R. (1974). *Selective Genocide in Burundi.* Report 20. London: Minority Rights Group.

Lemarchand, R. (1994). *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

LeVine, R. A. & Campbell D. T. (1967). "Report on Preliminary Results of Cross-Cultural Study Ethnocentrism". *Carnegie Corporation of New York Quarterly.*

Levtzion, N. (1971). The Early States of the Western Sudan to 1500. In J. F.A. Ajayi & M. Crowder (Eds.). *History of West Africa.* vol.1. London: Longman Group Ltd.

Logams, P. C. (1987). Traditional and Colonial Forces and the Emergence of the Kaduna Mafia. In B. J. Takaya & S. G. Tyoden (Eds.). *The Kaduna Mafia: A Study of the Rise, Development and Consolidation of a Nigerian Power Elite.* Jos: Jos University Press Ltd.

Mabogunje, A.L. (1971). The Land and Peoples of West Africa. In J. F. A. Ajayi & M. Crowder (Eds.). *History of West Africa.* vol.1. London: Longman Group Ltd.

Mafeje, A. (1991). *The Theory and Ethnography of African Social Formations.* London: CODESRIA Book Series.

214

Mamdani, M. (2002a). *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and Genocide in Rwanda*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers Ltd.

Mamdani, M. (2002b). Making Sense of Political Violence in Post-colonial Africa. *Identity, Culture and Politics, 3,* 2.

Maquet J. (1970). Societal and Cultural Incorporation in Rwanda. In R. Cohen & J. Middleton (Eds.). *From Tribe to Nation in Africa*. Pennsylvania: Chandler Publishing Company.

Martin, P. M. & O' Meara, P. (Eds.). (1987). *Africa* [2nd ed.). London: Macmillan Publishers Ltd.

Mboge, A. (1974). Senegambia as a Historical Region. In *Senegambia: Proceedings of a Colloquium.* Aberdeen: Aberdeen University African Studies Group.

Miles, W. F.S. (1994). *Hausaland Divided: Colonialism and Independence in Nigeria and Niger.* Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Miles, W. F.S.& Rochefort, D. A. (1991). Nationalism versus Ethnic Identity in Sub-Saharan Africa. *American Political Science Review, 85,* 393-403.

Mitchell, C. R. (1993). Problem-solving Exercises and Theories of Conflict Resolution. In D. J. D. Sandole & H. van der Merwe (Eds). *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice, Integration and Application.* Manchester University Press.

Mokoshy, I. (1993). Fulbe and the Trans-border Relations between Nigeria and Niger. In A.I. Asiwaju & B. M. Barkindo (Eds.). *The Nigeria – Niger Transborder Cooperation.* Lagos: National Boundary Commission.

Molomo, D. (2005, February 13). Foreigners sack Adamawa towns.*Sunday Sun,* p.17.

Momoh, C.S. (1989). A Critique of Borderland Theories. In A. I. Asiwaju & P. O. Adeniyi (Eds.). *Borderlands in Africa: A Multidisciplinary and Comparative Focus on Nigeria and West Africa* (pp. 51-61). Lagos: University of Lagos Press.

Morgan, P. M. (1977). *Theories and Approaches to International Politics: What Are We to Think?* New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction.

Morton, R.F. (1984). Chiefs and Ethnic Unity in Two Colonial Worlds: The Bakgatla baga Kgafela of the Bechuanaland Protectorate and the Transvaal, 1872-1966. In A.I. Aiswaju (Ed.). *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884-1984.* London and Lagos: C. Hurst and Company, University of Lagos Press.

Moshin, A. (2000). Identity, Politics and Hegemony: The Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, *Identity, Culture and Politics, 1,* 1.

Muller, E. N. (1985). Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence. *American Sociological Review, 50,* 47-61.

Murdock, G. P. (1959). *Africa: Its Peoples and their Culture History*. New York.

Newbury, C. & Newbury, D. (1999). A Catholic Mass in Kigali: Contested Views of the Genocide and Ethnicity in Rwanda. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 33, 2 & 3.

Nnoli, O. (1978). *Ethnic Politics in Nigeria*. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers.

Nnoli, O. (1986). *Introduction to Politics*. Lagos: Longman.

Nnoli, O. (1998). Ethnic Conflicts in Africa: A Comparative Analysis. In O. Nnoli (Ed.). *Ethnic Conflict in Africa* (pp.1-25). Dakar: CODESRIA.

Nugent, P. & Asiwaju, A. I. (Eds.). (1996). *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities*. London: Pinter.

Nuggent, P. (1996). Arbitrary Lines and the Peoples' Minds: A Dissenting View on Colonial Boundaries in West Africa. In P. Nugent & A. I. Asiwaju (Eds.). *African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities*. Edinburgh: University of Edinbourgh.

Nwomeh, D. (2001, July). Intra-Party Conflicts and Political Instability in Nigeria. Paper presented at a Seminar, Department of Political Science, University of Lagos.

Okeke, G. S. M. (2001). Economic Integration and Regional Security: A Study in Conflict Resolution in West Africa. Unpublished Seminar Paper presented to the Department of Political Science, University of Lagos.

Okonta, I. (2000, June 11). The North is not a Foreign Country, 1. *Thisday*, p.7.

Orville, J. B. (2004a). Tutsi, Hutu and Hima-Cultural Background in Rwanda. **Retrieved August 28, 2005, from http://orvillejenkins.com/peo/tutsiandhutu.html**

Orville, J. B. (2004b). The Hima People of Eastern Africa. **Retrieved August 28, 2005, from http://orvillejenkins.com/peoples/tutsiandhutu.html.**

Otite, O. & Olawale, I. A. (1999). *Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation*. Ibadan: Spectrum Books.

Ottoh, O. F. (2004). Revitalizing the State in Africa: A Contribution to the Debate on the Failed State Phenomenon. Unpublished Seminar Paper presented to the Department of Political Science, University of Lagos.

Paden, J. N. (1986). *Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto: Values and Leadership in Nigeria*. Zaria: Hudahuda Publishing Company.

Peter-Omale, F. (2002, September 8). Plateau Peace Summit: A Farce or Reality? *Thisday*, p.13.

Phiri, S.H. (1984). National Integration, Rural Development and Frontier Communities: The Case of the Chewa and the Ngoni Astride Zambian Boundaries with Malawi and Mozambique. In A.I. Asiwaju (Ed.). *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884 –1984* (pp.105-125). London and Lagos: C Hurst and University of Lagos Press.

Prunier, G. (1995). *The Rwanda Crisis: History of Genocide.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Rabushka, A. & Shepsle, K. A. (1972). *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability.* Ohio: Charles Merril.

Renner, F. A.(1984). Ethnic Affinity, Partition, and Political Integration in Senegambia. In A.I. Asiwaju (Ed.). *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884 –1984* (pp.71-85). London and Lagos: C Hurst and University of Lagos Press.

Reyntjens, F. (2004). Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship. *African Affairs*, 103.

Riesman, P. (1977). *Freedom in Fulani Social Life: An Introspective Ethnography.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rodney, W. (1972). *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa.* London: Bogle-L' Ouverture Publications; Dar-es-Salam: Tanzania Publishing House.

Rotberg, R. I. (2002). The Nature of Nation-State Failure. *The Washington Quarterly,* 25, 3.

Rothchild, D. (1991). An Interactive Model for State-Ethnic Relations. In F. M. Deng & W. I. Zartman (Eds.). *Conflict Resolution in Africa.* (pp. 190-215). Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute.

Rutake, P. & Gahama, J. (1998). Ethnic Conflict in Burundi. In O. Nnoli (Ed.). *Ethnic Conflicts in Africa.* Dakar: CODESRIA.

Sabine, G. H. (1973). *A History of Political Theory.* 4th ed. Illinois: Dryden Press.

Saideman, S. M. & Ayres R. W. (2000). Determining the Causes of Irredentism: Logit Analyses of Minorities at Risk Data from the 1980s and 1990s. *The Journal of Politics, 62*, 4,1126-1144.

Samatar, S. S. (1984). The Somali Dilemma: Nation in Search of a State. In A.I. Asiwaju (Ed.). *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884 –1984* (pp.155-193). London and Lagos: C Hurst and University of Lagos Press.

Sanusi, L. S. (2000, June 25). The Fulani Factor in Nigerian History. *Thisday,* p.18.

Scholte, J. A. (2000). *Globalization: A Critical Introduction.* London: Macmillan.

Sigelman, L. & Miles, S. (1997). A Cross – National Test of the Linkage between Economic Inequality and Political Violence. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 21,*105-128.

Smock, D. R. & Bentsi-Enchill, K. (Eds.). (1976). *The Search for National Integration in Africa.* London: The Free Press.

Stenning, D. J. (1957). Transhumance, migratory drift, migration: Patterns of pastoral Fulani nomadism. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, LXXXIII (1),*57-73.

Stenning, D. J. (1959). *Savannah Nomads:A study of the Wodaabe pastoral Fulani of the Western Bornu Province, Northern Region, Nigeria.* London: Oxford University Press.

Stone, J. (1996). Ethnicity. In A. Kuper & J. Kuper (Eds.). *The Social Science Encyclopedia.* 2nd ed. London: Routledge.

Strassaldo, R. (1977). The Study of Boundaries: A Systems – Oriented Multi-Disciplinary Bibliographical Essay. *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 2* (3), 81-106.

Suhrke, A. & Noble, L.G. (Eds.). (1977). *Ethnic Conflict in International Relations.* New York: Praeger.

Suret-Canale, J. (1971). The Western Atlantic Coast, 1600-1800. In J. F. A. Ajayi & M. Crowder (Eds.). *History of West Africa.* vol.1. London: Longman Group Ltd.

Takaya, B.J. (1987). Ethnic and Religious Roots of the Kaduna Mafia. In B. J. Takaya & S. G. Tyodan (Eds.). *The Kaduna Mafia.* Jos: Jos University Press Ltd.

Taylor, T. (Ed.). (1978). *Approaches and Theory in International Relations.* London: Longman.

Thom, W. G. (1999). Congo – Zaire's 1996-97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence. *The Journal of Conflict Studies, XIX,* 2, 93-123.

Tordoff, W. (1997). *Government and Politics in Africa.* 3rd ed. London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

Touval, S. (1984). Partitioned Groups and Inter-State Relations. In A.I. Asiwaju (Ed.). *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884 –1984* (pp.223-232). London and Lagos: C Hurst and University of Lagos Press.

Tull, D. M. (2004). A Reconfiguration of Political Order? The state of the State in North Kivu (DR Congo). *African Affairs,* 103.

Twagiramutara, P. (1998). Ethnicity and Genocide in Rwanda. In O. Nnoli (Ed.). *Ethnic Conflicts in Africa.* Dakar: CODESRIA.

United Nations Organization (1998). The Causes of Conflicts and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa. *Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council.*

Uvin, P. (1997). Prejudice, Crisis, and Genocide in Rwanda. *African Studies Review*, 40.

Uvin, P. (1999). Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence. *Comparative Politics, 31*, 3, 253-271.

Volgy, T.J., Imwalle, L. E., & Corntassel, J. J. (1997) Structural Determinants of International Terrorism: The Effects of Hegemony and Polarity on Terrorist Activity. *International Interactions, 23*, 2, 207-231.

Wallerstein, I. (1960). Ethnicity and National Integration in West Africa. *Cahiers d' Etudes Africaines, 3*,129-139.

Whitaker, C.S., Jr. (1970). *The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria: 1946 – 1966.* Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Wiseman, H.V. (1966). *Political Systems: Some Sociological Approaches.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Young, C. (1976). *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Young, C. (1991). Self-Determination, Territorial Integrity, and the African State System. In F. M. Deng and I. W. Zartman (Eds). *Conflict Resolution in Africa.* Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.

Young, C. (1994). *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Young, M. (2000). Wodhaabhe Pastoral Fulani. **Retrieved October 17, 2005,fromhttp://www.mnsuedu/emuseum/cultural/oldword/africa /fulani.html**

Zartman, W. (1989). *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa.* New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

APPENDIX 1:

DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR THE STUDY TRIPS.

FORM FGQ I: QUESTIONS FOR THE FULANI/TUTSI ETHNIC GROUPS:

1. Do you know that there are other members of your ethnic group living in other countries?
    (a)   Yes
    (b)   No

2. Do you interact with members of your ethnic group in other countries?
    (a)   Yes
    (b)   No

3. How do you think the continued well being of your people will be guaranteed?
    (a)   Through capturing/retaining power in the countries of abode
    (b)   The coming together of members of the ethnic group in one country

4. When your group is in power, whom do you think they should owe more responsibility to?
    (a)   Members of your ethnic group in your country and elsewhere.
    (b)   Members of every ethnic group in your country

5. What do you think your ethnic group will do if they are not in power and the state does not protect their interest?
    (a)   Fight to change government
    (b)   Relocate to another country where members of the ethnic group are in power

6. How do you think your ethnic group will react should other ethnic groups in your country demand to take power from the group?
    (a)   Resist/fight to retain power
    (b)   Dialogue/find accommodation with others.

7. How do you think your ethnic group in your country will react if your kin are engaged in conflict with other ethnic groups in their countries?
    (a)   Fight alongside kin
    (b)   Leave kin to their fate

8. Which of these are you ordinarily more attached to?
    (a)   Your larger ethnic group
    (b)   Your country of abode.

9. Is your feeling of attachment to the country influenced by the favorable political and socio economic conditions of your ethnic group in your country?
    (a)   Yes
    (b)   No

10. Is your feeling of attachment to your country influenced by the size of your ethnic group in the country?

(a) Yes
(b) No

FORM FGQ 2: QUESTIONS FOR THE MOORS/WOLOF/HUTU ETHNIC
GROUPS:

11. Are you aware that the Fulani/Tutsi of your country:
    (a) Are continuing to relate with kin in other countries
    (b) Have cut links with their kin in other countries

12. Which of these interests do you believe the Fulani/Tutsi of your country work
    for, especially when they are in power?
    (a) Their larger ethnic group
    (b) The country

13. What will you do if the Fulani/Tutsi capture power in your country?
    (a) Support them
    (b) Oppose/fight them

14. Which do you feel the Fulani/Tutsi of your country are more attached to?
    (a) The country
    (b) Their larger ethnic group

221

Fig. 2: AFRICA - POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATION

Countries with Fulani Populations

Countries with Tutsi Populations

Fig 4: WEST AFRICA -POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATION

Mauritania

Cape Verde

Senegal

Gambia, The

Guinea Bissau

Guinea

Sierra Leone

Liberia

Cote D'Ivoire

Mali

Burkina Faso

Ghana

Togo

Benin

Niger

Nigeria

Sao Tome and Principe

500   0   500   Kilometers

N

Fig 5: COUNTRIES OF THE GREAT LAKES REGION OF CENTRAL AFRICA

Central African Republic

meroon

Cameroon

Lake Turkana

Uganda

Lake Albert

Kenya

Congo

Lake Kweu

Lake Victoria

abon

Gabon

Lake Kivu

Rwanda

Burundi

Congo Demoractid Republic

Tanzania

Lake Tanganyika

N

Angola

Lake Malawi

Malawi

200   0   200 Km

Zambia

Countries with Tutsi Populations

225

MAURITANIA

Dagana
Podor
Thilogne

St-Louis
Louga
Matam

Louga
Linguere

Kebemer

Tivaouane

Bhabey Diourbel
Dakar
Thies
MBacke

Thies

MBour
Gossas
Kaolack

Fatick
Fatick
Kaffrine

Kaolack
Tambacounda
Bakel

Foundiougne

Nioro
Tambacounda
MALI

THE GAMBIA

Kolda
Velingara

Sedhiou
Kedougou

Bignona

Oussouye
GUINEA-BISSAU
GUINEA

Main roads
Primary and secondary roads
Rail-Road allroads.shp
Administrative Boundary

40 0 40 80 Kilometers

RWANDA

- ⊛ National capital
- ⊚ Prefecture capital
- ○ Town, village
- ✈ ✛ Airport, airstrip
- International boundary
- Prefecture boundary
- Road
- Track

UGANDA

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

BURUNDI

KAGERA

BIRUNGA NAT'L PARK

NATIONAL PARK

Kagitumba
Rwemhasha
Lubirizi
Nyagatare
Rutshuru
Kisoro
Cyanika
Kabale
Muvumba
Butaro
Kidaho
Katuna
Mulindi
Gatunda
Gabiro
Ngarama
Ruhengeri
Kirambo
Cyamba
BYUMBA
Byumba
Kora
Busogo
Kinihira
Mutura
NEMBA
Kanyami
Muhura
Goma
Kagalio
RUHENGERI
Rutare
Rukara
Gisenyi
Nyundo
Kabaya
Ngaru
Rushashi
Mbogo
Murambi
Shyorongi
GISENYI
Ngororero
Kiyumba
Kinyinya
Gikoro
Rwamagana
Runda
Kigali
Kicukiro
Kayonza
Bulinga
Bicumbi
Mabanza
Butamwa
KIGALI
Kigarama
Kibuye
Gitarama
Bugesera
Kibungo
Rukira
KIBUYE
Birambo
GITARAMA
Rilima
Gishyila
Bwakira
Sake KIBUNGO
Rwamatamu
Masango
Ruhango
Gashora
Rusumo
Galagara
Nemba
Bare
Kirehe
Kaduha
Ngenda
Nyabisindu
GIKONGORO
Karaba
Rusatira
Rwasero
CYANGUGU
Karama
Kamembe
Gisakura
Gikongoro
Bukavu
Cyangugu
Rwumba
Kitabi
BUTARE
Cyimbogo
Karengera
Butare
Gisagara
Nyakabuye
Bugumya
Ruramba
Busoro
Bugarama
Munini
Runyombyi

Lac Kivu

Lac Muhazi

Lac Mugesera

227