



**Thesis**

**By**

**HUNGWE,  
Emaculate**

**FACULTY OF ART AND  
SOCIAL SCIENCE AT  
STELLENBOSCH  
UNIVERSITY**

**Land transactions and Rural Devdopment  
Policy in the Domboshava periurban  
communal area, Zimbabwe**

---


**December 2014**

A large orange triangle is positioned in the bottom right corner of the page.

07.02.01  
HUN  
16229.

**Land transactions and Rural Development Policy in the Domboshava peri-urban communal area, Zimbabwe**

**Emaculate Hungwe**



**Dissertation presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the  
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University**

**Promoter:**

**Professor Simon B Bekker**

**Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology**

**December 2014**

07.02.01

HUN

16229

**Land transactions and Rural Development Policy in the Domboshava peri-urban communal area, Zimbabwe**

**Emaculate Hungwe**



**Dissertation presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the  
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University**

**Promoter:**

**Professor Simon B Bekker**

**Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology**

**December 2014**

## **DECLARATION**

By submitting this dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by the Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third party rights, and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

Signed:.....

Date:.....

CODESRIA - LIBRARY

**Copyright © 2014 Stellenbosch University  
All rights reserved**



## ABSTRACT

Urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa has led to the proliferation of peri-urban settlements close to cities. Development policy in these areas is multi-pronged. Residents with local tribal, as well as migrant backgrounds take land matters into their own hands. This leads to diverse land transactions and changing household survival strategies. My research investigates the complex interactions *between* land transactions, Rural Development Policy (RDP), and the emergent household survival strategies between 2002 and 2012 in the peri-urban communal area of Domboshava in Zimbabwe located northeast of Harare the capital city. Domboshava is classified as 'rural' and is administered by traditional authority as well as a local authority called Goromonzi Rural District Council. This Council considers RDP as a solution to increased individualized land transactions. My thesis is based on field research of a case study comprising four villages of Domboshava. Forty-one local residents, as well as a number of key informants such as Traditional Leaders and local government officials were sampled for the study. Qualitative data were collected through structured interviews, review of pertinent documents, as well as observation. The research findings reveal that the rapid pace of urbanization across Africa is widespread and poses key challenges to policies on rural development and land tenure more generally. Research evidence shows the changing practice in access to land rights in Domboshava by migrants from other parts of the country. As a result, land transactions shift from customary inheritance in the tribal line to individualized land transactions such as direct land sales and renting thereby privileging financially better-off households. Household survival strategies also shift from farm based to off-farm and non-farm activities because of the influence of land transactions and a multi-pronged RDP. Changes in household survival strategies of community residents of Domboshava were however not influenced by land transactions and RDP alone, but also by wider political and economic shifts and state interventions such as Operation Restore Order/Operation Murambatsvina and the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. The practice of a multi-pronged RDP as a solution to land transactions in Domboshava became part of the problem as land transactions proliferated unabated. This research is an important topic within the Sociology of Development, and provides useful insights regarding debates on land, policy, and survival strategies in peri-urban communal areas, not only in Domboshava in Zimbabwe, but in sub-Saharan Africa. Appropriate policies that address these peri-urban challenges in Zimbabwe are sorely needed.

## OPSOMMING

Verstedeliking in Afrika het gelei tot die vermenigvuldiging van buite-stedelike nedersettings naby stede. Ontwikkelingsbeleid in hierdie areas het vele vertakings. Inwoners van plaaslike stamsgediede asook van migrante agtergronde neem grondsake in eie hande. Dit lei tot uiteenlopende grondtransaksies en veranderende huishoudelike oorlewingstrategieë. My navorsing ondersoek die komplekse interaksies tussen grondtransaksies, landelike ontwikkelingsbeleid (LOB), en die opkomende huishoudelike oorlewingstrategieë tussen die jare 2002 en 2012 in die buite-stedelike kommunale area van Domboshava in Zimbabwe, gelêe noord-oos van Harare, die hoofstad van Zimbabwe. Domboshava is geklassifiseer as ‘landelik’ en word geadmistreer deur ‘n tradisionele owerheid sowel as ‘n plaaslike owerheid wat bekend staan as die ‘Goromonzi Rural District Council’. Ontwikkelingsbeleid word deur hierdie Raad gesien as oplossing vir toenemende individuele grondtransaksies. Die huidige navorsing is gebaseer op veldwerk van ‘n gevallestudie van vier dorpie in Domboshava. Een-en-veertig plaaslike inwoners sowel as ‘n aantal sleutelinformante soos tradisionele leiers en plaaslike regeringsamptenare was deel van ‘n steekproef vir die studie. Kwalitatiewe data is ingesamel deur middel van gestruktureerde onderhoude, bestudering van pertinente dokumente asook waarneming. Die navorsingsresultate toon dat die vinnige pas van verstedeliking deur Afrika ‘n algemene verskynsel is en dat dit belangrike uitdagings bied vir beleid oor landelike ontwikkeling, en grondpag in die besonder. Navorsingsbevindinge wys die veranderende patrone in toegang tot grondregte van migrante van ander dele van die land. Dit toon dat grondtransaksies verskuif het van gewone oorerwing binne stamverband na geïndividualiseerde grondtransaksies soos bv. direkte grondverkope en verhuring om dan sodoende huishoudings wat finansiële beter daaraan toe is, te bevoordeel. Huishoudelike oorlewingstrategieë het ook verskuif vanaf boerderygebaseer na nie-boerderygebaseerde aktiwiteite as gevolg van die invloed van nuwe grondtransaksies en komplekse LOB. Die veranderinge in huishoudelike oorlewingstrategieë van inwoners van Domboshava was egter nie slegs beïnvloed deur grondtransaksies en LOB nie, maar ook deur wyer politieke en ekonomiese veranderinge en deur intervensies deur die staat soos “Operation Restore Order/ Operation Murambatsvina” en die “Fast Track Land Reform Programme”. Die praktyk van grondbeleid met vele vertakings as oplossing vir grondtransaksies in die Domboshava area het deel geword van die probleem soos wat grondtransaksies ongekontroleerd toegeneem het. Hierdie navorsing is ‘n belangrike onderwerp binne die Sosiologie van Ontwikkeling en gee bruikbare insigte in die debatte rondom grond, beleid en oorlewingstrategieë in buite-stedelike kommunale gebiede naby stede, nie alleenlik in Domboshava in Zimbabwe nie, maar ook elders in Afrika. Toepaslike beleid wat hierdie buite-stedelike uitdagings in Zimbabwe aanspreek is dringend noodsaaklik.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am indebted to all individuals and institutions that contributed to the success of this thesis. Foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Graduate School in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University for a full scholarship that funded my doctoral studies under the auspices of the Hope Project. I would also like to express my appreciation to the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) for funding my fieldwork through the Small Grants Programme for Thesis Writing. I am also grateful for the financial support from the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Stellenbosch University, as well as encouragement from the staff members and students from this department. I am also profoundly grateful to my supervisor Professor Simon Bekker for being patient and meticulous in guiding me throughout the thesis process. I would also like to acknowledge the insightful discussions I had with a number of academics from other institutions.

My sincere gratitude also goes to the community residents of Domboshava, Traditional Leaders, and other stakeholders for their participation in this research. I would like to thank officials from the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development of Zimbabwe for granting me permission to undertake this research in Domboshava, and for their contributory debates.

Lastly, I would like to thank my mother, father, sisters, brothers (vana securu), varoora, babamukuru, vazucuru, vana, friends, daughter Cocco Patasvitswanashe, and my husband Thomas for their encouragement and moral support - indeed the Lord has taken us this far. Ebenezer!

## **DEDICATION**

To my people with love

CODESRIA - LIBRARY

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>DECLARATION.....</b>	<b>i</b>
<b>ABSTRACT .....</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>OPSOMMING.....</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .....</b>	<b>iv</b>
<b>DEDICATION.....</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>TABLE OF CONTENTS.....</b>	<b>vi</b>
<b>ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS .....</b>	<b>xi</b>
<b>LIST OF FIGURES .....</b>	<b>xiii</b>
<b>LIST OF PHOTOGRAPHS .....</b>	<b>xiii</b>
<b>LIST OF TABLES .....</b>	<b>xiii</b>
<b>LIST OF BOXES.....</b>	<b>xiv</b>
<b>Chapter 1 The context .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1.1 Introduction .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>1.2 Communal areas of Zimbabwe.....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>1.3 Land transactions in peri-urban zones .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>1.4 Rural Development Policy .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>1.5 Household survival strategies.....</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>1.6 The peri-urban communal area of Domboshava .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>1.7 Why land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies in Domboshava?</b> .....	<b>11</b>
<b>1.8. Problem statement and focus .....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>1.9 Structure of the thesis .....</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>Chapter 2 Developing a conceptual framework .....</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>2.1 Introduction .....</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>2.2 An overview of land and the land tenure systems in sub-Saharan Africa.....</b>	<b>17</b>
2.2.1 Influence of colonial policies on land tenure systems in sub Saharan-Africa.....	19
2.2.2 The complex nature of land tenure in the post-colonial period in sub-Saharan Africa .....	21
2.2.3 Post-colonial land tenure reforms in sub-Saharan Africa.....	31
2.2.4 Dynamics of land property rights in sub-Saharan Africa .....	33
2.2.5 Land transactions in peri-urban areas of sub-Saharan Africa.....	36

2.2.6 Rural Development Policy and land tenure debates .....	42
2.2.7 Livelihoods and household survival strategies in rural and peri-urban sub-Saharan Africa .....	47
<b>2.3 Theories .....</b>	<b>51</b>
2.3.1 Giddens' theory of structuration .....	52
2.3.2 Hirschman's exit, voice, and loyalty model .....	55
<b>2.4 Conclusion: The conceptual framework for analyzing the case of Domboshava...</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>Chapter 3 Land, policy, and survival: an historical narrative .....</b>	<b>62</b>
3.1 Introduction .....	62
3.2 Zimbabwe - land transactions, policy, and survival – the colonial.....	64
3.3 Zimbabwe - land transactions, policy, and survival - the post-colonial .....	70
3.3.1 Land administration in contemporary Zimbabwe .....	73
3.4 Sketching post-independence Rural Development Policy initiatives in Zimbabwe .....	79
3.4.1 The Fast Track Land Reform Programme in Zimbabwe.....	85
3.5 Changing livelihoods in communal areas of Zimbabwe.....	89
3.6 Colonial and post-colonial Harare and its peripheries .....	93
3.7 Situating the peri-urban communal area of Domboshava .....	97
3.7.1 Changing demographic trends in Domboshava.....	100
3.7.2 Traditional authority and land administration in Domboshava .....	104
3.7.3 Village profiles - Zimbiru, Mungate, Murape, Chogugudza .....	107
3.8 Conclusion .....	111
<b>Chapter 4 Methods.....</b>	<b>112</b>
4.1 Introduction .....	112
4.2 Preparation and planning - the research design .....	112
4.3 Sampling.....	116
4.4 Data collection procedures .....	123
4.4.1 The reconnaissance.....	123
4.4.2 Negotiating entry into Domboshava.....	125
4.5 Situating self in action.....	127
4.5.1 Interviews with other stakeholders .....	129
4.5.2 Interviews with Informal Discussants .....	130
4.5.3 Conversations with academics.....	130

4.5.4 Review of pertinent policy documents .....	131
4.5.5 Community meetings and traditional court hearings.....	132
4.5.6 Dealing with the unexpected during fieldwork .....	132
<b>4.6 Data analysis .....</b>	<b>133</b>
4.6.1 The unit of analysis.....	134
4.6.2 Data analysis procedures .....	140
<b>4.7 Ethical considerations .....</b>	<b>142</b>
<b>4.8 Tying up the loose ends.....</b>	<b>143</b>
<b>4.9 Conclusion.....</b>	<b>143</b>
<b>Chapter 5 Dynamics of land transactions in Domboshava .....</b>	<b>145</b>
5.1 Introduction .....	145
5.2 Description of households, and land users in Domboshava .....	146
5.3 Customary vs. individualized land transactions in Domboshava .....	150
5.4 Land transactions in Domboshava before 2002, and during 2002 to 2012 .....	157
5.4.1 Inheritance .....	159
5.4.2 Direct land sales.....	160
5.4.3 Renting.....	161
5.4.4 Land grabs .....	165
5.4.5 Land transactions and gender in Domboshava .....	167
5.4.6 A summary on land transactions in the four villages .....	170
5.5 Reasons for land transactions in the four villages.....	171
5.5.1 Influence of household survival strategies on land transactions .....	172
5.5.2 Influence of Rural Development Policy on land transactions .....	176
5.6 Dynamics of negotiating land rights in Domboshava .....	182
5.6.1 Manipulation of circumstances.....	182
5.6.2 Gifts or bribes? .....	185
5.6.3 Backdated payments .....	186
5.6.4 Gerrymandering.....	187
5.6.5 Language, relationships, and power .....	188
5.6.6 Documentation.....	191
5.7 Conclusion.....	192
<b>Chapter 6 Residents and stakeholders' perceptions of Rural Development Policy .....</b>	<b>195</b>

<b>6.1 Introduction .....</b>	<b>195</b>
<b>6.2 How Rural Development Policy is interpreted in Domboshava .....</b>	<b>196</b>
<b>6.3 Community residents and stakeholders' views about Rural Development Policy .....</b>	<b>197</b>
6.3.1 Views of community residents .....	197
6.3.2 Views of Traditional Leaders .....	202
6.3.3 Views of other stakeholders .....	203
<b>6.4 Perceptions of RDP - criticism or disregard of, or compliance with policy.....</b>	<b>207</b>
6.4.1 Perceptions of tribal household members.....	208
6.4.2 Perceptions of migrant household members.....	218
6.4.3 Perceptions of Traditional Leaders.....	222
<b>6.5 Conclusion.....</b>	<b>225</b>
<b>Chapter 7 Types of household survival strategies in Domboshava .....</b>	<b>227</b>
<b>7.1 Introduction .....</b>	<b>227</b>
<b>7.2 Land rights and household assets in Domboshava.....</b>	<b>228</b>
7.2.1 Arable, grazing, and the commons .....	230
7.2.2 Homesteads and household property .....	232
7.2.3 Livestock .....	236
<b>7.3 Emergent household survival strategies in Domboshava .....</b>	<b>239</b>
7.3.1 Land transactions as a household survival strategy .....	239
7.3.2 Changing patterns of subsistence farming.....	242
7.3.3 Formal employment - the 'salarial' .....	246
7.3.4 Informal employment .....	248
<b>7.4 Livelihoods diversification and survival in Domboshava .....</b>	<b>254</b>
<b>7.5. Changing patterns of migration and mobility - straddling the rural-urban divide .....</b>	<b>257</b>
<b>7.6 Emerging class differentiation and division of labour in Domboshava .....</b>	<b>263</b>
<b>7.7 Conclusion.....</b>	<b>265</b>
<b>Chapter 8 Conclusion: the complex interplay of land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies in Domboshava .....</b>	<b>268</b>
<b>8.1 Introduction .....</b>	<b>268</b>
<b>8.2 Situating Domboshava historically in contemporary Zimbabwe .....</b>	<b>269</b>
<b>8.3 The multi-pronged Rural Development Policy environment in Zimbabwe .....</b>	<b>271</b>



<b>8.4 From customary to individualized land transactions - the intended and unintended outcomes .....</b>	<b>273</b>
8.4.1 Reduced arable land and diminishing tribal legitimacy .....	278
8.4.2 Changes of land use .....	280
<b>8.5 Emergent household survival strategies in Domboshava .....</b>	<b>283</b>
8.5.1 Diminishing practice in peasant farming .....	284
8.5.2 Shifts from peasant farming to off-farm and non-farm activities .....	286
8.5.3 Signs of depeasantization .....	289
<b>8.6 Emergent class and gender distinctions .....</b>	<b>290</b>
<b>8.7 Dilemmas in peri-urban communal areas and how these can be addressed .....</b>	<b>292</b>
<b>8.8 Concluding remarks: Generalization and dissemination of findings .....</b>	<b>295</b>
<b>REFERENCES .....</b>	<b>298</b>
<b>APPENDICES .....</b>	<b>322</b>
<b>Appendix A: Interview profiles .....</b>	<b>322</b>
A1: Household interviews .....	322
A2: Interviews with Traditional Leaders .....	323
A3: Interviews with Informal Discussants .....	323
A4: Interviews with other stakeholders .....	323
<b>Appendix B: Migration history of migrants - the last moves .....</b>	<b>324</b>

## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AGRITEX	Agriculture Technical and Extension Services
CLA	Communal Land Act
CLRA	Communal Land Rights Act
DA	District Administrator
DNMMZ	Department of National Museums and Monuments, Zimbabwe
DRLA	Director of Rural Local Authorities
ESAP	Economic Structural Adjustment Programme
FTLRP	Fast Track Land Reform Programme
GRDC	Goromonzi Rural District Council
ID	Informal Discussant(s)
LPS	Land - Policy - Survival dialectical framework of analysis
LRP	Land Reform Programme
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDC-N	Movement for Democratic Change - Ncube
MDC-T	Movement for Democratic Change - Tsvangirayi
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MERP	Millennium Economic Recovery Plan
Ministry of LGRUD	Ministry of Local Government Rural and Urban Development
NERP	National Economic Revival Programme
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
OG/HK	Operation Garikai/Hlalani Khuhle
ORO/OM	Operation Restore Order/Operation Murambatsvina
PA	Provincial Administrator
RDC	Rural District Council(s)
RDCA	Rural District Councils Act
RDP	Rural Development Policy
REP	Rural Electrification Programme
RTCPA	Regional Town and Country Planning Act
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SLA	Sustainable Livelihoods Approach
TL	Traditional Leader(s)
TLA	Traditional Leaders Act

TLGFA	Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act
VH	Village Head(s)
VIDCO	Village Development Committee
WADCO	Ward Development Committee
WC	Ward Councillor(s)
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front
ZIMPREST	Zimbabwe Programme for Economic Social Transformation
ZNSA	Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency

CODESRIA - LIBRARY

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1: The location of Domboshava .....	8
Figure 2.1: The LPS framework .....	60
Figure 3.1: Boundaries of Zimbabwe .....	63
Figure 3.2: The structure of land administration in Zimbabwe .....	75
Figure 3.3: Land use in Zimbabwe .....	76
Figure 3.4: Location of Ward 4 of Goromonzi District .....	98
Figure 3.5: Villages of Domboshava .....	107
Figure 5.1: Influence of RDP and household survival strategies on land transactions.....	145
Figure 6.1: Influence of land transactions and household survival strategies on RDP.....	195
Figure 7.1: Influence of land transactions and RDP on household survival strategies.....	227
Figure 8.1: The dialectical relationships between land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies.....	268

## LIST OF PHOTOGRAPHS

Photograph 3.1: A scenic view of the Domboshava communal area .....	100
Photograph 3.2: A woodlot of 'mizhanje' at Domboshava Hill .....	109
Photograph 5.1: Backyard lodgers' quarter in Domboshava .....	162
Photograph 6.1: A community borehole in Murape Village.....	200
Photograph 7.1: Arable land use.....	231
Photograph 7.2: A modern and a traditional tribal homestead in Domboshava .....	235
Photograph 7.3: An example of small and medium enterprise in Mungate Village.....	253
Photograph 7.4: Straddling the urban-rural divide in Domboshava .....	259
Photograph 8.1: Degradation of the commons in Domboshava .....	281

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: Distribution of households in the four villages in 2012 .....	103
Table 5.1: Land interests in Domboshava.....	149
Table 5.2: Categories of customary and individualized land transactions in Domboshava ..	158

## LIST OF BOXES

Box 5.1: An example of an inheritance dispute .....	153
Box 5.2: Expectations from TLs .....	154
Box 5.3: Expectations from GRDC .....	155
Box 5.4: Non-approval of land transactions .....	164
Box 5.5: Gender and land grabs.....	165
Box 5.6: A fatal land grab .....	167
Box 5.7: Failed inheritance vs. land transactions .....	168
Box 5.8: Influence of RDP on land transactions in Domboshava .....	177
Box 5.9: A history of land rights in Domboshava .....	184
Box 5.10: The role of language in land transactions .....	189
Box 6.1: The concept of RDP in Zimbabwe.....	196
Box 6.2: Views on sanitation provision in Domboshava.....	198
Box 6.3: Perceptions of RDP by tribal members .....	209
Box 6.4: Perceptions of RDP .....	211
Box 7.1: Crop and vegetable farming by lodgers .....	243
Box 7.2: AGRITEX support and peasant farming in Domboshava.....	245
Box 7.3: A tale of a street vendor from Domboshava .....	251
Box 7.4: Loans as a household survival strategy .....	256

## **Chapter 1 The context**

### **1.1 Introduction**

Domboshava is a peri-urban communal area close to Harare the capital city of Zimbabwe. Domboshava has been selected to identify the complex ways in which land transactions, Rural Development Policy (RDP), and household survival strategies interact. This chapter introduces these key ideas and the study area.

The sub-Saharan Africa region has been experiencing changes in the political, economic, and demographic spheres. As a result, the rate of urbanization in this region has been on the increase (Wehrmann, 2008). The sub-Saharan Africa region is however characterized as rural because the majority of the population (about 60%) is rural, and considered as poor (Quan & Payne, 2008; United Nations Development Programme Report, 2010; World Urbanization Prospects, 2012; Human Development Report, 2013). Africa's urban population is nonetheless expected to reach 60% by 2050 (World Urbanization Prospects, 2012). Urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa has led to the proliferation of peri-urban settlements close to cities. Competition not only for access, but also for control over resources particularly land in these zones by different categories of people is apparent. In any case, wars in most African countries testify the socio-political conflict that exist within communities, and between nations as people struggle to control land (Berry, 1992; Berry, 2002; Peters, 2004; Peters, 2007; Lund, 2008; Wehrmann, 2008). Cousins (2008a); Lund (2008); and Chauveau & Colin (2010) view land struggles as more apparent in parts of rural sub-Saharan Africa where land tenure systems are messy and deeply embedded in socio-economic and political processes of human interaction. Land tenure systems define the structure of land property rights in rural areas (Cousins, 1990). Land rights in rural areas are central to the well-being of individuals, and they "constitute a distinct category of socio-economic rights" (Walker, 2009:467). They determine access to land as a resource fundamental to agricultural production, and human survival (Cousins, 2008a; 2008b). Land rights define the different relationships between people and land, and these relationships are never simple, but complex (Cousins, 2008a; Cousins, 2008b; Walker, 2009). Yet, about 20% of the world population lacks access to land for survival (Quan & Payne, 2008).

A repertoire of administrative and legal institutions regulates access to land and other resources in sub-Saharan Africa (Berry, 2002; Lund, 2008; Okoth-Ogendo, 2008; Wehrmann, 2008). The systems of land administration in most of these countries comprise different levels of authority: from households to villages, to national levels, accordingly involving nested and layered structures of authority (Cousins, 2008a; Cousins, 2008b). In most instances, the systems of land administration are rooted in colonial premises, and these vary between countries and communities (McAuslan, 2000; Lund, 2008; Cousins, 2008b; Thebe, 2010; Cliffe *et al.*, 2011). The purpose of this research is to unravel the rapid changes, and the dynamics of accessing land rights in light of the interplay of land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies in the Domboshava peri-urban communal area in Zimbabwe.

## 1.2 Communal areas of Zimbabwe

Land administration in Zimbabwe demonstrates the existence of historical remnants on land alienation and dispossession that stretch back to the colonial era (Zinyama, 1992; Thebe, 2010; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). All land in Zimbabwe is distinguished as rural and urban, and is vested in the hands of the state. Quan (2000a) describes the state as a neutral entity capable of controlling land on behalf of its citizens. The urban/rural dichotomy sets forth the principles of land tenure that regulate access and control of land in Zimbabwe. There exist a plethora of land tenure systems in Zimbabwe, and these are complex (Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Little investigation has been done on the process by which land can be accessed in communal areas that are situated at the edge of cities in Zimbabwe where conflict of interest to control land is apparent.

Communal areas of Zimbabwe are predominantly rural. They consist of villages and peasant households whose main economic activity is farming (Sargent, 1991; Bryceson, 1999; Chiremba & Masters, 2003; Marimira, 2010). Thus, peasants' survival largely depends on land. Previously known as native reserves, the communal tag came into effect after independence in 1982 through the Communal Lands Act of 1982 (Roe, 1995; Cheater, 1999; Gunby *et al.*, 2000; Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2006). The label 'native reserve(s)' is often corrupted to 'ruzevha' or 'maruzevha' in vernacular Shona. Shona represents both the language and one of the tribal groups of people that live in Zimbabwe (Holleman, 1952; Bullock, 1972; Bourdillon, 1976). Land in communal areas of Zimbabwe is administered under the communal land tenure system, and is 'owned' collectively, individually, and in

common by community residents (Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2006; 2008; 2010). The Rural District Councils (RDCs) - popularly referred to as '*Kanzuru*' (Council) in vernacular Shona - as local authorities and custodians of communal land also administer land through statutes on behalf of the state (CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002; Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2006).

Within the system of communal land tenure, customary land tenure provides the conditions on which land can be accessed for various uses in terms of arable, residential, and grazing in rural Zimbabwe. The system of customary land tenure entails rules that govern access and use of land based on membership to a group controlling a particular territory (Migot-Adholla & Bruce, 1994). Under these circumstances, land in Zimbabwe is legally vested in collectives such as clans, tribes, and the state under the custody of Traditional Leaders (TLs) such as Chiefs (CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002). Tradition and custom are at the core of land administration under customary tenure (Gondo & Kyomuhendo, 2011). Since customary land rights are not clearly spelt out in the legislative framework, they are often open to various interpretations by different land users including individuals and institutions mostly to their advantage (Qaun, 2000a). Community residents simply put land issues in their own hands. This interferes with livelihood options of the rural poor (Cousins, 2000). This also leads to unequal access to resources by some community members based on gender and age, and also the emergence of class (Peters, 2007).

### **1.3 Land transactions in peri-urban zones**

In Zimbabwe, a number of communal areas are located on the periphery of cities - the peri-urban. Over the years, the influence of urban development has shifted into these zones. Peri-urban areas signal the outward movement of the edges of cities (Mabin, 2012; Watson, 2012). "In social terms, the peri-urban represents an intersection among people, resources, activities, and ideas on the move coalescing, colliding, and dispersing in a kind of restless straddling in which some find prosperity, while others struggle to make ends meet" (Berry, 2011:5). This results in diverse, complex, and dynamic processes (Berry, 2002; Mbiva & Huchzermeyer, 2002; Marshall *et al.*, 2009; Chauveau & Colin, 2010; Gough *et al.*, 2010; Colin & Woodhouse, 2010; Mabin, 2012; Watson, 2012). As cities spread and expand further into the countryside, they always absorb farmland and villages (Tacoli, 2002; Berry, 2011; Mabin, 2012). Local administrative authorities often lack the capacity to deal with these challenges (Tacoli, 2008). As a result, peri-urban areas experience various kinds of land transactions



because of unclear physical and institutional boundaries that regulate conditions of access to common property resources and land use in these areas (Tacoli, 2002). Land transactions entail the different kinds of land rights exchanges within and outside the procedures of land tenure systems (Benjaminsen & Lund, 2003; Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2010; Colin & Woodhouse, 2010). In general, peri-urban areas experience unprecedented levels of land transactions to prospective buyers and developers for various land use purposes (Chirisa, 2010a; Chirisa, 2010b). Thus, land in peri-urban communal areas is under siege from different forms of land exchanges. The prevalence of land transactions in the periphery of cities is however not new in sub-Saharan Africa (Colin & Woodhouse, 2010).

The emergent patterns of land transactions in communal areas situated on the periphery of cities have become a cause for concern in Zimbabwe (Marongwe, 2003; Chirisa, 2010a; Chirisa, 2010b). Land seekers use different strategies to negotiate land (Berry, 2002). The causes of land transactions in general are diverse (cf. Owusu, 2008; Wehrmann, 2008; Chirisa, 2010a; Chirisa, 2010b; Benjaminsen & Sjaastad, 2010; Chauveau & Colin, 2010; Shabane *et al.*, 2011). These emanate from the general neglect of the peri-urban areas by the responsible authorities, lack of appropriate administrative policies, as well as the nature of the peri-urban spaces themselves (cf. Owusu, 2008; Tacoli, 2008; Wehrmann, 2008; Marshall *et al.*, 2009; Chirisa, 2010a). Absence of regulatory procedures and neglect of cities' peripheries leads to invasion of the spaces by the urban poor (Tacoli, 2008). For buyers of land, seeking land in peri-urban communal areas through land transactions is a way of gaining access to land without incurring the costs of official registration and other procedures that characterize the formal land market (Mamdani, 1987:358 in Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2006).

Like the causes, the outcomes of land transactions are also diverse. Scholars like Deininger (2003) and Chauveau & Colin (2010) acknowledge that land transactions play a vital role in the redistribution of land to more efficient land users. On the other hand, Kojo (2010) believes that land transactions result in the reduction of family farms, and therefore household income. Wehrmann (2008) states that land transactions in peri-urban areas do not only result in alteration of land use, but land rights as well. Migot-Adholla & Bruce (1994) and Wehrmann (2008) believe that land transactions lead to individualization of land rights and exclusion of others, as well as insecurity of tenure. Clearly, there is no consensus on the causes of and outcomes from land transactions. Land transactions are laden with baggage and uncertainties of many kinds (Benjaminsen & Lund, 2003). These need to be isolated and

understood in the context within which they are experienced since societies and communities in general are never homogenous.

The distinction between land transactions as *customary* and *individualized* is made and applied throughout. The distinction informs analysis on land transactions in the entire thesis. Customary land transactions are the ones that take place within the procedures of the system of customary land tenure, whereas individualized land transactions take place outside this structure (typically between individuals). The practice of land transactions is a significant pointer to the reproduction of the structure that regulates access to land and other property rights in communal areas (cf. Bromley & Cernea, 1991; Nyambara, 2001; Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2006; Wehrmann, 2008; Cousins, 2009; Colin & Woodhouse, 2010). Examination of the dynamics by which land, common property rights, and other physical resources such as forests, water, grazing are accessed for various purposes in communal areas situated on the periphery of cities - the peri-urban - and how these continuously evolve is therefore significant. The dynamics are complex because of the heterogeneity of land use and land users in these areas (Mabin, 2012).

#### **1.4 Rural Development Policy**

Given the divergence of causes and outcomes of land transactions, local administrative authorities in Zimbabwe regard land transactions in peri-urban communal areas as a rural problem that can be resolved through RDP. Wildavsky (1979:387) states that, "Policy is a process as well as a product". Policy is a decision-making process (Somekh & Lewin, 2011). It is a product of the process that contributes to its making (Wildavsky, 1979). The RDP process is often facilitated and strengthened by different strategies, programmes, or interventions; and these are often interchangeably referred to as RDPs by local authorities (Ploeg *et al.*, 2000). In Zimbabwe, RDP as a decision-making process is conceptually broad and its implementation cuts across several ministries and government departments (Gunby *et al.*, 2000). In this regard, RDP is a "text, a process, a discourse, a political decision, a programme, or even an outcome" (Somekh & Lewin, 2011:190). Since land is a vital component in Zimbabwe's rural economy, RDP is construed within the broader discourses of land redistribution apart from its generic goals on service provision in terms of clean water, health facilities, electricity, transport, and infrastructure (Wekwete, 1990; 1991). Delius &

Schirmer (2001) also state that rural development strategies are often packaged with different activities from different service sectors.

Land and tenure issues are at the core of rural development (Toulmin & Quan, 2000). In Zimbabwe, the plurality of regulations on land tenure and property rights in communal areas influences the nature of RDP because this policy derives its tenets from land laws in many ways. Often, it is very difficult to isolate RDP from land issues because these are at the core of rural development agendas of the state. For example, RDCs of Zimbabwe regard the Land Reform Programme (LRP) as RDP<sup>1</sup>. This situation has been a huge challenge for Zimbabwe due to the breadth of what constitutes LRPs and land issues in general. Land issues are inseparable from the broader spectrum of economic and political processes and experiences as they are part of these social realities (Ranger, 1983; Berry, 2002; Peters, 2007). The focus of this research is therefore on the implementation of RDP in Domboshava because my basic assumption is that: there exist procedures (whether they are implemented or not) on the implementation of RDP insofar as land transactions in peri-urban communal areas are concerned.

### **1.5 Household survival strategies**

In communal areas of Zimbabwe, peasant households depend on land for rain-fed agriculture and animal rearing mainly for farming. Peasant farmers are people that live in rural areas, rely on peasant agriculture for growing of crops and animal husbandry on specific land parcels passed from generation to generation within a bounded zone (Shanin, 1975; Harriss, 1982; Ranger, 1983; Bryceson, 2000b; Marimira, 2010; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Peasant farmers are “small agricultural producers who intend to make a living by selling part of their crops or herd” (Ranger, 1985:101). Peasant farming involves the growing of crops and raising animals for household consumption (Bryceson, 2000a; Marimira, 2010; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Surplus produce from peasant farming is often sold to supplement household income. Peasant farmers rely mostly on household labour for agriculture production (Cousins, n.d.). Access to land and farm inputs, availability of household labour, favourable weather conditions, and conducive policies also determine the success of peasant farming in communal areas (Shanin, 1975; Ranger, 1983; Bryceson, 2000a; Matondi & Dekker, 2011;

---

<sup>1</sup> This emerged from interviews with local government officials during fieldwork.

Cousins, n.d.). Peasant farming is largely seasonal. When peasant farming is under siege for whatever reason, peasant households develop some forms of agency as creative strategies to cope with adversities (Chiumbu & Musemwa, 2012). Notably, peasants vary in space and time, and can be differentiated amongst themselves into the rich and poor categories (Ranger, 1983; Cousins, 1990). My assumption was that the established way of life based on peasant farming in the peri-urban communal area of Domboshava is under siege and no longer holds because of increased land transactions and influx of migrants. My interest therefore is to explore what happened to survival strategies of peasant households that experienced land transactions within this peri-urban communal area in contemporary Zimbabwe.

During the decade of crisis in contemporary Zimbabwe, survival in general was negatively impacted by a number of factors inter alia resource scarcities, drought, the 'unfinished business' on land, as well as political and economic maelstroms (Chiumbu & Musemwa, 2012). In Zimbabwe, the decade of crisis constitutes a period when the country experienced an economic meltdown between the year 2000 and 2010. This period coincides with the global decade of crisis when many countries of the world encountered economic downturn, and when household incomes and living standards particularly of the poor decreased significantly (Human Development Report, 2013). Migration into zones of comparative advantage within and between spaces was one of the coping mechanisms adopted by many people. Migration is the movement of people between the urban and rural zones, and at times within these zones (Bekker, 2002; Potts, 2012). People tend to move from relatively poor regions to better-off regions in a bid to enhance their chances of improved access to resources and opportunities (Bekker, 2002). Urban areas are often considered as better-off compared to rural areas (Bekker & Therborn, 2012). However, this is a general trend and it is not universal. People may choose to stay in or move to poor regions for a variety of reasons as the case in most peri-urban areas today (Berry, 2011). Migration of people between the rural and urban areas blurs the rural-urban divide (Bekker, 2002; Lynch, 2005; Berry, 2011). This also creates reciprocal linkages between these spaces (Bekker, 2002; Tacoli, 2008; Allen, 2010).

## **1.6 The peri-urban communal area of Domboshava**

The peri-urban communal area of Domboshava is situated twenty kilometres northeast of Harare (see Figure 1.1 below).



Figure 1.1: The location of Domboshava

Source: The Department of Surveyor General (2012).

In terms of local governance, Domboshava is considered as a rural area, and falls under traditional authority and a local authority called Goromonzi Rural District Council (GRDC). Land in Domboshava falls under communal land tenure system, and is administered under the system of customary land tenure. A combination of statutes on land and settlement, and local customs and tradition legally constitute the structure that regulates access to land in this peri-urban communal area. The prevalence of land transactions in Domboshava presents complex institutional challenges on this structure. My interest is in interrogating the dynamics of land transactions, how local residents perceive RDP largely regarded as a solution to land transactions, and the influence of both land transactions and RDP on household survival strategies during a census decade from 2002 to 2012.

Land in Domboshava is deemed by the local authorities as non-tradable, untitled, and of no market value (CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002). In contrast, Harare is urban, and its periphery is rural. Land in Harare is administered through local authorities referred to as Urban District Councils and municipalities (City of Harare (Private) Act Chapter 29:04 of 1983). Land in

Harare has a market value, is titled, and therefore is tradable (Ibid). It is outside the scope of this study to look into land issues in Harare. However, a reflection on the relationships between Harare and Domboshava as geographical locations situated in proximity to each other is critical. Domboshava as one of Harare's peri-urban settlements is influenced by the location of Harare in many ways due to irresistible forces of urbanization and migration.

The focus of this research is on four villages of Domboshava - Zimbiru, Mungate, Murape, and Chogugudza. Two important kinds of households were identified in Domboshava. These are tribal and migrant households. The word 'tribe' often carries derogatory connotations due to its colonial origins linked to "savages" (Ranger, 2000:250). However, tribes can be viewed as cultural units that possess a common language and are rooted in social systems based on kinship, hereditary membership, and genealogical relationships (ibid). In this research, the term 'tribe' simply defines a group of people living together as a community who share a distinct culture (Amin *et al.*, 1997). Latham (1965: ii) defines a community as a locality or a geographic entity whose boundaries are defined and recognized by the people that live in it, where there are a number of institutions that serve the basic needs and a sense of togetherness, and where people have a potential to work together in matters of common need. In this research, I characterize a community as "a group of persons whose rights to land are derived from shared rules determining access to land held in common by such a group" (Cousins, 2008b:109). I also make reference to the culture of the Shona (Holleman, 1952; Bullock, 1972; Bourdillon, 1976).

The community of Domboshava constitutes tribal and migrant residents. This classification is important because Domboshava is deemed to be rural where customary land rights belong to tribal members. Tribal households are those with historically sanctioned rights to communal land under the system of customary land tenure. Tribal members comprise individuals born and bred in Domboshava often with a lengthy lineage history to this area. Tribal households and their members are presumed to 'own' land (in communal areas) that supposedly belongs to their ancestors (Holleman, 1952; Bullock, 1972; Bourdillon, 1976). They are the agents with extensive knowledge about the local structures in terms of tradition and customs that constitute the system of customary land tenure, and how land rights within these structures can be accessed and disposed of. In Domboshava, tribal members refer to themselves as '*vana vemuno*' - meaning 'original inhabitants of this community' in vernacular Shona. Holleman (1952:24) and Bourdillon (1976:41) refer to original descendants of tribal members

as “*chizvarwa*” or “*zvizvarwa*”. The tribal status is therefore associated with individuals’ long-term autochthonous relationship with particular land parcels, belonging, as well as ‘ownership’ of land in this rural area (cf. Berry, 2011). By virtue of their tribal identity and land claims through descent from the original inhabitants and ‘owners’ of land in Domboshava, tribal households and their members practice peasant farming if they so wish, and are able to bequeath land. Thus, tribal land rights create economic, symbolic, and emotional relevance for tribal households in many rural communities such as Domboshava (cf. Anseeuw & Alden, 2010).

On the other hand, migrants are outsiders without legitimate lineage land rights in Domboshava. Migrants constitute a diverse group of strangers in terms of aspects such as place of origin, language, culture, and ethnicities. Migrant households migrated from elsewhere to live in this communal area. Migrants are referred to as ‘*vanhu ava*’ by tribal members of Domboshava - meaning ‘those people’ in vernacular Shona. Migrants nevertheless acquired land sometimes within the system of customary land tenure, but in most cases outside these parameters in part because of the actions of ‘greedy’<sup>2</sup> TLs - thereby reproducing the social and economic character of the peri-urban communal area. Migrants that access land rights through land transactions are also labelled variously and adopt new identities. Cousins (1990) refers to them as migrants or outsiders. Berry (1992; 2002) refers to them as strangers as well as migrants. Chimhowu & Woodhouse (2006) refer to them as aliens, incomers, and squatters. In Zimbabwe, a squatter is an unauthorized land user (TLA Chapter 29:17 of 2001). The term ‘squatter’ has its origin in the colonial era (Cheater, 1983). From the culture of the Shona, migrants are simply ‘*vatorwa*’, meaning sojourners or foreigners in vernacular Shona (Holleman, 1952:15; Mujere, 2011:1127).

The various labels assigned to the tribal/migrant households define their residence status. This provides the basis for analyzing forms of social and class differentiation in this communal area. Tribal membership entails legitimation and the ability to exercise authority particularly over land and other resources both at individual and collective levels in this community. This sets the “complex cultural politics” of processes that regulate land transactions and creates new forms of “identities, identifications, and sense of belonging” (Scoones *et al.*, 2011b:12). Social differentiation between migrant and tribal members

---

<sup>2</sup> This term was used by some tribal members during interviews in Domboshava.

originates from the indigeneity or autochthony posited as the basis for land claims and tenure rights, as well as belonging (Peters, 2007). These relationships are significant in shaping and reconstructing the terms and conditions on the practice of customary land tenure rights in Domboshava. Positioning tribal members on one hand and migrants on the other is important because migrants constitute a category of ‘other’ land rights holders in Domboshava. The “rights and obligation of migrants are different from those of indigenes” (Berry, 1992:336). Thus, tribal members and migrants are capable of inventing traditions as far as land transactions are concerned (cf. Ranger, 2000).

### **1.7 Why land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies in Domboshava?**

Nyambara (2001) found out that there are limited investigations on processes involved in land transactions in communal areas of Zimbabwe. Chimhowu & Woodhouse (2010) add that there are few detailed studies on land transactions undertaken in Southern Africa. It is also claimed that little work has been done to characterize residents living and working in peri-urban areas, and how they perceive themselves and their environment (Lacatelli & Nugent, 2009). Generally, there is little academic literature on peri-urban localities (McGregor *et al.*, 2006). As such, greater attention is needed to problematize land transactions in peri-urban areas, as well as the evolution of innovative arrangements used by different people to secure land rights in these areas (Toulmin & Quan, 2000). My assumption was that there are customary set rules on accessing land rights that operate separately for tribal and migrants in Domboshava. These rules define the context in which tribal and migrants should act insofar as land transactions are concerned. Land transactions are conceptualized within a broader framework of the evolving political economy of land tenure and access to land rights in Domboshava as a result of urbanization and migration. Often, these issues are investigated in isolation from RDP and household survival strategies. My interest is therefore to investigate the mutual influences that arise from the interaction of these concepts in Domboshava. Studies on land transactions in communal areas are not new. They stretch back to the colonial era (Holleman, 1952; Bullock, 1972; Bourdillon, 1976; Cheater, 1999). Cousins (1990:18) reveals that:

“Outsiders may also gain access to land by petitioning the allocating authority and by pleading need. This may be accompanied by the payment of a “gift”, a practice which according to Holleman (1952) was widespread in the 1940s and 1950s, and survives in some areas today. A household leaving a village, ... may negotiate the “sale” of buildings and other



“improvements” on their homestead site to an outsider, who then in practice also takes over the arable land of the departing household. Cash payments of the order of several hundred dollars have been reported. These negotiations appear to involve the granting of permission by kraalheads in the role of land allocation authority”.

Moyo (1995) also acknowledges the existence of the practice of commoditization of land and other resources in communal areas of Zimbabwe. Nyambara (2001) describes strategies used by tribal and migrant members to exchange land outside formal procedures in Gokwe communal lands. This study established that land transactions were a reaction of tribal members of Gokwe against a proposed RDP on villagization. Saruchera (2002) highlights problems of land transactions, conflict, and natural resource management in Domboshava communal area. Dzingirai (2003) describes land transactions in the Binga communal area of Zimbabwe. In this study, land transactions emerge as a reaction by communal residents against a development project on wildlife conservation. Community residents of Binga perceived the project as forced upon them by the RDC and the project developer, and therefore reacted to and rejected the project through selling communal land to migrants (Dzingirai, 2003). In another case, Matondi & Dekker (2011) report the practice of land transactions in Madziwa and Bushu communal areas in Mashonaland Central Province of Zimbabwe. Chimhowu & Woodhouse (2010) also reveal the practice of land transactions in Svosve communal area of Zimbabwe, and their implication on rural livelihoods from a rural area’s perspective. The study describes the economic and political dynamics underlying land sales and rentals in Svosve. Potts (2008) and Marongwe (2008) mention probable land transactions taking place in Domboshava because of the exodus of migrant households from commercial farms after their displacement through the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) of 2000, as well as from Harare through Operation Murambatsvina/Operation Restore Order (OM/ORO) in 2005. Elsewhere in similar cases, Maxwell *et al.* (1998) focus on peri-urban land use change, property rights, and livelihoods in Ghana; while Owusu (2008) characterizes land transactions in the light of land scarcity also in Ghana. In Cameroon, Gonne (2010) reveals the problems of land tenure and land transactions faced by rural residents of Diamare Plain.

Although the above studies provide insightful literature on land transactions, there is a dearth of studies that explore mutual influences from interaction *between* land transactions, perceptions of RDP, and household survival strategies in peri-urban communal areas - my

study seeks to reveal. My background in rural and urban planning, as well as my experience in socio-economic impact assessments of development projects in communal areas of Zimbabwe inspired me to undertake this research. I am familiar with development policies, land, and household livelihoods in Zimbabwe. In particular, I am familiar with the peri-urban communal area of Domboshava which I have visited on a number of occasions. My personal background, professional experience, and social relations remain critical in methodological considerations, motivations on the nature of research questions asked, as well as the process of conceptualizing this research (cf. Ravitch & Riggan, 2012). It is a common cause that decisions on the research designs is influenced by the stance of the researcher (Maxwell, 1996). Substantial consideration was therefore made not to impose personal assumptions and values in the discussions.

### **1.8. Problem statement and focus**

Land transactions outside the system of customary land tenure are on the increase in Domboshava. Since Rural Development Policy (RDP) appears officially to be regarded as a solution to land transactions in this peri-urban communal area, what mutual influences emerged from the complex interactions *between* land transactions, perceptions of RDP, and household survival strategies? This research problem is addressed by the following research questions:

- i. What are the dynamics of land transactions in the peri-urban communal area of Domboshava from 2002 to 2012?
- ii. What are the community residents' perceptions of RDP in the peri-urban communal area of Domboshava?
- iii. What types of household survival strategies are developing in Domboshava?
- iv. What mutual influences emerged from the interactions *between* land transactions, perceptions of RDP, and household survival strategies?

This research is an original contribution to the understanding of conditions and processes embedded in land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies in peri-urban communal areas of Zimbabwe. The thesis is an important and revealing study on key processes and on the fundamental changes in the character of 'customary' land tenure system in the peri-urban areas of Zimbabwe and Africa more generally. Addressing the above research questions updates knowledge and debates on the complex interactions between these

variables not only in Domboshava and in Zimbabwe, but also in the African region, particularly sub-Saharan Africa. The findings are informative and revealing on these poorly understood phenomena, and are useful in generating capacity and strengthening the political will of local authorities in Zimbabwe to implement appropriate development policies in peri-urban communal spaces situated on the outskirts of expanding cities. Since this research deploys well-known theories and concepts on social systems, it frames real life issues on land transactions, RDP, and their implications on household survival strategies in Domboshava.

## **1.9 Structure of the thesis**

This thesis is an aggregate of eight chapters that contribute to addressing the research problem in distinct ways. Through highlights from a preliminary literature review, this introductory chapter sets the tone as background to the thesis. The preliminary literature review critically contextualizes and problematizes the key issues under study in terms of land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies in communal areas situated close to burgeoning cities - the peri-urban. Chapter 2 focuses on developing a conceptual framework to investigate the case of Domboshava. The chapter situates the adopted key concepts through an extensive review of literature on colonial and post-colonial processes, as well as the changes in land issues in sub-Saharan Africa and in Zimbabwe. The chapter provides the theoretical underpinnings selected for this research. Chapter 3 presents an historical narrative on land, policy, and household survival issues while reflecting on the colonial and post-colonial periods of Zimbabwe. The main thrust is on positioning the study area (Domboshava) in relation to Harare and the broader context of Zimbabwe. Chapter 4 is a description of methods adopted in my study. It presents a narrative on the investigation of sensitive issues such as land transactions in a politically and constantly changing peri-urban context. These methods are not a series of logical activities, but rather a product of an iterative and interactive process within a framework that seeks to reveal the complex relationships between land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies. Chapter 5 as the first substantive chapter highlights the dynamics on land transactions in Domboshava - my first research question. The analysis focuses on the influence of RDP and household survival strategies on land transactions. Chapter 6 brings to the fore the community residents' perceptions of RDP - my second research question. The chapter highlights the confusing, conflicting, and broad nature of what is perceived as RDP in Domboshava. The focus is on an evaluation of the influence of land transactions and household survival strategies on RDP.

Chapter 7 reveals the emergent household survival strategies in Domboshava - my third research question. The analysis focuses on the influence of land transactions and RDP on household survival strategies. Chapter 8 concludes the research by addressing the mutual influences that emerged from the interactions *between* land transactions, perceptions of RDP, and household survival strategies - my fourth research question. The chapter provides the complex interplay between these variables within the peri-urban communal area of Domboshava - my research goal.

CODESRIA - LIBRARY

## Chapter 2 Developing a conceptual framework

### 2.1 Introduction

The historical, political, and economic contexts within which land issues are experienced and take place vary significantly from country to country (Toulmin & Quan, 2000; Peters, 2004). Land is a multifunctional and multidimensional physical resource at the heart of complex processes that define territories and regions (Anseeuw & Alden, 2010). The value of land in communal areas is embedded in the social and cultural identity of its users (Walker, 2008; Carruthers, 2010; Anseeuw & Alden, 2010). A careful analysis on ways in which land can be accessed, the nature of social relationships embedded in these processes, and how survival dynamics of people are shaped and reshaped along the way is therefore vital.

In peri-urban zones, trends on land transactions of most African cities are a clear indication of how the systems that regulate access to land are failing to cope with the rapid demand and competition for land (Peters & Kambewa, 2007). Simultaneously, land issues in these zones remain largely connected to the practice of Rural Development Policy (RDP) - as this policy is regarded a solution to problems linked to land and livelihoods (Mutizwa-Mangiza & Helmsing, 1991; Fair, 1992; Zinyama *et al.*, 1992; Nyambara, 2001; Potts, 2011). It is against this background that my research seeks to reveal the mutual influences that emerge from interactions *between* land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies in the Domboshava peri-urban communal area - the scope of my study.

This chapter provides an overview of the relevant literature within both an historical (colonial and post-colonial) as well as geographical (sub-Saharan Africa) context. In some instances, examples from elsewhere are cited. By so doing, the chapter will introduce and clarify a number of key concepts<sup>3</sup> (listed below in a footnote) to be used later in the substantive chapters. This chapter moreover will introduce the theoretical approaches that are used in the substantive chapters, and closes with a brief preview of how the Domboshava case study will be analyzed historically, geographically, and theoretically.

---

<sup>3</sup> (1) Land transactions - land, land tenure, land rights, traditional authority, inheritance, communal land tenure, customary land tenure, 'living' customary land tenure, common property resources, gender; (2) RDP - policy implementation, strategies, programmes, projects (3) household survival strategies - peasant farming, peasant farmers, livelihoods, depeasantization; (4) rural, urban, peri-urban.

This chapter comprises three major sections. After this introduction, the second section summarizes scholarly debates on land tenure systems in sub-Saharan Africa, and shifts during the processes in particular of colonization and of urbanization. The discussion centres on: the colonial influences and colonial policies on land tenure systems in sub-Saharan Africa; the complex nature of land tenure in the post-colonial period in sub-Saharan Africa; post-colonial land tenure reforms in sub-Saharan Africa; dynamics of land rights and secure rights of tenure in sub-Saharan Africa; land transactions in peri-urban areas in sub-Saharan Africa; RDP, and land tenure debates; and livelihoods and household survival strategies in rural and peri-urban areas in sub-Saharan Africa.

The third section brings to the fore the theories and approaches used in data analysis and these are - Giddens' structuration theory; and Hirschman's exit, voice, and loyalty model. The chapter concludes by presenting a conceptual framework adopted in my study, that is, the Land - Policy - Survival (LPS) dialectical framework of analysis. This conceptual framework presents an argument on why this research is important, and how the research problem and the research questions will be addressed.

## **2.2 An overview of land and the land tenure systems in sub-Saharan Africa**

De Soto (2000) views untitled land (such as in most rural areas) as 'dead capital'. However, land in most rural sub-Saharan Africa is laden with multiple definitions and carries great social and symbolic value and meanings as a place and territory within which people live and interact. Berry (2008:27) in Peters (2010:604) defines land in institutional and physical terms, as property. She views land as an economic resource that can be valued as a means of production, a territory, and a governed space that gives those in control advantage to control others. Tacoli (1999) also views land as a critical concept in peri-urban debates where multiple land uses and land users are apparent. The categories of land users can be differentiated through gender, age, and class.

Dynamics that regulate access to land as a resource, property, or territory in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa as described above - the land tenure system - is as old as human kind itself. Access refers to social and political relations that mediate acquisition of land and is critical for the survival of community residents (Quan & Payne 2008; Mutopo, 2011). All land tenure systems exist in a wider political, social, and economic context (Cliffe *et al.*,

2011). The history of land tenure systems in Sub-Saharan Africa is about the socio-economic and political dynamics on accessing and 'owning' land (Cheater, 1990). In ancient times, land tenure systems were characterized by exploitation of land mainly for livelihoods as little exchange in land was experienced at that time, and land was vested in social groupings such as chiefdoms (Okoth-Ogendo, 2008). In contemporary sub-Saharan Africa, land tenure systems are characterized by the dynamics and institutional arrangements under which people can gain access to land (Toulmin, & Quan, 2000). These institutional arrangements entail rights, restrictions, and responsibilities held by people in relation to land (Chome & McCall, 2005). Land tenure systems thus provide the conditions and terms on which land can be accessed, held, used, and transacted (Adams *et al.*, 1999). Quan & Payne (2008) also describe land tenure systems as the way by which land is held or 'owned' by individuals or groups, as well as the nature of relationships the individuals have with land. Adams *et al.* (1999) refer to land tenure as a set of rights that a person or a group holds to land. It concerns who can use which resources, for how long, and under what conditions including the right to occupy, transact, and to exclude others from using particular land parcels (Ibid). Rukuni (1998) in Matondi & Dekker (2011:3) summarizes these rights as use, transfer, exclusion, and enforcement rights. These land rights are embedded in social, political, cultural processes, and relations that characterize institutions and systems of social production and exchange (Chauveau & Colin, 2010).

Land tenure rights are socially or legally recognized entitlements to access, use, and control of land parcels as well as the allied natural resources (Quan & Payne, 2008). Land rights involve people (as individuals or groups) and their relationships to land as well as the requisite responsibilities (Simbizi *et al.*, 2014). Thus, land tenure sets the guidelines on how land rights are constituted and secured within societies (Smith, 2008). The system of land tenure therefore does not only call for the observance of land rights, but the obligation to reflect on the collective and multiple nature of the land use rights. Often, this is difficult to achieve due to diversity of interests among the land users. More often than not, people as individuals or in their collective form (as communities) choose to ignore the set guidelines. In my study, I conceptualize land tenure and land tenure systems as social relations and a product of these relations (see Peters, 2004; Cousins, 2007). The concepts of land tenure systems and land tenure rights are inseparable and often used interchangeably in land debates. In the next subsection, I therefore expose how the land tenure systems in sub-Saharan Africa were mediated through colonial and post-colonial policies and experiences.

### 2.2.1 Influence of colonial policies on land tenure systems in sub Saharan-Africa

Imposition of colonial rule on many African states institutionalized changes on land tenure systems with regards to control and access of land and other resources (Cousins, 1990; Berry, 1992; Cheater, 1999; Zinyama, 1992; Okoth-Ogendo, 2008). These conditions were adopted and adapted to suit the colonial agenda amid the local dynamics of survival and interaction of the indigenous populations (Mamdani, 2000; Cousins, 2007b). The colonial socio-economic ideas on land tenure recognized people (families, kinships, chiefdoms, communities, individuals) as having interests and rights to the same piece of land, while the state remained the ultimate owner of the land (Berry, 1992; Peters, 1994; McAuslan, 2000).

In sub-Saharan Africa, the colonial systems of land tenure sought to consolidate colonial power over the colonies, and this was central to direct and indirect rule (Bull, 1967; Ranger, 1983; Palmer, 1977; Mamdani, 2000; Berry, 2011). According to Mamdani (2000:100),

“Direct rule was based on the presumption of a single legal order that was formulated in terms of the received colonial (‘modern’) law. Its other side was the nonrecognition of ‘native’ institutions ... It involved ... the appropriation of land, the destruction of communal autonomy, the defeat and dispersal of ‘tribal’ populations, and creation of subject peasant populations”.

Colonial land tenure “was the foundation of native rule” (Berry, 1992:342). For example, in South Africa, colonial land tenure marked land dispossession of the blacks by the dominant white minority (Mamdani, 2000; Cousins, 2008a). The blacks were resettled in Bantustans (Walker, 2003). In Zimbabwe, the colonial power institutionalized a dual system of land tenure along the black/white racial divisions, and created native reserves to pave way for white commercial farms (Bull, 1967; Palmer, 1977; Cheater, 1983; Ranger, 1983; Zinyama & Whitlow, 1986; Palmer, 1990; Zinyama, 1992; Cheater, 1999; Alexander, 2006; Thebe, 2010; Scoones *et al.*, 2011). The blacks were relocated to remote areas with severely limited agricultural potential and services (Ranger, 1983; Zinyama, 1992; Kinsey, 2010; Thebe, 2010). Thus, African reserves in both South Africa and Zimbabwe were created by the colonial settlers as forms of authority, and as a way of consolidating colonial interests on land. Colonial rule used the system of land tenure to create a bifurcated state of citizens and subjects, and the linkages were rather coercive (Mamdani, 1996).



On the other hand, indirect rule was effected through institutionalization of traditional authority in land administration parallel to the state (Cousins, 2008a). The notion of traditional authority in land tenure issues is therefore a creation of the colonial state (Andersson, 1999; Mamdani, 2000; Alexander, 2006). Colonial powers in most sub-Saharan Africa introduced and imposed new forms of authority and economic organization through the installation of Chiefs who were instrumental in the collection of a land-tax (Berry, 1992; Mamdani, 2000; McAuslan, 2000; Alexander, 2006). The colonial powers installed Chiefs even in places where traditional chiefdoms were nonexistent (Migot-Adholla & Bruce, 1994). Chiefs as Traditional Leaders (TLs) were accorded significant power over the allocation of land as a means of policing and controlling their tribesmen on behalf of the state (McAuslan, 2000; Alexander, 2006; Thebe, 2010). Traditional Leaders commonly referred to as the native authorities took charge of “managing the local state apparatus ... the source of the law was the very authority that administered it” (Mamdani, 2000:102). Traditional Leaders such as chiefs became an integral component of the “administrative convenience” of the state (Migot-Adholla & Bruce, 1994:7). The colonial settlers used traditional authority and adapted it to suit their own needs as it became part of the colonial rule and ceased to be part of a traditional society (Berry, 1992; McAuslan, 2000; Alexander, 2006). According to Mamdani (2000:102):-

“the functionary of the local state apparatus was everywhere called the ‘Chief’... the Chief was not only a person who had the right to pass rules (bye-laws) governing persons living under his domain, he also executed all laws and was the administrator in ‘his’ area in which he settled disputes. The authority of the Chief thus placed in a single person all moments of power: judicial, legislative, executive and administrative”.

Within these dynamics of indirect rule, many TLs in Africa were co-opted and coerced into forming the lowest rung of administrative structure accountable to the state (Mamdani, 1996). For example in Botswana, the traditional kingdoms under traditional authority were changed to tribal reserves under Chiefs, and these were later referred to as districts (Peters, 1994). Colonial administration in Botswana was meant to strengthen kingship as an instrument for indirect rule, and as a way of alienating property rights that were only pronounced by the colonial administrator (Peters, 2010). The traditional system of authority in communal areas of Zimbabwe for example, was also a creation of the colonial state (Goldin & Gelfand, 1975, Cheater 1990; Cousins, 1990; Dzingirayi, 2003; Alexander, 2006). The role of TLs such as Chiefs was to enforce coercive colonial principles on land, labour, and law (Alexander,

2006). For example, Chiefs were in charge of growing of appropriate crops, implementation of 'good' farming practices, and collection of tax inter alia land-tax, hut-tax, man-tax, cattle-tax, as well as eviction of land-tax defaulters (Cheater, 1983; Ranger, 1983).

### 2.2.2 The complex nature of land tenure in the post-colonial period in sub-Saharan Africa

In contemporary sub-Saharan Africa, multiple land tenure systems exist predominantly in rural or communal areas (Cousins, 2000; Peters, 2007). The current land tenure systems are deeply rooted in statutory principles that are part of the colonial legacy - the land law, received law or modern law - and these are a creation of the colonial states (McAuslan, 2000; Mamdani, 2000; Peters, 2004; Alexander, 2006; Peters, 2007; Bennett, 2008; Cousins, 2008b; Okoth-Ogendo, 2008; Thebe, 2010; Berry, 2011). Negligible adjustments were made on the land law to suit local circumstances (McAuslan, 2000; Quan, 2000a; Musandu-Nyamayaro, 2008). However, in practice the principles remain the same (Berry, 2002; Musandu-Nyamayaro, 2008). Thus, the diversity of land laws in most sub-Saharan Africa presents attempts by the states to provide regulatory mechanisms adoptable in all communities regardless of the diversity of customs and traditions in the rural contexts (Mamdani, 2000).

The Euro-centric approach to systems of land tenure in many African countries today provides the statutory principles for the separation of what is owned from the physical substance of land itself (McAuslan, 2000). The statutory principles or simply land law stipulate that what is owned is not the land itself, but the interest in land constitutive of bundles of land rights (Ibid). Under these conditions, "land belongs to the state and not individuals. People can only assume rights to land and not ownership" (McAuslan, 2000:81). The state is therefore the land, and conversely the land is the state (Adams *et al.*, 1999). Words such as rights, power, and interest suffice in relation to land tenure in most sub-Saharan Africa and not 'ownership' (Bennett, 2008). Clearly, land 'ownership' is vested in the state, whereas individuals retain rights to access and use land under these conditions.

There exist many systems of land tenure in sub-Saharan Africa. These include freehold, leasehold, communal, customary (Quan & Payne, 2008). Land under freehold tenure is "held by an authority of a title deed such as a private individual, institution, or the state, whereas land under leasehold is occupied under an agreement or a lease by private individuals, public

body or the state” (Matondi & Dekker, 2011:1). Of interest to my research are the communal and customary land tenure systems. Communal land tenure is a mixture of tenure rights, uses, and user obligations ranging from individuals, groups, and nation states (Cousins, 2000). Communal land tenure is a form of property rights clearly distinct from that of individuals (Cousins, 2000; 2008b). All members of a group have rights of access to communal land since it is held in common jointly by a group of people (Cousins, 2000; Bennett 2008; Cousins, 2008b).

The notion of communal land rights and access to land under the communal system of land tenure in sub-Saharan Africa is however variable, contingent, and relevant to social and political contexts in which it is applied (Sjaastad & Cousins 2008). For example in West Africa, several systems of land tenure co-exist with none completely dominating the other, and there are no legal land holding rights that exist among community residents (Delville, 2000). In South Africa communal land tenure is defined in Chapter 1 of the Communal Lands Rights Act (CLRA) 11 of 2004 of South Africa as, “land occupied or used by members of a community subject to the rules or custom of the community” (Cousins, 2008b:109). In Zimbabwe, communal land is administered through a plethora of Acts including the Communal Lands Act (CLA) Chapter 20:04 of 2002, TLs Act (TLA) Chapter 29:17 of 2001, the Regional Town and Country Planning Act (RTCPA) Chapter 29:12 of 2001, and the Rural District Council Act (RDCA) Chapter 29:13 of 2002. The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Number 20 Act of 2013 section 332 (b) (iii) defines communal land as “land set aside under an Act of Parliament and held in accordance with customary law by members of a community under the leadership of a Chief”. The CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002 defines communal land as, “land which immediately before the 1<sup>st</sup> of February 1983 was Tribal Trust land ... vested in the President who shall permit it to be occupied and be used.” The administration of communal land is thus enabled through the Constitution of Zimbabwe and the Acts of Parliament (statutes). The Rural District Councils (RDCs) as the local authorities administer these Acts on behalf of the state on one hand, together with traditional authorities (Chiefs, Headmen, and Village Heads (VHs)) on the other hand. Both the state and traditional authorities hold important roles in land administration of Zimbabwe.

Communal land tenure in Zimbabwe provides for access and use of land parcels to residents in communal areas as individuals and as collectives. Communal land in Zimbabwe like in most sub-Saharan Africa belongs to the state, and individuals lack rights to dispose of land at

will since 'communal' implies some form of collectivity (Cousins, 1990; Nyambara, 2001; Cousins, 2000; Bennett, 2008). This system of land tenure therefore represents sets of elusive relations often overlapping and nested with regards the rights to access land and other resources (Cousins, 2000; Cousins, 2007; Cousins, 2008b; Sjaastad & Cousins, 2008). This context in Zimbabwe like in most African countries does not only demonstrate pluralism of the communal land tenure system in terms of its content, but the legal pluralism in terms of statutory provisions that also regulate communal rights to land (Delville, 2000; Nyambara, 2001; Berry, 2002; Wehrmann, 2008; Cousins, 2009). However, in the minds of many land users in Zimbabwe and generally in most sub-Saharan Africa, "communal land belongs not to single individuals, but to a vast family of which many are dead, few are living and countless numbers are still unborn" (Berry, 1992:342; Chimhowu & Woodhouse 2006:349). This also shows polarization and overlapping of rights and institutions that regulate land with the state as the sole owner of the land on one hand, and community user groups on the other (Nyambara, 2001; Wehrmann, 2008; Cousins, 2009).

In most sub-Saharan African countries, land rights of local community residents are often overshadowed by provisions of codified statutory laws as these are applied concurrently with customary land tenure provisions (Delville, 2000). According to Adams *et al.* (2000), this situation is also apparent in Zimbabwe where communal tenure is not only providing a conflation of tenure regimes, but also interchangeably refers to customary land tenure. However, communal and customary land tenure systems do not necessarily mean the same (Cousins, 2009). They represent a dualism (Mamdani, 2000). The provisions and conditions for land use under communal and customary land tenure systems overlap. Customary land tenure like the communal tenure system defines the conditions on which land can be accessed, held, and used in most rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa. Peters (2004) views customary land tenure as a pre-colonial oral system on land rights merely put into writing through the land law. Customary land tenure is governed by land relations among the community members, and is viewed as tribal law or simply custom, and "its claim was not to guarantee rights but to enforce tradition" (Mamdani, 2000:101). Delville (2000:98) describes customary land tenure as "'procedural' and not codified". Written procedures on the practice of customary land tenure unlike communal land tenure are absent. Customary land tenure systems are largely shaped by local interests and institutions (O'Flaherty, 1998). Customary land tenure features cultural and religious symbolisms rooted in local customs and tradition of community residents as land 'ownership' is vested in local traditional authorities

(Christodoulou, 1990; Delville, 2000; Mamdani, 2000; Mathieu *et al.*, 2003; Wehrmann, 2008). These local traditions and customs define the context in which people “live their lives” (Giddens, 2001:643).

Individuals and collectives under customary land tenure assume rights to hold and use land without title (Moyo, 1995; Cousins, 2009). Customary land tenure systems do not define each person’s rights by which they access and obtain resources (Chauveau, 1998 in Delville, 2000:98). Customary land tenure implies collective rights to land, as well as other natural resources in communal areas (Cousins, 2009). Under customary land tenure, communal residents hold kinship rights to land, and they can always claim such rights even after their long absence from their communities (Christodoulou, 1990). The tenets of customary land tenure lie within the norms, beliefs, and values of communities often connected to ancestral spirits (Ibid). These principles of customary land tenure continue to apply in most rural sub-Saharan Africa even though the circumstances in terms of traditional authority, socio-economic conditions, and rights themselves are not universal, homogenous, and evolve over time (Delville, 2000).

In most cases, customary land tenure is viewed as informal, traditional, as well as separate from and opposed to the formal systems of tenure, that is, land law (Peters, 2004). However, what makes customary land tenure systems ‘formal’ is their grounding in land laws although customary land tenure systems are largely oral in form. This means that the concept of ‘customary’ applies to the official or statutory version of land tenure or land law that rests on tradition and “legitimacy from immemorial custom” (Ranger, 2000:250). Absence of written text as reference points therefore does not necessarily make customary land tenure ‘informal’ since land laws recognize the legitimacy of customs and traditions through statutes. For example in Zimbabwe, statutes on land and settlement together with the Constitution of Zimbabwe recognize customary land tenure as legal. Customary land tenure in Zimbabwe is defined through the custom of communities where it is applied, and in turn, these communities are definable and identifiable through such custom. Traditional Leaders remain the custodians of customary land tenure.

Administration of land and property rights under customary land tenure in communal areas in most sub-Saharan Africa is through both statutes (laws) and traditional system of authority. Under these circumstances, TLs have limited authority to administer land rights under

customary land tenure. For example, in South Africa and the post-independence era in Zimbabwe pursued changes on the colonial version of the role of TLs on land, as well as the land tenure in most rural areas commonly referred to as native reserves (Cliffe *et al.*, 2011). However, in the post-apartheid era in South Africa many TLs still derive their powers not only from tradition and custom, but also “from colonial and apartheid constructs embodied in previous laws” (Claassens, 2008:361). In Zimbabwe, the post-independence era also witnessed changes in the administrative role of traditional authorities on land as these roles were transferred to local authorities referred to as RDCs by the government (Cliffe *et al.*, 2011). Although these changes were institutionalized, the presence and the current roles of TLs as part of the state remain. For example, the Chiefs retain their legislative, judicial, executive, and administrative roles which they enmesh with tradition (cf. Mamdani, 2000). Chapter 15 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe institutionalizes these roles of TLs. However, the Constitution of Zimbabwe neither elaborates nor provides clear guidelines on how the traditional authorities and local authorities such as RDCs complement their roles particularly on land administration in communal areas.

In South Africa, traditional authorities comprise Headmen and Chiefs. In Zimbabwe, traditional authorities comprise Chiefs, Headmen, and VHs. In Ghana, TLs include Chiefs and community elders. Institutionalization of traditional authority and traditional leadership varies from country to country in sub-Saharan Africa, and is done in line with local tradition and custom. These traditional authorities do not necessarily derive their power from laws (statutes) *per se*, but from local tradition and custom, and are expected to observe the laws in the discharge of their duties (O’Flaherty, 1998). In South Africa, TLs administer land rights under the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (TLGFA) 41 of 2003 (Claassens, 2008; Love, 2008). In Ghana, the ‘non-interference in chieftaincy affairs’ policy is one of the important legal instruments used in the administration of communal land (Ubink, 2008 in Peters, 2010). The policy on ‘non-interference in chieftaincy affairs’ empowers TLs to act as they please, discharge political power, act as government ‘voter-brokers’, and thus the “fallacy of a strict division between ‘traditional’ leaders and modern government and party politics is clear” (Ubink, 2008 in Peters, 2010:606). In Ghana, Chiefs have more power to adjudicate on land issues (Crook, 2008 in Peters, 2010). In Zimbabwe, TLs perform their roles under the guidance of the TLA Chapter 29:17 of 2001. In most African countries, it is the role of local authorities to administer the statutes on land on behalf of the state. In Zimbabwe, it is the role of RDCs to administer communal land under

customary land tenure on behalf of the state. In this regard, it is therefore unlawful to allocate land without the collective consent of both the RDCs and TLs as the custodians of land on behalf of the state.

The relationships between the state and TLs on land administration under customary land tenure in sub-Saharan Africa vary from country to country. These relationships are localized, and are never homogeneous. Different countries vest different degrees of power and authority on TLs since African traditions, cultures, norms, values, and rituals are themselves divergent. The influence of statutory regulation on traditional authorities in most sub-Saharan Africa is never neutral (Claassens, 2008). Although the role of traditional authority is obscured by the role of the state through laws, their influence in land administration cannot be underestimated (Okoth-Ogendo). Struggles on land administration in communal areas clearly exist. Under these circumstances, the critical question that needs clarity is on 'who' has authority over land (Cousins, 2008a). Love (2008) views these struggles in terms of whose voices are heard, and whose are silenced. Berry (2002) relates the struggles to who should have access to land rights and the terms of reference on which the rights are exercised. I therefore conceptualize traditional authority as an institution that regulates access and allocation of land rights under customary land tenure comprising the VHs, Headmen, and the Chief.

While customary land tenure is definable through tradition and custom, these are not static; they keep changing from time to time and vary from place to place (Claassens, 2008). Traditions change to accommodate new circumstances (Ranger, 2000). This presents the notion of the 'living' customary tenure or the 'living' customary law within the nested and layered nature of customary land tenure (Mnisi, 2010). The 'living' customary law can be understood in contrast with the customary land law. For example, the 'living' customary law is referred to as the unofficial customary land law vs. the official customary land law; the not codified land law vs. the codified customary land law; the not fixed land law vs. the fixed customary land law; the indigenous customary land law vs. the foreign customary land law; the informally classified customary land law vs. the formally classified customary land law (Claassens, 2008). The contrasts that exist between the 'living' customary law and the customary land law are generally used to define and to characterize the 'living' customary law.

The 'living' customary law also provides for land rights in communal areas within the context, conditions, and circumstances in which local community residents live. It is far from being a series of precise rules, but an outcome from local negotiations (Delville, 2000; Peters, 2004; Peters, 2007). This law is also shaped by local systems and practices within local customs and traditions (Bennett, 2008). It demonstrates considerable flexibility, negotiability, and adaptability within the surrounding changing circumstances (Hilhorst, 2000; Delville, 2000; Quan, 2000, Peters, 2004; Peters, 2007; Oomen, 2005 in Sjaastad & Cousins, 2008). The 'living' customary law encompasses the resources that people use to argue their claims to land tenure rights, and these range from custom, statutory law, constitutional principles, development as a desired goal, and even the Bible (Oomen, 2005 in Sjaastad & Cousins, 2008:8). The 'living' customary land law is therefore not a "fixed body of formally classified and easily ascertainable rules ... by its very nature it evolves as the people who live by its norms change their patterns of life" (Claassens, 2008:360). What distinguishes the 'living' customary tenure from 'fixed' customary land tenure is its ability to adapt to change within the local conditions (Peters, 2004). Hilhorst (2000) and Quan (2000a) see the 'living' customary law as capable of responding to new needs and opportunities. Benjaminsen & Lund (2003) in Peters (2007:14) view the 'living' customary law as "informalization of the formal" customs and traditions. The 'living' customary law provides a new dispensation of a formal within a formalized informal customary system of land tenure (Okoth-Ogendo, 2008). Simply put, the 'living' customary law represents the 'formalization of the informal' customary land tenure.

The challenge on the 'living' customary law remains - customs, norms, rules, and values of societies are subject to infinite variations, and are neither universal nor homogeneous to communities (Bennett, 2008). Often these rules, norms, values, and customs provide 'unstandardized' guidance on how the system of the land tenure within the realms of the 'living' customary law are practiced and recognized through individuals' lived experiences - these are diverse. Local customs and traditions are also dynamic and always change in response to other social, economic, environmental, and political processes within communities (Christodoulou, 1990; Cousins, 2000; Benjaminisen & Sjaastad, 2010; Mathieu *et al.*, 2003; Peters, 2004). As a result, the 'living' customary law is susceptible to 'abuse' as individuals may take advantage of the variations that exist in customary practices for personal gain as procedures under this law are unwritten. For example, people can easily justify individualized land exchanges in communal areas under the guise of 'living' customary



procedures. Yet, rights to land under customary land law assist to exclude other people with competing interests from claiming interests on the land parcels in question (McAuslan, 2000). These circumstances also question the realities that surround the openness, negotiability, and adaptability of the 'living' customary tenure as 'abuse' of the system may lead to exclusion, and class divisions (Peters, 2007). For example, when collective land rights overlap with those of individuals, the weak and the vulnerable are disadvantaged - in most cases, these are women and children. This leads to deepening rifts among kin (Peters, 2007). Thus, the 'living' customary law becomes an obstacle and constraint to change (Hilhorst, 2000). The concept of 'living' customary tenure therefore remains ambiguous and difficult to characterize as a 'formal' or 'informal' system of land tenure. Its meaning is contingent on place and time as stressed by Claassens (2008:360-361) when she states that:

"the biggest challenge in applying the 'living' customary rests on - the content of a 'living' law that 'recognizes and acknowledges the changes continually taking place', especially in the context of widespread regional variety and competing versions within particular localities ... And in determining the content of living law, how does one avoid 'fixing' or 'codifying a particular version or rule, thereby closing down the competing constructs that animate change over time? The living law paradigm raises a series of questions about what constitutes law, for example, whether and at what point particular 'custom' or patterns of practice qualify as 'law'. Questions of both scale and timing arise: how widespread is the custom or practice, and at what point during the process of change and transition can an emerging practice be considered as a 'law'?"

In most sub-Saharan Africa, the 'living' customary law is not yet part of many land laws as with customary law. In South Africa, the 'living' customary law is legally recognized through the CLRA 11 of 2004, and the TLGFA of 41 of 2003 (Claassens, 2008). Although the 'living' customary law is legally constituted through these statutes in South Africa, there exist challenges in terms of how to establish the content of a 'living' customary law that is capable of recognizing and acknowledging the continuous change taking place in communities, aspects of regional variety, and competing versions of the law within particular communities (Mnisi, 2003). There exist enormous variations within which the 'living' customary law can be practiced, and there are no generalizations on the different versions of this law - they vary from individual to individual, community to community, as well as from region to region (Claassens, 2008). In Zimbabwe, the 'living' customary law is not legally constituted. It is

embedded within the nested layers of the customary land law that is governed through statutes on land as well as customs and traditions of various communities.

In order to address the research problem, the concept of land tenure is conceptualized within the domain of the customary law, and not the 'living' customary law. I am interested in distinguishing between two main categories of land transactions in my analysis - the customary and individualized land transactions - which are both not only applicable to the practice of land transactions in Domboshava, but in their combination characterize the 'living' customary law in communal areas of Zimbabwe. Customary land transactions are equated to inheritance, that is, the practice of bequeathing land and property before or after death, allowing for the establishment of new household formations by the descendants of the holders of property rights. Whereas, individualized land transactions are seen as comprising direct land sales, renting, as well as land grabs which grant land rights to outsiders (largely migrants) through monetary exchanges. Land grabs are not a result of the process of interaction, bargaining, or negotiation between land rights holders and others. Land grabs are categorized as individualized because they involve the seizing of the land of others without their consent thereby individualizing the land rights in question in that process. Both individualized land transactions such as extending land rights to migrants as well as customary land transactions such as inheritance are often possible within the system of customary land tenure in Zimbabwe, and have been so for a long time. What makes land transactions individualized is their deviation from the structure that regulates the process of land allocation to outsiders, that is, migrants - a move away from allocation of land to migrants that plead need on compassionate grounds. The 'living' customary system of land tenure is simply another form of invention of tradition on ways of allocating land that are rooted in codes and procedures of the land laws (cf. Ranger, 2000). However, the distinction between customary and individualized land transactions in some cases rests upon highly problematic assumptions many of which are collapsible within the system of customary land tenure itself.

Rather than making reference to the 'living' customary law - which can also be applied to the case of Domboshava - I will therefore stick to the customary/individualized distinction since I am looking at types of land transactions and how people practice these in terms of custom and statutes that regulate access to land rights and the implementation of RDP. It is critical to maintain this distinction because land transactions taking place in Domboshava can also be

characterized as taking place within the procedures of the 'living' customary law. As such, it is often difficult to characterize land transactions as customary or individualized within the realms of the 'living' customary law described as processual, flexible, adaptive, responsive to changing local conditions, and can be appreciated even outside the legal limits of the customary land procedures (Peters, 2004; Claassens, 2008). The application of the 'living' customary law can therefore prove difficult to distinguish customary from individualized land transactions in relation to not only the plurality of custom and tradition in communal areas such as Domboshava, but the plurality of statutes in terms of the nature of the state's land laws in Zimbabwe. However, the concept of the 'living' customary land tenure system remains important in the conceptualization and detailed analysis of land transactions within social systems because it makes central the question of 'whose voice counts?'. The 'living' customary land tenure system allows tensions and conflicts between different actors with varying degrees and sources of power to be analysed. Thus, the 'living' customary land tenure system presents a greater degree of individualization of land rights than the 'official' customary land tenure system. In this thesis, the distinction between customary and individualized land transactions will be retained. Examples and case studies will be selected to illustrate the fluidity of this distinction in line with the 'living' customary land tenure system.

Given the ambiguities and complexities that characterize the 'living' customary land tenure system and its lack of reference points within the codified statutes in Zimbabwe, the analysis of land transactions in Domboshava focuses on the customary land tenure system which has a legal basis in land laws and can therefore distinguish the individualized from customary land transactions. Customary land tenure carries and serves the same objectives as customary law (Tsikata & Whitehead, 2003). The terms customary law and customary land tenure are applied interchangeably to the subtle processes inherent in rules, norms, and customs of the community residents of Domboshava. Customary land law demonstrates the social order as well as the socially determined procedures in accessing land rights amid ever-changing political, social, demographic, and economic processes in this peri-urban communal area. In this regard, the system of customary land tenure allows actors (community residents) to exchange land within the official and codified land laws as specified in the statutes on land and settlement.

### 2.2.3 Post-colonial land tenure reforms in sub-Saharan Africa

The major focus of post-colonial states in sub-Saharan Africa were on redressing colonial imbalances on land with a desire for land allocation to all citizens (Toulmin & Quan, 2000). Cousins (2007) acknowledges that the central issues on land tenure reforms in Africa and elsewhere rests upon the recognition of land tenure rights distinguishable from colonial arrangements that are based on 'western-legal' principles on property rights to those characterized by traditional or pre-colonial property rights. In African countries such as Zimbabwe and South Africa, the major objectives of land tenure reforms were on redistribution of land rights and promotion of agriculture development (Zinyama, 1992; Cousins, 2008a; Marongwe, 2008; Okoth-Ogendo, 2008). Walker (2009:267-268) describes land tenure reform in South Africa as seeking to "redress past injustices, promote national reconciliation, support economic growth and alleviate household poverty". Cousins (2008a) also views the implementation of land tenure reforms in South Africa as a process that aims at correcting colonial imbalances for the benefit of the majority of South Africans, mainly the dispossessed rural poor.

Land tenure reforms entail implementation of amendments of the ways which people access, use, and control land (Smith, 2008). Often, governments are forced to come up with legislation or legal frameworks to facilitate the process of land reform (Okoth-Ogendo, 2008). Land tenure reforms take different initiatives from country to country depending on local commitment of nation states, for example, decentralization of land administration to lower level bodies, nationalization of state land, land-titling programmes, introducing formal land markets for commercial farmers, and creation of policies and institutional structures for management of the land reform (Migot-Adholla & Bruce, 1994; Marongwe, 2008; Okoth-Ogendo, 2008). For example after independence in Botswana, the District Land Boards were created to administer land issues (Peters, 2007). In Zimbabwe, institutionalization of RDCs as part of the decentralization initiatives is regarded as one of the major post-colonial initiatives in land administration that aimed at removing racial barriers in land access between the black Africans and white commercial farmers (Cousins, 1990; Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990; Zinyama, 1992; Paradza, 2010). Such "local government reforms were instituted to undo the territorial, administrative and social segregation of communal areas from former large scale commercial farming areas ..." (Moyo, 2013:30).

Other programmes on post-colonial tenure reform elsewhere include the agrarian collectivization in Mozambique, Tanzania, Angola, and Ethiopia (Qaun, 2000). The land tenure reform programmes in these countries aimed at conversion of private estates to state farms, and to promote cooperative association of peasant producers and some form of communal labour (Ibid). Countries such as Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe introduced the villagization programmes as part of post-colonial effort on tenure reform (Nyambara 2001; Razavi, 2003; Spierenburg, 2004). The villagization programmes entail relocation of households to spaces they could access more land for peasant farming. In Tanzania, the villagization programme aimed at relocation of rural population into concentrated rural settlement (Razavi, 2003). In South Africa, the land restitution programme between 1995 and 2000 is one of the major LRPs by the South African government that sought restoration of land rights to people who were dispossessed of their land during the colonial era (Walker, 2008; Cousins, 2008a; Walker, 2012). In Zimbabwe, the FTLRP of 2000 is also seen as a solution to land dispossession experienced in the colonial era (Moyo, 2004; Moyo & Yeros, 2005; Marongwe, 2008; Moyo, 2009; Scoones *et al.*, 2010; Moyo, 2013). The policy challenges of most LRPs rests on identification of land rights viz-à-viz categories of beneficiaries, as well as the dynamics and manner in which the rights should be secured (Cousins, 2007b; Marongwe, 2008; Scoones *et al.*, 2010; 2011a; 2011b; 2011c).

Land Reform Programmes are often criticized for failure to secure the rights of the intended beneficiaries. For example, the LRPs in South Africa and Zimbabwe have been criticized by a number of experts on land and agrarian studies. Walker (2012:809) describes the land restitution programme in South Africa as:

“in disarray as a result of its failure to deliver set targets, although the success of the programme in the eyes of the government can be viewed in terms of: the number of claims processed, hectares of land restored and financial compensation paid out ... at least since the early 2000s when the number of settled claims began to increase dramatically. From just 1 651 claims settled by early 2000, the number had reached 73 433 by 2006. In the late 2010 the CRLR reported that 75 800 claims were settled, out of the approximately 80 000 restitution claim forms that were counted as officially lodged at that stage, thereby benefitting approximately 325 000 households at a total cost of R21.6billion.”

Walker (2009; 2012) views the benefits from the land restitution programme in South Africa as minimal. In the case of Zimbabwe, Marongwe (2008) and Scoones *et al.* (2010; 2011a; 2011b; 2011c) identify omissions in beneficiary selection as one of the weaknesses of the

FTLRP. The FTLRP is described as chaotic due to the way it was implemented. Implementation of the FTLRP in Zimbabwe was marred by violence, corruption and legal contestations (Chaumba *et al.*, 2003; Walker, 2005; Marongwe, 2008; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011; Helliker & Murisa, 2011; Hanlon *et al.*, 2013). On the other hand, the LRP in Kenya is described as one of the success stories in Africa through introduction of formal land titles that grant individual leases and land registration as a way of promoting efficient land markets and agricultural investments (Quan, 2000). Kenya is the only country in sub-Saharan Africa that implemented individual titling to land in communal areas (Cliffe *et al.*, 2011). The cases described above clearly demonstrate that the prerequisites for successful LRPs in most instances lie not only in the distribution of land to the poor, but rather in the political will of the governments particularly on programme implementation (Bergmann, 1984 in Lieten, 1990). Programmes on land titling often exacerbate class differences between the rich and the poor as the rich are likely to benefit by displacing the poor in most cases women (Toulmin & Quan, 2000).

Many sub-Saharan Africa LRPs also face challenges of different kinds, and these vary from country to country. These challenges emerge from the plurality of the system of land tenure that provides for the duality between statutory law and tradition (Berry, 2002; Okoth-Ogendo, 2008). Within these two categories of tenure lie contradicting and often conflicting rights to land (Ibid). For example, cases of RDCs in Zimbabwe and the Land Boards in Botswana versus traditional authorities in these countries (see Quan, 2000b). Such tensions on land administrations are also evident in South Africa where statutory law and traditional authority compete for rights to control and 'own' land. Thus, the land question and tenure reforms in post-colonial Africa signify competing claims to authority on control over land (Berry, 2002). These circumstances often lead to unsanctioned land exchanges in various communities.

#### 2.2.4 Dynamics of land property rights in sub-Saharan Africa

The definition of property originates from a Latin word "*proprius*" and a French word "*proprete*" meaning - "something of one's own" (Peters, 1994:13). Access to property rights is vital to people's survival dynamics. Land rights entail interests that are recognized in land or property vested in individuals or groups of people to access, use, and control of land parcels and other natural resources (inclusive of pastures, water, forests, grazing land, wetlands); and these recognized interests may include customary, statutory or other social

practices approved by society (Quan & Payne, 2008). The notion of property rights entails entitlement “to access things or places”, and thus, people belonging to certain places have every right to benefit from ‘things’ and the ‘place’ (Peters, 1994:13). For example, people from peri-urban communal areas have the right to benefit from what constitute ‘things’, that is, the resources; and the ‘place’, inclusive of the community or territory, the social, political, and cultural rewards (ibid). Tsikata & Whitehead (2003) also add that rights entail claims made by people against each other, and these are used to access and to dispose of land. There are different kinds of land rights. These can be categorized as private, individual, group, and communal (Cousins, 1990). Property rights may include the right to occupy, use, cultivate, restrict and exclude others, transfer, sell, purchase, inherit, develop, rent, or sublet (Chome & McCall, 2005; Cousins, 2008b; Quan & Payne, 2008). These are often obtainable through “long-practiced usage of certain resources which claimants refer to over certain uses being carried out for as long as they could remember or in ‘time out of mind’ (Peters, 1994:11). Thus, rights arise from relationships between people and not necessarily between people and ‘things’ - property rights (Tsikata & Whitehead, 2003: 76-77). These are dynamic, adaptable, and allow several arrangements to coexist depending on the type of property in question (Nyamu-Musembi, 2006).

The concept of secure land tenure is also a potent constituent on land rights discourses. However, “there is no one size fits all definition for security of land tenure” (Simbizi *et al.*, 2014). Migot-Adholla & Bruce (1994:3) define security of land tenure as “the perceived rights by the possessor of a land parcel to manage and use the parcel, dispose of its produce and engage in transactions, including temporary or permanent transfers without hindrance or interference from any person or corporate entity”. Security of land tenure is also determined by the social, legal, and administrative institutions dominant in society (Matondi & Dekker, 2011). In most communities of rural Africa, security of tenure lies within individuals or their collective relationships with particular land parcels, often stretching back to many generations of land use rights (Bromley & Cernea, 1991). The concept of security of tenure therefore must be viewed holistically - politically, economically, legally, and socially - as part of the structure that defines land rights (Migot-Adholla & Bruce, 1994). Thus, security of land tenure is rooted not only in land use, but also in the everyday and lived experiences of individuals as they interact with particular land parcels and resources. In communal areas situated in the periphery of cities, the concept of land rights and security of such rights remains contentious as individualization of land increases. Yet, “the process by which rights

come into being is as important to rights protection as the substance of such rights” (Mnisi, 2010:2).

Recognition of individuals’ secured rights to access and to control communal land remains important in discussions on land rights in my research because land rights carry different meanings to different categories of people in space and time. These are conceptualized beyond the biophysical attributes of land, to include the wellbeing of people in terms of household survival strategies (cf. Walker, 2009). In most African countries, land rights often are limited since land ownership rests in collectives such as tribes, kinships, chiefdoms, and the state (Peters, 2007; Bennett, 2008). Secure individual land rights for vulnerable groups of people such as women are often absent (Peters, 1994; 2004; 2007). In most cases, women hold secondary land use rights. They lack primary land rights. Under such circumstances, women’s rights to land are directly linked to those of men who are primary land rights holders (Okoth-Ogendo, 2008). This suggests that absolute land rights for such women under the system of communal land tenure are therefore non-existent since women are regarded as dependants or less complete subjects compared to men (Ruzavi, 2003; Nyamu-Musembi, 2006; Makura-Paradza, 2010). In South Africa, women are concerned with the disparities that exist between security of land tenure and their interests to access land rights for generation of household food (Walker, 2009). In Zimbabwe, the security of land rights for women under the LRP are often jeopardized by competition for land between male and female communal residents (Scoones *et al.*, 2010). As such, issues of women’s land rights need to be examined particularly in contexts where shortage and commoditization of land are apparent (Tsikata & Whitehead, 2003).

Gender issues on land particularly women’s rights to land and access dynamics remain significant in peri-urban debates since women are a distinct social category (Walker, 2009). Women’s rights to land cut across customary and statutory laws, and these are diverse and non-universal. Statutory law tends to recognize women’s rights to land in terms of customary land law because it provides the legal aspects on gender, whereas customary land law is localized and is based on tradition, and societies tend to interpret land rights under customary land law from the perspective of local systems that give men advantage as main decision-makers (Okoth-Ogendo, 2008). In most cases, women often lack an equal say to contribute on how land rights should be determined and structured (Mnisi, 2010). As such, women’s rights are marginalized in most provisions as much focus in sub-Saharan Africa today grants



lesser land rights to women compared to men. Women are therefore disadvantaged through social systems such as patriarchy (Makura-Paradza, 2010). They assume subordinate rights to land tenure as secondary users mainly as dependents, daughters, wives, or mothers (Razavi, 2003; Okoth-Ogendo, 2008; Makura-Paradza, 2010; Mutopo, 2011). For example in some parts of South Africa, divorced or widowed women are often forced to leave their land behind to join their maternal roots. These revelations shape our understanding of women's relationship with land within complex systems of social interaction in rural societies (Walker, 2003; Okoth-Ogendo, 2008; Walker, 2009; Makura-Paradza, 2010).

The issue of secured land rights of secondary holders such as migrants and women requires an in-depth analysis particularly on how they may claim land rights under customary tenure. These categories of people often lack political power to influence their position on land, as well as risk seeing their rights eroded (Toulmin & Quan, 2008). It is therefore important to pay attention not only to women's rights to land, but to the terms and conditions that regulate such rights, the language of culture that is used, as well as the lens through which these rights are viewed, mobilized, idealized, and realized (Nyamu-Musembi, 2002 in Mnisi, 2010:2). My research highlights the experiences of secondary landholders such as women and migrants in Domboshava and the struggles they make not only to access land rights in this communal area, but also to secure these within the system of customary tenure.

#### 2.2.5 Land transactions in peri-urban areas of sub-Saharan Africa

In many African countries, the development of peri-urban areas signals a moving edge of cities (Mabin, 2012; Watson, 2012). This implies urban expansion into the rear, that is, the peri-urban (Mabin, 2012). This is a result of diverse, complex, and dynamic processes that continually take place and affect peri-urban areas in many ways (Mbiva & Huchzermeyer, 2002; Marshall *et al.*, 2009; Gough *et al.*, 2010; Mabin, 2012; Watson, 2012). This often results in land use change, increased population densities, and pressure on access to common resources such as land (Marshall *et al.*, 2009). Substantial evidence shows the commercialization of land in communal areas (Berry, 2002). Given the rapid pace of urbanization across sub-Saharan Africa, this phenomenon is widespread and poses key challenges and concerns to RDP, land tenure, and development in general.

The proliferation of land transactions in peri-urban zones of many African countries has thus become a cause for concern in academic discourses globally. In literature, land transactions are variously referred to as vernacular land markets; commodification of communal land; and the commoditization and monetization of communal land at odds with government policy (Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2006; Chauveau & Colin, 2010; Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2010; Colin & Woodhouse, 2010). Land transactions involve changing access to land and land rights through buying, selling, and renting outside as well as inside the formal tenure systems (Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2006; Peters, 2007; Colin & Woodhouse, 2010; Owusu, 2008). This entails individualization and privatization of access to land by locals and even strangers (Owusu, 2008; Maxwell *et al.*, 1998; Peters, 2007). Chauveau & Colin (2010) refer to land transactions as customary land transfers framed outside the legal procedure. The land exchanges however remain embedded in social relations of the agents that participate on the land market (Marx, 2007; Chauveau & Colin, 2010). Peters (2007) sees land transactions as illegal land transfers outside customary law. Gonne (2010) refers to land transactions as the monetization of arable land through buying, selling, and letting. According to Quan (2000a), land transactions in peri-urban areas involve buying, selling, and renting of land on a short or long term as well as permanent or temporary basis. Marx (2007) describes land transactions as negotiated ways of accessing land use rights. Simply put, land transactions are a negotiated way of gaining entry into the collectivity of communal tenure (Cousins, 1990; Nyambara, 2001).

Diversity of land transactions between and within countries has been witnessed in some parts of Africa such as Ghana, Northern Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, and Ivory Coast, and some of these land transactions date back to the early 1930s and 1940s (Peters, 2007). In Ghana, Kenya, and Tanzania land transactions were already in progress during the colonial era and even before this period (Migot-Adholla, 1994). Kojo (2008) in Peters (2010) reveals that land transactions in Ghana date back to the 1920s, and most of these land transactions involved land sales, sharecropping, renting, and contract farming. Ubink (2008) in Peters (2010) also points not only to the continual practice in land transactions in Ghana, but also to their persistence as farmland in the peri-urban Kumasi converts to residential areas. In Cote d'Ivoire Berry (2008) in Peters (2010) found out that land transactions took form of land sales among migrants and tribal members in a relationship of clientage (*tutorat*) that obliged migrants to give annual gifts of farm produce and other forms of help to Chiefs, elders, or family heads whenever required to do so. In Botswana, land transactions involve land sales

that date back to the colonial administration era when land was sold to people to pursue private land rights for animal rearing projects (Peters, 1994). Individualized land transactions that take place on land markets in parallel to those sanctioned by customary tenure in rural areas in general and in peri-urban areas of Africa in particular are therefore not a new phenomenon (Cousins, 1990; Quan, 2000a; Peters, 2007). These land transactions are ongoing, and are practiced both at individual and national levels (Berry, 2011). For example, the case of Jubba Valley in Southern Somalia (Peters, 2007).

In Zimbabwe, a number of communal areas experienced land transactions during the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial periods giving rise to various forms of socio-economic differentiation among the rural households in terms of access to land and land holding capacities, income levels, power, and influence over traditional authority (Nyambara, 2001). The practice of land transactions in Zimbabwe was widespread in the 1940s and 1950s (Holleman, 1952). Cheater (1990) reveals a case reported in a national press about land transactions in Chinamhora communal area (Domboshava). According to Cheater (1990), land transactions in communal areas of Zimbabwe have been in existence as far back as the 1950s as a purchase in Chinamhora “in the mid-1950s may well have occurred under the Native Land Husbandry Act” (Cheater, 1990:194). This trend continued in many communal areas of Zimbabwe where migrants such as Mozambican refugees acquired communal land through monetized procedures (Cheater, 1990). In most cases land transactions in communal areas of Zimbabwe are driven by the struggle for power between statutory and traditional authority, lack of sanctions that regulate access to land, as well as economic needs of households, for example, the cases of Gokwe and Svosve communal areas (Nyambara, 2001; Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2010). However, land transactions that involved monetary exchanges were limited as individual property rights up to the 1990s were grounded in social obligations where group interests prevailed (Cousins, 1990).

The causes of land transactions in peri-urban areas of African cities are many, and these vary from country to country. According to Delville (2003), cash based land transactions emerge for various purposes and reasons as migrants from elsewhere seek to establish land holding in communal areas. Chome & McCall (2005) also state that land transactions particularly in peri-urban areas are a by-product of rapid urbanization, migration, the declining capacity of governments to sustain urban planning, as well as the ever-increasing gap between demand and supply in urban housing. Commoditization and individualization of land transfers can be

viewed as a way of generating other forms of capital by converting 'dead capital' (communal land) to productive use (De Soto, 2000; Peters, 2007). Kojo (2008) in Peters (2010), views the causes of land transactions in Ghana as similar to what is happening in many African countries. In her study on land transactions in peri-urban Ghana and how people and resources were governed in the process, Berry (2011) found out that rural land was attracting growing numbers of people for whom farming was at most subsidiary as the urbanites invested in acquisition of huge tracts of land. What remains important in this study is the causal linkages between these land transactions and the livelihoods of rural households. The land transactions increasingly brought a variety of monetary gains, assets, and enterprises apart from internal displacements of the rural poor (Ibid). In Zimbabwe, land transactions form part of a broad socio-political economy that stretches back to the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial eras (Holleman, 1952; Bullock, 1972; Bourdillon, 1976; Cheater, 1999; Ranger, 1983; Berry, 2002). The discussion on land transactions and how they evolved over time in Zimbabwe is presented in detail in Chapter 3.

Market based land transactions in communal areas often lead to negative consequences for the rural poor whose land rights are prone to distress already (Peters, 2007). Quan (2000a); Deininger (2003); and Chauveau & Colin (2010) believe land transactions are of structural relevance as they enable land allocation from less to more efficient land users and producers through selling and renting while these people obtain income streams they are unable to generate through other means. In this regard, both efficient and inefficient producers benefit from underutilized land (Quan, 2000a). However, Kojo (2010) and Wehrmann (2008) see those that sell or rent their land as reducing their arable plots and in turn output from their farms. Berry (2011) also believes that land transactions are the major forces behind re-ordering landscapes, blurring the division between the rural and urban, as well as augmenting the linkages between these spaces. The processes of acquiring land by migrants differ from country to country (Tsikata & Whitehead, 2003; Peters, 2010). These processes remain significant pointers to the development of land markets in peri-urban areas in response to the changing nature of the institutional processes that regulate land rights in these areas (Quan, 2000a; Tsikata & Whitehead, 2003; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). In my study, I conceptualize land transactions as any form of land exchange within or outside the system of customary land tenure. An important distinction in my empirical analysis is that between customary and individualized land transactions. Customary land transactions are those practised according to the customary procedures, as well as the provisions of the legislative framework on land and

settlement in Zimbabwe, for example, inheritance. On the other hand, land transactions practiced by individuals outside the realms of the system of customary land tenure mostly for personal gain I refer to them as individualized. Regulatory procedures of the customary tenure from statutes on land and settlement, as well as the local traditions and customs of the communities are supposed to hold and apply insofar as allocation of land in communal areas such as Domboshava is concerned.

The procedures of inheriting land under the system of customary tenure are usually understood well in communities that are involved, but are often complicated (Hilhorst, 2000). Inheritance involves passing land and other property rights to one's descendants usually within the tribal lineage in a generational order (Bullock, 1972; Bourdillon; 1976; Makura-Paradza, 2010; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). It also includes assumption of land ownership rights by tribal women after the deaths of their husbands (Ibid). Within the culture of the Shona, inheritance refers to passage of land and other items such as livestock and homesteads to a family member after the death of the original owner, as well as the responsibilities such as decision making in the household (Bullock, 1972; Bourdillon; 1976). In this regard, the process of inheritance ensures that land and other property rights are passed from the dead to the living (Bullock, 1972; Bourdillon; 1976). Male inheritors can also inherit widows, and assume the title of head of household of the deceased (Ibid). As a result, inheritance is a process of accumulation. Thus, in my research inheritance is conceptualized as simply a customary land transaction through bequeathing land property rights to one's descendants.

In most sub-Saharan Africa, the practice of inheritance does not take place in a legal vacuum. For example, in Zimbabwe and South Africa the practice of inheritance is based on both the statutory, as well as the customary laws (Mnisi, 2003; Claassens, 2008; Makura-Paradza, 2010). Since most sub-Saharan Africa countries are patrilineal, the succession of inheritance of property is culturally determined through the male line, that is, the sons and male patrikin inherit land and property rights (Hilhorst, 2000; Makura-Paradza, 2010). Community elders and kin within a lineage often trace land rights orally from generation to generation in the practice of inheritance within the customary systems (Hilhorst, 2000). In Zimbabwe and in South Africa, daughters have the right to inherit property such as land under customary law (Makura-Paradza, 2010). Inheritance laws place both male and female offspring on an equal footing to inherit their parents' property rights and items such as cattle and homesteads. In Tanzania, different laws of succession including the Islamic Law and statutory law govern

the practice of inheritance (Hilhorst, 2000). However, Islamic laws tend to discriminate against women's rights to land whereas statutory laws recognize those rights (Ibid). My study seeks to unravel the practice of land transactions within a peri-urban context.

Peri-urban areas are variously referred to as a divide or periphery (Mbiva & Huchzermeyer, 2002). They are situated where the city ends and where the rural areas begin (Shaw, 2005). They constitute a zone where rural and urban activities are juxtaposed (Tacoli, 1998; Douglas, 2006; Wehrmann, 2008; Allen, 2010). They form a rural fringe that surrounds urban areas (Narain & Nischal, 2007; Narain, 2009; Marshall *et al.*, 2009). Narain & Nischal, (2007:261) cited in Marshall *et al.* (2009:3) further describe peri-urban areas as a place, a process and a concept characterized by proximity to the urban areas, where rural-urban linkages exist, and where change is ubiquitous. As a place, peri-urban areas lie at the edge of the cities, as a process they signify physical movement of goods and services between the rural and urban spaces; and as a concept they are an interface between these areas (Marshall *et al.*, 2009). In addition, peri-urban areas are characterized by diversity in terms of the local population and sources of income, lack of regulation on planning, contested tenure rights, resource exploitation, and lack of service provision (Ibid).

Peri-urbanism therefore represents a fusion of rurality and urbanity (Sadiki & Ramutsindela, 2002). Vanemtpen (2009:865) refers to the peri-urban zone simply as 'rurban' - a spatial condition that is neither rural nor urban. In physical terms, the peri-urban zones appear as disorderly frontiers of urban expansion with housing construction moving ahead of infrastructure for service provision as building codes are usually ignored (Berry, 2011). Peri-urban areas are under different kinds of transformations, pressures, and densities as people of diverse backgrounds and social status live there (Wehrmann, 2008; Berry, 2011; Mabin, 2012). In Nigeria for example, the periphery of the city of Kano is viewed as peri-urban because of its location in the hinterland, existing 'mosaic' land use patterns, and its proximity to the city (Mortimore & Wilson, 1965 in Marshall *et al.* 2009). In Indonesia the term '*kotadesasi*' provides a joint reference to Indonesian words '*kota*' (town) and '*desa*' (village) to describe not only the existing linkages between these physical and geographical locations as rural and urban, but the activities that take place within these areas (McGee, 1987 in Tacoli, 1998). In India, the peri-urban is viewed as a periphery around the city (Marshall *et al.*, 2009). In South Africa, the peri-urban is perceived in terms of settlements that surround metropolitan cities such as "smaller country towns including former bantustans" (Walker,

2009:473). In Zimbabwe, the peri-urban zone is defined as a hinterland and a belt outside the city occupied by farmers and commuting households (Kamete, 1998; Chirisa, 2010b). In addition, this zone is also characterized as rural since the majority of the land is used for farming (ibid). Clearly, the characterization of peri-urban areas displays plurality of meanings and depends on the context in question. Thus, increasing urbanization of most sub-Saharan cities results in invasion of the peri-urban zones for different land use purposes, as well as increased pressure on access to natural resources (Berry, 2011). This is increasingly becoming a key policy issue (Marx, 2007).

In my research, I conceptualize peri-urban areas from Narain & Nischal (2007), and Marshall *et al.* (2009) s' definition of peri-urban as a place, process, and a concept. "As a place it can refer to rural fringe areas surrounding cities. As a concept, peri-urban could be seen as an interface of rural urban activities and institutions. As a process, it could be thought of as the two-way flow of goods and services and a transitional stage between rural and urban (Narain & Nischal, 2007:261). Marshall *et al.* (2009:3) view the peri-urban as a place situated on an urban fringe or at the edge of cities where movement of goods and services is apparent, and as a process characterized by the transition from rural to urban, as well as an interface between rural and urban activities. Definitions of peri-urban from Narain & Nischal (2007) and Marshall *et al.* (2009) characterize the peri-urban as a place of diverse interaction that is neither rural nor urban.

#### 2.2.6 Rural Development Policy and land tenure debates

Policies are a response to problems in society (Cousins, 2008a). Wildavsky (1979:387) speaks of policy as generally, "what is and what ought to be". Policy specifies the government's intentions (Smith, 1972). It looks at the past, current, and potential activities of what the government seeks to achieve, and the consequences of such action (Hogwood & Gunn, 1991). Rural Development Policy focuses on improving living conditions in communal areas. Apart from this, it seeks to make that process self-sustaining (Bryant & White, 1984). According to Bryant & White (1984), and Singh (1986), an RDP aims at improving the conditions under which residents live in rural areas. Bryant & White (1984) also add that an RDP is a strategy or a process of collective effort aimed at improving the wellbeing and self-realization of the rural people. Rural development strategies entail what governments do in order to promote rural development (Delius & Schirmer, 2001). Elsewhere

in United States of America, Deavers (1980:1021) sees RDP as “deliberate action by the state, local governments, private institutions, and individuals to achieve improved rural income levels and employment opportunities; access by rural residents to adequate housing and essential community facilities and services; and responsible use of rural resources and the rural environment to preserve the quality of life”. In Sub-Saharan Africa, focus of rural development involves extending benefits of development to the poor, and people whose livelihoods are based in rural areas. Clearly, the practice of RDP is more than just official texts produced by the state (Somekh & Lewin, 2011). It is a product of socio-political debates (Ploeg *et al.*, 2000).

That being the case, a RDP is constitutive of intended state goals, strategies, and programmes that seek to provide better living conditions for people that live in rural areas. Identification of problems that need to be addressed through RDPs in rural areas is often problematic because of the complex nature of rural problems themselves. Yet, the way these problems are recognized and understood remains important (Cousins, 2008a). In my study, I conceptualize as RDP what the government chooses to do or not to do. This entails activities, projects, strategies, and programmes, as well as the outcomes from the RDP implementation process. Rural development programmes are based on what rural people want, and how the interventions can improve the people’s priorities (Delius & Schirmer, 2001). A programme constitutes a group of related projects whose intention is to generate wider implications beyond the intended deliverables (Lycett *et al.*, 2004; Pellegrinelli *et al.*, 2007). For example, LRPs often go beyond land distribution to generation of livelihoods opportunities. On the other hand, projects are transient in nature with specific set of deliverables, timeframes, location, resources, benefits, and beneficiaries. Strategies are task-oriented in terms of achieving project deliverables (*ibid*). Simply put, programmes are cumulative benefits from projects and strategies (*ibid*). McLaughlin (1987:172) however notes that the “consequences of even the best planned, best supported, and most promising policy initiatives depend on what finally happens as individuals interpret and act on them” - the outcomes.

The notion of RDP in Zimbabwe cannot be isolated from land issues. The nature of RDP in Zimbabwe is part of broader discourses on the political history of the country (Paradza, 2010; Thebe, 2010). The political history of Zimbabwe has a great influence on the development of state policies in rural areas (Zinyama, 1992; Paradza, 2010). Post-independence RDPs in Zimbabwe focused mainly on reduction of racial and spatial inequalities and imbalances by



giving priority to once the neglected rural areas (Zinyama, 1992). In Zimbabwe, the FTLRP is one of the government's rural programmes that focuses at propping peasants' agricultural production effort and poverty reduction strategies (Thebe, 2010). Nearly 170 000 households benefited from FTLRP in Zimbabwe by 2011 (Scoones *et al.*, 2011a:2). In order to understand the dynamics of RDP it is therefore imperative to reflect on what the term 'rural' means since "rural areas are clearly recognizable" (Maxwell *et al.*, 2001:397).

Wiggins & Proctor in Maxwell *et al.* (2001:397) define rural as "the space where human settlement and infrastructure occupy only small patches of the landscape, most of which is dominated by fields and pastures, woods and forest, water, mountain and desert". The International Fund for Agricultural Development (2001:17) in Maxwell *et al.* (2001:397) defines rural not in terms of the location or physical expositions, but settlement densities as well as the nature of residents and the activities they undertake in these areas. Rural residents are described as people who live on farmsteads, and spend most of their time working on farms (Ibid). Cousins (1990) also describes rural areas as communal areas where peasants reside. In Zimbabwe, communal or rural areas are spaces for people presumed to primarily depend on peasant agriculture - the rural peasants (Marimira, 2010; Helliker & Murisa, 2011; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Rural areas are often referred to as communal areas or reserves - 'maruzevha' (Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2008; Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2010). In addition, communal or rural areas in Zimbabwe are characterized by dominance of compact settlements of less than 2 500 inhabitants where the majority of people survive on peasant farming (GRDC Turn-Around Strategy, 2005). While these reflections are comprehensive, the term rural remains ambiguous and there seems no consensus on what rural exactly means as it refers to different kinds of settlements in different contexts (Maxwell *et al.*, 2001). The definitions of rural often provide narrow views as many processes in diverse contexts dictate what constitutes rural.

The practice of development policy often implies a separation of rural from urban areas (Tacoli, 1998; Gough *et al.*, 2010). In Zimbabwe, urban areas are defined as predominantly non-agricultural and have more than 2 500 inhabitants, for example the city of Harare (Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1986; Zinyama & Whitlow, 1986; Munzwa & Jonga, 2010). Urban areas are commonly referred to as 'madhorobheni' in vernacular Shona. Urban areas are spaces where non-agricultural activities dominate, and are constitutive of four or more continuous urban wards (RDCA Chapter 29:13 of 2002). According to the Zimbabwe National Statistics

Agency (ZNSA) National Census Report (2012:25), urban areas are places with “2 500 inhabitants or more, with a compact settlements pattern, where the majority (more than 50%) of the employed persons engage in non-agricultural occupations”. In most sub-Saharan Africa small towns are often defined as urban based on the administrative structure, demographic patterns, and infrastructure provision although the majority of the population engages in agricultural activities for survival (Tacoli, 2008). Elsewhere in Philippines, urban areas are definable through a population threshold of 500 people per square meter, and other physical attributes such as road sizes, infrastructure, and industry (Tacoli, 1998).

Rural and urban settlements are often considered as separate physical entities, yet they are typically a continuum (Gough *et al.*, 2010). Categorization of settlements as rural and urban is context specific as countries and regions vary, and are never homogenous. There is no consensus on what constitutes rural or urban areas in defining them; however, the concept of livelihoods pursued by inhabitants in certain rural or urban areas, demographic patterns, and the implementation of development policy often remain critical in this categorization. For example, most livelihood strategies in urban areas are believed to be non-agriculture based. However, it is not always the case as people in both rural areas as well as in urban areas survive on diversified livelihood portfolios including agriculture (Tacoli, 1998; Potts & Mutambirwa, 1990). A reflection on rural-urban linkages is therefore important in the characterization of rural and urban areas as these areas depend on each other (Lynch, 2005; Gough *et al.*, 2010). For example, Kamete (1998) describes the rural-urban linkages in Zimbabwe as complex than usually thought as people continue to straddle the rural-urban divide for livelihoods purposes. Gough *et al.* (2010) and Tacoli (1998) also assert that it is often difficult to define places as either rural or urban, but rather characterize them in terms of existing linkages (movement of people, goods, and services), and by assuming that they form a rural-urban continuum, and not necessarily a dichotomy.

The connection between land tenure issues and RDP clearly exists amidst processes of social, economic, and political changes in different societies of sub-Saharan Africa. Land laws are colonial footprints that continue to reshape processes that characterize development policy for rural areas, as well as the implementation of such policy initiatives in these areas (Thebe, 2010). These processes are experienced differently in most rural sub-Saharan Africa, and thus present key issues on the extent to which countries can rely on agriculture as the engine to rural development, and the viability of peasant farming among other rural challenges related

to poverty and governance (Maxwell *et al.*, 2001; Thebe, 2010). In rural areas, agriculture is seen as the engine of growth for poor small farmers and a way of addressing rural poverty related inequalities (Carney, 1999a, 1999b; 1999c). Rural poverty is regarded as a rural phenomenon - “at least for now” (Maxwell *et al.*, 2001:395). This scenario also presents dilemmas on RDPs in sub-Saharan Africa where land and agricultural activities are significant in securing livelihoods for the majority of the rural poor (Toulmin & Quan, 2000; Peters; 2007). Thus, land laws that guide rural development in rural areas in most sub-Saharan Africa are also viewed as tools of governance in terms of policy (McAuslan, 2000). For example, the tendency by the state in Zimbabwe, South Africa, Malawi, and Ethiopia is to regard the implementation of LRPs as RDPs since the goals are to achieve rights to access to land largely regarded as a vital resource in enhancing rural livelihoods (Toulmin & Quan, 2000). This approach to rural development emanates from the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) (Chambers & Conway, 1991; Carney, 1998; Ellis, 1998; Bryceson, 2000a; Ellis & Biggs, 2001; Cahn, 2002; Cousins, 2007; Batterbury, 2008; Scoones, 2009). Clearly, there is lack of a clear and convincing narrative that characterizes the concept of RDP (Maxwell *et al.*, 2001).

Description of RDP and its implementation in peri-urban zones is much more sticky due to conflicting definitions of peri-urban as neither rural nor urban as well as the nature and meaning of processes taking place in these areas (Mbiva & Huchzermeyer, 2002; Lynch, 2005; Tacoli; 2008). These processes are embedded in land tenure and the dynamics of accessing land in peri-urban areas. The implementation of programmes that define RDP in peri-urban zones differs from country to country, and is neither universal nor homogenous. These strategies are determined by the political and socio-economic processes of countries, particularly the land laws. The practical implications of the implementation of RDP and land issues (land transactions, land tenure, land rights) in peri-urban contexts, and their influence on household survival strategies need deeper reflections because as much as the designed policy programmes enable outcomes, they do not always translate into desired outcomes (McLaughlin, 1987).

### 2.2.7 Livelihoods and household survival strategies in rural and peri-urban sub-Saharan Africa

The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) acknowledged the concept of sustainable livelihoods in 1987. The goals of WCED were on the integration of sustainable livelihoods with basic human needs, food security, sustainable agriculture practices, and poverty reduction (Chambers & Conway, 1991; Cahn, 2002; Scoones, 2009). Carney (1998:4) and Cahn (2002:2) state that the much used definition for sustainable livelihoods was coined by Chambers & Conway (1991) who define livelihoods as comprising capabilities, assets, (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a living. "A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets ... both now and in the future"(Carney, 1998:4; Cahn, 2002:2).

The sustainable livelihoods framework presents a complex archaeology and hybrid of ideas, practices, and concepts that cut across a variety of rural development thinking and disciplines (Scoones, 2009). My research reflects on the SLA proposed by Carney in 1999. This framework comprises the vulnerability context, livelihood assets, transforming structures and processes, livelihood strategies, and livelihood outcomes. The vulnerability context frames the external environment in which people live, as well as how people adapt and cope with stresses and shocks that emanate from their surroundings (Cahn, 2002). For example, trends in population increases, national policy initiatives, politics, drought, changing land rights all constitute the vulnerability context for many communal areas in sub-Saharan Africa. People's livelihoods and their capabilities to access and control assets and resources are largely affected by the circumstances that surround them, that is, the context in which vulnerabilities to their well-being manifests (Cahn, 2002; Scoones, 2009). Examining and understanding the vulnerability context is therefore significant in extracting sound and meaningful analysis on what is happening to livelihoods in rural communities such as Domboshava.

The SLA postulates that people's livelihoods are based on the nature, availability, and capabilities to access assets also known as resources within the vulnerability context they live (Cahn, 2002). Assets include social, human, physical, cultural, and economic elements (Chambers & Conway, 1991; Tacoli, 1999). The SLA refers to these as forms of capital (Scoones, 1998; 2009; Cahn, 2002). People are always competing for resources, and can do

whatever it takes to access them (Peters, 1994; 2007). My analysis of assets focuses on what people have, and not necessarily their needs (Helmores, 1998 in Cahn, 2002). In addition, I seek to demonstrate how people access these assets, particularly land within a peri-urban context and the emergent differential outcomes among different social groups. Household survival strategies are synonymous with household livelihoods (Chambers & Conway, 1991; Carney, 1998; Ellis, 1998; Scoones, 1998; Bryceson, 2000a; Cahn, 2002; Cousins, 2007; Batterbury, 2008; Scoones, 2009). Livelihoods are a combination of resources used and activities undertaken in order to live (Scoones, 2009). Often, this involves a repertoire of activities (Chambers & Conway, 1991). I therefore conceptualize livelihoods as household survival strategies, and these are simply an art of living.

In most rural sub-Saharan Africa, most household survival strategies are based on peasant farming although shifts from peasant farming to other forms of survival strategies are now common (Quan, 2000a). The practice of peasant farming was mediated by the colonial political systems (Ranger, 1983:102). Peasant farming consists mainly of crop and animal husbandry. However, peasant farming is not synonymous with small-scale agricultural production although small-scale farmers are often referred to as peasant farmers (Quan, 2000b). Many households no longer rely solely on peasant farming. For example, people engage in perennial off-farm and non-farm activities that are largely informal (Bryceson, 1999; 2002a; 2000b; Scoones *et al.*, 2010; Helliker & Murisa, 2011). However, in most instances the activities are regarded as marginal, of less significance, and not prime cash earners (Bryceson, 1996). These also vary with regions and localities. For example, Bryceson (1996; 1999; 2000a; 2002) illustrates diminishing trends in rural peasant population in terms of both size and significance in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Malawi, Congo-Brazzaville, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. From these studies, Bryceson demonstrates the changing livelihoods and the resultant depeasantization of the rural population because of 'turning-point' policies (Bryceson, 1996; 1999; 2000a; 2000b; 2002; 2005). These 'turning-point' policies include restrictions on access to land in South Africa in 1913; the urbanizing effects of the oil boom in Congo-Brazzaville and Nigeria in the 1970s; and the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in Ethiopia, Tanzania, Malawi, and Zimbabwe during the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. Many rural communities from these countries experienced a paradigm shift from peasant farming to non-agricultural income sources for household survival (Ibid). Bryceson's ideas were influenced much by the earlier livelihoods discussions by Chambers (1983);

Carney (1999a, 1999b, 1999c); Scoones (1998); as well as the characterization of peasants by Shanin (1975) and Harriss (1982).

Chambers & Conway (1991) postulate that livelihoods constitute people, their activities, the nature of assets they own, and the output in terms of a living pursued as a result of these. Shanin (1975:240) characterizes peasants as small agricultural producers, who make use of simple equipment and family labour to produce food for their consumption and who hold obligations to holders of political and economic power. Harriss (1982:24) views peasants as a society of rural producers who produce for their own consumption and for sale using family labour, control the equipment they use, and are insubordinate to the state. Borrowing from these viewpoints, Bryceson characterizes peasants by their relationship to farms as units of production, and families as sources of labour. She also views peasants as a class of agrarian producers, and as a community that signifies a collection of peasants. Bryceson thus sees the process of depeasantization as a subset and a specific form of deagrarianization identifiable through the diminishing relevance of peasant societies. Deagrarianization refers to people leaving agriculture to work in other sectors such as mining, services or industry and this has been taking place for several centuries at different rates in different places throughout most of the world (Bryceson, 2013). For example, with regards the case of South Africa (Walker, 2009:472-473) states that:

“Contemporary South Africa is much further along an uneven path of deagrarianization than most African countries. Agriculture’s contribution to the national economy is important in many respects, but its contribution to the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is small compared to financial services, manufacturing, commerce, transport and mining. From being a predominantly rural society in the 1950s ... today some 60 per cent or more of the population is classified as urban and there are no indications that urbanization trends are being reversed”.

The above analysis from Walker (2009) demonstrates the process of deagrarianization that is currently taking place in South Africa. Signs of deagrarianization are mediated through sectoral change from contraction of rural populations that derive their livelihoods from agricultural production (Bryceson, 2000b).

On the other hand, depeasantization is linked to peasant farmers whose production units are household farms for the practise agriculture, and that form a community representing a specific peasant class. Depeasantization can therefore be viewed as a process with respect to

people who opt out of agrarian structures to pursue other income-generating activities they perceive as more remunerative and better aligned to their social and economic aspirations. It entails a decrease of peasant population or rural producers specifically involved in peasant labour processes for survival (Bryceson, 2000b). “I should stress that depeasantization is a process that is evidenced by changes in farming units, family form, the nature of the community and emerging class differentiation. It is not a matter of farm, family, class and community 'being exhausted' before depeasantization is underway” (Bryceson, 2012:1). Depeasantization is therefore not an event. It happens in different places at different rates since peasant communities are not homogeneous. Depeasantization pertains to most African countries including Zimbabwe as people move from surviving on farms as production units (Bryceson, 2013). In Punjab in India, for example, peasant farmers’ move from peasant farming to capital-intensive farming is viewed as depeasantization (Singh *et al.*, 2009). It is therefore critical (as explained by Bryceson) that depeasantization is not necessarily the same as deagrarianization - this distinction is applied in all my analyses.

According to Bryceson, depeasantization is marked by the disintegration of a community of peasants that is defined by interpersonal relationships embedded in commonly held norms and values based on shared peasant identity (Bryceson, 1999). With depeasantization, peasant communities lose their economic capacity and social coherence and shrink in demographic size relative to non-peasant populations (Bryceson, 2005). The process signifies a departure from traditional household strategies based on land and its allied activities and relationships in pursuit of off-farm and non-farm household survival strategies (Bryceson, 2000a). This also indicates a change in relationship of peasant farmers to soil (Bryceson, 2000b). Non-farm activities do not directly involve plant or animal husbandry, whereas off-farm activities involve working on farms away from one’s individual farm unit (Ellis, 1998; Tacoli, 1998; Bryceson, 1999). Ellis (1998) and Bryceson (1999; 2002; 2005) define this move as diversification.

Diversification is a “process by which rural families construct a diverse portfolio of activities and social support capabilities in their struggle for survival and in order to improve their standard of living” (Ellis, 1998:4). Generally, diversification adopts different routes including migration to enable households to expand their income streams of household survival strategies (Bryceson, 1999; 2000a; 2002; Scoones *et al.*, 2010; Helliker & Murisa, 2011). Diversification is out of necessity rather than choice; and can be viewed as a positive

response to new opportunities, and as a way of offsetting the risks from agricultural production (Scoones *et al.*, 2010). In Zimbabwe, diversification of survival strategies particularly in the rural areas can also be attributed largely to the impacts of drought and state policies. Bryceson (1999; 2002); Scoones *et al.* (2010); and Helliker & Murisa (2011) emphasise the relevance of state policies in determining survival strategies of peasant populations. For example, the period between 2000 and 2008 was the toughest for most ordinary Zimbabweans (Chiumbu & Musemwa, 2012). Zimbabwe experienced a myriad of crises that triggered new forms of agency and creative coping strategies (Ibid). The multidimensional crisis that plagued Zimbabwe in the first decade of the current millennium resulted in the rapid decline of the economy characterized by among other things steep decline in industrial and agricultural productivity; historical levels of hyperinflation, the informalization of labour; the dollarization of economic transactions; displacements; and critical erosions of livelihoods (Ibid).

In order to address my research problem, I discuss the various routes employed by household members of Domboshava in diversifying their survival strategies as well as the extent to which these remain viable given the proliferation of land transactions and the significance of land as a physical asset for rural peasants. In these discussions, I reflect on the distinction between tribal/migrants, as well as other differential factors such as class, gender, age, education background and marital status (widowed, married, divorced) to conceptualize the nature of household survival strategies that are developing in Domboshava.

## 2.3 Theories

This section unpacks the theoretical perspectives that were applied to analyze and to substantiate research evidence on the larger economic and political forces driving land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies in Domboshava. Paying attention to existing theory is important because theories are the key sources and building blocks of conceptual frameworks critical to understanding processes that are at work (Maxwell, 1996; 2005). I applied Antony Giddens (1984)'s structuration perspective, and Albert Hirschman's (1970) exit, voice, and loyalty model. The application of these rather different modes of analysis generated a coherent theoretical framework adopted in my study as a whole. Since this study is trans-disciplinary and borrows from rural and urban issues while grounded in Sociology of Development, an eclectic approach to analyzing such debates was therefore



significant. Combined and crosscutting theoretical frameworks yield the most satisfactory results in explaining complexities that surround research problems (Potts, 2011). In any case, the social world is messy and the messiness cannot be adequately dealt with through a single and conceptually neat theoretical approach (Craib, 1992 in Ritzer, 2008; Haralambos & Holborn, 2008). McLaughlin (1987:175) also describes social problems as “thorny”. In my research, theoretical eclecticism assists in revealing the complex mutual influences that emerge from interactions *between* land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies in the case of Domboshava. A combination of the two major analysis mechanisms and the key concepts characterizes not only the relationship between the theories and concepts, but the significance of this research as reflected in the statement of the problem. Since a good theoretical framework identifies a main theory that provides focus of the study (Neuman, 2010), structuration is the main theory, in particular the structure/agency dialectics. Notably, “specific studies rarely contrast or test the entire framework as many researchers seek evidence from one part of a theory within a framework” (Neuman, 2011:85).

### 2.3.1 Giddens’ theory of structuration

Antony Giddens coined the term structuration in 1973 (Parker, 2000). Structuration theory is closely linked to the functionalist perspectives by Auguste Comte and Claude Levi-Strauss among others; and the structuralist perspectives by Margaret Archer, Pierre Bourdieu, Antony Giddens, and Talcott Parsons among others (Parker, 2000; Blaikie, 2010). Structuration is eclectic and rejects polarized views between the structure and agency from the structuralist and functionalist domains (Stone, 2005; Ritzer, 2008). The basic elements of the structuration theory are the structure and agency, and the interplay of these concepts lead to structuration (Giddens, 1984; Giddens, 1999; Blaikie, 2010; Jackson & Hogg, 2010). Structuration is a result of the structure/agency relationship - the duality of the structure (Giddens, 1984; Giddens, 1991; Giddens 1999; Kaspersen, 2000; Parker, 2000; Giddens 2001; Ritzer 2004; Stones, 2005; Ritzer 2008; Blackie, 2010). Structuration theory is applicable within a wide range of fields of inquiry (Giddens, 1984; Giddens 1999; Parker, 2000; Stones, 2005). Its ability to cut across disciplines lies in the way structure and agency are conceptualized (Stones, 2009).

Structures consist of rules and resources that people reflect upon and utilize in their daily conduct within the social world (Giddens, 1984; Cassell, 1993; Ritzer, 2000; Stones, 2005;

Ritzer, 2008; Haralambos & Holborn, 2008). The structures are important reference points that enable or limit human action (Giddens, 1984; Cassell, 1993; Archer, 2003; Wang, 2010). Structures “tell us how to go on in social life” (Stones, 2005:42). Rules are “procedures of action and aspects of practice” (Stones, 2005). Rules are available within the memory traces of individuals (Ibid). Further, “rules are constitutive of meaning and the sanctioning mode of conduct ... and work closely with resources such as power to sanction appropriate behaviour of agents” (Giddens, 1984:18). There are two major categories of resources namely allocative and authoritative (Haralambos & Holborn, 2008; Ritzer, 2000; Stones, 2005; Ritzer, 2008; Blaikie, 2010). According to Cleaver (2007:228), allocative resources are “raw materials, means of production and produced goods ... (these) relate to command over things” whereas authoritative resources constitutive of power, language, and authority “imply command over people”. Allocative resources are materials that enable individuals to generate assets while authoritative resources involve individuals’ abilities to carry out their wishes and to dominate others (Stones, 2005; Ritzer, 2008; Stones, 2009). Often, there is unequal distribution of these resources among people leading to different socio-economic groupings in different communities - the emergent class distinctions.

The structure is intrinsically part of the individual, and cannot be viewed as something external or outside the agent as these are intertwined (Stones, 2005). The agents are individual elements that constitute social practice, and these are the actors and bearers of structures within social systems (Ibid). “Actors do act, but they do so under circumstances not of their own choosing. Actors do define and redefine situations, but there are structural limits on what can be accomplished and changed this way” (Fuchs, 2001:24). An agent is “one who exerts power or produces an effect”, whereas agency refers “not to the intentions people have in doing things but to their capability of doing those things in the first place ... the individual is the perpetrator because the individual could at any phase in a given sequence of conduct have acted differently” (Giddens, 1984:9-15). Agency is processual, and denotes the flow of events as well as the structuration process (Stones, 2005). Agency is “a slip intervening in a course of action in which the person is intending to do something different altogether ... such behavioural ‘slips’ like slip of the tongue are actually unconsciously motivated ... however they can be viewed as intentional descriptions from another angle” (Giddens, 1984:9). “Agency refers to doing” (Parker, 2000:58). Agency is the capacity or requisite ways of individuals in solving social problems that arise while they continuously interact with the structure (Giddens, 1984; Hay, 1994; Ritzer, 2000; Archer, 2003; Ritzer, 2008). “Agency is

more related to power than intention” (Stones, 2005:40). For example, the capability of community residents to engage in land transactions demonstrates agency. Agency is more than the intention of agents to do certain things, “but their capability of doing those things in the first place” (Ibid).

Structuration theory is a means of studying different modes of interaction within social systems that are grounded in the knowledgeable activities of situated actors that draw upon rules and resources in the diversity of their action and contexts (Giddens, 1984). Dialectical relationships exist between the structure/agency, and these give rise to the notion of structuration (Parker, 2000; Stones, 2005). For example, customary land tenure procedures on the practice of land transactions are placed under tension through changing conditions within peri-urban zones, and leads (often after conflict) to new ways of doing things. In this way, structuration is processual. Neither the structure nor agency can exist on their own. For example, we cannot have rules that regulate land transactions under the system of customary land tenure without the people whose culture, customs, and tradition that define human conduct within the systems; neither can we have the system of customary land tenure and people without the rules that regulate the practice of land transactions within this system. The structure/agency relationship gives rise to the duality of the structure - the central aspect of Giddens’ structuration theory (Giddens, 1984; 1987). “The constitution of agency and structures are not two independently given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality” (Giddens, 1984:25). “The agency and the structure can thus not be conceived apart from each other; they are the same sides of the same coin ... they are a duality ... all social action involves structures, and all structures involve social action” (Ritzer, 2008:20). “They are two sides of the same coin” (Haralambos & Holborn, 2008:888).

The structure/agency is inseparable, and intractably interwoven within situated encounters of human action. It is through practice and interaction within social systems that structures are produced and reproduced by agents through agency (Haralambos, & Holborn, 2008). For example, land transactions shape and reshape the system of customary land tenure, while transforming people’s behaviour at the same time. The system of customary tenure and the practice of land transactions presuppose each other. This is a dialectical process “where structural properties of the social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organise” (Giddens, 1984:25-26; 1987:61). Structures are “both the medium and

outcome of agency” (Parker, 2000:59). “The structure and the agency are a duality, neither can exist without the other as both are intimately related” (Giddens, 1984:25-26).

The structure/agency debate postulates people’s ability and capability to change the world around them through their action by drawing upon the rules and resources circumstantially as they interact within their social systems (Stones, 2005; Haralambos & Holborn, 2008). The individual and the structure are one, and this relation is mediated through human action. “There are always large stocks of mutual knowledge of how to go on and how to get things done” (Haralambos & Holborn, 2008:889). For example, community residents as agents are conversant with how to go about their everyday lives (Haralambos & Holborn, 2008). Conduct within the structure is therefore strategic since community residents are not necessarily passive victims of the social processes that surround them (Chiumbu & Musemwa, 2012). This often leads to intended and unintended outcomes (cf. Giddens, 1984; Cassell, 1993; Giddens, 1999, Giddens, 2001; Ritzer, 2002; Ritzer, 2008; Haralambos & Holborn, 2008; Blaikie, 2010). “The consequences of what actors do intentionally or unintentionally are events which would not have happened if the actor had behaved differently” (Giddens, 1984:11). For example, the structures that mediate land transactions within conflated and adulterated customary land tenure systems engender intended and unintended outcomes. My analysis focuses on the role of individual agents in producing the mutual influences from the interactions *between* land transactions, perceptions of RDP, and household survival strategies. The mutual influences demonstrate self-directed action as well as the fundamental level of human freedom of community residents within a peri-urban context. My research interest is therefore to use the structure/agency debate to reveal these mutual influences within the 2002 - 2012 period.

### 2.3.2 Hirschman’s exit, voice, and loyalty model

Hirschman’s model on exit, voice, and loyalty addresses different responses consumers are able to make when faced with poor and declining markets. Exit means quitting (Bekker & Leilde, 2003; Cheater, 1999), or simply leaving (Hirschman, 1970; Barry, 1974; Laver, 1976). Voice means speaking out (Hirschman, 1970; Barry, 1974) or “staying put and shouting” (Laver, 1976:464). Loyalty means ‘stay and be silent’ (Hirschman, 1970; Barry, 1974). Loyalty also entails to ‘simply stick it out’ or ‘grin and bear it’ (Hirschman, 1970; Barry, 1974; Bekker & Leilde, 2003). In my research, Hirschman’s exit, voice, and loyalty

model is applied in the analysis of perceptions of communal residents regarding the implementation of RDP in Domboshava. This theory is unpacked in detail in the subsequent paragraphs.

The title of Hirschman's model states the words of the theory in full (Barry, 1974). The market model on exit, voice, and loyalty is used to analyze people's responses to market products (Hirschman, 1970; Ayes, 1971; Barry, 1974; Dowding *et al.*, 2000; Bekker & Leilde, 2003). Hirschman's market model has unlimited range of application in discussing common problems in society (Hirschman, 1970; Ayes, 1971; Barry, 1974; Laver, 1976; Dowding *et al.*, 2000; Bekker & Leilde, 2003). For example, concerns on policy or service delivery (Bekker & Leilde, 2003). The exit, voice, and loyalty model is a useful pointer to deteriorating situations (Hirschman, 1970). In my analysis, I use this market model to demonstrate the perceptions of community residents of Domboshava in terms of the choices they make regarding the implementation of RDP within a peri-urban context where land transactions are on the increase, and household survival strategies are changing. When the implementation of RDP by the GRDC in Domboshava becomes problematic and flawed, the community residents are able to choose one (or more) of the three orientations - exit, voice, and loyalty - concerning their perceptions on the implementation of RDP. The perceptions of community residents to RDP are shaped not only by the implementation this policy, but by what the policy promises to provide within a peri-urban context.

When community residents experience policy interventions as dysfunctional, they are able to exit, voice, or to remain loyal. These choices are made against their likelihood to improve the undesirable situation (Hirschman, 1970; Barry, 1974; Laver, 1976; Bekker & Leilde, 2003). Community residents make such choices within a wider framework of relationships within the service delivery chain (Bekker & Leilde, 2003; World Development Report, 2004). In my analysis for example, these relationships characterize community residents as RDP end-users, while the GRDC is responsible for policy implementation on behalf of the state. Both community residents and the GRDC hold diverse interests within this policy delivery chain (cf. World Development Report, 2004). On the other hand, the tribal/migrant distinction among households in Domboshava also differentiates community residents not only in terms of class, but also in terms of their perceptions of RDP within these categories. Under these circumstances, the decision to exit, voice, or to remain loyal within the policy context is rational (Hirschman, 1970; Bekker & Leilde, 2003).

According to Hirschman (1970), the basic responses to declining situations are exit and voice. While exit and voice are alternatives, loyalty is about exercising neither exit nor voice (Hirschman, 1970; Barry, 1974; Bekker & Leilde, 2003; Dowding *et al.*, 2000). Dissatisfied consumers can register their discontent by exiting the market - 'quitting the game' (Hirschman, 1970; Ayes, 1971; Bekker & Leilde, 2003). This means that when a system or a product deteriorates in quality dissatisfied customers switch to other competing firms or give up the product or the service totally (Hirschman, 1970; Barry, 1974). In such cases, consumers lose interest and confidence in the delivery system (Laver, 1976). For example, with the case of Domboshava, when community residents perceive the RDP as dysfunctional for whatever reason, they lose confidence in the policy delivery system and seek redress.

When a market fails, consumers can also use voice as a rational response to the situation (Barry, 1974; Laver, 1976). Voice is therefore an antidote to declining situations through expressing dissatisfaction openly (Hirschman, 1970; Barry, 1974; Laver, 1976; Dowding *et al.*, 2000; Bekker & Leilde, 2003). Voice means "staying put and shouting" (Laver, 1976:464). Voice is a sign of disapproval of the status quo (Hirschman, 1970; Laver, 1976). This means complaining and protesting (Barry, 1974). Voice also involves advocacy and lobbying (World Development Report, 2004). In some instances, voice uses platforms such as the press, elections, or community meetings (World Development Report, 2004). Voice therefore assumes collective or individual freedom of expression (Ayes, 1971). Thus, voice should be seen as a possible response to decline, and a possible positive and rational decision that improvement is possible (Hirschman, 1970; Barry, 1974; Laver, 1976). However, voice needs to appear in sufficient volume or to exceed a critical threshold in order to be worthwhile - for people to be heard (Barry, 1974; Laver, 1976; Bekker & Leilde, 2003). In some cases, faint and weak or 'little' amount of voice produces little influence or is likely to make little impact (Bekker & Leilde, 2003; Laver, 1976). In such instances, collective expression of concerns is believed to make more impact.

From Hirschman's perspective of voice, community residents of Domboshava as individuals or collectively can voice their concerns to the GRDC as a way of expressing their perception of the implementation and outcomes of RDP. However, there is no guarantee that voice leads to redress (World Development Report, 2004). This is visible when the local government officials simply choose neither to care nor to listen to community residents. Corrupt leadership is also a form of a voice failure (World Development Report, 2004). In addition,

policies that fail to reach expected outcomes are a signal of voice not being heard (Ibid). However, the tendency is towards a decrease in voice when the situation begins to improve (Barry, 1974; Bekker & Leilde, 2003). Voice can only be a threat to policy providers only when they view the consumers as important (Laver, 1976). For example, community residents' voice can make impact only when there is something the RDC may benefit from them, such as, their vote during election.

Loyalty is a free man's opinion of peaceful resistance (Ayes, 1971). It means waiting patiently for a deteriorating situation to improve (Saunders, 1992). "Loyalty holds exit at bay and activates voice" (Barry, 1974:97). Loyalty is an indication of divergence of concerns to other pressing issues on the 'market' and not necessarily complaining about a deteriorating situation. Loyalty does not however mean reluctance to leave or to voice, but shows a positive commitment to stick with the situation and try to seek change from within (Hirschman, 1970; Barry, 1974; Laver, 1976). In some instances, residents remain loyal not because they are less concerned with deteriorating situation, but are either too busy to notice, or simply do not care - 'getting along with life regardless of what is going on around' (Laver, 1976; Bekker & Leilde, 2003). This is when people get used to what surrounds them, and when the deteriorating policy context makes no difference to them. It is therefore difficult to ascertain loyalty in such cases (Saunders, 1992).

The nature and context of problems dictate the most appropriate combination of exit, voice, and loyalty (Ayes, 1971). Communal residents can use possible combinations of exit with voice (campaigning for improvement after leaving); exit without voice (leaving silently); voice without exit (radical campaigning for improvement from within); loyalty with voice (campaigning for improvement from within); loyalty without voice (silent and non-exit) (Barry, 1974). Decisions to exit, voice, or to remain loyal are determined not only by the context within which they take place, but the capability of people to make the choices. Individual and collective ability of community residents to implement these choices are critical since there are costs to using any of the alternatives (Laver, 1976). Considerable thought is therefore necessary in each case - for example, 'why raise your voice in contradiction and get yourself into trouble? (Hirschman, 1970), or why shout when noone bothers to listen? This means that in some cases community residents may choose not to openly voice and to remain loyal for fear of reprisal, or because they are 'tired' of non-responses. Those who choose to openly exit or voice often risk being labelled sell-outs, rebels

or stubborn although it could be their democratic right to make such choices. Consequently, some community residents often choose to voice, exit or to be loyal because it is fashionable or 'safe' to do so - 'going in the direction of the wind' or 'going with the flow of the current'. When making these choices community residents are just being rational.

In this research, the circumstances that surround not only the implementation of RDP but also the dynamics of land transactions under the system of customary land tenure determine the choices by community residents to exit, voice, or to remain loyal to the RDP context. This is a rational process where people weigh up the trade-offs of the policy implementation process and envisaged outcomes in order to avoid making 'wrong' choices (Barry, 1974; Laver, 1976). 'Wrong' choices are possible and are often regrettable. This research conceptualizes RDP as constitutive of the 'market' as well as the product of that 'market'. When community residents perceive the 'market' as failing them, they are able to seek redress through exit or voice.

#### **2.4 Conclusion: The conceptual framework for analyzing the case of Domboshava**

In developing a conceptual framework for the case of Domboshava, I fused concepts and theories to problematize human conduct within a social system. My conceptual framework is a model that I will use to tell a story of what is happening in Domboshava, and to explain why 'things' happen the way they do in this communal area with regards land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies (cf. Maxwell, 1996; 2005). While Giddens' structuration theory; Hirschman's theory on exit, voice, and loyalty; Bryceson's concept of depeasantization; and Carney's SLF are the methods of analysis, the structuration theory is the 'organizing theory' in my study (cf. Vincent *et al.*, 2006). Bryceson's approach to depeasantization is not a theory as such, but an historical (empirically) informed account of developments locally, and an explanation with regards to the context in which depeasantisation takes place. Whereas, Carney's SLF provides the context in which livelihoods in communal areas can be studied. Although these modes of analysis are polarized views on human conduct, they demonstrate people's capacity to challenge the status quo to their advantage while creating and adapting to new contexts at the same time. These modes of analysis also concur that people use their ingenuity when social systems become dysfunctional or undesirable; that human interaction within social systems produce intended and unintended consequences; and that the behavior of people is a product of the



circumstances that surround them. Emphasis of these explanatory mechanisms is on the conduct of individuals seeking survival within social systems bounded by sets rules, and what happens when such rules do not apply. These theories and concepts were exploited elsewhere, but not within the context of Domboshava. In any case, the “most productive ways of constructing a conceptual framework are often those that integrate different approaches, lines of investigation or theories that noone had previously connected” (Maxwell, 1996:26).

My conceptual framework therefore treats the four explanatory mechanisms not as independent modes of analysis, but rather concisely in their combination. What is significant about my conceptual framework for the Domboshava case are the dialectical relationships *between* land transactions (L), Rural Development Policy (P), and household survival strategies (S) - the key concepts of my research problem (see section 1.8 in Chapter 1). Flyvbjerg (2011) emphasizes the significance of focusing on such relational situations in case studies. I therefore refer to my conceptual framework as the Land - Policy - Survival (LPS) dialectical framework of analysis as illustrated in Figure 2.2 below. It is shortened as the LPS framework throughout the thesis.



Figure 2.1: The LPS framework  
Source: Field data, (2012).

The constitutive components of the LPS framework influence each other both dialectically through feedback. I understand a dialectical relationship in my research as one that starts with a stable structure (thesis), and then shifts to one of conflict between historical structure and new conditions (antithesis), and finally leads to a new form of structure (synthesis) (Popper, 1940). This dialectic triad is useful in explaining and developing ideas and theories (Ibid). The arrows linking land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies in Figure 2.1 above demonstrate the mutual relations that arise from the interplay of these concepts. The LPS framework explains the relationships as well as the reversals or feedback loops between these concepts - the mutual influences. The above model is a simplification of what happens

from the dialectical relationships, how these are constructed and understood, the reasons behind these changes, and the resultant meanings from these interactions. These are unpacked in the substantive chapters (Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8). In Chapter 5, my interest is on highlighting the influence of RDP and household survival strategies on land transactions and not the other way round. In Chapter 6, my focus is on the influence of land transactions and household survival strategies on RDP and not the other way round. In Chapter 7, I demonstrate the influence of household survival strategies on land transactions and RDP and not the other way round. In Chapter 8, I illustrate the mutual influences that emerged from the interactions between land transactions, perceptions of RDP, and household survival strategies in Domboshava. The last chapter pulls together the arguments from the analyses on land transactions in relation to the dynamic interaction between people's behaviour, perceptions, and livelihood strategies.

## Chapter 3 Land, policy, and survival: an historical narrative

### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter sets the background to land transactions, Rural Development Policy (RDP), and household survival strategies in Zimbabwe, and how these are experienced in peri-urban areas. The historical, political, and economic contexts within which these issues are experienced vary significantly from country to country as well as at local levels. This chapter presents these debates on two scales: that of Zimbabwe and of Domboshava. The first scale is a national scale, while the second scale is a local scale. My aim is to situate the Domboshava peri-urban communal area - my study area - as one of the peripheries of the capital city of Zimbabwe, Harare, in relation to these scales. The relationship between Harare and Domboshava is demonstrated within the context of major processes of political and economic change particularly those within the period under review, that is, the 2002 to 2012 census decade. A number of events that occurred during this period influenced land issues, RDP, and household survival strategies in many ways.

After this introduction, the second section of this chapter provides an historical narrative on land issues - both policy and practice - in Zimbabwe during the colonial era. The third section reflects on land issues - both policy and practice - in the post-colonial era. The fourth section highlights the practice of RDP in communal areas of Zimbabwe. The fifth section describes the changing nature of household survival strategies in rural areas in general and in peri-urban areas in particular. The sixth illustrates the colonial and post-colonial environment of Harare, the physical expansion of this city, and the impacts on its periphery. The seventh section provides a detailed description of the peri-urban communal area of Domboshava in Zimbabwe geographically and conceptually as my study area.

Zimbabwe is a land-locked country covering an area of approximately 390 580km<sup>2</sup> (Department of Surveyor General, 2012). The name Zimbabwe was adopted in 1980 when the country gained its independence from Britain. The name originates from the country's oldest stone monument, the Zimbabwe ruins. Possibly, the name Zimbabwe was derived from a Shona phrase - *ziimba remabwe* or *ziimba rebwe* - meaning a 'Great house of stone' (Tavuyanago & Mbenene, 2008; Baxter, 2010). Zimbabwe is located in the Southern Africa

region bounded by Zambia to the north, Mozambique to the east, South Africa to the south, and Botswana to the west (see Figure 3.1 below). The national boundaries for Zimbabwe were institutionalized by the colonial state and these remain valid to date (Raftopolous & Mlambo, 2009).




Figure 3.1: Boundaries of Zimbabwe  
Source: The Department of Surveyor General, Zimbabwe (2012).

In 2002, the population of Zimbabwe was estimated at 11 634 663 (ZNSA Mashonaland East Census Report, 2002:6). The national population rose to 12 973 808 in 2012 (ZNSA National Census Report, 2012:9). The majority of this population (86%) lives in rural areas (ZNSA National Census Report, 2012:8). A population increase of 11.5% recorded between 2002 and 2012 can be attributed to migration of people to other countries in search of better economic opportunities (Potts, 2011; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011; World FactBook, 2012; Chiumbu & Musemwa, 2012). However, the population of Zimbabwe is relatively small compared to most countries of similar size in the sub-Saharan Africa. Land in Zimbabwe falls under three distinct categories and these are communal, freehold, and stateland (Cheater, 1990; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). The tenure arrangements are a creation of both the colonial and the postcolonial states.

### 3.2 Zimbabwe - land transactions, policy, and survival – the colonial

Land issues in Zimbabwe are characterized by a lengthy history of land transactions enmeshed within political and social processes prevailing at that time. These have been central to survival of indigenous populations and to colonial rule. The creation of the colony of Rhodesia was essentially about land, how it was used, accessed, settled, and the nature of authority exercised over it (Alexander, 2006). This goal was prioritized through institutionalized change within the traditional mode of survival of the black Africans. Indigenous black Africans cultivated land for survival, and observed their tradition in land exchanges. Procedures on land transactions during that time were flexible as individuals freely selected unoccupied land parcels in their neighbourhoods to establish themselves, and relocated to other places after sometime (Holleman, 1952; Cheater, 1990). People left their land parcels fallow, opened new spaces for cultivation, or simply extended their land boundaries if they so wished (Holleman, 1952; Ranger, 1985; Cheater, 1990). Since inheritance procedures on land were absent, land never featured on distribution of the deceased's property (Cheater, 1990). Land was viewed as a 'property' (*chinhu*) without value that people could "use for a certain time and then abandon" (Holleman, 1952:6). People regarded land as an infinite resource found everywhere. Moyana (1984:13) in Cheater (1990: 189) states that:

"Prior to the advent of colonial rule the prevailing African land tenure system vested land rights in a corporate group, which had overriding rights over those of the individual. The king or chief served as the trustee who allocated land to newcomers and ensured that its use was in harmony with traditional land tenure formula. The traditional land tenure system also accepted that land rights were inalienable. Land belonged to the living and to the unborn as well as the dead. No member of a group could sell or transfer land to an outsider as land was considered a natural endowment in the same category as rain, sunlight and the air we breathe.

During the pre-colonial period, land transactions were subtly embedded in sharing land as a communal commodity for survival within traditional land tenure systems (Holleman, 1952; Bullock, 1972; Bourdillon, 1976). "There could be no commodity more valuable than land and no circumstances in which it could be profitable to dispose of it" (Moyana, 1984:13 in Cheater, 1990: 189). Thus, "in the African cosmology such an important natural endowment as land does not have a marketable value" (Ibid). In the minds of many people, land in its collective form was everywhere, and everyone owned it - no one could buy what belonged to

them. Land had both material and symbolic significance (Berry, 1992). However, the mode of survival during that time was never simple; but complex in its own peculiar ways. The practice of land transactions suited the circumstances of that time in terms of settlement and cultivation mainly for subsistence under traditional land tenure system.

With the advent of colonial rule in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia), the procedures on land transactions were reproduced to meet the colonial system of administration while the notion of traditional land tenure itself remained the same. According to Ranger (2000), such invented traditions were mediums through which colonial encounters were expressed. The colonial state shaped the land questions of many African states through displacement of tribal populations, demarcation of territorial and social boundaries, as well as through reconstruction of institutions and rules that governed access and allocation of land rights (Berry, 2002). The colonial state imposed itself on traditional societies (Berry, 1992). A 'new' version of the traditional land tenure system was institutionalized through the creation of native reserves for black Africans in 1894 to pave way for white commercial farms, and to consolidate the settlers' interests (Palmer, 1990; Cheater, 1999; Berry, 2002; Alexander, 2006). The Native Reserves Commission of 1914 created standards of administration for native reserves, and officially separated the native reserves from settler settlements in urban areas (Bull, 1967; Ranger, 1983). The peripheries of the urban areas were set free for the creation of more native reserves (Zinyama & Whitlow, 1986). The Native Reserves Commission administered and monitored land transactions particularly allocation of land for communal occupation in native reserves (Palmer, 1977). This was a clear departure from the past practices that allowed flexible movement and settlement. The introduction of native reserves within the indigenous population did not only result in new survival strategies, but also redefined the modes of survival under communal land holding organized on tribal lines (Berry, 1992). This reaffirmed the social identity and belonging of the native populations (Ibid). However, this marked alienation and dispossession of land rights from the indigenous populations, while at the same time creating class differentiation between the original inhabitants and the colonial settlers (Zinyama & Whitlow, 1986).

The colonial native reserves were characterized by traditional lifestyle, and land remained central to household survival. Subsistence farming shifted to peasant farming as people were forced to practice agriculture not only for their own survival, but also to satisfy colonial interests (Ranger, 1983; Berry, 2002). Household survival was based on peasant farming

apart from wage labour from the white commercial farms, urban areas, and mines (Berry, 1992). Introduction of wage labour signified invention of traditions in terms of ‘modernized’ ways of survival and shifts from subsistence farming (Ranger, 2000). However, land in native reserves remained a communal property under the custody of the Chiefs. Individuals had to seek permission to settle through the Chief (Holleman, 1952; Goldin & Gelfand, 1975; Cheater, 1990; Andersson, 1999). Individuals had the right to cultivation and occupancy only (Cheater, 1990:190). This entailed “absence of individual rights and domination of group rights” (Peters, 2007:5). Young men who were about to marry were usually given portions of arable land such as fields and gardens to establish themselves, as well as to cultivate crops in preparation for their married lives (Holleman, 1952). Men were the primary landholders, and they had the prerogative of allocating land rights to their household members. Married men as heads of households allocated land to their wives and sons (irrespective of their marital status), whereas divorced daughters and older girl children could cultivate part of their fathers’, brothers’, or mothers’ land parcels (Holleman, 1952; Cheater, 1990). “Women acquired temporary usufruct rights within their lineage system, through their husbands, or male patrikin” (Cheater, 1990:191). In some cases, migrants worked on tribals’ plots in exchange for permission to settle on arable spaces (Bourdillon, 1976; Berry, 1992). Migrants never ‘owned’ land parcels, but retained the right to use or to cultivate land. When individuals leave their communal areas forever or abandon their fields the land parcels were reallocated to other households (Holleman, 1952; Cheater, 1990). The practice of inheritance entailed returning the land rights of the deceased into the communal pool for reallocation (Cheater, 1990). Since tribal authority was a colonial institution, TLs such as Chiefs and Headmen had the prerogative to allocate land to their people, as well as to strangers under communal tenure (Cheater, 1990). According to Bullock (1972:70):

“The Chief as the earthly vicar ... was recognized as the landlord from whom each head of the kraal derived his right to till the soil. That was a right never denied to a member of the tribe, but... a stranger must first approach the Chief, bringing with him a hoe. Accepting him, the Chief would send his deputy with a stave to mark the kraal site of the immigrant. Later, when the Chief made his tour, beer, and a goat were given to him by the newcomer, whose right of occupation was thus confirmed. But, that tenure conferred no right of ownership. No man could sell the land he tilled, and when one was expelled ... pegs were stuck in his land to show that he had lost all claim to occupation”.

With the introduction of colonial rule, a series of legal regulations were passed as enforcements and reinforcements of the colonial agenda on land. Under colonial influence, the way of life of tribal households in reserves was affected, and so were the dynamics of accessing land. With the introduction of trade and a cash economy, trading land was inevitable. "The idea of noncommoditization of land was inconceivable given the fact that households commoditized food and women as young girls were forced into marriage to food providing families" (Cheater, 1990:191). Monetized land transactions took the form of gifts paid to tribal authorities by new settlers. "Chiefs and Headmen received gifts as material tokens usually alcoholic for their allocation of usufructuary rights" to migrant land seekers (Ibid). Foreigners were given spaces to establish homesteads and villages, and were expected to pay tribute through brewing beer as an obligation to show gratitude and to submit to authority (Holleman, 1952). The concept of individualized land 'ownership rights' was however still absent, and therefore land "could not be owned individually, or disposed of" (Ibid). People could not openly trade in land. Class distinction was however evident as the poor (*varombo*), the rich (*vapfumi*), and successful farmers (*hurudza*) coexisted and were a result of not only access to land, but agriculture production (Ranger, 1983:111). Riches were measured in socio-economic status and material possession of household items such as livestock, agricultural produce, the number of children, or even the number of wives one possessed (Ranger, 1983; Berry, 1992).

The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 was enacted to legally constitute communal tenure, and to alienate native reserves from the settlers' commercial farms through creation of Native Purchase Areas (Bull, 1967; Cheater, 1983; Ranger, 1983). The Act vested land administration powers in the "Governor-In-Council" who had the "right to regulate the area of holdings to be allocated to natives and the conditions of holding in the Native Purchase Areas" (Cheater, 1990:200). Black Africans could purchase land in Native Purchase Areas, and pass it on generationally to their descendants (Cheater, 1983). Black Africans that chose to remain on alienated white farms were required to pay rentals to the colonial government (Cheater, 1983; 1990). People that failed to pay rentals were regarded as squatters, and were often evicted (Bullock, 1972; Cheater, 1983). Through this legal instrument, native boundaries for household land parcels were demarcated. Clearly, the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 institutionalized harsh measures against people regarded as squatters as well as individualized land transactions such as renting and land sales. People could buy land directly from the government through resettlement schemes, for example, the case of Msengezi (see



Cheater, 1983). Yet, these tribals regarded land in native areas as their ancestral land. Women also negotiated land for themselves, for example, in Msengezi communal area (see Cheater, 1983; 1990). The meaning of inheritance was also altered in the process, as land became inheritable (Cheater, 1983; 1990). This period marked the successful peasantization of black Africans (Cheater, 1999; Ranger, 1983). Thus, the motivation to buy land was therefore apparent as highlighted by Bourdillon (1982:63) who states that,

“Means have been found according to which land can be bought and sold: initially the original user could demand compensation for the work for land clearing and preparing farmland, but as land becomes more scarce, value for the land itself is added to the compensation fee, and Chiefs and Headmen can charge settlers a fee for allocation of land”.

Cases of monetary payments for land were already being reported in the national press as described by Cheater (1990:194) when she states:

“The national press has quite regularly reported cases of payment for land in the communal areas. The genre is captured by a recent press report on a successful polygynist from Chinhamora communal lands who, following his fathers’ failure to send him to school in the late 1940s, for five years herded his brother’s cattle and saved every penny he was given by his brother as pocket money, until he managed to buy a small piece of land”.

The practice of land transactions was in response to commoditized land exchanges, and the need to access more land for agricultural production among the tribal communities (Cheater, 1990; Berry, 1992). People produced cash and food crops for the market, as well as for household consumption as the population increased (Ibid). This clearly shows the emergence of monetized land transactions in communal areas in the 1940s. The above case remains an important pointer to the practice of land transactions not only in native reserves during the colonial era, but also in Domboshava - my thesis seeks to problematize.

In 1951, the colonial government institutionalized the Native Land Husbandry Act to control the utilization and allocation of land in native reserves (Bull, 1967; Ranger, 1983, Moyo, 2009). Under this Act, grazing and arable land rights were given to the tribal natives (Bull, 1967; Ranger, 1983). Permanent allocation of land was institutionalized thereby breaking the tradition of shifting cultivation (Bourdillon, 1976). According to Cheater (1990:201), the Chief Native Commissioner was the primary allocative authority of both grazing and farming rights”, while the “Minister of Native Affairs was responsible for determining the standard area for allocation and variation from it”. Holleman (1952) reveals that the tribal natives

would receive a maximum of six acres of land under this arrangement. From Cheater (1990)'s perspective, the Land Husbandry Act of 1951 was an attempt by the settler state to individualize communal land tenure in native reserves through allocation of standardized land parcels. This approach to native land allocation however underestimated the diversity of land needs and interests among tribal natives. The enactment of the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 ushered the departure from the communal landholding regimes that allowed tribal natives flexible land rights to extend their arable land onto the areas that adjoined their fields. The Act also challenged the role of traditional authority in allocation of residential spaces to migrants in terms of where to build their homesteads, and the location of arable plots, gardens, and the commons (Holleman, 1952).

The Tribal Trust Land Act of 1967 established a Tribal Land Authority for every tribal area in the country. This Act became part of the Land Tenure Act of 1969 that led to the creation of separate Land Boards of Trustees for Europeans and African areas, and set aside tribal lands for tribal settlements (Cheater, 1990:201). This Act enforced not only the separation of urban centres from the native reserves, but also legally institutionalized dynamics of land holding in these areas thereby distorting the concept of communal land tenure. As much as this Act regulated land administration, allocation of land and land use in some cases tribal natives deviated from set procedures on land use and allocation. For example the case of Matetsi where in the 1970s tribal natives set up rural factories on communal land earmarked for agricultural production (Cheater, 1990).

In 1979, the Tribal Trust Land Act was enacted and made provision for the establishment of Tribal Trust Land Boards (current RDCs) to spearhead development issues in native reserves "in the interest of the tribesmen and the occupation of Tribal Trust Land by tribesmen" (Cheater, 1990:201). Chiefs were instated as the sole "tribal authority" whose consent every tribesmen required in order to occupy or use land for agricultural purposes" (Ibid). Through this Act, Chiefs retained their roles in land allocation which they lost through the Land Husbandry Act of 1951 (Ibid). Land transactions outside this structure continued as forms of resistance to legitimation of tradition through law (Ranger, 1983). The socio-economic and political economy of peasants in native reserves demonstrate the evolving nature of land transactions, the nature of colonial policy, as well as the emergent household survival strategies during the pre-colonial and colonial eras. These circumstances were a result of land Acts and the institutional order that prevailed in native reserves at that time.

### **3.3 Zimbabwe - land transactions, policy, and survival - the post-colonial**

The major focus of the post-colonial state was about removing distortions from the communal land tenure, and the racial imbalances that characterized this model. Through the Communal Lands Act of 1982 land allocation was vested in RDCs who were directed to “have regard to customary law and grant land only to those people who have customary rights” (Cousins, 1990:15). This Act however perpetuated subordination of traditional elements within the customary land tenure system by the state through introduction of legal purchase of communal land in Communal Purchase Areas. The Acts provided for the rejection of linguistic use of concepts such as native reserves and Tribal Lands Boards. These linguistic terms were deemed as derogatory colonial constructs (Cheater, 1990). However, linguistic changes alone remained inadequate to bring sufficient change on the colonial footprint within the communal land tenure system that was institutionalized over several decades. The move was to refer to native reserves as communal areas, and Tribal Lands Boards as District Councils. The District Councils were separated as rural and urban. Through the District Councils the post-colonial state centralized control of communal land rights, yet these were flexible under the traditional model. In practical terms, the conditions on communal land and landholding within the Communal Lands Act of 1982 remained the same as those of the Tribal Trust Land Act of 1979, and were entrenched in the colonial system of administration.

The Communal Lands Act of 1982 was repealed over the years giving birth to the current CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002. This Act vests all power over communal land in the hands of the state and restricts the occupation and use of communal land by people from outside a particular communal area. The Act expressively prohibits the sale of communal land (Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Those found guilty of selling communal land are liable to prosecution. Unlawful occupation of communal land is also a criminal offense. Customary rights to allocation, use, and occupation of communal land are obtainable with the consent of RDCs. Responsibility to allocate communal land has been transferred from TLs to RDCs. Under these conditions, residents of communal areas cannot own land under communal tenure. They retain customary land rights. However, customary procedures on land allocation are absent in the Act. These are subject to individual interpretation viz-à-viz the local customs and tradition of each communal area. The Act also stipulates that communal land can be set aside for the establishment of townships, business centres, and industrial areas.

Under these conditions, the state has the right to take over land from communal residents for any purpose seen fit (Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Those affected by development plans of the new establishments receive compensation, and are reallocated to other places. This provision has been problematic with regards development projects in Zimbabwe, for example, the Marowa Diamond mine, the Tokwe-Mukosi dam project, and Marange Diamond mine among others (cf. Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Under this Act, TLs only retain powers on dispute resolution and not necessarily land allocation.

A number of statutory instruments were also put in place by the post-colonial state to administer land in communal areas, and had been revised and repealed several times. Of interest to my research are the current RTCPA Chapter 29:12 of 2001, the RDCA Chapter 29:13 of 2002, and the TLA Chapter 29:17 of 2001; and how they regulate land administration in communal areas. For example, RTCPA Chapter 29:12 of 2001 recognizes communal land as state land. This Act empowers RDCs to implement rural development initiatives in communal areas through spatial planning tools such as master plans, as well as other development plans. According to Musandu-Nyamayaro (2008), such a provision is more concerned with order and spatial development of settlements. Kombe (2005) argues that conventional tools for regulating and directing land use, such as master plans, are no longer instrumental in planning development especially in peri-urban areas where land falls under the customary system of tenure. RTCPA Chapter 29:12 of 2001 also empowers the RDCs to enforce planning principles in accordance with orderly settlements in rural areas. Kamete & Lindell (2010) view this approach to planning as land use planners' image-making tool that lies outside the interests of residents. Watson (2009) also adds that the approach seeks to maintain 'law and order' and enhance image making of settlements at the expense of social processes and interests of residents. The RTCPA Chapter 29:12 of 2001 thus oversimplifies and reduces RDP to land use planning, and disregards the social, cultural, and economic components that define people's lived experiences.

The RDCA Chapter 29:13 of 2002 provides for separate development agendas for rural and urban areas. This Act categorizes land as communal, urban, resettlement, large and small-scale commercial areas. This defines land tenure in Zimbabwe (Munyuki-Hungwe & Dirwayi, 2010). Within this instrument, my research is interested in specific provisions for rural areas. Through this Act, there is clarity on what should constitute rural and urban areas. The state through RDCs has the power to alter and to modify traditional land use and

ownership rights particularly under customary land tenure to meet the state's objectives through the RDCA Chapter 29:13 of 2002. This Act also justifies the implementation of non-planning interventions as RDP strategies by RDCs (see Kamete & Lindell, 2010). According to the RDCA Chapter 29:13 of 2002, communal land is vested in the state and RDCs. By this Act, the administration of communal land is assigned to the Ministry of LGRUD. This eliminates the cultural role of TLs in the allocation of communal land in rural areas, as they are subservient to RDCs (Munyuki-Hungwe & Dirwayi, 2010). Conflict regarding the power to control land in communal areas is thus inevitable.

The TLA Chapter 29:17 of 2001 describes what constitutes tribal authority, how TLs are appointed, and their duties in communal areas. The Act officially recognizes TLs as a cultural institution. The duties of TLs include the collection of land levies on behalf of RDCs, the prevention of unauthorized settlement, and the preservation of natural resources in communal areas. The TLA Chapter 29:17 of 2001 provides for the allocation of land in communal areas and clearly states that no land in communal areas shall be allocated without the approval by RDCs as the local authorities that control the use and allocation of communal land in line with the CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002. The TLA Chapter 29:17 of 2001 also prohibits subdivision of communal land without approval of VHs, and specifies that urban dwellers can only occupy communal land in places where they have customary rights. The TLA Chapter 29:17 of 2001 also prevents communal residents from disposing of land without the consent of TLs and RDCs. No person is allowed to sell or lease land for settlement. However, the TLA Chapter 29:17 of 2001 is not explicit on how TLs may allocate land in communal areas under customary procedures, but clearly stipulates their duty to report unlawful settlement, land users, and land uses. Through the TLA Chapter 29:17 of 2001, TLs retain their cultural positions as custodians of communal land and subsequently customary tenure. This dispensation integrates the powers of TLs into a conventional system of governing communal areas where they are relegated to policing their tribesmen. Chiefs are regarded as ex-officio members of RDCs (Munyuki-Hungwe & Dirwayi, 2010). Like in the colonial past, Chiefs in Zimbabwe receive salaries from the state (Ranger, 1983; Alexander, 2006; Munzwa & Jonga, 2010; Munyuki-Hungwe & Dirwayi, 2010). However, paralleling of tribal and conventional systems of governance strips TLs of the power to allocate land. Yet, tribal authority and power is derived from control of land and other resources in communal areas. Although it cannot be substantiated at this moment, it is clear that some TLs are not necessarily aware of the provisions of statutes that regulate allocation of communal land. Laws by nature are very

difficult to interpret. Knowledge gaps and technical issues with regards the land laws present huge anomalies and loopholes often manipulated by the elite including RDCs. In such cases, the state always holds an upper hand in ownership and control of land (Walker, 2012). “Central to the power of the state is to allocate land according to the dictates of land use planning ... which is seen by state technocrats as essential to the conservation of natural resources” (Cousins, 1990:15). The post-colonial Acts in land administration still alienate individuals from land rights, yet under traditional communal land holding, the individual and land rights presuppose each other through tradition.

Clearly, land transactions in communal areas today are pointers to distortions from colonial planning principles as well as the failure by the post-colonial state to rectify the gaps embedded in the ‘new’ models of communal and customary land tenure. Statutes on land and settlement highlight a fusion and confusion associated with land administration under customary tenure. Legal pluralism is evident on how land can be accessed, allocated, used, and ‘owned’ in communal areas. Thus, land transactions are at the core of resisting standardized communal models of accessing land rights, as well as appropriation of land through legal instruments that are largely static. This brings to the fore the shifts in modes of survival and accessing land, as well as progression of rural households from being subsistence households to peasant households although there is lack of straightforward or logical steps in this progression (Ranger, 1983). Colonial land administration attempted to separate the colonial residents (natives and settlers) in both spatial and institutional terms thereby initiating resentment to the rural-urban dichotomy through different forms of land transactions. However, movement of people between the rural and urban spaces continued though controlled. My study seeks to unravel the existing dynamics of land transactions using the case of Domboshava situated in the periphery of Harare the capital city of Zimbabwe.

### 3.3.1 Land administration in contemporary Zimbabwe

Land in Zimbabwe is administered as either rural or urban. The system of administration in both rural and urban areas of Zimbabwe borrows much from colonial principles. Most African countries, including Zimbabwe never implemented reforms to these ex-colonial administrative frameworks (Berry, 2002; Musandu-Nyamayaro, 2008). In fact, most former British and French colonies continue to use policies of the colonial regimes (Tsikata &

Whitehead, 2003). Limitations to what the post-colonial state achieved in breaking the communal reserve tag persist (Helliker & Murisa, 2011).

In Zimbabwe, urban areas are administered through the Urban Councils Act Chapter 29:15 of 2005, whereas a plethora of statutory instruments is used for land administration in communal areas also referred to as rural areas (see section 2.2.2 in Chapter 2). Zimbabwe consists of ten administrative provinces that are subdivided into several districts. The districts are categorised as rural or urban. Some rural districts integrate both rural and urban areas. However, there are no situations where urban districts in Zimbabwe comprise rural areas. Rural and urban district Councils as local authorities are responsible for the implementation of policy strategies in areas under their jurisdiction.

Districts in post-colonial Zimbabwe are further divided into Wards that are presided over by Ward Councillors (WCs). Ward Councillors as elected officials and as community representatives initiate rural development strategies in collaboration with other service providers such as civil servants and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (Jonga & Chirisa, 2009). Since WCs are elected on party tickets, their operations and those of RDCs tend to be political. Under these circumstances, rural communities often become experimental spaces for new ideas, exploratory policy, and political decisions (Jonga & Chirisa, 2009). In practice, politicians and professionals from government departments frequently overrule policy decisions by officials at lower ranks such as WCs thereby reducing the functions of local authorities to political organs of the state and not necessarily institutions for service provision (Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990; Jonga & Chirisa, 2009). Political contamination of policy programmes in local authorities is thus inevitable.

Within the different Wards, provision has been made for the creation of Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) presided over by WCs to oversee land administration and implementation of development programmes at this level (Helmsing *et al.*, 1991). Wards are further segmented into villages. There are no village structures in urban areas. Each village is presided over by a Village Development Committee (VIDCO) to oversee local level land administration and development agendas (Ibid). In contemporary Zimbabwe, WADCOs and VIDCOs exist in principle, but have struggled to be effective. In some cases, these are defunct. In resettlement areas, the VIDCOs and WADCOs as structures of local governance emerge as Village Committees institutionalized through the FTLRP (Cliffe *et al.*, 2011;

Matondi & Dekker, 2011; Mujere, 2011; Scoones *et al.*, 2010). Village Committees are improvised structures set to seal the vacuum created by the defunct WADCOs and VIDCOs in land administration in rural areas (Dekker & Kinsey, 2011). Although Village Committees are informal political structures in land administration in resettlement areas, they remain accountable to formally institutionalized RDCs as their roles insinuate those of TLs in terms of land allocation and dispute resolution (Matondi & Dekker, 2011; Mujere, 2011; Scoones *et al.*, 2010). Whereas, in rural areas land administration comprises the traditional authority and the conventional system of governance through local authorities (the RDCs) (see Figure 3.2 below).




Figure 3.2: The structure of land administration in Zimbabwe  
Source: Adapted from Munyuki-Hungwe & Dirwayi (2010:8).

The system of land administration in communal areas of Zimbabwe is coordinated by a plethora of institutions and authorities (see Figure 3.2 above). The system is complex. Its



elements tend to compete rather than complement each other, and often contradict and conflict (Andersson, 1999; Jonga & Chirisa, 2009; Mushamba, 2010; Munyuki-Hungwe & Dirwayi, 2010). While the traditional ranks seem to disappear at Ward level, somehow these implicitly filter through to national levels. The powers of TLs such as Chiefs are not limited to their local communities. Inclusion of TLs in the government administrative structure suggests a deliberate effort by the state to compensate the TLs for their lost powers during the colonial period (Alexander, 2006). The conventional system of land administration in communal areas of Zimbabwe is guided by statutes on land and settlement, whereas TLs are guided by tradition and custom often varied from community to community. These inherent disparities within the functions of the administrative system restrain rural residents from exerting pressure on issues they regard important, particularly those concerning survival and policy (cf. Carney, 1999a; 1999b; 1999c). Challenges on allocation of resources such as land, and implementation of RDPs emanate from this structure.

Land use and settlement in Zimbabwe is broadly categorised as communal areas, small-scale commercial farms, large-scale commercial farms, resettlement areas, urban Councils areas, administrative centres, growth points, and state land (ZNSA National Census Report, 2012; see Figure 3.3 below).




Figure 3.3: Land use in Zimbabwe  
Source: Adapted from ZNSA (2012:28)

Communal areas are entirely rural. Rural areas are generally regarded as agriculture based settlements characterized by slow technological innovations, inefficient markets, and rapid demographic growth (Tacoli, 1998; Matondi & Dekker, 2011; see section 2.2.6 in Chapter 2). Often, many scholars characterize communal areas as densely populated despite constituting more land (Zinyama & Whitlow, 1986; Kinsey, 2010; Thebe, 2010; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). The pressure on land in communal areas rather concerns arable land largely regarded as vital in sustenance of agricultural production. As a result, inhabitants of communal areas either adapt to land pressure or migrate to other areas to access land. On the other hand, urban Councils areas, administrative centres, and growth points are considered as urban. Urban areas are regarded as focused on industry and service (Tacoli, 1998). My thrust is on communal areas and communal land tenure.

In communal areas of Zimbabwe land tenure is “the sum of rules recognized in law underlying land ownership, allocation of land rights, the substantive content of those rights, their protection in law, their disposal and/or extinction as well as their regulation” (Shivji *et al.*, 1998 in Matondi & Dekker, 2011:2). This describes the rules and relationships between individuals and particular land parcels, as well as the structure that regulates behaviour in terms of allocation of land and other property rights within rural communities. The rules also define and control individual agency in terms of how access to land held in common can be granted, how the land rights can be transferred, as well as the associated responsibilities and restraints (Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Simply put, land tenure in communal areas determines who can use what resources for how long, and under what conditions (Ibid; see 2.2.2 in Chapter 2). This imposes a moral duty on tribal household members not only to ensure that their land is passed on to future generations, but that it is retained for peasant farming. Individuals as group members carry individual rights they can deem private, while at the same time they are liable to observe group rights, and this limits them to individually alienate land (Cousins, 1990). Thus, “land should be alienated by a group if at all” (Cousins, 1990:17).

Communal land in rural areas of Zimbabwe is administered under the customary land tenure system - is a shift from traditional land tenure systems of the past. There is strong influence of the colonial state on the construction of the official version of the communal and customary land laws/tenure, as well as the roles and powers of TLs in land administration in communal areas in Zimbabwe (cf. Mamdani, 2000; Alexander, 2006). According to Matondi

& Dekker (2011:1), customary tenure refers to “tenure regime under which land rights are acquired and held in terms of customary law”. Traditional Leaders on one hand practice land administration duties in accordance with tradition and custom within their areas of jurisdiction, while RDCs perform the same roles in line with provisions from statutes on land and settlement on the other (see Figure 3.2 above). A dualism exists between the statutory and traditional systems, as well as corresponding dualism between the state and communal residents in the system of land administration in Zimbabwe (Roe, 1995; Adams *et al.*, 1999; Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2006). Parallel systems of land administration have created not only problems in administration of land, but have opened informal avenues for accessing land rights in rural areas (Okoth-Ogendo, 2008). In Zimbabwe, tensions between TLs and community residents in communal areas are not a new phenomenon (see Nyambara, 2001; Chimhowu & woodhouse, 2006; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Similarly, in Tanzania and Mali tension between statutory and customary rights as well as conflict of interest between Chiefs and government officials exist within the system of land tenure (Bah *et al.*, 2003). This leads to exploitation of property rights of vulnerable groups such as women and children, as well as resources under common property rights. The thrust of my research is to explore land issues and the dynamics of exchanges of land rights within a communal area situated at the edge of a big city - the peri-urban, that is, Domboshava.

Legally, peri-urban communal areas are rural, and fall under communal land tenure. Land use in these areas translates into arable, residential, and grazing; and is untitled. The ultimate title on such land is held by the state (Gunby *et al.*, 2000; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Under these circumstances, residents of peri-urban communal areas can only claim land use rights since ownership and control over land rests on the discretion of the state (Bromley & Cernea, 1991; Moyo *et al.*, 1993; Moyo, 1995; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). The RDCs remain the custodians of land on behalf of the state. This means that residents of these areas can ‘own’ land on the forbearance of the state (cf. Bromley & Cernea, 1991). Land in peri-urban communal areas, remains subject to state appropriation with or without compensation if required for development purposes (Ranger, 1983). Under these circumstances, community residents are entitled to compensation of diminution of land rights (Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Communal land rights for people that live in peri-urban communal areas of Zimbabwe are therefore insecure.

### 3.4 Sketching post-independence Rural Development Policy initiatives in Zimbabwe

The concept of Rural Development Policy (RDP) in Zimbabwe is broad in spectrum. Rural Development Policy discourses and processes relate to a broader context that covers the history on land tenure and initiatives pursued by the post-colonial state to 'improve' lives of people living in rural areas. In most cases, RDP is synonymous with LRPs as these dominate development agendas of the state (Thebe, 2010). The practice of RDP involves government strategies and programmes that seek to correct colonial imbalances, for example, the villagization programmes that dominated development initiatives soon after independence (Potts & Mutambirwa, 1990; Nyambara, 2001; Spierenburg, 2004; Thebe, 2010). In other instances, service provision as well as projects and programmes that seek to improve agriculture production through land tenure reforms are regarded as RDP by RDCs for example the FTLRP. Agriculture is at the core of rural development practice (Maxwell *et al.*, 2001). These strategies are designed to improve the economic and social life of the rural poor (Dixon, 1990). Rural development initiatives and strategies in Zimbabwe revolve primarily on land since that sector has been facing problems of inherited inequalities (Fair, 1992). Due to the broad nature of land laws, characterization of RDP in Zimbabwe has been extremely complex, ambiguous, and often contradictory (Wekwete, 1990; Van-Hoof, 1992; Helmsing *et al.*, 1991). Consequently, RDP implementation faces significant challenges (Thebe, 2010).

There is lack of distinct RDPs in rural areas of Zimbabwe (Wekwete, 1991). The basic tenets of RDPs are not spelt out in black and white in a single document (Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990; Munyuki-Hungwe & Dirwayi, 2010). Statutory instruments on land and settlement (land law), programmes, strategies, and projects on rural development are the core components of the development policy (Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990; Gasper, 1991; Helmsing *et al.*, 1991; Wekwete, 1991; Mutizwa-Mangiza & Helmsing 1991; Zinyama, 1992; Fair, 1992; Dzingirai, 2003; Musandu-Nyamayaro, 2008; Munyuki-Hungwe & Dirwayi, 2010). Resolutions passed by RDCs are regarded as RDP (Jonga & Chirisa, 2009). Under these circumstances, clear RDP goals are viewed as absent by those interested in policy discourses (Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990). The definition of RDP in Zimbabwe remains a big challenge and remains 'fuzzy' as the policy direction assumes contextual definitions from practice (Zinyama, 1992; Thebe, 2010). In any case, many RDPs are a complex combination of goals (Singh, 1986). As a result, RDP goals often fall short, and fail to capture the priorities of residents on what they feel the state ought to do in order to bring about change for the better (Ibid). In Zimbabwe,

the RDP direction is even complicated in zones that are neither urban nor rural - the peri-urban.

Implementation of RDP strategies in Zimbabwe involves a variety of ministries and government departments under the auspices of the Ministry of Local Government Urban and Rural Development (MLGURD). The responsibility cuts across several government departments and other service providers such as the private sector, NGOs, and traditional authorities (Mushamba, 2010). The practice of RDP is thus sectoral. There is no legal basis upon which government departments or other institutions are obliged to implement RDPs (Munyuki-Hungwe & Dirwayi, 2010). While taking into consideration the plurality of RDPs viz-à-viz the land laws in Zimbabwe, my focus rests on aspects that inform land and settlement discourses in communal areas as represented in the statutes. The statutes on land and settlement form the basis on which the legal aspects on land rights are administered, enforced, and applied. Elements outside this realm are beyond the scope of my thesis. A conflation of statutes on land and settlement are deemed RDPs by RDCs (see section 3.3 above). Yet, statutes are laws, they are not policies. Laws simply guide rural development strategies in many ways.

In post-independent Zimbabwe, a number of programmes were put in place to improve the living conditions of people in rural areas. The focus of the government was mainly to boost agricultural production and to reduce inequality in rural land holding (Chiremba & Masters, 2003; Marongwe, 2008; Moyo *et al.*, 2009). Rural development and other post-independence policies largely targeted adjusting and redressing racial colonial imbalances through redistribution of land, and modernising the neglected and segregated communal areas (Mutizwa-Mangiza & Helmsing, 1991; Andersson, 1999; Alexander, 1999; Kinsey, 1999; Moyo, 2004; Marongwe, 2008; Kinsey, 2010; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011). Rural Development Policy was viewed by the government as the solution to rural problems such as rural poverty. As a result, post-independence RDP packages in Zimbabwe comprised programmes like villagization, resettlement, LRPs, and the upgrading of rural settlements to urban (Potts & Mutambirwa, 1990; Mutizwa-Mangiza & Helmsing, 1991; Nyambara, 2001; Dzingirai, 2003; Spierenburg, 2004; Potts, 2011).

In 1981 for example, the Zimbabwe government introduced the Growth with Equity Strategy comprising economic and social policies with an aim of achieving 'growth and equity'

through planned change (Helmsing *et al.*, 1991; Gunby, 2000; Sachikonye, 2003). The strategy provided the basis for investment by both the government and external agencies (Gunby *et al.*, 2000). With this plan, much of government spending was directed towards the rural areas particularly the social service sector and the expansion of rural infrastructure (Ibid). Increase in agricultural output was witnessed in most communal areas because of this strategy. This was a period during which Zimbabwe was internationally widely regarded as a model in rural development and as a breadbasket of Africa (Ibid). In comparison to many other countries in the region, the rural local government in Zimbabwe was robust and well organized (Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990).

In an endeavor to reduce poverty, the government introduced the Transitional National Development Plan in 1982. Focus was particularly on eradicating poverty in the previously neglected communal areas. In 1984, the government introduced the Prime Minister's Directive of 1984-85 as an attempt to decentralize national development (Ibid). Under this directive, Zimbabwe witnessed local government reforms on decentralization of local government structures (Munzwa, & Jonga, 2010). Decentralization of local government activities led to the creation of growth-points (small towns) in all provinces in an endeavor to modernize the rural areas. These small towns were expected to develop in a linear hierarchy to become fully urbanized (Helmsing *et al.*, 1991; Munzwa, & Jonga, 2010). The settlement hierarchy proceeds from what are known as business centres, rural service centres, growth points, towns, and ultimately to cities (Helmsing *et al.*, 1991; Munzwa & Jonga, 2010). The purpose of the settlement hierarchy was to curb rural-urban migration by bringing similar urban services closer to the people living in the rural areas (Tacoli, 1998; Helmsing *et al.*, 1991). The approach was meant to harmonize urban spread into rural areas (Munzwa & Jonga, 2010).

Between 1986 and 1990, an attempt was made by the government to separate land as residential, arable, and grazing (Sachikonye, 2003). The state's land policy sought to address the viability of land tenure and land use in communal areas (O'Flaherty, 1998). In 1991, the Second Five Year Development Plan of 1991-1995 was abandoned for Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). This programme was part of the government's effort to boost economic development through reduced expenditure, cutting of subsidies, and decreasing budget allocations for the social services (Bryceson, 2002; Berry, 2002). For example, subsidies on seed and fertilizer were cut and the price of seed increased (Bryceson,

2002). Commercialization of state enterprises was also introduced (Helliker & Murisa, 2011; Berry, 2002). The objectives of ESAP were never realized as the policy was associated with economic decline (Helliker & Murisa, 2011). The decade of the 1990s witnessed a turnaround of economic fortunes as ESAP ushered a turnaround on gains achieved soon after independence (Zimbabwe MDGs Progress Report, 2004). Hence, this decade is often referred to as the 'lost decade of development'.

In an effort to curtail the negative achievements of ESAP, the government unveiled a home-grown reform package branded the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) in April 1998. With brilliant objectives on paper, this home-grown initiative never realised its objectives due to lack of adequate financial commitment (Zimbabwe MDGs Progress Report, 2004). The Millennium Economic Recovery Plan (MERP) was then launched in August 2001 as a short-term eighteen-month economic recovery measure meant to restore economic vibrancy and to address the underlying macro-economic fundamentals (Zimbabwe MDGs Progress Report 2004). The plan was prematurely aborted because Zimbabwe experienced international isolation and donor apathy. In February 2003, the National Economic Revival Programme (NERP) with a twelve-month benchmark was launched as a stabilization programme and an urgent measure to ease existing challenges while searching for possible options for a long-term economic recovery (Gunby *et al.*, 2000; Zimbabwe MDGs Progress Report, 2004). This home-grown initiative did not reach its full term. It failed to generate the required levels of foreign currency inflows to support economic recovery (Ibid). Subtly, the initiative was abandoned for the MDGs in 2000. With the 2015 benchmark, the MDGs seek to reduce poverty, combat HIV/AIDS, improve services in health and education, increase gender equality and women empowerment and other aspects of the human welfare and environmental sustainability (Gunby *et al.*, 2000).

After 2000, there was a shift from nation-wide orientation in the practice of RDP to piece-meal initiatives in response to deteriorating situation in the national economy. The government 'operationalized' policy initiatives in the various service sectors in an ad hoc manner. This defines the practice of RDP, and policy initiatives in Zimbabwe generally. Policy packages were code-named 'Operation', followed by a prefix of the proposed policy strategy. This approach marks a departure from nation-wide policy strategies to piece-meal, often drastic and unplanned interventions as substitute for policy. Before, policy planning in Zimbabwe took form of planned interventions borrowed mainly from the rational

comprehensive models of planning as highlighted in the above paragraphs. According Faludi (1988) and Cambell & Franstein (2003), rational comprehensive models are sequential and they begin with consideration of available alternatives courses of action, identification, evaluation of all possible consequences of the chosen alternatives, and ultimately the selection of the most preferable alternatives in terms of reduced negative consequences and meeting the intended targets. On the other hand, through ‘operationalized’ policy strategies the government adopted what Lindblom (1959) coined the ‘science of muddling through’ in contrast to the rational comprehensive approach to RDP practice. In this regard, the ‘science of muddling through’ is an adaptive response to changes in the local context (McLaughlin, 1987). From Lindblom (1959:83)’s perspective, ‘operationalized’ practice of RDP in Zimbabwe was adopted as a departure from the usual problem solving techniques to more of a ‘quick-fix’ and prompt solutions to complex policy problems amid political, social and economic challenges experienced during the first decade of the millennium. This approach to the practice of RDP is characterized by random and panic interpretation and enforcement of mixed regulations and decrees (Allen, 2003). Under these circumstances, the practice of RDP has been reduced to mere fire-fighting as solutions are sought ahead of planning. Scoones *et al.* (2011c) refers to this approach as retrospective planning to describe the implementation of the FTLRP as a policy initiative. Selective implementation of policy initiatives in Zimbabwe has thus become the norm (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011). The situation is engendered by an interplay of influences from the political maelstrom, international isolation (sanctions), kneejerk policies, and corruption (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011; Chiumbu & Musemwa, 2012; Hanlon *et al.*, 2013).

The most contested and deeply unpopular ‘operations’ particularly in the eyes of victims that occurred during the period covered by this study - (2002-2012) - were Operation Murambatsvina/Operation Restore Order (ORO/OM) of 2005 and Operation Garikayi/Hlalani Kuhle (OG/HK) of 2005. Operation Murambatsvina/Operation Restore Order was launched as a national crackdown to destroy all informal sector business operations and buildings in urban areas (Tibaijuka, 2005; Potts, 2008; Kinsey, 2010; Kamete, 2011; Potts, 2011). Many urban households had their dwellings demolished and were left homeless as a result of this operation (Ibid). Kamete (2012) describes ORO/OM of 2005 as a militarized nationwide cleansing campaign characterized by evictions and demolitions of which the declared intention was to purify urban spaces by driving out filth ‘*tsvina*’ - an idiomatic nomenclature referring to people and building structures outside the parameters of urban planning.



More than 700 000 people lost their homes and livelihoods through ORO/OM of 2005 (Tibaijuka, 2005; Potts, 2008; Potts, 2011; Kamete, 2012). A similar operation was enacted in Epworth in Harare in October 2012 (Nehanda Radio, 16 October: 2012; The Standard, 21 October: 2012). Events of ORO/OM of 2005 in Zimbabwe are similar to what was experienced in Mozambique ahead of the Second Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments (the African Union Summit) scheduled for the 8<sup>th</sup> to the 11<sup>th</sup> of July 2003 (Kamete & Lindell, 2010). The aim of the Mozambican cleansing programme was to eradicate informal markets regarded by the city planners as illegal (Ibid). According to Kamete & Lindell (2010), the clean-up campaigns experienced in Zimbabwe and Mozambique have little or no basis in existing plans, and thus are non-planning strategies or interventions. Thus, eviction of the urban poor ignores structural challenges that result from migration and economic and sometimes political factors.

With the case of ORO/OM of 2005 in Zimbabwe, 'back to the village calls' were enforced on households that lost their dwellings and sources of income through clean-up operations. Destitute urban households were forced to return to their traditional homelands<sup>4</sup> - '*kumusha*' (Tibaijuka, 2005; Potts, 2008; Kinsey, 2010; Potts, 2011). This was a mere replication of influx controls used by the colonial state to manage population increase in urban centres. This also advanced the government's perception that blacks belong to rural areas (Mpofu, 2012). The eventual destinations of and the demographic consequences to most of these households remain obscure (Potts, 2008; Watson, 2009; Kinsey, 2010; Potts, 2011; Kamete, 2012). The city planning authorities however underestimated the capacity of the 'filth' to regenerate (Potts, 2008; Kamete, 2012). Regeneration of 'filth' can be conceptualized as strategies and efforts employed by household members to regain their lost livelihoods and housing by migrating into the cities' peripheries for settlement. By so doing, the displaced households did not only congest peri-urban zones, but invented new dynamics of accessing housing beyond the expectations of those that planned the programme. In the eyes of the state, these drastic policy strategies such as clean-up campaigns are always necessary in bringing order and 'respectable' city images (Potts, 2008; Kamete & Lindell, 2010; Kamete, 2012). They are crucial in retaining the 'citiness' of urban centres (Mpofu, 2012). However, such justification obscures the far deeper economic and political causes embedded in the creation of informal settlements and markets by the poor in these areas (Potts, 2008). As a result, the clean-up

---

<sup>4</sup> The concept of homeland interchangeably refers to village or rural homes.

strategies tend to provide temporary reprieves as displaced households always come up with alternative ways to ameliorate their predicaments.

Operation Garikayi/Hlalani Kuhle, a public housing scheme was initiated in 2005 after ORO/OM. The objective of this government programme was to provide decent and affordable housing to victims of ORO/OM, and to create an enabling environment that promotes small and medium enterprises (Chirisa, 2010a; Gumbo & Geyer, 2011). Operation Garikayi/Hlalani Kuhle sought to reconstruct informality for the victims of ORO/OM (Chirisa, 2010a; Gumbo & Geyer, 2011; Kamete, 2012). However, the number of dwellings provided by this public housing scheme remains insignificant compared to the number of households affected by the clean-up operation (Chirisa, 2010a). The reconstruction exercise was a dismal failure (Chirisa, 2010a; Gumbo & Geyer, 2011). Some observers claim that the programme was intended to pacify mounting international criticism (Kamete, 2011). It was a mere political gimmick, and a form of continuity and change (Gumbo & Geyer, 2011; Kamete, 2011). Operation Garikayi/Hlalani Kuhle was suspended indefinitely due to lack of financial resources resulting from the ailing national economy (Gumbo & Geyer, 2011). No other measures were put in place to ameliorate the destitution of households that lost their dwellings through ORO/OM in 2005. However, the survival and housing needs of the victims of ORO/OM of 2005 could neither be suspended nor deferred. Households needed to cope with their losses. As a result, they drifted into the peripheries of cities for survival and housing. Victims of displacement presumed peri-urban zones as out of reach of the strict land and settlement laws of the cities. Urban-rural migration due to the failed OG/HK of 2005 continues to mount pressure in peri-urban communal areas of Zimbabwe especially those surrounding Harare. These peri-urban zones are already congested since by nature they are 'moving edges' of cities (Chirisa, 2010a; Mabin, 2012). These circumstances also generate different kinds of pressure and densifications in spatial and non-spatial terms through urban-rural migration by transforming the status quo and creating mixed environments in terms of diversity of activities, forms of life, social relationships, growing spatial expansions, and new centralities in peri-urban zones (Mabin, 2012).

#### 3.4.1 The Fast Track Land Reform Programme in Zimbabwe

The purpose of this section is not to replicate existing debates on the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in Zimbabwe, but to note the influence of the programme on land

transactions and household survival strategies in a peri-urban context of Domboshava within 2002-2012 decade - the period under study. In this study, I conceptualize the FTLRP in terms of both land tenure reform and RDP. This programme was meant to “redress historical settler-colonial land dispossession and the related racial and foreign domination, as well as class-based agrarian inequalities which minority rule prompted” (Moyo, 2013:29-30). Post-independence land reforms aimed to shift repressive social relations of production and reproduction through broadening access to land and promoting peasant productivity (Moyo, 2013). The LRP in Zimbabwe took place in three distinct phases - 1980 to 1989, 1990 to 1997, and the period after 1997 (Moyo, 2013:30). The first phase was based on state-led purchases of land on the market and its allocation to selected beneficiaries (Ibid). The second phase aimed at adoption of land expropriation laws, restricted state intervention on land markets, and a slowdown in land redistribution (Ibid). The third phase is characterized by escalation of social crisis, extreme political polarization leading to the land redistribution programme, shifts towards land appropriation, and increased state intervention in the economy alongside bitterly contested elections (Ibid). By 1987 about 400 000 hectares of land had been distributed under the land reform initiatives in post-independence Zimbabwe (Marongwe, 2008).

The FTLRP in Zimbabwe was introduced in 2000 (Marongwe, 2008; Moyo *et al.*, 2009; Kinsey, 2010; Helliker & Murisa, 2011; Scoones *et al.*, 2010). The programme has been variously referred to as the Agrarian Land Reform, the Fast Track Land Reform, the Land Reform, ‘*jambanja*’, and land invasions - due to the way it was implemented. Implementation of the FTLRP was characterized by violence, corruption, and legal contestations (Chaumba *et al.*, 2003; Walker, 2005; Cliffe *et al.*, 2011; Helliker & Murisa, 2011; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011; Mujere, 2011; Hanlon *et al.*, 2013). “The Fast Track Land Reform was indeed fast” (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011:93). The FTLRP was based on compulsory acquisition of land mainly commercial farms (Moyo, 2000; 2009; 2011; 2013). However, the basic aim of the FTLRP “was to transform the poor, backward, and inefficient farmers from the reserves into fulltime farmers” through redistribution of land to the majority of Zimbabweans (Scoones *et al.*, 2011:16).

The initial phase of the FTLRP in Zimbabwe was packaged as The A1 and A2 models of settlements (Scoones *et al.*, 2010; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). The A1 model was designed to decongest the communal areas by catering for the landless in both

rural and urban centres, while the A2 model was meant to ensure the continuation of large-scale commercial farming in Zimbabwe (Helliker & Murisa, 2011; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). The FTLRP involved the subdivision of large commercial farms thereby providing settlement and farmland to a larger number of households on one farm (Cliffe *et al.*, 2011). For example, subdivisions that exist at Merrivale farm in Mwenze District of Masvingo (Mutopo, 2011).

There is a large volume of literature on the FTLRP in Zimbabwe (Marongwe, 2008; Moyo, 2009; Scoones *et al.*, 2010; Helliker & Murisa, 2011; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011; Hanlon *et al.*, 2013). However, few studies have examined in depth the outcomes from this programme and its prospects for progressive and political transformation within a largely agrarian society (Cliffe *et al.*, 2011; Moyo, 2013). Differential outcomes from the FTLRP have been observed (Marongwe, 2008; Moyo, 2009; Moyo *et al.*, 2009; Kinsey, 2010; Scoones *et al.*, 2010; Chambati, 2011; Cliffe *et al.*, 2011; Dekker & Kinsey, 2011; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011; Matondi & Dekker, 2011; Mujere, 2011; Mutopo, 2011; Hanlon *et al.*, 2013; Moyo, 2013). “There have been benefits and opportunities as well as costs, challenges and pitfalls” that emerged from the FTLRP (Scoones *et al.*, 2011c:2). Many of these are still in progress, and thus the FTLRP is largely processual, and is not an event.

Cliffe *et al.* (2011) and Scoones *et al.* (2010) believe that there were favourable outcomes from the FTLRP. The FTLRP brought new forms of livelihoods through asset accumulation as witnessed in various resettlement areas of Zimbabwe (Moyo *et al.*, 2009; Kinsey, 2010; Scoones *et al.*, 2010; Chambati, 2011; Cliffe *et al.*, 2011; Dekker & Kinsey, 2011; Mutopo, 2011; Hanlon *et al.*, 2013). These successes are similar to what was experienced in many communal areas of Zimbabwe in the 1980s. Cousins (1990:2) refers to the transition witnessed in the 1980s as a “peasant miracle”. Through the FTLRP, for example, some farmworkers scaled up their status from workers to farmers (Chambati, 2011; Cliffe *et al.*, 2011; Matondi & Dekker). In the Kadoma commercial farming area, the FTLRP fared the livelihoods of ex-farm workers because they did not move from the farms, but ‘stayed put’ and thus were allocated land (Cliffe *et al.*, 2011). Claims of success were also observed in Masvingo where Scoones *et al.* (2010) challenge the myths that the FTLRP led to the transition of Zimbabwe from a ‘bread basket’ to a ‘basket case’. According to Scoones *et al.* (2010), the FTLRP contributed to improved livelihoods of the land beneficiaries in Masvingo province through access to land as well as accumulation of assets. In addition, the FTLRP

scored successes in terms of numbers of people who benefited from land through the A1 and A2 models (Chaumba *et al.*, 2003; Moyo, 2009; Scoones *et al.*, 2010; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011). For example, 146 000 and 245 000 farmers were settled under the A1 and A2 models respectively (Hanlon *et al.*, 2013). These figures include women. However, the success of the FTLRP in terms of figures alone is not a sufficient pointer to progress made by such programmes since land carries multiple meanings and values to different categories of people in space and time (cf. Walker, 2012).

Some observers are of the opinion that the benefits from the FTLRP were unevenly distributed as the elites benefited more than ordinary citizens (Marongwe 2008; Matondi & Dekker, 2011; Hanlon *et al.*, 2013). Undeserving urbanites, civil servants, and elites hijacked the A1 and A2 models of resettlement under the FTLRP in some instances (Chaumba *et al.*, 2003; Marongwe, 2008; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011; Scoones *et al.*, 2010). Some critics of the FTLRP such as Byres (2004:13) in Marongwe (2008), and Matondi & Dekker (2011) also believe that the FTLRP did very little to address the conditions of the poor in rural Zimbabwe as the major beneficiaries are better-off Zimbabweans. In some cases, large numbers of commercial farmers and their labour force were negatively affected by the FTLPP through displacement under violent circumstances (Kinsey, 2010; Chaumba *et al.*, 2003; Marongwe, 2008; Kinsey, 2010; Cliffe *et al.*, 2011; Matondi & Dekker, 2011; Hanlon *et al.*, 2013). Most of the farm workers that lost their jobs became destitute (Ibid). With nowhere to go, they targeted the cities' peripheries for settlement (Sachikonye, 2003, Marongwe, 2003, Chaumba *et al.*, 2003; Marongwe, 2008; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011; Helliker & Murisa, 2011; Hanlon *et al.*, 2013). There is a paucity of literature on the fate of the displaced ex-farm workers and their children, and little is known about their final destinations (Marongwe, 2008; Moyo, 2009; Kinsey, 2010; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011; Scoones *et al.*, 2010; Hanlon *et al.*, 2013). Yet, in the pronouncement of the FTLRP farm workers were part of the beneficiaries (Scoones *et al.*, 2010; Chambati, 2011).

Cases have been reported of some people that took advantage of the farm occupations nationwide to occupy the periphery of cities (Marongwe, 2003). This led to sudden increases of population densities, pressure on spaces located on the edge of cities, new tenure regimes, as well as shifts in household survival strategies within these areas. In addition, the A1 and A2 models under the FTLRP continue to label beneficiaries as small/large and black/white commercial farmers. By so doing, the state is not only reinforcing the land alienation

mythologies and identities of the colonial era, but is creating new forms of land tenure. Security of land issues under the FTLRP remain distorted as both small/large and black/white commercial farmers lack title to land, but only retain user rights thereby exposing these farmers to eviction by the state or elites (Moyo *et al.*, 2009; Matondi & Dekker, 2011; Scoones *et al.*, 2010). Land titling entails allocation of real land rights that are transferrable, mortgaged, or inheritable (Payne *et al.*, 2009). Marongwe (2008); Matondi & Dekker (2011); and Scoones *et al.* (2010) believe that security of land tenure under the FTLRP is closely linked to political influence and power to some extent as the influential and the more powerful were found to be behind the eviction of other beneficiaries of land. Many critics of the FTLRP also claim that large scale commercial farming, and the agriculture sector largely regarded as the mainstay of the economy were disrupted because of the way the programme was implemented, thereby creating adverse impacts on other sectors of economy (Marongwe, 2008; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). For example, food shortages experienced in Zimbabwe particularly between 2000 and 2008 are attributed to poor output from the commercial farming sector (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). These negative outcomes are a result of political, financial, and natural factors, as well as administrative aspects such as inappropriate selection of land beneficiaries, poor management of farms, inadequate farming knowledge, and lack of adequate resources (Marongwe, 2008; Helliker & Murisa, 2011; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011). Clearly, positive and negative outcomes from the FTLRP in Zimbabwe are debatable. There is need for further discourses on this subject to analyze the merits and demerits of the programme through investigation of individual case studies.

### **3.5 Changing livelihoods in communal areas of Zimbabwe**

The relationships between land issues and survival of people in rural areas are often assumed rather than examined (Walker, 2005). Land tenure issues in Zimbabwe are complex. However, land is more than just a spatial entity and has powerful cultural meanings that reflect a sense of place, history and identity of different residents in different communal areas (Haralambos & Holborn, 2008; Carruthers, 2010). Land remains a community asset that determines survival of people living in communal areas since subsistence farming is one of the primary activities for rural livelihoods in most African countries (Cheater, 1990; Bah *et al.*, 2003; Cousins, 2009).

In this section, the changes in household survival strategies of rural residents are reviewed within the evolving economic context of Zimbabwe during the 2002-2012 census decade. This discussion seeks to characterize the changes in livelihood strategies on one hand, and land property regimes on the other since household survival strategies cannot be understood by reflecting on the local context alone (see section 2.2.7 in Chapter 2). According to Chambers (1995), livelihoods are a means of gaining a living, as well as a combination of resources and activities undertaken in order to live. Bebbington, (1999:2021) also views livelihoods as “the way people get by and get things done”. Livelihoods provide a descriptive analysis and portray a complex web of activities that emphasise the diversity of ways people use to make a living (Scoones, 2009:2).

While land is largely regarded as a critical element for household survival in most rural sub-Saharan Africa (Bah *et al.*, 2003; Scoones, 2009; Anseeuw & Alden, 2010), most people that live in rural areas however lack title to their land parcels. Lack of title to land undermines the livelihood bases for the rural poor in many ways (Quan & Payne, 2008). For example, in Goromonzi and Masvingo districts of Zimbabwe, some poor rural residents lost land they obtained through the FTLRP because some powerful elites used their political muscles and influence to grab land, and to evict some of the land beneficiaries (Marongwe, 2003; Marongwe, 2008; Scoones *et al.*, 2010). In a similar case, some farm workers that obtained land in Kadoma were also evicted (Cliffe *et al.*, 2011). Land titles increase security of tenure, protect property rights, and secure investments, (Payne *et al.*, 2009). Secured land rights for the rural poor are important in securing livelihoods (Sjaastad & Cousins, 2008; Simbizi *et al.*, 2014). However, in some instances people invest in land without title (Scoones *et al.*, 2010). For example, in Masvingo Province under the FTLRP (Ibid). Similarly, in Kenya and Tanzania coffee growers often invest in land without titles (Nyamu-Musembi, 2006).

The livelihoods of many households in rural Zimbabwe have been evolving. Bryceson (1999; 2002) attributes these shifts to colonial and post-colonial policies such as the ESAPs of the 1980s and 1990s. However, Matondi & Dekker (2011), Scoones *et al.* (2010), and Helliker & Murisa (2011) attribute livelihoods shifts in contemporary Zimbabwe largely to FTLRP and the macro-economic challenges. Sigauke (2000) also believes that livelihood strategies for people that live in rural areas of Zimbabwe are narrowing because of mass invasion of former commercial farms during the FTLRP. Inversely, Bryceson (1996, 1999; 2000a; 200b; 2002; 2005) views stressful conditions as opportunistic in creating leverages for diversification and

expansion of livelihoods portfolios for the rural poor. For example, in Masvingo Province Scoones *et al.* (2010) reveal the transformation of the agriculture sector through the FTLRP contrary to the negative perceptions of the programme as disruptive. According to Scoones *et al.* (2010; 2011c), the agriculture sector has not collapsed as widely acclaimed by some critics of the programme. On the basis of their findings, Scoones *et al.* (2010) state that the FTLRP transformed not only the land rights of the people in this province, but their livelihoods in terms of diversification of strategies and accumulation of assets. Dekker & Kinsey (2011) also add that through the FTLRP many households were able to invest their output and to produce adequately for household consumption and for sale. These positive observations are however not common in many of the current livelihoods debates.

In ranking the success of farmers in resettlement areas of Masvingo, Scoones *et al.* (2010: 228-229) deduced four categories of livelihoods which are, “dropping out, hanging in, stepping out, and stepping up”. Farmers whose livelihoods were ‘dropping out’ were exiting their plots due to a variety of reasons such as poor health or lack of agricultural inputs. Those that were ‘hanging in’ reserved their plots for future use because they lacked assets, and continuously straddled the resettlement and communal areas. Farmers that were ‘stepping out’ diversified their livelihood strategies, engaged in off-farm activities, and received remittances from within and outside Zimbabwe. Farmers that were ‘stepping up’ were ranked as the real farmers - ‘*hurudza*’, classified as ‘petty commodity producers and worker peasants’. This category also gained surplus from farming, invested in land from off-farm work, and were able to accumulate assets from below (Ibid). This classification or ranking of the performance of farmers in resettlement areas of Masvingo can be applied to describe the livelihood strategies pursued by households in other contexts. The model of analysis is simply an extension of livelihoods diversification strategies by Bryceson (2000a; 2000b; 2005). These ideas are useful in describing emergent households’ survival strategies and class differentiation in communal areas without necessarily ranking them.

In Zimbabwe, the causes of livelihoods diversification are varied due to variations in income opportunities, social networks, spatial location, prevailing institutions (Helliker & Murisa, 2011). Different routes and activities such as migration generally mark diversification of survival strategies in most rural and peri-urban areas of Zimbabwe. This situation was witnessed in Mali, Nigeria, and Tanzania (Bah *et al.*, 2003). Diversification of survival strategies particularly in the rural areas can also be attributed largely to the impacts of



drought and state policies. In some cases, diversification of household survival strategies does not necessarily improve people's lives, but remain a hedge against destitution or starvation (Scoones, 2009). The activities just represent vital safety nets in terms of food security and community held agrarian values (Bryceson, 2000a).

In contemporary Zimbabwe, the period between 2000 and 2008 was the toughest for most ordinary people (Chiumbu & Musemwa, 2012). The multidimensional crisis that plagued Zimbabwe in the 2000s resulted in the rapid decline of the economy characterized by among other things steep decline in industrial and agriculture productivity, historical levels of hyperinflation, the informalization of labour, displacements, and critical erosions of livelihood (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011; Chiumbu & Musemwa, 2012). Situations of economic distress experienced in Zimbabwe are similar to what most African nations experienced after the introduction of ESAPs (cf. Berry, 2002). However, such experiences remain significant in determining diversification of household survival strategies particularly in rural areas. Under such conditions, household members cope, manage the risk, and eventually adapt (Bryceson, 1999).

When Zimbabwe went through the decade of crisis, one of the measures put in place as a panacea for the deteriorating economic, social, and political climate was to print money (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011; Mukwedeya, 2012; Hanlon *et al.*, 2013). This resulted in hyperinflation that topped the world record creating shortages of basic commodities in every sector of the economy including shortages of money, fuel, food, electricity, water, and skill (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011; Mukwedeya, 2012). Illicit deals and informal activities prevailed (Kabwato, 2011). The value of bank notes rose to denominations of a million, a billion, and a trillion. Prices of basic commodities and daily transactions rocketed. How individuals carried out daily transactions under these circumstances is a subject for other debates. The Zimbabwean dollar lacked credibility as the national currency, and became obsolete (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011; Potts, 2011; Hanlon *et al.*, 2013). Amid these hyperinflationary conditions, the unemployment rate soared to between 85% and 90% (Potts, 2011; Kabwato, 2012; Mukwedeya, 2012). The formal sector of the economy was completely paralysed (Gumbo & Geyer, 2011; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011; Potts, 2011). The drought that resulted in poor harvests in most rural areas exacerbated food shortages further.

In September 2008, a Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed three main political parties at that time (ZANU PF, MDC-T, and MDC-N) after a highly contested election in June of the same year. In trying to stabilize the economy, and as a solution to the prevailing crisis, the GNU dollarized the economy in January 2009. Dollarization is the adoption of stable foreign currencies as legal tender. The American Dollar, the South African Rand, the Euro, and the British Pound became part of the multi-currency system introduced in Zimbabwe in 2009; whereas the Australian Dollar, the Indian Rupee, the Japanese Yen, and the Chinese Yuan were added to the basket of the multicurrency in 2014. With dollarization, “overnight, so it seemed, the crisis disappeared” (Kabwato, 2012: 270). The availability of basic commodities improved, and inflation decreased to single digit levels. However, the normalcy of economic conditions in terms of accessibility to services, goods, and money did not translate immediately to availability of formal jobs, and the unemployment levels remained high. Most ordinary citizens particularly the sick, the poor, and the elderly lack the means to generate income within a dollarized economy. Many urbanites trickle out of the cities to their rural homelands where living conditions are perceived as better. Similar movements were witnessed in peri-urban zones of Mali, Nigeria, and Tanzania (Bah *et al.*, 2003). In Zimbabwe, some people decide to reside in the cities’ peripheries to remain in reach of income-generating opportunities without being subject to high cost of living in the cities. Clearly, policy decisions are capable of generating outcomes beyond what is expected of them (Human Development Report, 2013).

### **3.6 Colonial and post-colonial Harare and its peripheries**

Harare originates from Fort Salisbury the capital city of Rhodesia (Bull, 1967). Fort Salisbury was part of Chief Zharare’s territory (Vambe, 1972). The name of this Shona Chief was later corrupted to ‘Harare’ (Ibid). Salisbury shared its boundaries with tribal territories of the Shona situated in the periphery of the city (Ibid). Salisbury became an economic, social, political, and administrative hub for settler activity in Rhodesia (Kay & Smout, 1977; Musemwa, 2010). From its establishment in 1890, the city experienced a steady population growth such that by 1961 it had a population of 310 360 which rose to 386 040 in 1969 (Zinyama *et al.*, 1995).

Separation of blacks from the white community in Salisbury was clearly evident. This was deemed necessary by the settler state to avoid the grave danger of living together with a large

native community perceived to suffer from typhoid, and practised prostitution and other social evils (Yoshikuni, 2006). The settlement of blacks in urban areas was therefore strictly restricted with the first location for blacks established in Harare in 1907 (Ibid). The term 'location' was/is corrupted to '*rukisheni/rokesheni/rukesheni*' in vernacular Shona. Life in native locations became unbearable as the movement of people was regulated, and segregation between whites and blacks was institutionalized (Yoshikuni, 2006; Potts, 2011). Revenue collection was operationalized with the goals to force male black Africans to seek employment and to avail labour in the growing economy in industries, mines, and farms (Yoshikuni, 2006; Potts, 2011). This triggered migration of blacks to farms and communal areas on the city's peripheries where restrictions on settlement were limited (Yoshikuni, 2006; Munzwa & Jonga, 2010). Migration of people into the cities' peripheries and changing economic opportunities created new demands for access to land (Berry, 1992). By the 1980s, people paid as much as seventy dollars for residential plots in crowded spaces just outside Salisbury (Bourdillon, 1982:63). The central government had a laissez-faire attitude on their control over the periphery of cities since these spaces were dismissed by the colonial government as economically unviable (Kay & Smout, 1977; O'Flaherty, 1998). As a result, the blacks lived a dual life and maintained contacts in both rural and urban spheres. They practised peasant farming and pursued their tribal cultures in these areas (Yoshikuni, 2006). Nine communal areas commonly known as native reserves were created around the city of Salisbury (Marongwe, 2008). These communal areas formed a partial ring of twenty to forty kilometer radius around the city (Kay & Smout, 1977). Among these was the Chinamhora communal area also referred to as Domboshava (Palmer, 1977; Yoshikuni, 2006; Marongwe, 2008).

At independence, Salisbury was renamed Harare, the capital city of Zimbabwe. The city was dubbed the 'Sunshine City' because of its beautiful appearance, orderly layout, and impressive maintenance (Musemwa, 2010). Rakodi (1995) describes Harare as a planned and orderly city. Harare obtained its city status through the City of Harare (Private) Act Chapter 29:04 of 1983. As such, Harare is administered as a city and as a province. As a province, Harare has several Wards under its jurisdiction. Responsible Urban Councils through the Ministry of LGRUD administer these Acts.

The population of Harare has been on the increase since the colonial period, especially between 1982 and 1992 mainly as a result of freedom of settlement wrought by independence

(Rakodi, 1995; Zinyama *et al.*, 1995), and the attraction to the city as explained by the 'bright city lights' theory (Todaro, 1997). Cities are viewed as glamorous centres of attraction perceived to have 'abundant' services and employment opportunities (Ibid). Harare's current population is 2 098 199 (ZNSA National Census Report, 2012:110). The increase in the population of Harare over the years is a manifestation of rural-urban migration, as well as natural increase (Rakodi, 1995, Potts, 2011). However, increase in the urban population is not a sufficient pointer to the increase in the rate of urbanization of cities (Potts, 2012). While the population of numerous urban areas in Africa is estimated to be on the increase, the urbanization of most cities is often slow (Potts, 2012; Human Development Report, 2013). For example, Zimbabwe recorded a low annual rate of urbanization of 3.4% in 2010 (World FactBook, 2012). Urbanization is therefore more than just an increase in the urban population. It also encompasses other aspects, such as access to services and opportunities, and sustained rural-urban linkages.

The urban form of Harare like other cities in Zimbabwe is a reflection of political and economic legacies of the settler state (Rakodi, 1995). In any case, most African cities to date have not yet escaped their cycle of post-colonial crises (Bekker & Therborn, 2012). While the colonial physical plan for Harare remains unaltered, land uses in the city have increasingly changed with the expansion of settlements particularly into the city's periphery (Zinyama *et al.*, 1995; Chirisa 2010a). Harare's periphery is largely rural. Six communal areas are located on the periphery of this city. These include Chinamhora, Chishawasha, Zvimba, Mazoe, Manyame, and Seke. Commercial farms separate these communal areas from Harare.

In 2010, the boundaries of Harare were extended mainly for urban housing with the annexation of twenty-eight adjacent commercial farms that were part of Mazoe and Goromonzi RDCs (Chideme, 2010; The Zimbabwe Situation, 14 July: 2010). However, it is claimed that the extension of Harare's boundaries was tailor-made to increase the number of parliamentary constituencies in this province (Ibid). By increasing Harare's parliamentary constituencies political parties expect to improve their electoral position outside their rural strongholds (Kamete, 2011). The poor are the politicians' assets to power (World Development Report, 2004; Chirisa, 2008). This is a form of gerrymandering (Bekker & Fourchard, 2013).

Urban expansion of Harare outside its boundaries shows that urbanization has outstripped the declared urban zone. Urbanization always has a huge impact on the peri-urban areas particularly rural areas adjacent to cities (Chirisa, 2008; Bekker & Therborn, 2012). People in most cases are always on the move from worse-off to better-off regions in search of survival although such trends are not universal (Bekker, 2002). Like in most rural communities of sub-Saharan Africa, extensive linkages between Harare and adjacent rural areas are common (cf. Bekker & Therborn, 2012). This shows that symbiotic relationships exist between the rural and urban settlements despite their separation in physical terms (Gough *et al.*, 2010). Potts (2011) and Bekker (2002) view circular migration as the main contributory factor in the generation of the endless movements of goods and services between the rural and urban zones. People move continually from urban to rural areas and vice versa in an attempt to tap resources from either region (Bekker, 2002; Lynch, 2005; Gough *et al.*, 2010; Potts, 2011). Circular migration is prevalent between the urban and rural areas of Zimbabwe. Kinsey (2010) views migration as a coping strategy for survival. As a result, land speculation and illegal land exchanges in these areas is often experienced (Allen, 2003; 2010). For example, the case of Epworth in eastern Harare as highlighted by Chirisa (2010a; 2010b), and the case of Bulawayo as revealed by Mpofu (2012). In these cases, the practice of different land exchanges is not only exacerbated by the failure of urban planners to curb the practice, but by failure to provide adequate housing for the urban poor (Chirisa, 2010a; Chirisa, 2010b; Mpofu, 2012).

In most urban areas of Zimbabwe such as Harare, urbanization has been characterized by high levels of urban poverty as survival has been reduced to mere 'subsistence' (Chirisa, 2009; Gumbo & Geyer, 2011; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011; Mpofu, 2012). This has resulted in ruralization of the cities as residents embark on opportunistic income-generating activities, largely informal (Chirisa, 2009; Gumbo & Geyer, 2011; Mpofu, 2012). In Bulawayo for example, the urban poor flock into the city's periphery mainly for housing and livelihood purposes (Mpofu, 2012). These people have since acquired new identities as they are derogatorily referred to as "outcasts, new gypsies of our society, bandits, social deviants, to criminals" (Mpofu, 2012:46). Livelihoods in many urban centres of Zimbabwe have thus greatly degenerated (Gumbo & Geyer, 2011; Kadenge, 2012). Albeit, Harare remains an international destination as well as a model city with reference to urban settlement and planning. This shows that declining urban standards do not necessarily imply the total disappearance of urbanisms (Bekker & Therborn, 2012).

### 3.7 Situating the peri-urban communal area of Domboshava

The peri-urban communal area of Domboshava is situated in a wild and rugged country side (Taylor, 1927). It is a development node for the communal areas in Goromonzi District due to its proximity to Harare. Domboshava is one of Harare's urban frontiers located on the edge of this city. Experiences in cities' frontiers are diverse and unique (Gough *et al.*, 2010; Watson, 2012). In this section, the peri-urban communal area of Domboshava is characterized beyond its physical and geographical location in proximity with Harare to capture the processes that mediate the movement of people, goods, and services between the two settlements. These processes encompass institutional references that regulate land transactions and RDP, as well as the linkages and the resultant interface between these two settlements. In this regard, the population of Domboshava is characterized as having a foot in both the urban and rural spheres (cf. Narain & Nischal, 2007:262).

As one of Harare's peripherals, Domboshava is rapidly accumulating urban population from Harare (GRDC Turn-Around Strategy 2005-2015). The periphery and other parts of the city are connected in many ways (Mabin, 2012). These connections explain the politics of the new movement of people from Harare to Domboshava. Bekker (2002) describes the importance of these rural-urban linkages in maintaining both social and kin networks. These are integral social obligations necessary for continual investment in social capital (Ibid). The mobility of rural populations is a vital coping strategy that prevents permanent loss of well-being (Kinsey, 2010). However, in some cases the endless movement of people between rural and urban often creates insecurity for the people who are already living in those places (Toulmin, 2006).

Domboshava is located in Ward 4 of Goromonzi District in Mashonaland East Province. Figure 3.4 below shows the location of Ward 4 (Domboshava) and Harare. In most conversations, Ward 4 of Goromonzi District is often referred to as Domboshava. Some people prefer to refer to Ward 4 as Zimbiru after the oldest village in this communal area. In some cases, Domboshava is referred to as Chanamhora after the presiding Chief (Yoshikuni, 2006; Marongwe, 2008). While the spatial boundary between Domboshava and Harare separates the two settlements in physical terms, practically the settlements are conjoined (see Figure 3.4 below). Movement of goods and services between Harare and Domboshava is unrestricted and is continuous.




Figure 3.4: Location of Ward 4 of Goromonzi District

Source: The Department of Surveyor General, Harare, Zimbabwe (2012).

Other communal areas in Goromonzi district situated in proximity to Harare are Seke and Chishawasha. The demarcation of Domboshava is believed to date back to the establishment of Salisbury when this district was delineated through the Native Commissioner's Minute number 45/686/41 of 15 August 1941 which states that:

"It is recommended that the following line be accepted for the time being as the boundary between new Salisbury District (West of line) and the new Goromonzi District (East of line). This line though described crudely is felt to be sufficiently accurate to give officials concerned a working boundary ... as a means towards breaking the natives of Goromonzi area from their common habit of running to Salisbury with their cases ... disputes between Goromonzi natives must be taken to Goromonzi office" (The National Archives of Zimbabwe, 2012).

The creation of Goromonzi District was a deliberate effort by the colonial state to perpetuate separation of this rural settlement from urban Harare in line with the Land Apportionment Act of 1931. The creation of boundaries between Salisbury and its peripheries was also a way of bifurcating movement of people, goods, and services between the two settlements. The current land holding of community members is an outcome of the Land Husbandry Act of 1951, the Tribal Trust Land Act of 1967, the CLA of 1982, as well as the CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002.

Archaeologists believe that the tribal settlement of Domboshava has been in existence since the Iron Age as shown by the presence of elaborate rock paintings on Domboshava Hill dating back to 17<sup>th</sup> century (DNMMZ, 2011; Pwiti & Mvenge, n.d.). The original settlers of Domboshava who are depicted on the rock paintings were hunters and gatherers (Fothergill, 1953). Some historians believe these early settlers to be the Shona with a life style that was characterized by farming, animal rearing, metal working, and village life (Vambe, 1972; Palmer, 1977; Beach 1980; Bourdillon 1982; Ranger 1983; Beach, 1994; Pwiti & Mvenge, n.d.). The rock paintings symbolize the tradition and the art of living of the Shona such as rain-making (Bridger *et al.*, 1973; Pwiti & Mvenge, n.d.). Rain-making ceremonies are a Shona ritual conducted to appeal to the ancestors for rain in times of drought. It is claimed that the early settlers communicated with their ancestors in a cave at Domboshava Hill through spirit mediums (Fothergill, 1953, Bourdillon, 1982; Pwiti & Mvenge, n.d.). Thus, the culture and religion of the Shona are intricately bound in nature and the physical environment, as well as the socio-political organization embedded in spirits believed to be the owners of the land and everything on it (Gelfand & Hannan, 1959; Taringa, 2006).

It also believed that the name Domboshava originates from the existence of a vast mass of solid granite that dominates the landscape in the communal area (Fothergill, 1953; Lloyd, 1962; Pwiti & Mvenge, n.d.). 'Dombo' means stone/rock; and 'shava' means reddish brown, in vernacular Shona (Fothergill, 1953; Lloyd, 1962). Oral tradition asserts that the name Domboshava originates from the name of first settler's daughter Chishava - meaning someone strikingly beautiful and very light in complexion in vernacular Shona (DNMMZ, 2011). The physical exposition of the reddish and smooth slopes of granite rock at Domboshava Hill covered with red lichens - a fungi found on granite rock - symbolizes Chishava (Fothergill, 1953; DNMMZ, 2011).

On the other hand, ethnographic sources postulate that the name Domboshava originates not only from the physical rock structures, but also from social interactions among the Shona. The name 'Domborevashava' means 'the hill of the Eland clan' (Vambe, 1972). The Shonas of the *Shava* (Eland) totem claim to be the original inhabitants of Domboshava (DNMMZ, 2011). Currently, the area falls under Chief Chinamhora of the *Soko-Murewa* (velvet monkey) totem. Chief Chinamhora is believed to have migrated from Chishawasha (Vambe, 1972; Palmer, 1977; Marongwe, 2008). Some oral historians also claim that Domboshava communal area was given to Chief Chinamhora during the colonial era when the paramount



Chief of this area failed to remit land tax to the District Native Commissioner. Whatever explanation is given about the name Domboshava, the communal area remains a unique place and space of Shona interaction in Goromonzi District. Photograph 3.1 below shows a scenic view of the communal area.



Photograph 3.1: A scenic view of the Domboshava communal area  
Source: Field data, 2012.

### 3.7.1 Changing demographic trends in Domboshava

Goromonzi District is one of the rural constituencies of Mashonaland East Province that comprises both communal and commercial farming areas. The district falls under Agro-Ecological Region II characterized by good soils and high rainfall patterns that are ideal for rain-fed maize, tobacco, and vegetable farming leading to the district being referred to as the heart of large-scale commercial farming in Zimbabwe (Moyo *et al.*, 2009; Marongwe, 2008; Marimira, 2010). Because of these natural endowments, Goromonzi District attracts many migrants.

Goromonzi District had a population of 147 159 people in 1982 (GRDC Turn-Around Strategy 2005-2015:1). The population of Goromonzi rose to 154 262 in 2002, and to 224 987 in 2012 (Zimbabwe Census, 2002:9; ZNSA National Census Report, 2012:15). About 97.9% of this population is rural (ZNSA National Census Report, 2012:1). The population of Goromonzi District has been increasing over the years, for example, by about 31% between 2002 and 2012. This is attributed to the location of this district in proximity with Harare, as well as in-migration of people from other places (GRDC Turn-Around Strategy 2005-2015). According to the 1992 census data, a percentage of 39.42% migrants settled in Goromonzi of which 32.37% came from Harare and surrounding large-scale commercial farming areas (GRDC Turn-Around Strategy 2005-2015:3). These population and migration trends are attributable not only to ease of entry into the communal areas of Goromonzi, but the possibility of land transactions between individuals. According to Migot-Adholla & Bruce (1994:254), population pressure “results in greater privatization of land rights”. Similar trends were also observed in Ruhenga and Butare regions of Rwanda and Senegal respectively, as well as in Anloga, Wassa, and Ejura regions of Ghana (Migot-Adholla & Bruce, 1994).

A total of 37 936 households with an average of 4.02 people per household were recorded in Goromonzi District in 2002 (Zimbabwe Census, 2002:27). This average household size was well above the provincial mean of four people per household (Zimbabwe Census, 2002:26). A total of 56 248 households with an average size of four persons per household were also recorded in the district in 2012 (ZNSA National Census Report, 2012:30). These figures highlight an increase in the district’s households by 33% between 2002 and 2012. The average household size however decreased. This could be a result of the out-migration, as well as natural events such as deaths. Incidences of HIV/AIDS ravage most communities of Goromonzi District (Makura-Paradza, 2010).

Goromonzi District recorded a population density of 59 people per km<sup>2</sup> in 1992 that is higher than the provincial density of 32 people per km<sup>2</sup> recorded in the same year (GRDC Turn-Around Strategy 2005-2015:1). In 2002, the district had an average of 62 people per km<sup>2</sup> (Zimbabwe Census, 2002). An increase in the population density of the district is therefore evident. The carrying capacity of any area determines its ability to support and perpetuate life and resources without causing deterioration (Davis, 1991). An increase in population, numbers of households, and population density in the district puts pressure on resources such

as land, and influences emergence of new land tenure systems and class differentiation. Population densities are concomitant with pressure on the resource base (Cousins, 1990). As population increases, households' land parcels are likely to fragment as their members establish themselves through marriage. Population pressure often undermines the ability of rural residents to generate income through agriculture (Delius & Schirmer, 2001). While communal areas are capable of adapting to population increases, they have limited ability to cope with rapid and externally induced change concerning land (Dixon, 1990). Under such conditions, land tenure systems do not break down entirely, but revolve towards alienable and individualized land rights in response to local changes (Migot-Adholla & Bruce, 1994).

Concerning parliamentary representation, Goromonzi District is divided into three political constituencies. These are Goromonzi North, South, and East. Domboshava falls under Goromonzi North constituency. There are eight Wards in Goromonzi North constituency with Wards 6 and 7 of Goromonzi North constituency being commercial farms (see Figure 3.4 above). These are simply bifurcating Ward 4 which is largely rural. Wards 6 and 7 have since been absorbed into Harare (Chideme, 2010; The Zimbabwe Situation, 14 July: 2010). Discourses on institutional and spatial distribution of political Wards are pertinent in understanding the governance or absence of such in specific spaces (Bekker & Fourchard, 2013).

According to the 2002 census record, Ward 4 had a total population of 16 149 of which 47.88% were male and 52.12% were female (Zimbabwe Census, 2002:105). Current statistics show that Ward 4 has an estimated population of 30 123 of which 48% are males and 52% are females (ZNSA National Census Report, 2012:138). This represents a population increase by 46% in Ward 4 between 2002 and 2012 that nearly doubled within a decade. During the 2002 and 2012 censuses, females outnumbered the males. Since Domboshava is patriarchal, land rights are skewed in favour of men who are responsible for decision-making. Yet, females outnumber males. In most instances, women are responsible for agricultural activities and peasant farming compared to their male counterparts (Gaidzanwa, 1997).

In 2002, Ward 4 had 3 717 households with an average household size of 4.34 persons (Zimbabwe Census, 2002:105). In 2012, a total of 7 213 households with an average household size of 4.2 members was recorded in this ward (ZNSA National Census Report, 2012:138). An increase of 48% was also witnessed in the number of households in Ward 4

between 2002 and 2012. However, there was a reduction in persons per household in this ward during the same period. This can be attributed to the migration of household members to other places, or simply natural death. In both 2002 and 2012 census results, Ward 4 recorded the highest average population, and number of households compared to other Wards in Goromonzi District (Zimbabwe Census, 2002; ZNSA National Census Report, 2012). These census reports however do not provide disaggregated village population statistics such as number of households or people in each village. Nevertheless, statistics from the Food Aid Database that was created by the WC and VHs show that a total of 3 656 households lived in Ward 4 as of January 2012. These statistics are however unpublished, and are unofficial. I accessed these statistics in 2012 with the help of the WC. The Food Aid Database contains the names of households in each village in Ward 4. It could not be ascertained when the Food Aid Database was constructed and how often it was updated or reviewed. Its purpose was to ensure equitable distribution of food aid. Such statistics are often fraught with inconsistencies, and are subject to manipulation by those that wish to inflate the size of their households in order to increase their share. However, some households may deliberately unregister for aid due to lack of interest. The statistics keep changing. Accessing official population statistics on the number of households and villages in the ward was a challenge since such data is classified as an important state security item used to make political decisions. However, statistics from the Food Aid Database remain vital in providing estimates, approximations, and projections on the number of households in Ward 4. From the Food Aid Database, there were more migrant than tribal households as shown in Table 3.1 below.

Table 3.1: Distribution of households in the four villages in 2012

Villages	Tribal households	Migrant households	Total
<b>Zimbiru Village</b>	13	60	73
<b>Mungate Village</b>	19	86	105
<b>Murape Village</b>	7	38	45
<b>Chogugudza Village</b>	93	48	141
<b>Total</b>	132	232	364

Source: Field data, (2012).

### 3.7.2 Traditional authority and land administration in Domboshava

This section provides an overview of the influence of land policy frameworks on the status and powers of the TLs in administration of land rights, and the continuing relevance of the practice in communal areas. Essential to any property right regime, is an authority system that makes sure the expectations and rights of holders are met (Bromley & Cernea, 1991:17). Institutions that govern land rights are fundamental and legitimate fixtures on land administration in these areas (Lund, 2008). In Domboshava, men dominate the system of traditional authority. However, current laws in Zimbabwe recognize women as eligible to hold positions of authority as TLs. Generally, the number of women that assume titles of TLs in Zimbabwe is minimal compared to men. This emanates not only from the tradition, but from the patriarch system that governs social processes in many communal areas. In land and settlement debates, the traditional system of authority defines the structure that controls access, use, and 'ownership' of land rights. In my research, reference is made to land as a territorial and political unit that belongs to both the living generation and their ancestors (Taringa, 2006).

In Domboshava, several households usually on patrilineal relations form a village, '*misha*' or a 'kraal' (Goldin & Gelfand, 1975). This means a collection of households usually of the same lineage and totem (Holleman, 1952; Latham, 1973; Goldin & Gelfand, 1975; Andersson, 1999; Taringa, 2006). In Domboshava, each household is designated to a specific homestead and arable land for the practice of peasant farming mainly rain-fed, and vlei gardening for growing of vegetables and crops. Households of Domboshava share common access to grazing land and other natural resources such as woodlands, forests, dams, and rivers. Households that live in villages where natural resources are non-existent or are few extend their access rights to common property resources in other villages within this communal area.

A collection of homesteads belonging to several households culminates into a village. A village has territorial and spatial connotations comprising vaguely clustered homesteads and fields (Bourdillon, 1982). A village consists of kin and the extended family including relatives by kin or marriage (Holleman, 1952; Latham, 1973; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). In my research, I conceptualize villages both in spatial and institutional terms. Villages are associated with scattered and sparsely built homesteads, tracts of land, a collection of

households functioning within the limits of norms and values; and often named after an influential lineage title of a group of households (Latham, 1973; O'Flaherty, 1998). It is important to be part of the lineage group within a village for purposes of relating to others (Latham, 1973). In Domboshava, belonging to a tribal lineage group also determines the rights of individuals to access land and other common property resources in this communal area. On average, villages in Zimbabwe consist of at least thirty to forty households. In Domboshava, most villages have surpassed this threshold due to influx of migrants into this communal area. Proclamation Number 18 of 1993 of the Zimbabwe Government shows that Ward 4 of Goromonzi District has twenty-five official villages, whereas the Food Aid Database indicates seventy-three villages.

Individual villages of Domboshava like in all communal areas of Zimbabwe fall under VHs - 'Sabhuku' (cf. Andersson, 1999; Taringa, 2006; Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2008; Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2010) or a 'kraal head' (Goldin & Gelfand, 1975). 'Sabhuku' is a honorific title meaning 'owner or keeper of the book' - 'bhuku' (O'Flaherty, 1998; Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2008; Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2010). In other words, 'bhuku' refers to a village; hence 'Sabhuku'. The 'book' or 'bhuku' also has spatial and institutional significance. In Domboshava, the 'book' or 'bhuku' is a collection of names of household heads (cf. Andersson, 1999; Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2008). The role of the VHs in Domboshava is to collect land-tax, cattle-tax, and hut-tax from each household on behalf of the RDC. However, sometimes these taxes are paid directly to the RDC. The VHs also exercise control over land, and expect obedience from their people (Holleman, 1952; Latham, 1973; O'Flaherty, 1998). In Domboshava, the VHs are the focal point for migrants seeking land. Thus, the VHs have the power to accept new entrants in their villages or to refuse them entry. VHs identify vacant plots for possible allocation to migrants in consultation with other TLs and heads of households. According to Latham (1973), VHs wield autonomy not only to settle migrants in the communal areas, but in dispute resolution involving villagers' petty issues. When such issues become contentious, VHs refer these to the Headman.

The Headman referred to as the 'Sadunhu' controls a 'dunhu' meaning a tribal ward (Holleman, 1952; Goldin & Gelfand, 1975; O'Flaherty, 1998; Andersson, 1999). A tribal ward often translates into a political ward and consists of a defined geographical area with a number of villages 'misha' (Latham, 1973; Andersson, 1999). In Domboshava, two Headmen were in charge of Ward 4 during the period of my study. This scenario is neither new nor

surprising in most communal areas of Zimbabwe since tribal power is often contested among kin. Headmen exercise their customary powers in consultation with VHS and household heads under their authority. Headmen have judicial powers and report directly to the Chief. They also wield significant powers to allocate land, and adjudicate land disputes (Holleman, 1952; Latham, 1973, Berry, 1992; O'Flaherty, 1998).

Several Wards make up a communal area (Chiefdom) under a hereditary Chief, '*Ishe/Mambo*' meaning 'king' (O'Flaherty, 1998; Taringa, 2006). Communal areas are simply geographical residential units comprising clusters of heterogeneous populations whose socio-economic interests are widely fragmented (Bromley & Cernea, 1991). Like in all communal areas of Zimbabwe, the Chief in Domboshava is deemed the owner of the 'soil' or '*nyika*' that translates into a communal land (cf. Holleman, 1952; O'Flaherty, 1998; Taringa, 2006). In Shona culture, the Chief owns the soil/land supposedly on behalf of its mythological owners - the ancestors and spirits (Taringa, 2006). The main responsibility of the Chief in communal areas such as Domboshava is to crystallize all territorial units such as villages and Wards under his authority (O'Flaherty, 1998). He commands authority and control over common property resources in the communal area on behalf of the ancestors and the state (O'Flaherty, 1998). The Chief therefore derives his authority from land (Taringa, 2006). The Chief is the guardian and custodian of communal land on behalf of the state, spirits, and ancestors. He is the highest court of appeal in land disputes and other litigations among his subjects (cf. Andersson, 1999). The Chief however relies on reports from the Headmen and VHS on issues of land allocation and dispute resolution.

In summary, conditions of customary land rights apply in Domboshava. Tribal members claim land rights through their belonging to the communal area, as well as their history that stretches back to the Iron Age as depicted on the rock paintings at Domboshava Hill, whereas others sell such land. Social units such as households, villages, and Wards in Domboshava define the boundaries according to which customary tenure and the traditional system of authority are practised. Traditional Leaders are the trustees or custodians of the communal area on behalf of the state and ancestors within the system of customary land tenure. Yet, in essence their authority is controlled by legislation.



### 3.7.3 Village profiles - Zimbiru, Mungate, Murape, Chogugudza

In the villages of Domboshava, many people speak Zezuru, a dialect of the Shona, which is one of the main vernacular languages of Zimbabwe. Migrants in Domboshava speak Zezuru, as well as their homeland dialects. My research focuses on Zimbiru, Mungate, Murape, and Chogugudza villages that are situated along the border with the urban area of Harare (see Figure 3.5 below).




Figure 3.5: Villages of Domboshava  
Source: The Department of Surveyor General (2012).

The boundaries of the villages of Domboshava were found to be vague. However, VHs and to some extent community members are conversant with the territorial boundaries of these spaces. Community residents habitually straddle the abstractions between villages, as well as between Domboshava and Harare. A tarred road traverses through the villages of Domboshava linking the communal area with Harare in spatial terms (see Figure 3.5 above).



Zimbiru Village is the oldest village of Domboshava. This village shares a boundary with Harare, the capital (see Figure 3.5 above). The Food Aid Database shows that Zimbiru Village has seventy-three households. Of these households, only thirteen are tribal and the rest are migrant households from different parts of the country such as Harare, Murewa, and Kariba (see Table 3.1 above; Appendix B). The population of Zimbiru Village comprises mostly migrants. This reveals movement of migrants into the communal area. Two schools are situated in Zimbiru Village. These are Zimbiru Primary and Zimbiru Secondary schools. Most children from this village and the neighbouring farms attend these schools. On average, each of these schools records an annual enrolment of between nine hundred and a thousand pupils. These schools often share some of their amenities such as the boreholes and toilets with the community residents. The classrooms are often used for community functions. One of the village cemeteries is also located within the primary school yard. Zimbiru Village hosts traditional and modern houses that are closely settled. Traditional paths and dirt roads connect different households with the main tarred road. These paths enable community residents to maintain contacts within the village and to access other parts of the communal area. In spatial terms, Zimbiru Village contains homesteads and a popular shopping centre called Mverechena. The shopping centre accommodates several shops, restaurants, butcheries, supermarkets, a market, service stations, grinding mills, surgeries, a bus stop, nightclubs, and a police post. Government offices of the Department of Agricultural Technical and Extension Services (AGRITEX) are also located in this village. In Zimbiru Village, there is a dam and a stream called Gaurani that serve as water sources and as recreation facilities mainly for swimming, washing, and fishing. There are also watersheds, a perennial spring, and a hill regarded as sacred. The local people consider the humid conditions in this village as remarkable for perennial vegetable gardening.

Mungate Village is the second village from the boundary with Harare (see Figure 3.5 above). The village is situated along the tarred road linking Harare and Domboshava. The Food Aid Database indicates that Mungate Village is made up of 105 households. Only nineteen of these households were tribal, and the rest were migrant (see Table 3.1). Migrants came from places such as Harare, Makoni, Mtoko, Murewa, Chegutu, and Bindura. Mungate Village hosts both traditional and modern housing structures that are densely settled. Among the village's physical structures, is Mungate Township consisting of grocery shops, hardware shops, a vegetable market, butcheries, and grinding mills. This business centre is smaller compared to Mverechena. A private tertiary college, a church, a bus top, and small and

medium enterprises are also located at this business centre. Like in Zimbiru, the residents of Mungate Village use dirt roads and paths to reach different parts of the village and the communal area. A site of cultural relevance to the Shona, Domboshava Hill, is situated in Mungate Village. This national monument is one of the famous archaeological sites of cultural relevance in Zimbabwe. This monument is protected by the DNMMZ. The site was proclaimed a national monument in 1936, and it signifies the spirituality of the Shona (Pwiti & Mvenge, n.d.). This cultural site has a sacred woodlot of sugarplums (*Uapaca kirkiana*) - a wild fruit known as 'mazhanje' in vernacular Shona - see Photograph 3.2 below.



Photograph 3.2: A woodlot of 'mizhanje' at Domboshava Hill  
Source: Field data, (2012).

The Shona culture does not allow people to collect unripe sugar plums from the woodlot at Domboshava Hill. It is forbidden to comment on the taste of sugar plums while in the woodlot. Failure to observe these rules leads to disappearance of transgressors. Oral myths also claim that some migrants once cut down the trees from the sacred woodlot for construction purposes. The trees regrew overnight, and the forest was intact the following morning. Such cultural beliefs remain critical not only in the preservation of the sacred

spaces and the natural environment in Domboshava, but also in observation of elements that define the spirituality of the Shona.

Murape Village is situated at the heart of Domboshava (Figure 3.5 above). The late Headman lived in this village. The village is relatively small compared to other villages in Domboshava. It is a clustered settlement comprising both traditional and modern houses. It is more like a compound. The Food Aid Database indicates that Murape Village has a total of forty-five households comprising seven tribal households. The rest are migrants (see Table 3.1). Murape Village is the communal hub of Domboshava since most community facilities such as soccer and netball fields, a dip tank, two cemeteries (separate for tribal and migrant members), a community borehole, and a community hall are located in this village. Most of these facilities are derelict due to lack of maintenance. Murape Village also hosts woodlots and watersheds where wild fruit trees mainly water-berry trees (*Syzygium guineense*) or 'mikute' in vernacular Shona prevail. These are sacred. Woodlots and watersheds are however degenerating due to new settlements in the village. Some homesteads are built on vleis, marshy areas, forests, and dwalas (flat rock). In this village, there is a perennial spring in a gully 'goronga' deemed sacred. Sacred snakes are believed to congregate at the spring to drink water. If community residents use black tins or anything sooty to fetch water from the spring, the sacred snakes fill the water point in protest. This space also defines the spirituality of the Shona of Domboshava.

Chogugudza Village is located a bit further down the boundary that separates Domboshava from Harare (see Figure 3.5). This village hosts 141 households, of which ninety-three are tribal and the rest are migrants (see Table 3.1). Chogugudza Village displays traditional and modern housing structures. An outstanding feature in this village is Chogugudza Primary School situated at the heart of the village. In Chogugudza Village, there are vlei gardens, fields, pastures, watersheds, and woodlots. Wild fruit trees such as 'mikute' and 'mizhanje' also dominate the natural environment. Old and tall gum trees conspicuously rise above other physical structures such as homesteads, forests, and hills in this village. Several footpaths and a dirt road connect community residents within their village and the rest of the community.

### 3.8 Conclusion

This historical narrative situates debates on land, policy, and household survival strategies within the colonial and post-colonial eras. The debates clearly demonstrate how social change in the present has been shaped by the past. The colonial era marks the introduction of dualism of land tenure, as well as land administration in Zimbabwe. This colonial footprint is visible in the political administration and land tenure even in the second decade of the new millennium as evidenced by the rural-urban dichotomy. The nature of RDP in Zimbabwe is complex. It is informed by land laws. The urban influence of Harare on Domboshava communal area situated in its periphery demonstrates how rural-urban linkages, urban-rural linkages, and migration are constructed, and mediate the processes that characterize land, RDP, and household survival strategies. The resultant changes arise not only from national political and economic decisions, but also from local circumstances. As a result, Domboshava emerges as both a dormitory village for Harare the capital city, as well as a peri-urban communal area that hosts traditional settlements deemed rural in policy terms.

## Chapter 4 Methods

### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the methods used in my research. These methods are the specific means by which data was collected (Somekh & Lewin, 2011). After this introduction, the second section of this chapter focuses on the research plan and design. The third section brings to the fore the sampling procedures, and describes the study sample. The fourth section details the data collection techniques. The fifth section describes the practical aspects of data collection in Domboshava. The sixth section highlights data analysis procedures. The last two sections pay attention to ethical considerations and tying the loose ends.

### 4.2 Preparation and planning - the research design

The research methods applied were based on their merit in contributing to addressing the research problem and the research questions (see section 1.8 in Chapter 1). For one to come up with a good research output it is important to work with methods that are appropriate to the research problem, as well as the researcher's own way of seeing the world (Somekh & Lewin, 2011). My personal experiences in both rural and urban areas as well as available resources influenced the research design considerations. Selection of methods was carried out in light of the concepts and theories adopted in my study.

Concepts are “words that stand for and represent events, situations, and problems as viewed through the eyes of the researcher” (Somekh & Lewin 2011:114). Simply, concepts guide decision-making in the whole research process - from the beginning to the end (Somekh & Lewin, 2011). In choosing concepts, I reflected on my research questions, other people's researches, as well as data collected through fieldwork. I also reflected upon Blumer (1954) in Bryman (2012:388)'s idea of stepping away from a “straitjacket approach” when studying social issues. In my research, concepts are closely related not only to the themes under discussion, but to also to the situation in Domboshava - my study area. On the other hand, the theories that were selected for this study helped me “to understand the complexities of life ... not only explain why people do what they do, but also offer insights and suggest directions for inquiry” (Neuman, 2011:56). Theorizing peri-urban spaces is often as difficult as

conceptualizing them (Mbiva & Huchzermeyer, 2002). Generally theoretical work on peri-urban spaces has been neglected as little theory targets interface in these spaces (Adell, 1999; Mbiva & Huchzermeyer, 2002). Theoretical approaches that focus on peri-urban zones borrow aspects of regional development (Lipton, 1977; Tacoli, 1998; Adell, 1999; Mbiva & Huchzermeyer, 2002). Theorizing peri-urban contexts from this spatial perspective alone is however inadequate. It neglects the relevance of processes that contribute to shaping of these zones because it is not only the physical linkages between Domboshava and Harare that are of relevance to my research problem, but also the way these linkages are constructed and structured (cf. Lynch, 2005). These concerns were addressed through my conceptual framework.

The conceptual framework applied in my study provides an overall description of the research problem (see Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2). It did not only determine methods of data collection, but the review of relevant literature, description and analysis of findings, as well as recommendations reached (Maxwell, 1996; Maxwell, 2005; Creswell, 2009; Blaikie, 2010; Ravitch & Riggan, 2012). My conceptual framework inspires fresh ways of looking at the social world (cf. Gilber, 2011). Through my conceptual framework, I was able to choose and appropriate research design to carry out this empirical study. A research design provides a strategy or a plan for inquiry on how the research was conducted (cf. Babbie *et al.*, 1998; Mouton, 2011).

A mixed methods approach was adopted for this study. Mixed methods entail a combination of both qualitative and quantitative approaches to research (Creswell, 2009; Creswell & Clark, 2011; Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006). “It is a multiple way of seeing” (Creswell & Clark, 2011:4). From the mixed methods, I adopted the “QUAL followed by quant approach” that regards the qualitative approach as the primary approach followed by a smaller proportion of the quantitative approach (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006:322). In my research, the qualitative approach is combined with the quantitative approach since both approaches remain critical in addressing the research problem. However, priority was given to the qualitative approach because my research problem focuses on characterization of land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies within the realms of customary land tenure system largely regarded as processual (cf. Cousins, 2008a; 2008b).



The qualitative approach was considered because of its ability and usefulness in studying phenomena in their natural setting (Babbie *et al.*, 1998; Merriam & Associates, 2002; Flyvbjerg, 2011). Through the qualitative approach, I was able to generate stories from community residents of Domboshava and other stakeholders in their natural setting. Creswell (2009) and Mouton (2011) stress the usefulness of qualitative research in terms of exploring and understanding meanings ascribed by individuals and groups to social problems. My investigation also focused on the social categories that influence decisions in terms of the tribal/migrant distinction, gender, class, and generation. These required qualitative descriptions.

On the other hand, the quantitative approach entails collection of numerical data (Bryman, 2012). The approach allows attachment of numerical values on social conditions of community residents (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005; Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006; Bryman, 2012). Through the quantitative approach, generalizations were drawn from the stories told (Ibid). Generalizations of the findings were made within the population from which the study sample was drawn, and these were made possible through quantitative analysis of trends on land transactions, sources of livelihoods, and access to services. As such, the quantitative approach was useful to test results from the sampled population under the three main variables. No hypothesis testing was done. Adoption of both qualitative and quantitative approaches through mixed methods thus enabled the triangulation not only of these approaches, but also of theories, concepts, sources of data, methods of data collection, and methods of data analysis (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006). Qualitative approach was critical in understanding the research problem, whereas quantitative approach served to assist with testing findings from the qualitative approach.

In order to examine the mutual relationships *between* land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies, I used a descriptive case study. Usually qualitative in nature, a descriptive case study aims at providing an in-depth description of a small number of cases (Mouton, 2011:149). Case studies emphasize social construction of social realities and meanings in situ (Somekh & Lewin, 2011). The case study of Domboshava provides an etymological analysis, description, and interpretation of phenomena in order to extract meaning through investigating issues in depth and within a real life context (cf. Merriam & Associates, 2002; Yin, 2009; Flyvbjerg, 2011; Yin, 2011; De Vos *et al.*, 2011). In my research, the case study interrogates social realities created through interaction of community residents with the

structure of customary land tenure system by asking the question - “What is going on here?” (Somekh & Lewin, 2011:53). Thus, Curry (1992:1) in Thomas (2012:301) states that a case study design presents “an account and analysis of particular events and decisions”. I chose a case study design in order to generate as many stories as possible (based on my research questions) from the community residents of Domboshava. Through this design I avoided what I may call an ‘academic tourism paradigm’ or a ‘strait jacket approach’ to research, that is, a research design that follows rigid and predictable steps - rather, I adopted a more interactive and reflexive approach that allows creativity and flexibility (cf. Bryman, 2008; 2012). In any case, research is “more like an art than a science. It requires invention, imagination, and creativity rather than slavish following of textbook blue prints” (Somekh & Lewin, 2011). An interactive and reflexive approach to research was useful since my study took place within a peri-urban communal area where change is ubiquitous. A case study gives room for reflection on contingencies in ‘messy’ situations (Neuman, 2011). Peri-urban contexts have been characterized by many scholars as chaotic, unplanned, and disorderly (Wehrmann, 2008; Berry, 2011; Mabin, 2012; Watson, 2012). In addition, through a case study I was able to make use of a variety of concepts, theories, and data collection methods (cf. Babbie *et al.*, 1998; Yin, 2009; Somekh & Lewin, 2011; Mouton, 2011; Thomas, 2012).

Findings from case studies are however of limited generalizability (Alasuutari *et al.*, 2009; Creswell, 2009; Mouton, 2011; Neuman, 2011; Somekh & Lewin, 2011; Yin, 2009; Yin, 2011). Generalization of findings entail the ability of the research results to be applied or replicated in new settings or contexts (Creswell, 2009; Yin, 2011). Generalization of research findings from case studies “on the basis of one case are indeed difficult to make, and the temptation is to see every case study as unique” (Marongwe, 2011:1089). Generalization of findings can only be achieved depending on the case being studied and how the case was chosen (Flyvbjerg, 2011). Thus, I am fully cognisant that findings from the case of Domboshava are of limited generalizability in other contexts. The case of Domboshava nevertheless remains significant not only in generating insights on communal areas situated in the periphery of cities since land transactions have become a challenge in these areas, but a significant learning experience as well. Local government officials from GRDC cited substantial challenges from Seke and Chishawasha peri-urban communal areas located in the same district as Domboshava.



Findings from the four villages of Domboshava under study were treated as a complete sample and not as discrete study sites as earlier thought, and these generated learning experiences, and allowed for more thematic analysis of findings as reflected in different chapter subheadings. According to Maxwell (1996; 2005), in such cases internal generalization of findings is possible since the conclusions drawn from the findings have direct implications on the groups studied. Drawing learning experiences from the four villages that participated for reflection on other neighbouring villages that did not participate in my research is also possible to some extent because of the relational location and shared local conditions of the villages in this communal area. Generation of generalizations for peri-urban areas for other cities remains difficult as Domboshava communal area presents a unique case study in terms of the socio-economic and political processes experienced, as well as social systems that constitute its peri-urbanity. In addition, the scale of urban influence in other peri-urban areas of Zimbabwe varies depending on the size of the cities, although my findings are similar to other studies on peri-urban zones elsewhere. In the end, it is not Domboshava alone that presents a unique case of a peri-urban communal area in Zimbabwe or in sub-Saharan Africa, rather all cities and peri-urban areas are unique. As such, generalizations of findings manifest as learning experiences although they may have limitations in their application to other contexts. External generalizability of findings beyond the settings and groups being studied is always difficult (Maxwell, 1996; 2005). “In a strict statistical sense, case studies are always such” (Scoones *et al.*, 2010). Although generalizations can be limited to the research findings, the conceptual framework adopted in this research can be extended and adopted in other settings elsewhere (cf. Maxwell, 1996; 2005).

### 4.3 Sampling

In this research, sample selection was done to canvas small sets of categories that represent each of the elements within a broader population (Babbie *et al.*, 1998; Neuman, 2011; Somekh & Lewin, 2011; Yin, 2011). Selection of study samples for the case of Domboshava was ‘information-oriented’, that is, the cases were selected on the basis of their ability to generate data capable of addressing the research problem and research question - my expectation (Flyvbjerg, 2011). Two sampling procedures were applied in my research. These are purposive and systematic sampling procedures. Purposive sampling procedure is when sample units are deliberately selected at the discretion of the researchers with a specific

purpose in mind for special situations (Neuman, 2011; Yin, 2011). On the other hand, systematic sampling involves random sampling of participants at predetermined and specific intervals (Neuman, 2011). The purposive sampling procedure was used to select the study area and some categories of my research participants, whereas the systematic sampling procedure was used to draw heads of households or their representatives (stand-ins). The stand-ins were the most senior members of the households in the absence of heads of households.

Domboshava peri-urban communal area was purposively selected for this research because it provides a unique case on land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies. In addition, significant consideration of the peri-urban nature of the communal area and its linkages with Harare were of relevance to the choice of the study area. My prior knowledge of Domboshava also influenced the selection of this study area.

Four villages of Domboshava were purposively selected to participate in my study, and these are Zimbiru, Mungate, Murape, and Chogugudza. These villages were practically chosen due to their geographical location in proximity with Harare, and ease of access since the villages are located along Domboshava Road that links the communal area and Harare (see Figure 3.5 in Chapter 3). Inclusion of these villages in my research was determined by the research problem and the sub problem questions. Neuman (2011) and Yin (2011) stress that selected cases are always viewed more in terms of their contribution to the research question. Although my focus is on the four selected villages, in some of my discussions I mention other places outside Domboshava including international destinations.

The 2002 and 2012 census data shed light on the total population and number of households in Domboshava. However, the population of each of the villages of Domboshava could not be ascertained. Villages in Goromonzi District are roughly made up of between twenty to three hundred households (Makura-Paradza, 2010). There are always variations among these villages in terms of population densities, size, and natural endowments (Ibid). In Domboshava, villages were roughly made up of an average of 110 households. From this estimate, the total number of households in the four selected villages stood at 440. Since most households of Domboshava contained roughly an average size of six members, the total population in the four selected villages was estimated at 2 640.

Accessing data on the number of households in each village from the VHs was a huge challenge. The government department responsible for census data and other national statistics (ZNSA) could not avail these figures. The official statistics on villages and households in each of the villages in Ward 4 of Domboshava were therefore not available. Traditional Leaders constitutive of VHs, Headmen, and the Chief as custodians of the statistics refused to divulge the figures. Mouton (2011) warns that it is sometimes difficult or impossible to compile accurate lists of target populations - the sources are often incomplete, absent, outdated, or inaccessible. I therefore relied on estimates and figures from the Food Aid Database (see Table 3.1 in Chapter 3). I verified these figures through observation. According to the Food Aid Database, the four selected villages had an estimated population of 364 households.

Within the broader framework of villages, TLs were purposively selected to participate in my research because land and land tenure discourses need to be understood through the social, political, and economic relations through which authority, power, resource use, and management are channelled (Peters, 2007). Thus, the VHs for Zimbiru, Mungate, Murape, and Chogugudza Villages are custodians of customary land tenure in their respective territories. The Headmen and the Chief were also considered important elements since villages in Ward 4 were under their jurisdiction. Two Headmen that participated in my research doubled as Headmen and VHs. Three VHs from neighbouring villages were co-opted. These provided independent and unbiased opinion on sensitive issues surrounding land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies in the selected villages. Eight TLs participated in my study.

In sampling heads of households, I wanted to use systematic random sampling procedure to achieve representativeness of opinion. In real terms, the population for each of the four villages varied. My initial plan was to sample ten household heads from each of the four villages based on the eleventh element with a population estimate of 110 households per village in mind. By so doing, I wanted to eliminate possible repetitive responses likely to emanate from neighbouring household heads, as well as to draw general trends from my findings. The original plan to rely on village statistics from VHs was partially aborted when TLs did not avail statistics on village populations, because during the reconnaissance I was given an impression that village population statistics will be availed during the data collection phase. While picking the eleventh household from the VHs' homesteads, I walked in ever

increasing circles generating my study sample. I realized that the homesteads in the four villages were haphazardly settled. As a result, it was difficult to apply systematic random procedure in its strictest sense. The outcome with regards the sampled household heads was also not as systematic as I expected. The sample drawn was therefore not representative as earlier planned. In the end, I realized that it is the richness of the stories that is of relevance to my research rather than mere representation in terms of figures. Numbers in terms of samples generated do not always translate themselves into reliable data (Neuman, 2011). Often it is the relevance and contribution of the sampled elements that is important rather than the way the samples are generated (Ibid). Bekker (2002) adds that small samples are also capable of generating good results. People and not the spaces are responsible for the activities that take place in their social worlds (Adell, 1999).

Forty-one household heads or their representatives participated in my research. Initially, twelve household heads were sampled from Zimbiru Village during fieldwork between December 2011 and February 2012. Five more households became part of the sample when I visited Domboshava in January 2013 for a 'mopping' exercise. In total, seventeen households were chosen from Zimbiru Village; ten from Mungate Village; six from Murape Village; and eight from Chogugudza Village. A total of fifteen tribal and twenty-six migrant household heads or their representatives were sampled to participate in this research.

Generally, male household heads dominated the community because Domboshava is patriarchal. Thirty households that participated in this research were male-headed while the rest were female-headed (see Appendix A1). The female household heads assumed this role after the deaths of their husbands, and/or after divorcing their husbands. The authoritative role of household head is culturally reserved for males although females can legally assume the titles as widows or divorcees. Since heads of household are regarded as the chief economic providers for their members in general (Budlender, 2003), female heads of households assumed such roles on behalf of their members, apart from performing other gendered roles such as looking after children, washing, gathering firewood, cultivating land, and cooking. Most male household heads were not available for interviews (see Appendix A1). Male household heads had gone to 'work' away from their homesteads, mostly in Harare, the adjacent farms, or 'somewhere' in the villages. They were not necessarily 'absentee' household heads in Budlender (2003)'s terms since they came home every evening after 'work' to join the rest of their members. As a result, my study sample has more female

than male respondents. This is because most of the female respondents stood in as representatives of household heads for purposes of the interviews, and not necessarily in terms of household decision-making and authority although they contributed towards household activities. In this regard, women therefore assumed proxy or *de facto* roles of household heads in the absence of their male counterparts on short-term basis and in some instances on long-term basis (Budlender, 2003).

Although males constituted the bulk of the household heads, only nine male household heads were available and participated in my research (see Appendix A1). Thirty-two female respondents participated in this research on behalf of their household members. Seven households were represented by both the husband and the wife. In such cases, women dominated the discussions. Interactions with a combination of husbands and their wives generated interesting responses as couples clarified each other's contributions. Two cases involved daughters responding on behalf of their household members in the absence of their parents and male siblings. These daughters were articulate. Two similar cases involved housemaids who were in charge of the homesteads in the absence of their employers. They were not related to the heads of households. These housemaids stood in as respondents on behalf of their household heads. Housemaids as hired contract workers were powerless to make decisions on behalf of their employers although they were part of the households. These housemaids had insufficient household data about their households. My encounters with housemaids did not yield meaningful responses. I did not make a return trip to these homesteads. The housemaids indicated that their employers left the homesteads early in the morning and returned home in the evening on a daily basis.

This study primarily targeted household heads, but ended-up including an array of 'stand-ins' alongside key informants. However, I realized that by interviewing various stand-ins for household heads certainly constituted a strong source of data for analyzing household dynamics since households themselves are not static (cf. Budlender, 2003). This also assisted me to capture the forms of land transactions from various categories of people, perceptions of RDP, survival strategies for households that featured inside different households including activities by junior members, as well as the gendered dynamics that surrounded these issues. This approach enabled many households to participate in the research, and thus the sample size was big and representative for purposes of generalization of findings within the four villages. The responses from the 'stand-ins' as well as those of heads of households made

reference to 'we' - a demonstration of non-opinionated individual responses. Recalling of collective action and the 'we-ness' in the responses demonstrates stronger relationships among household members as symbolized in collective land rights and common property resource use under the system of customary land tenure. Rights to land and other resources in communal areas include even those of children who are in most cases incapacitated to make any household decisions due to their age. The views of adult women and young daughters that stood in on behalf of male household heads were important in affording them a chance to represent their households in a male dominated decision-making process. The 'we-ness' in their responses brought forth consideration of these women's land rights at household level although women are largely secondary rights holders. Clearly, women employ the language of rights and culture to claim and advance their land rights in their communities (Mnisi, 2010:2).

The Ward Councillor for Ward 4 of Goromonzi District is among the purposively selected elements of my study sample. As political appointees, WCs work closely with communal residents that vote them into power. Ward Councillors are expected to initiate RDP activities in their Wards. Although WCs do not have power to allocate land in their constituencies, they can influence decisions on how land can be used. In Domboshava, the WC kept records on the number of villages, VHs, and households in the ward. Such registers assisted in the equitable distribution of aid from NGOs such as food, seed, and farm implements. Timeous and adequate provision of farm implements is integral in the practice of peasant farming in Domboshava. The WC was therefore an important source of data on the demographic pattern, the agency on land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies.

The District Administrator (DA) for Goromonzi District was also purposively selected for this study. The DA as a senior civil servant was in charge of RDP for the district. One district land use planner, one provincial land use planner, and three national land use planners (ministry) were purposively selected for this study. These local government officials were custodians of statutes on land and settlement they largely regarded as RDP. In addition, the Director of Rural Local Authorities (DRLA) in the Ministry of LGRUD was purposively selected. He was responsible for policy directives for rural local authorities in Zimbabwe. A total of seven local government officials were therefore canvassed to participate in my study. This category of respondents was deliberately chosen for its richness in data on land transactions and RDP in Domboshava.

Two government offices were situated in two of the villages under study. These were the department of Agriculture Technical and Extension Services (AGRITEX) in Zimbiru Village, and the Department of National Museums and Monuments (DNMMZ) in Mungate Village. The Land Development Officer from AGRITEX offered extension services on peasant farming in Domboshava. The officer provided data on household survival strategies in the communal area since land transactions were interfering with the sizes of arable plots integral in agricultural production. My aim was to understand what would become of peasant farming and household survival strategies in the peri-urban communal area amid the prevalence of land transactions. The officer from the DNMMZ was responsible for the management and conservation of the cultural and natural heritage site at Domboshava Hill. A number of conflicts related to land transactions were witnessed between this department and community residents of Domboshava. I sought to understand how land transactions constrained sites of spiritual relevance in Domboshava. Contributions from these two officers remained important in demonstrating the structure/agency relationships mediated by community residents through land transactions.

Informal Discussants (IDs) form an important category of my data sources. These individuals were asked to contribute to the research on the basis of their neutrality. They provided data omitted deliberately or unintentionally by household heads, TLs, and other stakeholders. Other stakeholders' refer to a combination of Local Government Officers, politicians, and civil servants. Neuman (2011) refers to such omissions as evasion. Sensitive material difficult to divulge was obtained through IDs. These individuals were nonpartisan in their opinion as they interpreted and validated opinion from other respondents, and confirmed my personal observations.

Inclusion of an array of research participants was a deliberate move to come up with individual and collective constructions on the variables under study, and to extract meaning from stories as presented by the participants. The choice of these participants was significantly determined by their ability to address my research problem (Yin, 2011). Despite constraints such as the unavailability of village household statistics, sizable samples from each category of the primary data sources were canvassed. I reflected on the tiers of the RDC's administrative structure in order to select the various participants for this research (see Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3). Sixty-one research participants took part in my research. These

individuals were knowledgeable about the conditions that mediate land transactions, RDP, as well as household survival strategies.

#### **4.4 Data collection procedures**

Data collection presents important activities within the research process that address the research problem in a specific and unique way (Yin, 2011). These activities coincided with the summer season when community residents of Domboshava planted crops for peasant farming. My focus was to generate as many original and interesting stories from each of the categories of my respondents in situ. Although I used interview guides in the data collection process, the process still allowed the respondents to provide detailed accounts in each case.

##### **4.4.1 Sources of data**

Since my research design entailed mixed methods, a combination of primary and secondary sources of data was used. Primary and secondary data were also generated. I personally collected primary data, whereas secondary data was in form of text (cf. Babbie *et al.*, 1998; Yin; 2011). I obtained primary data from household heads, TLs, and other stakeholders through interviews and during informal discussions. Since my research involved RDP debates, it was therefore imperative to focus on participants such as politicians and service users (cf. Somekh & Lewin, 2011). Secondary data was obtained from literature sources such as published books, scholarly journals, archival documents, newspaper articles, statutes on land and settlement in Zimbabwe, and government publications such as census records. My goal in reviewing literature was not only about finding published articles in line with my research interests, but rather to find rigorous secondary data that could shape my views through identifying gaps in literature on what is unknown about my topic, the methodological approaches used, and the investigation techniques used (cf. Ravitch & Riggan, 2012).

##### **4.4.1 The reconnaissance**

After the successful completion and approval of my research proposal, I embarked on a reconnaissance in June 2011. The reconnaissance entailed a familiarization tour of the research area. In my case, it involved seeking permission to undertake research in Domboshava. The reconnaissance was instrumental in my preliminary assessment of the



study area, as well as the practicability of my research. This also enabled me to obtain an in-depth understanding of local governance and administrative structures in villages of Domboshava as well as the Ministry of LGRUD. This became an opportunity to create rapport with local government officials. Through the reconnaissance, I obtained permission to carry out research in Domboshava without which this study would have been impossible.

When permission to carry out research was granted by the Ministry of LGRUD, I was advised to make the same request at provincial level. The provincial offices for Mashonaland East Province are in Marondera, a town situated sixty kilometres from Harare. After obtaining approval to conduct research at provincial level, I obtained a letter of support to take to GRDC. The DA for GRDC approved my request. I obtained a letter to take to the District Chief Executive Officer for accreditation who gave me a letter to take to the Chief, and also linked me to the land use planner for GRDC. I discussed with the Chief my intention to carry out research in Domboshava. The Chief welcomed my research idea, and referred me to the Chief's Secretary, one of the Headmen in Goromonzi District. The Chief's Secretary is an integral component of the Chief's Council. The Chief's Secretary gave me a letter to present to VHs, Headmen, household heads, and other stakeholders. The letters of support authorized me to undertake research in Domboshava. Obtaining formal clearance to carry out research in Domboshava was informed by relational sequence within the administrative structure of the Ministry of LGRUD (see Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3).

My initial meeting with the Chief's Secretary highlighted the significance of observing the Shona culture in my research. He explained the relevance of observing a traditional process called '*kuombera*' in order to obtain audience from the Chief, permission to interview the respondents, as well as to 'walk-about' in villages of Domboshava during fieldwork. '*Kuombera*' means 'to pass greetings' in vernacular Shona. Chimhowu & Woodhouse (2008) observed this practice during their study in Svosve communal area of Zimbabwe. Fulfillment of the practice was through offering a valuable token to the Chief such as a live goat and '*shamhu*', that is, a stick for driving the goat, or an equivalent monetary token. Culturally, the process of '*kuombera*' and bringing gifts to the Chief signifies respect, loyalty, obedience, and submission to tribal authority. This process is not foreign, and is a prerequisite in the culture of the Shona. Ideally, '*kuombera*' takes place during an open ceremony at the Chief's Council - '*dare*'. Contemporary '*kuombera*' is generally monetized at rates set by TLs (Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2008).

The reconnaissance went on until the end of August 2011. I familiarized myself with the study area and boundaries in both conceptual and spatial terms. I was made aware of the social and most importantly the political organization of Goromonzi District and Domboshava. Research is a political activity (Andres, 2012). After my reconnaissance, I prepared data collection instruments from September 2011 to November of the same year. I prepared interview schedules for each category of my respondents. These schedules were constructed using themes from the research questions, and the conceptual framework. My conceptual framework provided guidance in terms of important issues to be examined, the individuals targeted by the research, the type of questions to be asked, and how I had to position myself in this research as a researcher (Creswell, 2009). My interview schedules contained series of questions that set guidelines on relevant debates for the different categories of respondents (cf. Yin, 2011). Most questions on these interview schedules were open-ended except for those that required biographical data from heads of households.

#### 4.4.2 Negotiating entry into Domboshava

Negotiating entry into Domboshava was tactful. I reflected on my LPS framework, and my research plan to achieve this objective as well as to understand the local dynamics deeper. Social systems are complex. As such, it was imperative for me as a researcher to be acquainted with the structures that regulate the community of Domboshava in order to be able to penetrate it. Domboshava as a social system exist not in isolation from the social practices of community members, but constitutes their practices as well. This required tenacity and patience.

My data collection involved fieldwork. This entails studying a phenomenon in its natural setting. Most descriptive case studies make use of fieldwork in data gathering (Mouton, 2011; Nueman, 2011; Yin, 2011). I enjoyed fieldwork because it is about 'hanging out' with people (Neuman, 2011). Fieldwork is fun. I used interviews, observation, and analysis of pertinent documents as methods of data collection. My fieldwork began in December 2011 with an appointment with the Chief's Secretary. I offered a monetary gift to the Chief since I could not secure a live goat. During this meeting, I secured accommodation at Zimbiru Primary School (see Figure 3.5 in Chapter 3). Staying in the village created opportunities for close observation of phenomena in its natural setting, as well as a way of reducing research costs. It also symbolized 'going native' in research (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005).

During data collection, I relied much on VHs for the identification of village boundaries, and household members for the identification of yards for their homesteads. Village and homestead boundaries are often abstractions better understood by community residents themselves. Fieldwork involved conducting in-depth and face-to-face interviews with my respondents, and making observations on the dynamics of land transactions and household survival strategies in Domboshava. Interview schedules acted as reference points in my discussions with participants. When approaching each village, my first port of call was the VH's homestead. I started with Zimbiru Village and proceeded to Mungate, Murape, and Chogugudza Villages - drifting away from the boundary with Harare. It was important to simultaneously interview household heads (or their representatives - the 'stand-ins') and TLs in order to balance as well as to crosscheck themes from the stories told. I carried my letters of support wherever I went.

Gaining access into a study area required common sense and social skills (cf. Neuman, 2011). As a researcher, I assumed the status of a 'village woman' during fieldwork. I always wore a wrapper and a head scuff as per the Shona tradition. When approaching homesteads, I announced my presence through a Shona word '*Gogogoi*'. This word literally means 'may I enter'. The phrase symbolizes the sound of a door-knock. Household members staying at the homesteads ushered me into their homes. In most cases, these were women and children. Before entering the yard, (usually not fenced nor gated), I asked if there were any dogs at the homestead. I am scared of dogs! Before taking a seat, I inquired about the whereabouts of the head of household. In the absence of a male head of household, I asked female heads of households present or 'stand-ins' (in some cases) if they were comfortable with participating in the research representing the household head.

I used my first day of fieldwork to assess the consistency of questions on the interview schedules. I assessed whether my interview schedules were able to solicit reliable responses since the questions were varied. No questions were removed entirely from the interview schedules, however; the order of some questions was changed to foster sequence from stories. I modified my questioning technique to make the questions more practical. By checking on the reliability of the interview schedules, I monitored the feasibility of my study.

I stayed in Domboshava during the entire data collection process. I became an observer. Being an observer entails presence in the situation and making a record of what is going on

from within (Somekh & Lewin, 2011). Observations are integral in the discourse of knowledge construction (Neuman, 2011; Somekh & Lewin, 2011; Yin, 2011). Observations provide an in-depth description of a group of people or a community (Mouton, 2011:148). My observations were largely unstructured and natural. I used my camera to capture relevant observable phenomena. My observations were based on the daily interactions with reality in the villages. Collecting data through observation was also vital in securing evidence not captured through interviews. I visited the Domboshava caves to observe the impact and outcomes of land transactions on the monument. Through observations I came to draw conclusions on culture, history, settlement patterns, land use, land use change, degradation of the commons, peasant farming, and emergent household survival strategies.

#### **4.5 Situating self in action**

Interviews were vital as they helped me to explore in detail people's motives behind land transactions and how these realities were constructed. Yin (2009; 2011) recognises interviews as a major source of data for case studies. Data collected through interviews was highly rewarding (cf. Neuman, 2011). Through interviews, community residents' perceptions on RDP also emerged. Open-ended questions in the interviews were useful in generating stories and flexible responses. I was able to probe for detail in each case. My aim was to produce as much qualitative data as possible through careful listening and recording of stories from my respondents. In some cases, respondents rambled off into political issues that were not directly relevant to the discussion. To them, the interviews offered the best platform to air their views, or show their allegiance to the government in power or vice versa. In such instances, I redirected conversations to focus on my research questions without upsetting or taking sides with my respondents.

##### **4.4.3.1 Interviews with TLs and household heads**

During each household interview, I started by greeting the household members in vernacular. I addressed household heads, VHs or Headmen as '*samusha*' (Holleman, 1952; Goldin & Gelfand, 1975; Andersson, 1999). This is a formal vernacular title that demonstrates ownership not only of homesteads, but also of tribal authority. Alternatively, I greeted people using their totems. Vambe (1972), stresses that knowing people's totems for purposes of respect and greeting is vital in the culture of the Shona. Household members and TLs were

surprised about how much I had gathered about their totems. They really felt honored, and appreciated this gesture because households belonging to the Shona tribes are proud of and value their totems substantially. Totems and language distinguish various tribes in Zimbabwe (Holleman, 1952; Vambe, 1972; Taringa, 2006). During interviews, I always opted to sit on the floor rather than to sit on a chair or a stool. In the culture of the Shona, women in rural areas generally sit on the floor. Men use chairs, stools, or anything that elevates them - even stones. Such positions signify authority. By opting for a lower seat, I was submitting myself to authority. This was significant in diluting the power relations between my respondents and me as a researcher during interviews. Such knowledge about the culture of the Shona was useful.

Each household interview started with casual talk about delayed rains, hot weather, and a brief self-introduction. In each case, I introduced myself as a student from Stellenbosch University, in South Africa. I spelt out the purpose of my visit as a researcher. At this point, I would request for consent from my participants to take part in the research. I would stress that the purpose of the research was purely academic. Usually, presentation of the letters of support followed. I would ask my respondents if they were comfortable with being voice recorded. Asking for permission to record conversations from participants is ethically important in research (Yin, 2011). Some of my respondents refused to be recorded. In such cases, I complied with their desires. It was not difficult to engage my respondents in the interviews though.

Each narrative was captured exploring the in-depth dimensions of what can be termed the '4ws' - what, when, why, with what consequence and how - in consistence with the research questions (Rubin & Rubin, 2012). My capacity to speak Shona was very helpful. In addition, my ability to generate and participate in ordinary conversations was valuable. Charm and social skills are vital in building rapport with respondents (Neuman, 2001). I listened, empathised, and appreciated each contribution from my respondents. My aim was to tread carefully on sensitive issues. I was also mindful not to upset or incite the emotions of my respondents. Issues on land transactions in Domboshava were very sensitive and emotional. For some tribal members these issues were associated with sad memories related to loss of land, whereas for some migrants the issues were associated with illicit land deals. Such stories often triggered unpleasant nostalgias for many tribal household members, and anxieties for migrants.

Use of stories or narratives in research entails “sensitivity to the connections with people’s accounts of past, present, future events, and states of affairs; people’s sense of their place within those events... and their role within them” (Bryman, 2008:553). I took trouble not to impose my personal opinion on what was being reflected and perceived by the participants as a representation of social realities in their narrations. I avoided making judgments on narrations at all costs by staying as objective as possible. Each narration presented a unique piece of research evidence. By letting out what they regarded as sensitive material, my respondents looked forward to a workable solution to their impasse. They trusted me with their closely guarded secrets. Some of my respondents were however insecure. They thought I was from the GRDC. As a result, they were unwilling to disclose much detail. It took me (on average) at least the first ten minutes of each interview to win the trust of my respondents. I assured them of my impartiality. Throughout the household interviews, I demonstrated my knowledge of the background of Domboshava. Interviews took on average one to one and half hours of interaction depending on the stories being told. I enjoyed each conversation with my respondents. Most conversations were conducted in vernacular Shona. In some cases, respondents used both Shona and English in their narrations. After each interview, I courteously thanked the respondents for their time.

I stayed in Domboshava until mid-February. I stopped interviewing household heads when I felt there was a lot of repetition in the narrations, when no new insights were being generated, and when no interesting stories were being told. I was somehow saturated (cf. Bryman, 2008; 2012). This is a point when new data or research insights are no longer illuminating, and do not generate new ideas (Ibid). These skills in data collection through in-depth interviews emanate from my attendance of a short course on Qualitative Interview Methods offered by the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Stellenbosch University, as well as a Winter School course on Research Methods offered by the Graduate School in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Stellenbosch University.

#### 4.5.1 Interviews with other stakeholders

These respondents were interviewed on separate occasions, at different locations and mostly in their offices, and were deemed knowledgeable and instrumental in their stakeholder portfolios. Interviews with other stakeholders involved making appointments prior to the interview dates. When making appointments, I explained the purpose of my research. No

hints on the nature of questions were given before the interview date. I wanted the discussions to flow naturally and to avoid premeditated responses. While waiting for the interview dates, I occupied myself with other data collection activities such as visiting the National Archives or local libraries. Interviews with the WC were conducted in both English and vernacular Shona at her house in Domboshava.

While translations to English were done for interviews conducted in Shona, revisions were not done on English narrations to retain the originality of the stories told. Transcriptions of recorded interviews were done later. Interviews with the Land Development Officer, the National Museums Officer, and the Local Government Officers were conducted in English in their respective offices. During these interviews, I requested for an RDP document. Local Government Officers revealed the nonexistence of an RDP document for Domboshava. I was therefore advised to buy statutes on land and settlement regarded by the local authorities (RDCs) as RDP.

#### 4.5.2 Interviews with Informal Discussants

Two Informal Discussants (IDs) were co-opted into the research through casual talk. I made an appointment to meet the IDs. Their coincidental participation provided significant insights on political, cultural, and historical dimensions of land transactions and RDP. Many of my respondents had skipped issues they felt were sensitive.

#### 4.5.3 Conversations with academics

In trying to understand the intricacies embedded in land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies, I conversed with academics. I had not originally planned to do this but the opportunities occurred during the course of the research. I requested academics to shed light on sticky issues since my data collection ran concurrently with analysis. These conversations were held with academics such as Professor Bill Kinsey in Harare. He has researched widely on communal areas in Zimbabwe. We met in Harare. I wanted to obtain Kinsey Data Sets on Domboshava. Unfortunately, there were no relevant Kinsey Data Sets specifically for my study area - Domboshava. Nevertheless, we discussed issues on land transactions in peri-urban areas, as well as RDP at length. Another important conversation was held with Professor Sam Moyo from the Institute of Agrarian Studies in Harare, Zimbabwe. This

meeting was significant in unravelling contentious issues on land tenure, the role of agrarian processes and general shifts in household survival strategies in communal areas. My conversation with Mr Conrad Brand from the University of Zimbabwe shed light on the uniqueness of my study on investigating a combination of land transactions and RDP. I held a meeting with Professor Ben Cousins at the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) at the University of Western Cape in South Africa. Deliberations with Professor Cousins shed light on issues of land transactions in peri-urban communal areas. I realized that land transactions in peri-urban communal areas were not a new phenomenon, but context specific cases are worth pursuing. My visit to the Institute of Social Studies at The Hague in Netherlands paved way for a noteworthy conversation with Professor Robert Chambers on RDP issues. From these discussions, I realized the importance of engaging the voice of the voiceless - “ask them” (Chambers, 2012). Professor Bert Helmsing and Professor Des Gasper both from the Institute of Social Studies (The Hague) have written extensively on post-independence development planning in Zimbabwe. Conversations with these two professors confirmed the gaps and absence of a distinct RDP in Zimbabwe. Apart from conversations with academics, I attended a range of seminars, social forums, and feedback sessions in the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at Stellenbosch University. I also attended international conferences on land and policy where I presented some of my preliminary research findings. These forums were brilliant feedback sessions for my research.

#### 4.5.4 Review of pertinent policy documents

The last stage of my stay in Zimbabwe was dedicated to the collection of pertinent information particularly on RDP, communal land rights in Domboshava, and the geography and history of this community. I visited the National Archives of Zimbabwe where archival data is stored. Archival material is one of the major sources of evidence for case studies (Yin 2009). I collected literature on historical and cultural components of the study area. I also visited the DNMMZ to get insights on cases regarding conflict emanating from land transactions at a monument site in Domboshava. I interviewed an officer from DNMMZ about the cases. I purchased pertinent policy documents from the government printers.



#### 4.5.5 Community meetings and traditional court hearings

During fieldwork, I was privileged to attend community meetings on land transactions, as well as court sessions on land disputes. I managed to record some of these proceedings and they shed light on the nature of relations between the state and community residents in relation to access to land rights, and land 'ownership' dynamics in Domboshava.

#### 4.5.6 Dealing with the unexpected during fieldwork

My field activities yielded surprises of their own. These made my research more interesting. Failure to obtain a concrete RDP in black and white presented me with a dilemma since my initial focus was on analyzing the contents of the RDP document. At first, I was devastated. However, instead of abandoning the research process, I grew eager to get more answers to the sticky issues on the absence of an RDP document. It became apparent that the practice of RDP was laden with complexities and ambiguities of its own (cf. Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990; Wekwete, 1991; Munyuki-Hungwe & Dirwayi 2010). It turned out to be very exciting. I quickly adjusted my interview questions to confirm this premise, as well as what my respondents understood and perceived as an RDP. I took a bottom-up approach to investigate their reactions, and to learn from their experiences on RDP. This stage of my research unravelled the ambiguities associated with RDP in Domboshava.

During fieldwork, I realized that my respondents no longer viewed me as a researcher per se, but as a medium through which they could present their problems to the RDC and the state regarding land transactions and RDP. At first, some community residents of Domboshava suspected I was an agent from the GRDC who could sell-out their secrets to the local authority, while some thought I was a platform and a channel for raising their concerns to this local authority. On the other hand, some of the local government officials and civil servants took me as someone closer to the community residents with the ability to mediate on their behalf. Both the community residents and the GRDC viewed me as a panacea to their problems. In this regard, my respondents perceived my role not necessarily a researcher, but as an intervener and a problem solver capable of bringing about some form of change. I demystified these misconceptions amicably by being impartial in my conduct. I realized that respondents could be part of the complexities being studied.

The initial plan for fieldwork was to interview the stakeholders before household heads in order to confirm the district's RDP. There was change in plan after an announcement about a national election was made. Events such national elections could hamper my interviews in the villages. My respondents could easily mistake me for a political party representative. It is often difficult for community residents to trust strangers under such circumstances. I embarked on interviews in Domboshava ahead of any of my data collection activities.

My data collection involved a lot of walking within the villages. Some sections of the villages were inaccessible by car. This was a bit stressful. I also travelled to Harare, Goromonzi, and Marondera to collect data. I stayed in Domboshava for a total of three months from December 2011 to February 2012. Before leaving Zimbabwe, I had to inform the Chief's Secretary of my departure from the field.

#### **4.6 Data analysis**

Data analysis involves "the breaking up" of data into manageable themes, patterns, trends and relationships (Mouton, 2011:108); as well as making sense out of the text and images (Creswell, 2009). In my research, data analysis involved reading the stories repeatedly making sense of what my respondents narrated. The stories shed light on how people organized their everyday practices and lived experiences (Neuman, 2011). These stories were "a form by which people construct identities and locate themselves in what is happening around them" (Neuman, 2011:525). Thus, data analysis entailed search for and examination of what people said about the world that surrounded them (cf. Bryman, 2008; 2012). The stories were not only a creation of the story tellers, but were an expression of the innate relationships of the human mind in making sense of the what constituted land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2011). For example, narrations particularly from tribal household members and TLs highlighted their struggles in coming to terms with realities of losing land through land transactions, as well as adapting to a peri-urban context in a community they largely regard as rural. On the other hand, narrations from migrant household members generally expressed jubilation about access to land rights in a peri-urban community situated in the periphery of Harare the capital city.

My data analysis entailed making sense of data collected through interviews, observation and pertinent policy documents (cf. Creswell, 2009). Since a case study design is iterative in

nature, it allowed repetitive interplay between collection and analysis of data (Bryman, 2008; Creswell, 2009; Bryman, 2012). Under these circumstances, I simultaneously embarked on data collection, data analysis, and literature review while reflecting on recurring themes from theory and the research questions. Careful attention was given to the specific meanings and constructions of realities from these stories as individuals justified their action with regards access, control, and use of land under customary tenure. My focus was on highlighting differential outcomes from each of the three main variables within the social and economic dynamics of the peri-urban communal area of Domboshava in relation to the larger social, economic and political context in which the communal area is located. Thus, my analysis of data was fine-grained to illuminate and explain sociologically the different responses to changing conditions of the forty-one households as represented by the individual respondents in the study sample. Empirical findings from the four selected villages were aggregated across the villages while noting similarities and differences where relevant. In order to disaggregate and analyse the findings, consideration was given to the use social differential aspects such as gender, status or class (rich/poor, better-off/worse-off generation, tribal/migrant status of households), while land transactions were categorized as either customary or individualized.

#### 4.6.1 The unit of analysis

In my research, households are the unit of analysis. A unit of analysis provides elements that we examine in order to construct summary description of all sampled units (Babbie *et al.*, 1998; Neuman, 2011). “It refers to the ‘what’ of the study I am interested in investigating” (Mouton, 2011:51). I characterized households as the chief architects of land transactions, and as RDP end-users, whose survival strategies were likely to be impacted by the interactions between these variables.

The concepts of household, family, and household heads can be operationalized in many ways depending on what is being studied (Budlender, 2003). Thus, these terms are applied in many social contexts (including my study area) to mean different things. Several researchers depending on what they were studying thus put forward several definitions of a household, family, and household head. Not much reference is made to families in my research, however it is worthwhile to provide the distinction between families and households, and why this distinction remains important. Giddens (1999) defines a family as a group of persons directly

linked by kin connections through marriage or descent, and the adult members assume responsibility. A family also implies people that hold blood and kin relationships and often sharing a common living quarters, child rearing activities, and economic resources (Budlender, 2003). Haralambos & Holborn (2008) view a family as a basic unit for socialization of individuals. Bah *et al.* (2003) see a family as a traditional unit of production. Murdock (1949) in Haralambos & Holborn (2008: 460) defines a family as, “a social group characterized by common residence, economic cooperation and reproduction ... includes adults of both sexes, at least two of whom maintain a socially approved sexual relationship, and one or more children, own or adopted of sexually cohabiting adults”. Le Roux (1994)’s data from the Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development in Budlender (2003:60) identifies the multiplicity forms of families in South Africa, as such, a family is defined as unit of interaction determined by biological relations, constitutive of parents living with their children in a nucleated form. These definitions of a family reduce the role of families to socialization and sexual reproduction. In addition, families are viewed as comprising adults and children, yet in some families there are no children. While this definition suffices, nuclear families are far from being the norm in Domboshava as the case in South Africa (cf. Le Roux, 1994 in Budlender, 2003). Families are neither stable nor static - they keep on changing as people change partners and as children move out of family residences.

On the other hand, definitions of households are not only numerous but messy due to the implications they draw from the studies conducted (Budlender, 2003). As such, research specific definitions are worthwhile as “there is nothing to replace” current definitions of households (Budlender, 2003:70). For example, Scoones *et al.* (2009:57) define a household as “a group of people cooking from the same pot”. Rakodi (1995) defines a household as a person or a group of two or more persons who make a common provision for food or other provisions essential for survival. Chambers & Conway (1991) expand Rakodi (1995)’s definition by referring to a household as people that share the same hearth for cooking. The above definitions of households originate from livelihood and poverty assessment studies, and these definitions were conceptualized to suit such contexts. A similar definition according to the October Household Survey of 1996 in South Africa in Budlender (2003:58) describes a household as “a person or a group of people who eat together and share resources ...” Budlender (2003) also links this definition to individuals residing at a specific house. However, people that form a household are capable of belonging to more than one household,

and can share resources and dwellings in different ways. This kind of multiplicity in defining households is expected as households are always dynamic and are never homogenous (Ibid).

From these descriptions, families are subcategories of households. Both families and households are about relatedness among their members. However, the composition of family members and household members differ. While family members relate through both blood and kinship, household members may and may not be related through blood and kinship. Kinship is about biological and social relatedness (Giddens, 1989; Maxwell, 1996). For example, household members in Domboshava were often related through kinship, blood, marriage, neighbourhood, totems, social networks, and other social positions such as housemaids. As a result, families can be part of households, but households cannot be conceptualized as part of families due the diversity of members and their relatedness to the household head. What made households substantive or recognizable in Domboshava were the nature of land rights held by their members, as well as their residence at a particular physical dwelling, that is, a homestead. Household members of Domboshava were therefore identifiable through land use of designated fields and occupancy of dwellings such as homesteads, and were usually related to the head of household in one way or the other, inter alia, as a kin, spouse, child, dependent,<sup>5</sup> or simply as housemaids. In this research, I conceptualize a household as a unit of interaction made up of members (often of the same family) living together and sharing a space or a dwelling unit such as a homestead; and not necessarily a simple given unit of analysis. Conceptualization of households must capture the complexities and fluidity of migrants on the ground (Delius & Schirmer, 2001).

A homestead is a specific residential unit where households reside (Makura-Paradza, 2010). In Domboshava, homesteads were generally constitutive of physical structures such as houses, huts, kraals, water wells, fowl runs, sheds, trees, small gardens, toilets, garages, rubbish pit, and granaries. Homesteads are physical structures as well as physical assets where household members (at times comprising lodgers) under household heads reside. For example, some of the sampled household heads were not necessarily the owners of homesteads, but were lodgers looking after homesteads belonging to absentee property owners. My study sample excluded lodgers sharing the same homestead or compound with their 'landlords' since they were not in charge of those particular homesteads. Household

---

<sup>5</sup> Dependents comprise household members that are not part of the nuclear family, but are part of the household more or less on a permanent basis.

members that occupied a homestead exercised their rights to live there. Absent household members never lost their membership to live at particular homesteads. In Domboshava, several households often shared a homestead, as these defined spaces of social interaction.

In Domboshava, households were usually made up of nuclear family members, kin and in some instances dependants, housemaids, and in some instances visitors on a more or less short and long term basis. The extended household members support and offer networks to each other (Bourdillon, 1976). The household sizes in the selected villages varied from household to household, but generally, they comprised between six to eight members. This is way above an average of 4.1 persons for Goromonzi District, and 4.2 persons for Ward 4 (ZNSA, 2012:138). The composition of household members that occupied homesteads in Domboshava also varied in terms of their age and sex. In Domboshava, tendency was to count absent household members, and the dead buried at the compound or graveyard as present. This a common practice among the Shona (Bourdillon, 1976). Households therefore provided an ideal unit of analysis within which land transactions took place, perceptions to RDP were revealed, and emergent survival strategies were evident in a peri-urban context. In rural Zimbabwe, a household is a useful unit of analysis as many production, reproduction, and accumulation processes occur at this scale (Scoones *et al.*, 2009:57).

The first level of interaction in Shona societies is a household under a head of household or household head (Bourdillon, 1976; O'Flaherty, 1998). The terms head of household or household head are laden with multiple meanings depending on how they are applied in particular studies or contexts. For example, Hedman *et al.* (1996:64) in Budlender (2003:48) refers to a household head as, "the chief economic provider, the chief decision-maker ...". According to the October household survey for South Africa in 1994 -1999, "a household head can either be male or female, and is the person who assumes responsibility of the household" (Budlender, 2003:52). Within the customary law, the powers of household heads are limitless, and they are expected to act more than being care givers, adjudicators of family disputes, provide food and shelter, allocate land, and making decision on behalf of their household members (Bennett, 2008:141). In Domboshava, household heads took charge of dwellings, were the chief economic providers, and decision-makers for their members. Although this definition of household heads identified them as persons of authority, most decisions particularly on land allocation were collective. Other social structures such as tribal authorities, and institutions such as the state often limited the conditions on which the

household heads exercised their authority in land allocation. For example, household heads in Domboshava could make decisions to allocate land to their members, but in consultation with their TLs and GRDC. The levels of decision-making assumed by household heads vary from household to household, as well as across societies in different countries and regions. Household heads however remain important figures in decision-making on behalf of their members.

There are different kinds of heads of households including male heads of households, female heads of households, single heads of households, absentee heads of households (Budlender, 2003). In Domboshava, such kinds of household heads exist although in most cases they were male-headed (see Appendix A). Female household heads assumed the roles after the deaths of their husbands, and or after they divorced their husbands. Assumption of this role by females implies that women had authority to make decisions on behalf of their members, and were in charge of homesteads. However, the role of widows in making decisions particularly with regards disposal of land or renting involved consultations with their husbands' kin. This is similar to what happens in Burkina Faso where widows remain part of their husbands' households for as long as they remain unmarried (Hilhorst, 2000). Thus, the roles of women as household heads is often limited in decision-making not by their gender, but their status as married, widowed, or divorced. Budlender (2003) sees women household heads as a category of vulnerable individuals because their households are often poorer compared to those that are male-headed. This is however not universal.

In Domboshava, the situation of divorced women was difficult as they were often expected to go back to their tribal origins leaving the children and their homesteads behind. This is similar to what is experienced in Chikwaka communal area also in Goromonzi District (Makura-Paradza, 2010). In Domboshava, women that choose to stay at their matrimonial homesteads after divorce assumed the title of head of household at their husbands' compounds by alienating themselves and their children from the male head of household. Such women in Domboshava like in most rural communities of Zimbabwe retain the role of an economic provider on behalf of their children or household members, and not necessarily matters of decision-making concerning their husbands' property such as land (Ibid). Despite the fact that such divorced women took charge of their children, they never assumed primary rights to land. They remained secondary land rights holders under their divorced husbands. The situation of divorced migrant women in Domboshava was different as these women

could buy land and build homesteads, or simply rent dwellings on behalf of their household members. In such cases, divorced women assumed primary land rights, and exercised their freedom in decision-making and authority over their household members. This demonstrates that assumption of household headship by female widows and divorcees was temporary. It remained valid for only as long as they are unmarried.

In Domboshava, the household head is addressed as '*samusha*', literary meaning the 'owner of the house' - whether female or male. Domboshava is patriarchal, and therefore culturally household heads are male. The household head title traditionally belongs to the eldest male offspring as the heir to their fathers' property (usually land, the homestead, livestock, household items) regardless of their age. However, women assume that title in the absence of their male counterparts. Like in any communal areas of Zimbabwe, household members under a specific household head in Domboshava are obliged to offer support to each other particularly on livelihoods issues (Latham, 1973). In addition, household heads are responsible for transferring land rights to their members, particularly new household formations for the purposes of peasant farming, as well as building new homesteads.

Clearly, the concept of head of household in Domboshava - in its multiple form - does not only concern individuals that are primary decision-makers in matters surrounding land rights, reaction to RDP, and household survival strategies; but the context in which these decisions are made - the system of customary land tenure. I therefore conceptualize household heads as owners and authorities in charge of homesteads, as well as significant mouthpieces for their members in decision-making. These constitute males and females. Homesteads are conceptualized as tangible units used to identify substantive household heads in relation to allocation of land rights, such as, a vlei gardens, fields, or the commons. It is from the definitions of households, household heads, and homesteads that I was able to sample household heads that participated in this research while separating them from visitors. Careful consideration was made not to treat households as homogenous nor static. "Households can shift over time" (Cousins, 1990:8). For example, from migrant lodgers to migrant 'landowners'. My conceptual definitions takes into account the social organization of the people of Domboshava, which I am familiar with. Budlender (2003) identifies such background knowledge of societal values as important in conceptualizing households and household heads. It is therefore important to note that while a household is the unit of analysis, there exist different intra-household dynamics that characterize households that



participated in my study. For example, heads of households were decision-makers in their particular households; often they consulted their members on household decisions, and such decisions became a 'consensus' by the household members.

#### 4.6.2 Data analysis procedures

My data analysis involves "moving deeper into understanding ... representing data and interpret larger meaning - like peeling the layers of an onion" (Creswell, 2009:183). The process acts as a 'sieve' in processing and sorting loads of data generated through primary and secondary data sources (cf. Vincent *et al.*, 2006). My data analysis also involved discussion of the research findings, making comparisons of findings using existing cases studies in literature, demonstrating theoretical points of departure, and extracting meanings and relevance of the findings from the stories told in the context of the research problem. In doing so, I drew much from my experience in Domboshava, while strongly reflecting on LPS framework for meaning. I used the LPS framework to position the research questions against theory and the stories from my respondents (Bryman, 2008; Creswell, 2009; Bryman, 2012). Arguments from the discussion through the LPS framework are rooted in the nature of influences from land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies, viz-à-viz individual actions and the motives of community residents, as well as the intended and unintended outcomes largely regarded as processual.

In addition, my data analysis involved transcribing interviews, reading data, and making sense of these (Creswell, 2009). Transcriptions of interviews were done after fieldwork from March to April 2011. Transcribing audio narrations to written text was a real test of patience since the stories had generated a huge amount of a database - "human beings are story telling animals" (MacIntyre, 1984 in Flyvbjerg, 2011). Neuman (2011) refers to this as information overload. If I were not careful or meticulous, I could have dismissed some responses as useless or scrap. All collected data remains valid and is valuable in analysis (Ibid). I made use of ATLAS.ti - a computer aided software used to organize data in qualitative data analysis (Yin, 2011). Using software in data analysis is common in social science research in this computer age. Application of ATLAS.ti made it easier for me to analyze loads of data systematically using coded concepts, as well as to structure my analysis in a traceable process which otherwise is problematic when using the manual method (Friese, 2012). Coding concepts and grouping them shed light on the relationships among the concepts, and led to

the development of the conceptual framework (Ravitch & Riggan, 2012). However, ATLAS.ti does not analyze data by itself. Its role is to organize the data.

Each of the chapters of my research addresses the research question in a distinct way. In analyzing data, I adopted a micro level analysis of social reality (Neuman, 2011). This means making meaning of data from a local scale, that is, at household level. Findings from the four villages studied are presented and analyzed in light of the core distinctions made earlier between tribal and migrant households, gender, generational differences, and class. As such, reference is made to fifteen tribal households and twenty-six migrant households to yield more insights into these social dynamics and generalize the findings to a wider picture of Domboshava since the number of households sampled from each of the four villages were unequal. I realized that generalizing findings at village level using the small samples from each village might provide challenges in making conclusions on existing trends. As such, analysis of findings consolidates the sample into a single unit of fifteen tribal households and twenty-six migrant households.

In analyzing data, I reflected on narrations by household heads or their representatives (the stand-ins), TLs, other stakeholders, and IDs. Since in some instances household members such as daughters, mothers, and maids stood in for the head of households during the interviews, the notion of household head denotes not necessarily the head of household, but the household itself as the unit of study - since the sampling of households was based on homesteads as residential spaces where household heads and their members reside. Several respondents participated in this research while representing the head of household. Issues pertaining social identity of my respondents within the households such as the gender, education level, position, or status within the household (wife, husband, daughter, maid), economic standing, and marital status are retained in discussion of findings in my data analysis. However, I use pseudonyms to identify my respondents, and as a way of safeguarding confidentiality and anonymity in data analysis. Since village names denote territorial space covered by my research, these are retained in all discussions.

In general with exceptions, tribal household heads disposed of land while migrant household heads were the buyers of land. Stories and responses from TLs, other stakeholders, and IDs support these findings. These stories are presented as short inserts or vignettes in part or in full to illustrate the responses from various respondents - a move from standard citation from

interview data (Yin, 2011). Through the vignettes descriptions of selected cases are provided in the analysis of processes not only within the underlying land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies; but the context within which these took place and attain meaning (Flyvbjerg, 2011). Since my research adopted a mixed methods approach, numerical values illustrate general trends and enable confirmation or refutation of relationships between variables (Vincent *et al.*, 2006). Quantitative data validates empirical evidence described in cases, excerpts, vignettes, and quotes in form of text. My concluding chapter crystalizes these research findings.

#### **4.7 Ethical considerations**

During the planning phase, I sought ethical clearance from the Human Sciences (Non-Health) Research Council at Stellenbosch University. Research ethics are codes of conduct that provide guidance and define what is or is not legitimate to do when carrying out a research (Maxwell, 1996; Maxwell, 2005; Neuman, 2011). Ethical considerations were therefore part of every aspect of my research (Maxwell, 1996; 2005). Obtaining ethical clearance is a basic requirement for every researcher at Stellenbosch University as outlined in the Framework Policy for the Assurance and Promotion of Ethically Accountable Research of 2009. All researchers at Stellenbosch University have to adhere to the fundamental principles of research, and these are integrity, respect, non-maleficence, responsibility, scientific validity and peer review, academic freedom, and dissemination of research results (Stellenbosch University, 2009).

Observing research ethics is an integral component of any research (Babbie *et al.*, 1998; Creswell, 2009; Neuman, 2011; Somekh & Lewin, 2011). It goes beyond setting guidelines (Creswell, 2009). Apart from institutional guidelines from Stellenbosch University, I observed procedures of the Shona culture. Such an approach to ethical considerations was important in sticking to the set norms and values of the Domboshava community. Throughout the research process, substantial recognition was given to confidentiality and anonymity of the research participants, as well as their responses. During data collection, I requested consent from each of the respondents before their participation in this research. Confidentiality was assured in each case. However, I feel that all stories were told because participants entrusted me with their most valued and guarded secrets. All respondents who participated in my research were fully aware of the nature and purpose of this research. All

interviews were conducted in a collegial and relaxed manner. All my research files were kept under passwords.

#### **4.8 Tying up the loose ends**

After my stay in Domboshava, I made a repeat field visit to Domboshava to validate and to triangulate my findings. This was important in tracking patterns of events (cf. Alasuutari *et al.*, 2009). I went to Domboshava at the beginning of December 2012 until the end January 2013. The purpose of this visit was to make checks and balances on emerging trends in the communal area. Five more households were interviewed in Zimbiru Village. I paid a courtesy visit to one VH from the four participating villages. The discussion was less 'formal'. I wanted to gain insights on possible changes witnessed in the communal area since my last visit in February 2012. I also carried out a brief conversation with some local government officials. The purpose of this visit was to check on any likely changes to RDP since the national elections were announced. During this exercise, the Director of Rural Local Authorities, three land use planners at ministry level and one land use planner at provincial level were interviewed. They confirmed the political nature of land transactions and RDP, as well as the nonexistence of an RDP document for Domboshava. I also observed that land transactions were still going on in Domboshava.

#### **4.9 Conclusion**

This chapter sets forth the research path travelled throughout the data collection process. The period stretches back to my initial stay at Stellenbosch University to the final write up of this thesis. Primary and secondary data sources comprised interviews, observation, and document analysis. I used the language of the people of Domboshava (Shona), as well as English in collecting data (see Appendix A). It would have been very difficult for someone who does not speak Shona or understand the Shona culture to undertake this research in Domboshava - a linguistic and cultural context that I am familiar with. Without those two, it would have been very difficult to analyze the stories from interviews too. Since a case study design was adopted in this research, generalizability of findings to other peri-urban communal areas is often limited. Drawing learning experiences from these findings to other households and villages in Domboshava, as well as other peri-urban communal areas is however possible because what is happening in Domboshava is not new. Other households, villages, and peri-

urban areas of Zimbabwe are experiencing similar situations. I faced challenges concerning coming up with a representative sample as earlier planned. Accordingly, to compensate for a less than representative quantitative sample, I assigned voice - through direct quotations - to my respondents to illustrate individual perspectives rather than generalized opinions (see footnote 5 under section 5.2 in Chapter 5). Various respondents speak directly from interviews in the four substantive chapters that follow on this chapter - Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8.

CODESRIA - LIBRARY

## Chapter 5 Dynamics of land transactions in Domboshava

### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses my first research question, namely: What are the dynamics of land transactions in the peri-urban communal area of Domboshava from 2002 to 2012? My focus is to highlight the extent to which agents observed rules that were supposed to hold insofar as land transactions were concerned, reveal the kinds of land transactions, determine why these land transactions took place, and highlight the ways used to negotiate land rights in this communal area. The assumption was that there were customary set of rules on accessing land rights under the system customary land tenure, and these operated separately for tribal members and migrants in Domboshava. Thus, I seek to reveal the extent to which resident households that were materially better-off entered into land transactions to their additional benefit thereby promoting a process of increasing class division, and how this was evident in terms of gender, generation, and class. I apply the LPS framework in my analysis focusing on the influence of RDP and household survival strategies on land transactions and not the other way round (see Figure 5.1 below).




Figure 5.1: Influence of RDP and household survival strategies on land transactions  
Source: Field data, (2012).

Reference is made to the 2002 to 2012 census decade - the scope of my study. My research took place in four villages of Domboshava - Zimbiru, Mungate, Murape, and Chogugudza. The findings from each of these villages are aggregated. In some instances, inferences are made to individual villages because the geographical location of these villages from the border with Harare is an influential factor with regards the practice of land transactions in this peri-urban communal area. The second section of this chapter provides a brief description of households in Domboshava followed by a categorization of land transactions in the third section. The fourth section provides a detailed description of land transactions during 2002

and 2012. In order to characterize these land transactions, attention was paid to land transactions that took place before 2002. The fifth section highlights the reasons for land transactions, explains the behaviour and motives of the community residents of Domboshava, and reveals the influence of RDP and household survival strategies on land transactions. The sixth section details the various strategies used by community residents to access land in Domboshava.

## 5.2 Description of households, and land users in Domboshava

Two important kinds of households were identified in Domboshava. These are *tribal* and *migrant* households. The tribal/migrant distinction accounts for the social differences and existing power relations on land rights among residents of Domboshava. For example, migrant households comprised urban professionals and non-professionals, ex-farmworkers, victims of displacement, and households who were tribal members elsewhere from distant rural areas that sought cheaper residential options in Domboshava. Whereas, tribal members comprised the original inhabitants of Domboshava. In Domboshava, migrants are referred to as '*vatorwa*' in vernacular Shona meaning sojourners. This situation is common in most rural communities of Zimbabwe (Cousins, 1990). In communal areas, '*vatorwa*' are legitimate migrants or sojourners that are not related to tribal members in any way, but are offered access rights to land and other common property resources on compassionate grounds (Holleman, 1952; Bullock, 1972; Bourdillon, 1976). Cousins (1990), states that migrants access land rights in communal areas by petitioning those in authority and pleading need, and are subject to observing local tradition and culture. Similarly, in Kenya migrants referred to as '*ahoi*' beg for land to settle through land transactions (Berry, 1992). Similar practices were witnessed in Ghana, Malawi, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Botswana, (Peters, 1994; 2004; 2007; Claassens, 2008; Wehrmann, 2008; Berry, 2011). Allocation of land rights to migrants under customary land tenure is thus not a new practice. In Zimbabwe, the practice can be traced back to the pre-colonial and colonial periods (Holleman, 1952; Bullock, 1972; Bourdillon, 1976; Cheater, 1990; Cousins, 1990; see section 3.2 in Chapter 3). Most communities have ways of assigning land rights to migrants (Tsikata & Whitehead, 2003). These vary in space and time.

In Domboshava, customary land transactions are moral obligations of community residents to extend help to people in difficult situations, and are acceptable to some extent as revealed by

Marylyn<sup>6</sup> the Ward Councillor (WC) for Domboshava when she said, “*we are all Zimbabweans*”. However, Tribal Leaders (TLs) such as Village Heads (VH) Nango of Domboshava believed that ‘*vatorwa*’ must never outnumber tribal members, and must remain an insignificant minority for security reasons. According to VH Nango, migrants must occupy little space, remain powerless, and exercise loyalty to tribal authority. An increased number of the migrant population was therefore perceived as a security threat to tribal authority. While tribal household members were people who belonged to Domboshava by tribal origin, migrant household members came from elsewhere during their lifetime to access land in Domboshava. Migrants’ homelands commonly referred to as ‘*kumusha*’ in vernacular Shona, were outside Domboshava. Migrants in Domboshava came from places such as Bulawayo, Harare, Mtorashanga, Mutare, Mount Darwin, Rushinga, Chipinge, Rusape, Mtoko, Masvingo, Mazoe, Kwekwe, Chimanmani, Chivhu, Uzumba, Mberengwa, Inyanga, Hwange, and Beitbridge among others (see Appendix B). The migration history of migrants, and their last moves differ. Some migrated from their homelands, rented houses in Domboshava, and later bought land to gain permanency in this communal area.

Traditional Leaders of Domboshava expressed concern that the ‘*vatorwa*’ of Domboshava were beyond the acceptable ideals of the Shona culture. Village Heads Karri and Nango said that, “*vanhu ava vakawandisa*” - meaning ‘those people are too many’. Community residents, Informal Discussants (IDs), other stakeholders, and TLs also confirmed these findings. This is similar to the case of Ferlo in Senegal where migrants outnumbered the locals leading to conflict (Berry, 2002). In Domboshava, the emergence of social identities as well as social differentiation patterns through the tribal/migrant distinction were apparent as migrants were referred to as ‘*vanhu ava*’ or ‘*those people*’. These new identities did not only distinguish tribal members from migrants, but also rights and claims to land between tribal members that regarded themselves as historically the ‘owners’ of land and the community as opposed to migrants they referred to as strangers because originally they belonged to some other places and not Domboshava. On the other hand, migrants referred to tribal members as ‘*vana vemuno*’ meaning ‘children from this locality’. Emergent differences from these identities were rather based on tribal origins of people as well as autochthonous claims to land. The new forms of identities also entail name-calling and demeaning of migrants by tribal

---

<sup>6</sup>Pseudonyms identify and ensure anonymity of the respondents. Italicized sentences represent direct quotes from respondents. Boxes give interview cases in part or in full. In some instances, the findings in Boxes provide summarized evidence. Details on all the respondents in terms of their original villages and date of interviews are given in Appendix A.



members. While identities are about fitting in and belonging (Puttergill, 2003; Gervais-Lambony, 2006), in Domboshava identities were rather disruptive as migrants were viewed as ‘insignificant others’. Migrants therefore formed a distinct category of community residents separate from those with autochthons tribal and customary land rights. The tribal/migrant distinction sets forth the class differences among community residents as land rights holders vs. the land seekers, as well as the locals vs. sojourners. However, substantial class differences exist within the tribal/migrant categories in terms of the rich/poor dialectics.

Migrant households were the dominant group, and constituted more than half the number of households in Domboshava (see Table 3.1 in Chapter 3). These dynamics in population distribution in Domboshava suggest a future domination of migrants and likely shifts in customary land rights in this communal area. The disaggregated population of tribal/migrant children also shows that migrant households had more children than tribal households. Children from tribal households constitute only a quarter of the total number of children from the sampled households. These dynamics point to new births, as well as patterns of movement of migrants accompanied by their children to this communal area. These findings signal possible future demands for land rights under customary land tenure as children grow old, marry, and establish their homesteads in Domboshava. The population from the sampled villages is dominated with a generation gap where on average there is more young people among migrants, and older people within tribal households. Similar trends were also observed in Masvingo (see Scoones *et al.*, 2010).

Other categories of people within the tribal and migrant households in Domboshava were lodgers, dependents, and visitors. These categories of people did not ‘hold’ customary land rights, but lived at and shared homesteads with substantive households in this communal area. Lodgers, dependents, and visitors remain significant indicators to population movement into this communal area as they often chose to settle permanently at later stages (see Appendix B). In Masvingo for example, “some of the relatives originally came on social visits, such as extending condolences following death in a family, while others had come to take care of an ill person. In the end, the social visits were transformed into permanent moves” (Scoones *et al.*, 2010:73). In Domboshava, visitors sought to extend such social networks among their tribal and migrant relatives. In some instances, the visits also shifted to permanent settlement.

The education levels among tribals and migrants show that community residents of Domboshava were relatively literate. The literacy rate for Goromonzi District is 97% (ZNSA Mashonaland East Census Report, 2012:67). Children as young as four years attend preschool or Grade 0 at the local primary schools. Most children that attend primary schools were aged between four and fourteen years, whereas those in secondary school were aged between fourteen and nineteen years. Some children took longer to complete their secondary education due to failure to acquire the minimum passes of five Ordinary Level subjects (Grade 11) with a Grade C or better. As a result, they repeat classes until they acquire the minimum number of subjects required to proceed to tertiary or university education. The educated members of society are often regarded as better-off compared to the uneducated (Thebe, 2010). The education status of individuals within the tribal and migrant categories usually point to possession of knowledge on legal provisions on land rights as represented in statutes on land and settlement. Description of household characteristics shed light on emerging differential patterns on social relationships, interests in access to land rights, and class differences. In Domboshava, different categories of community residents expressed different interests in land issues, whereas the local authority, Goromonzi Rural District Council (GRDC) focused on land administration (see Table 5.1 below).

Table 5.1: Land interests in Domboshava

<b>Tribal members</b>	Men, women, widows, divorcees, children, youths, retrenched	Land for peasant farming, belonging, identity, residential, social security, small business enterprises, inheritance
<b>Migrants</b>	Men, women, widows, divorcees, children, youths, retrenched, victims of displacement	Residential space, small business enterprises, social security, land for investments, inheritance, belonging
<b>GRDC</b>	The local authority on behalf of the state	Land levy, land for urban development, peri-urban expansion,

Source: Developed from Moyo (2009:43).

The perceived land interests in Table 5.1 above shaped the behaviour of community residents and GRDC concerning their participation in land transactions. For example, the tribal members were mostly interested in their lived experiences with particular land parcels, survival, and belonging as highlighted by VH Beta when he said, *"Our roots are in this land. Our ancestors are buried here. We do not have anywhere we call home. We lived here the whole of our lives"*. Migrants' interests focused mainly on residential, investment, and survival goals. On the other hand, GRDC's interests in land were on land administration and settlement planning. Thus, land in Domboshava has been subject to multiple land uses and users, as well as different interests and claims (cf. Razavi, 2003). Community residents of Domboshava had

the right to use land for cultivation, residential, as well as grazing without owning the land. However, in their minds, they owned these land rights through their relationship with particular land parcels, and not necessarily what statutes on land and settlement provide. Yet, according to GRDC, all land belongs to the state through statutes on land and settlement. Collectives such as tribes and Chiefdoms ‘own’ land on behalf of the state (Bromley & Cernea, 1991).

The power relations among the categories of people and institutions in Domboshava enable them to initiate action on land transactions for various purposes. As agents, community residents could not change the procedures on land transactions under the system of customary land tenure at will. Yet, if these procedures are to survive, they need to be used and reproduced over time and space. For example, Danai and Tino from Zimbiru Village said, *“We were aware that the Chief was objecting to land sales in this communal area. Nonetheless, we went ahead and bought this piece of land. We informed the Headman and the VH. We did not go to the Council. The VH and the Headman will sort that out. Since we did not have a chicken or a goat, we used money to facilitate and to pay for the procedures, and the land. We used our friends and the son of the VH as witnesses. When the land deal was sealed, there were no objections”*. Various agents invented and accepted new ways of transacting land in Domboshava, while they abandoned practices they regarded as obsolete and cumbersome under customary land tenure. The structure that accords access to land rights shapes the behaviour of the community residents, while reproducing the structure at the same time. A landowner once stated that, “If tradition no longer brings prosperity and happiness, it should go” (Cheater, 1984:174 in Cheater, 1990:196). Such ‘invented traditions’ become realities through which the status quo can be animated (Ranger, 2000). Clearly, situated encounters within social systems result in the reproduction of the social systems themselves as well as the structure leading to transformation into new forms while the system continue to exist (Jackson & Hogg, 2010).

### **5.3 Customary vs. individualized land transactions in Domboshava**

The practice of land transactions in Zimbabwe involves complex procedures and stakeholders. It accounts for multistage consultations between land seekers and TLs, as well as with the local authority. The procedures are grounded on colonial principles that regarded TLs and local authorities as custodians of land under customary land tenure (Andersson, 1999; Alexander, 2006; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Cases that were recorded during

fieldwork are however not necessarily typical but provide examples of these power relations and dynamics in Domboshava. This is similar to what happens in Ghana where TLs such as Chiefs are legally consulted and have the prerogative on matters of custom and tradition particularly on land exchanges in whatever form (Berry, 2011).

In order to come up with the distinct categories of land transactions in Domboshava, I developed two variables for analysis, and these are land use and customary land tenure. I categorized land use as arable, residential, and grazing. I distinguished land tenure as customary and non-customary. From the LPS framework, the customary land tenure system constitutes the structure, as well as a social system on obtaining land rights in Domboshava. The structure sets the rules and procedures that should guide individuals' action in land transactions. "Structures direct social systems to perform what they have to perform" (Giddens, 1984:18). The system of customary land tenure constitutes both the structure in its own right, as well as land transactions themselves, and these are dialectically constituted. In Domboshava like in most of Zimbabwe's communal lands, rules and procedures on customary land tenure are unwritten. However, the rules and procedures are recognized in statutes on land and settlement, as well as through tradition and values of tribal members even in their oral form. The system of customary land tenure is inherently processual. I refer to land transactions that were practised within the system of customary land tenure as *customary*, and the non-customary ones as *individualized*. Within these two distinct categories, a range of land transactions are described in terms of typologies undertaken in Domboshava. In addition, the tensions within the system of customary land tenure, contrasting practices, and competing sources of legitimation are also described using qualitative data from fieldwork. These categories are designed to draw attention and reflect on the profound and rapid social transformations inherent in this peri-urban communal area. However, I did not contrast the different versions of customary land tenure since my focus is on the practice and the nature of these land transactions in their customary or individualized form (see section 2.2.2 in Chapter 2). The dynamics of both individualized and customary land transactions in Domboshava are examined within the 2002 to 2012 census decade.

Land transactions within customary tenure in Domboshava comprise inheritance. This entails non-monetary land exchanges based on the tradition of the Shona culture. The practice of inheritance in Domboshava did not necessarily focus on the distribution of land and property rights during the afterlife of the original owners, but individuals distributed these in person

while they were still surviving. Village Heads and tribal members viewed inheritance as a way of bequeathing land rights, homesteads, and other household property before and after the death of the property owner. Inheritance was also a way of catering for new household formations. It involved passage of land rights and other physical assets without disposing of the pieces of land. For example, Eve, an old widow from Chogugudza Village had eight children and four of them died. She inherited land and a homestead from her husband. Eve gave her children part of her land to establish their homesteads. When four of her children died, Eve redistributed their land among their children and widows. Eve said, *"I gave the fields to my children so that they could build their homesteads. When four of them died, I redistributed their land to their children - my grandchildren. I used to have a garden, but I gave it to one of my children as part of his inheritance five years ago. I am left with this yard. It is better to give them their inheritance now. I decided to do it personally. I never sold anything, subdivide, nor rent any of my land. We cannot sell land because land does not expand. It is better to pass my land to my children and grandchildren so that they look after their own generations in future"*. Inheritors of property rights within the culture of the Shona have the prerogative to redistribute the property to their kin (Bourdillon, 1976). In Domboshava, land and other property rights are passed generationally to one's descendants. However, the concept of inheritance has since acquired different meanings and patterns within this peri-urban communal area. There are shifts from the original principles that follow a single generation (lateral) and from father to son (lineal) (Bourdillon, 1976:44). In Domboshava, decisions to pass land are done at household level sometimes without consulting other patrikin or TLs. In addition, the property owner is in charge of the process, as opposed to what happens after their death.

The approach to inheritance by tribal members of Domboshava was a response to changing dynamics on access to land rights in this communal area regardless of the living status of the owners of property. It also demonstrates how individual rights can be accommodated within the system of customary land tenure. By altering inheritance procedures, tribal members sought to avoid disputes often associated with inheritance of land rights among kin. Box 5.1 below highlights a court session I attended in Domboshava in 2012. The case typifies an inheritance dispute between tribal and migrant household members from Domboshava, and the rationale behind preference by most tribal members to distribute land rights during their lifetime as opposed to afterlife procedures. Land disputes between tribal members, between migrants, as well as between tribals and migrants are common in Domboshava.



**Box 5.1: An example of an inheritance dispute**

Mr and Mrs D from Domboshava had five acres of land. When Mr D died, Mrs D was left to look after a family of six minors. Sometime back in 1998, Mrs D sold part of the family land to Mr and Mrs C of Harare to supplement livelihoods for the orphaned children. This deal mainly involved Mrs D and Mr C. It was a verbal agreement. In the course of time, Mrs D and Mr C died. Mr and Mrs D's children were claiming 'their' land from Mrs C. "It is part of our inheritance. We need land to sustain our children. Our land was mistakenly sold to a stranger by our mother," they claimed. Mrs C was requested by the traditional court to return the transacted land to the D family since she was a stranger in Domboshava. Mrs C refused insisting that she was no longer a stranger because she stayed in Domboshava since 1998. In addition, Mrs C said she was a Zimbabwean, a "daughter of the soil", and was equally entitled to the land as a Zimbabwean. "I will not surrender my children's inheritance ... ask my husband. He is the one who bought the piece of land. Where do you want me and my children to go now", said Mrs C. The Chief was not aware of this land transaction. The Chief then said, "Land transactions are eating away our pastures. One of the VHs is already selling land which we set aside for a grave yard." The land under dispute was divided into two pieces for Mrs D's children and Mrs C.

Source: Field data, (2012).

Land disputes in Domboshava were not only about inheritance, but took different forms such as boundary disputes, and multiple claims on a single land parcel. In most cases, children were the most affected by the disputes because they were powerless to challenge their elders. Due to their age, children were also unable to trace generational land holding patterns of their households, and often lacked concrete evidence that surrounds the negotiations entered by their elders during the land transactions in question. Traditional Leaders and other community elders are critical sources of knowledge on generational land rights during inheritance disputes. From the perspective of migrants, inheritance to land rights under customary land tenure was definable through citizenship or national membership and not necessarily tribal status.

On the other hand, land transactions outside customary tenure in Domboshava comprised direct land sales and renting. These involved granting land rights to migrants through monetary exchanges within the system of customary land tenure (cf. Nyambara, 2001; Owusu, 2008; Wehrmann, 2008; Benjaminsen & Sjaastad, 2010; Kojo, 2010). In state sanctioned programs such as the FTLRP, land transactions such as land borrowing, leasing, selling, and renting are regarded as putting underutilized land to productive use as life is breathed into idle land (Scoones *et al.*, 2010; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Through individualized land transactions, tribal members of Domboshava transferred their bundles of land rights to migrants in part or in full. In my study, land grabs constitute another category of individualized land transactions. Land grabs involve seizing other households' land parcels without their consent for personal gain. Thus, individualized land transactions present the commodification of land and adaptations of these within the system of customary land tenure

through agency. This modifies the system of customary land tenure beyond inheritance alone, and demonstrates that the system of customary land tenure is dynamic.

Both customary and individualized land transactions are relevant in this research because they determine compliance or non-compliance with the structure that defines customary land tenure. The structure on land transactions is not meant to constraint people's behaviour, but to enable them to enjoy access to customary land rights, as well as excluding others. The land laws and tradition on customary land tenure appear as external from the community residents, but are part of the social system that characterize the behavior of community residents, as well as the peri-urban nature of this communal area. These provide the structural conditions that obstruct or facilitate agents' action in allocation of land rights to migrants under the system of customary land tenure (cf. Scott, 2011). Community residents and TLs of Domboshava together with the local authority were expected to up-hold the procedures on land transactions. Since societies are not unified collections (Giddens, 1984:24), contradictions and deviations from the set procedures are inevitable. In Domboshava, this often led to conflict. Below are Box 5.2 and Box 5.3 that highlight expectations on procedures on land transactions how these were experienced in Domboshava. Through land transactions, migrants acquire indisputable rights to land and can exclude others, but cannot sell those rights because they are inalienable (Holleman; 1952; Bullock, 1972; Bourdillon, 1976). If migrants decide to leave the communal area, 'their' land reverts to the communal pool for redistribution (Ibid).

Box 5.2: Expectations from TLs

VH Honor was aware of the land transactions in Domboshava. He was aware that the Chief did not approve the practice of monetized land transactions. "The reasons behind monetized land transactions are that people want money, and the GRDC wants to turn the communal area into a location. As VHS, we only mediate land transactions involving our children and their parents (inheritance) although some people are selling land to migrants. Most households have lodgers that rent houses. It is possible to transact land under customary tenure. The procedure involves processing of transfers and changing of the national registration. The VHS mediate among the migrants, the Chief, and the Headmen. Buyers and sellers of land are not following correct procedures. They only alert the VH after their deals turn sour. Buyers are often referred to as relatives or in-laws of the sellers, or any form of a forged relationship. You can tell they are migrants from their accent and national registration numbers. In most cases, migrants are introduced to the VHS after construction of residential structures. The VHS do not have power to order demolition of built structures. We just endorse migrants' stay by requesting a chicken (*huku yaSabhuku*), two goats, US\$20.00, and two meters of white cloth (*kupetera*) for the Chief and the Headmen" (VH Honor, Domboshava, 2012).

Source: Field data, (2012).

## Box 5.3: Expectations from GRDC

“The GRDC administers plans and policies. If one wants to settle as a local or migrant they need to be cleared by the Veterinary Department, AGRITEX, the WC, the Headman, the VH, and their current RDC. Letters of reference from these people are forwarded to the new RDC. When migrants enter a new district, e.g. Goromonzi they go to the respective VH and liaise with him to find out if there is space. The AGRITEX team has to ascertain this because they are responsible for pegging fields. The AGRITEX and WCs see to it that the identified piece of land is meant for settlement and not pastures. With the reference letters, migrants fill in the inter-district or the inter-ward transfer at the new RDC. Our role is to make sure that such people are not settled on streams or pastures. The migrants are issued with an inter-district transfer which they take to the DA. The process involves changing one’s identity number. Their names would be entered in the migrants’ register. That’s what is guiding us in settling people. This process is not being followed that’s why the migrants are deemed illegal” (Fah, GRDC, 2012).

Source: Field data, (2012).

Although the practice of land transactions can be traced to the early years of colonial rule, from Boxes 5.2 and 5.3, the procedures have since been reproduced in space and time. These involve passage of land rights to tribal members, and to outsiders largely regarded as migrants. Offering land to migrants under the system of customary land tenure is permissible to some extent as highlighted by VH Honor when he said, “*It is possible to transact land under customary tenure*”.

In Domboshava, VH Tenzana revealed that the gesture of extending compassion to migrants by giving them land ought to occur at an open gathering usually at the Chief’s Council, with other tribal members as witnesses. During the ritual, land seekers are expected to bring their gifts to TLs as tokens of appreciation. Gifts could be in the form of money, a hoe, or a chicken. Rich land seekers can offer goats or cows. With poor land seekers, even sticks suffice. However, the poor are still expected to bring something of value to the Chief at their convenience in future. It is therefore the symbolic relevance behind the rituals in terms of submission to tribal authority that counts, and not necessarily the value of the gifts offered by migrant land seekers. Rituals on land transactions are important in consulting the living, and the ancestors on the tribal decision to allocate land to land seekers (Bourdillon, 1976; Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2006). Thus, land transactions emerge as “social relations within changing land tenure regimes” (Cousins, 1990:10). In some cases, the negotiations are lengthy (Berry, 1992). However, these procedures on land transactions have undergone profound change over the years. For example, migrants of Domboshava no longer brew beer, as was the practice in some communal areas of Zimbabwe during the colonial period (see Holleman, 1952). It is probable because in the ‘old days’ land transactions were meant to provide additional land for farming which was much larger compared to current land



transactions that involve smaller residential land parcels. Faster and less cumbersome ways of paying tribute to TLs are invented along the way, and these vary in space and time.

It is mandatory to fulfil obligations from the statutes on land and settlement through official registration at GRDC as highlighted by Fah (see Box 5.3 above). The process is however disjointed and fragmented. In Domboshava, this involves intensive and multi-stage consultations with government departments whose principal tasks are largely not related to land and settlement. Thus, traditional and statutory procedures run parallel, and are not explicit not only on how the procedures should complement each other, but also on who should allocate land. The systems rather compete. Traditional Leaders of Domboshava emphasize matters that empower them to allocate land rights to migrants under customary land tenure, and not what statutes on land and settlement provide. Yet, RDCs legally set the procedures on land allocation to migrants under customary land tenure. Competition on power to allocate land under customary tenure in Domboshava was clearly visible, although the role of TLs was obscured by the power of the state through statutes. Tribal members viewed land transactions as their right to dispose of 'their' land to migrant land seekers. This demonstrates the nested layers within the procedures of allocating land to migrants, and the system of land tenure itself in this communal area (cf. Cousins, 2000; Cousins, 2007; Cousins, 2008b; Sjaastad & Cousins, 2008).

Most land transactions in Domboshava were individualized because they did not observe the full procedures as required by the TLs and the GRDC. Migrant land seekers chose rather to fulfil traditional requirements - a shorter route to accessing land while avoiding bureaucratic GRDC procedures. This also emerged as an opportunity for TLs to exercise their power and total control over land allocation. In the end, tribal and migrants together with TLs went beyond the institutions and rules on land allocation in this communal area. Clearly, the system of customary land tenure is not only about the actual practices carried out by the individual actors within the customary land law, but rather are official, codified and flexible set of norms as specified in the TLA Chapter 29:17 of 2001. The actions of TLs rather demonstrate contingency and individual interpretation of the practice of land transactions within the realms of the codified laws. This also reveals the capacity of community residents to transform their social world through their individual action for personal gain (cf. Giddens, 1984). Community residents and TLs of Domboshava as knowledgeable agents were aware of individualized and customary land transactions, and were conscious about the illegitimacy

of the practice as revealed by VH Karri when he said, *“As a VH, I am aware of the monetized land transactions taking place in this village. Everyone is aware of these land exchanges”*.

#### **5.4 Land transactions in Domboshava before 2002, and during 2002 to 2012**

In this section, I present the kinds of land transactions that were witnessed in the four villages, and demonstrate compliance or non-compliance with institutions of customary land tenure. Table 5.2 below identifies land transactions that took place before 2002 and during the decade of 2002 to 2012 - the scope of my study. Although the period before 2002 sounds vague regarding the temporal reach of data on how far back in time before 2002, this timeline remains important in understanding the current trends on land transactions, as well as their persistence. The present is a product of the past, and a reflection on the past is vital for us to understand the present (Peters, 2004). This timeline is also critical in capturing debates on the events within the 2002-2012 decade often referred to as the global decade of crisis. Since land transactions were some form of purposeful behaviour, my respondents recalled their action. In some cases, the land transactions were written on paper. Although such documents remained unofficial, they enabled my respondents to recall their action on land transactions. Retrospective analysis of trends allows for understanding of different stories on land transactions, and provides clearer expositions on the dynamics over the 2002 - 2012 decade.

Customary land transactions were classified as inheritance. In my analysis, a distinction was drawn between the husband's inheritance and the wife's inheritance after the death of the husband. I counted such land transactions as two. Individualized land transactions were classified as direct land sales, renting, and land grabs (see Table 5.2 below). Each kind of land transaction was categorized as with or without a homestead since homesteads were significant assets key to identifying households as substantive in Domboshava. Trends on land transactions in Table 5.2 below indicate that out of seventy-seven land transactions, twenty-nine, about a third, took place before 2002, and the rest during the period 2002 to 2012. Of the seventy-seven land transactions, only twenty-four were customary, whereas fifty-three were individualized. Of the twenty-four customary land transactions, seventeen occurred before 2002 and only seven occurred during the 2002 to 2012 period. On the other hand, of the fifty-three individualized land transactions, twelve took place before 2002, whilst forty-one occurred during the 2002 to 2012 period. These trends demonstrate prevalence of the individualized compared to the customary categories particularly during the 2002 to 2012

period. It is evident that customary land transactions were on the decrease during the 2002 to 2012 period compared to the period before. That being the case, I examined the action of both tribal and migrant household members as they exchanged land rights within the system of customary land tenure. In my analysis, I demonstrate whether the land transactions took place with or without conflict, and whether there were objections or not.

Table 5.2: Categories of customary and individualized land transactions in Domboshava

Categories of land transactions		Before 2002	Between 2002 and 2012	Total
<b>Customary land transactions</b>				
<b>Inheritance</b>	With a homestead	5	2	7
	Without a homestead	12	5	17
<b>Individualized land transactions</b>				
<b>Direct land sales</b>	With a homestead	1	0	1
	Without a homestead	6	28	34
<b>Renting</b>	With a homestead	2	7	9
	Without a homestead	0	2	2
<b>Land grabs</b>	With a homestead	0	0	0
	Without a homestead	3	4	7
<b>Total</b>		29	48	77

Source: Field data, (2012).

Since only forty-one households participated in this research and seventy-seven land transactions were recorded in total, it shows that some household members (both tribal and migrant) were involved in compound land transactions. These involved subdivisions of original plots, or multiple land transactions by a single household. For example, after buying land from tribal members, migrants often sold what they considered as ‘excess land’ usually for fundraising towards the construction of residential structures or for survival more generally. Some migrants sold their land after obtaining land elsewhere, for example, in Harare as revealed by Danai and Tino of Zimbirur Village when they pointed out that, *“Someone bought this land and he sold it to us. We changed the names and ‘ownership’ status of the land. The seller is from Epworth in Harare. He bought this land in 1993. This land used to be a field and partly pastures. He sold it to us because the soils are weak to produce crops. The deal was facilitated by the seller and the initial owner of the field. So, there is buyer number one and we are buyer number two. We involved witnesses”*. In Domboshava, compound land transactions involve selling of a single piece of land several times to unsuspecting buyers leading to conflict, as well as the exposure of the individualized land transactions to TLs. Compound land transactions also involve passage of land to more than one generation as the case of Eve in Section 5.3. Compound land transactions are not

new in land debates of Zimbabwe as these are also common in the FTLRP (Marongwe, 2008; Matondi & Dekker, 2011).



#### 5.4.1 Inheritance

From Table 5.2 above, five customary land transactions were conducted with a homestead before 2002, and two during the 2002 to 2012 period. This shows a decrease in the practice of inheritance with a homestead. Twelve cases of inheritance without homesteads before 2002, and five such cases during the 2002 to 2012 period were recorded. In some cases, tribal women inherited land and homesteads after the deaths of their husbands. This does not only indicate diminishing trends on inheritance, but shifts from inheritance with homesteads to without homesteads. Through inheritance, tribal members were able not only to take care of the land needs of new household formations, but also to distribute their land rights under customary tenure in person to their tribal descendants. New household formations that inherit land are expected to move away from the main homestead, and to construct their own dwellings on inherited land, which in most cases is arable. Although there is an increase in inheritance with homesteads after 2002, the practice remains minimal compared to individualized categories. The increase emanates from considering an initial inheritance by husbands at marriage, as well as widows' inheritance.

While inheritance was regarded a common practice among tribal households, migrants that acquire land rights also assume the right not only to pass their land rights to migrant descendants through inheritance despite the individualized motive behind their land transactions, but also to sell or rent such land. In the minds of migrant households, migrant descendants had the right to inherit communal land in Domboshava. Yet, under the system of customary land tenure migrants can only assume use rights. For example, Tino and Danai expected their children to inherit their land and homestead in Domboshava. Tonya a migrant from Mungate Village also said, *"When we bought this land we wanted to have our own plot and to prepare a future and inheritance for our children"*. These circumstances present a source of conflict as land transactions within the system of customary land tenure remain a prerogative of TLs and tribal members. Not only is there a conflict between the TLs and the statutes of land and settlement, but a conflict concerning migrants' inheritance of tribal land. Migrants assumed that they could in traditional terms and not in legal terms can pass on land as inheritance to their descendants through customary land transactions. Some tribal members of Domboshava

practiced inheritance and delayed bequeathing land and other property rights to their descendants as a way of safeguarding land rights against individualized land transactions. For example, Tumai a tribal member from Mungate Village said, *"My husband got this land from his parents. He must pass it on to his children like that. He must not to sell the land. When our son gets married, we will give him a piece of land as his inheritance to establish himself. If he gets the land early, he may sell it"*. Inheritance remains an important institution that ensures passage of land rights to household members, as well as securing these rights at the same time. Thus, inheritance has acquired different meanings for tribal members and migrants in Domboshava.

#### 5.4.2 Direct land sales

Thirty-five direct land sales were recorded (see Table 5.2 above). These comprise land sales with and without homesteads. My findings reveal one case of a direct land sale with a homestead before 2002. However, no such cases were recorded during the 2002 to 2012 period. This case remains exceptional and an important pointer to the realities of selling land and homesteads in this communal area. What is important in this case is not only the nature of the land transaction itself, but the timing as well since before 2002 most land transactions observed customary practice. This exception shows not only the existence of non-traditional land transactions, but also the extent and nature of deviance embedded in the individualized land sales. Of the thirty-five direct land sales, thirty-four took place without homesteads. Of these thirty-four, only six took place before 2002 while the rest occurred during the 2002 to 2012 period. These trends demonstrate an increase in direct land sales during the 2002 to 2012 period compared to the period before. Direct land sales were more in Zimbiru Village particularly during the 2002 to 2012 period compared to the other villages. For example, in Chogugudza Village a single case of a direct land sale without a homestead occurred before 2002. Cases of direct land sales were minimal in Chogugudza Village because the VH did not approve the practice. This shows that even under sanctions tribal members were capable of breaking rules that regulate land transactions through agency if they so wish. Community residents of Domboshava were not trapped by the structure that regulates access to customary land rights since they used agency to escape the set rules. Tribal members were thus not constricted by the rules of customary tenure, but were capable of moving beyond these sanctions without abandoning the system completely. Clearly, structures limit behaviour, but within these limit agents are capable of acting freely (Giddens, 1984; 1987; 1989). In any case, "the social structures that we live within, and which can confront us as both external

constraints and facilitating conditions almost always either have agents within them and/or are the product of the past practices of the agents; and agents for their part, have social structures within them..." (Stones, 2005:90). The case of a direct land sale in Chogugudza Village however faced objection. The seller sought to reverse the transaction. On the other hand, the buyer contested the reversal. The case was still pending at the Chief's court by the time I left Domboshava after fieldwork. These circumstances demonstrate the structure/agency dilemmas and the conflict that characterize the status quo when people invent their own rules or intentionally break existing ones. Clearly, individual agents always retain freedom of action despite existence of structures (Scott, 2011).

The practice of speculative hoarding of land in Domboshava was a common business venture among migrants. In such cases, migrants specialized in buying and selling communal land in Domboshava. This was a clear departure from the notion of collective land rights socially embedded in traditional values through group 'ownership' (cf. Cousins, 2008a; 2008b). Cases of speculative land purchases by migrants are a pointer to an emerging incipient land market within this communal area, and individualization of common property resources. This new dispensation also empowers migrants to allocate land under customary tenure - historically a prerogative of TLs, tribal household heads, and the GRDC on behalf of the state. Individualized land transactions transform the structure that defines customary land tenure as allocation of land rights is done at individual level, while the role of TLs turns to approval of decisions made by community residents. Under these circumstances, migrants that bought land from tribal members became rich as they invested in land through land transactions, while tribal members that sold part of 'their' land became land poor. As land values in Domboshava increased due to the locational advantage of the communal area with Harare, class distinctions between those that accumulated land through speculative land hoarding and those that simply bought land for residential reasons were apparent.

#### 5.4.3 Renting

Renting land and homesteads was widely practiced in Domboshava. Renting entailed both land use for farming and settlement in exchange for monetary payments. Renting was practised with and without homesteads. Eleven cases of renting were recorded. Of these, two occurred before 2002, and the rest during the 2002 to 2012 period. Of the nine cases of renting with homesteads, two took place before 2002, whilst seven occurred during the 2002



to 2012 period. This shows an increase in cases of renting both land and homesteads. There were no cases of renting without a homestead before 2002. Only two such cases occurred during the 2002 to 2012 period. The practice of renting land without a homestead after 2002 was a significant pointer to the nature of traditional land transactions in Domboshava. The cases suggest accessing land rights for agricultural production by both tribal and migrant members. Renting of land with homesteads was generally on the increase in Domboshava during the 2002 to 2012 period compared to the period before. Most migrants in Domboshava were lodgers in other villages as well as in Harare before they bought residential land. The prevalence of backyard quarters at homesteads pointed to rental housing in this communal area (see Photograph 5.1 below).



Photograph 5.1: Backyard lodgers' quarter in Domboshava  
Source: Field data, (2012).

Renting involved caretaking of land and homesteads, as well as keeping land levy payments up to date in the absence of the property owner. Lodgers emerge as security agents and stewards on behalf of the absentee property owners. For example, Pepukai and Chenai were married. Their household rented both land and a homestead in Chogugudza Village. Originally, Pepukai comes from Chivhu, while Chenai is from Gokwe. Pepukai and Chenai said, *"We are lodgers. The owner of this homestead 'mwana wemuno'. He stays in Harare. We share the same*

*totem with the owner of this homestead. We used to stay in Glen View in Harare. We came to this place in August 2011. We came here because we were looking for cheap rentals. In Harare, we used to pay US\$300.00 on monthly rentals. Now, we pay US\$50.00 only for the homestead, the garden, and the field combined".* In a separate case, Chipso and Muneni were widows. Chipso comes from Masvingo while Muneni is from Mazoe. The two women rented a homestead and land in Murape Village. They said, *"We are lodgers here. We are renting this homestead and everything on it. The owner of this homestead does not live here. He lives in the United Kingdom with his family. He is a son to the Headman".* Renting land and homesteads thus emerged as a new form of securing land and property rights against dispossession after the long absence of the owners. Absent tribal members retained their land rights in communal areas upon their return and even during their absence (Bourdillon, 1976). Through renting, tribal members were able to perpetuate their land rights while securing them at the same time. As such, renting presupposed agency in perpetuation of tribal land rights under customary land tenure. In most instances, no contractual agreements on rentals were signed between the concerned parties. Rental agreements were verbal, and these remained binding. Lodgers could use land and/or homesteads for as long as they wanted, and in most cases for as long as they were in good books with the property owners. However, this also means that rentals could be terminated any time.

Cases of renting land with homesteads were more prevalent in Chogugudza Village than in any of the three villages. Some tribal land leasers did not stay in Domboshava. They were absentee property owners that stayed elsewhere including places such as Harare and the diaspora. In some cases, 'absentee' migrants left undeveloped pieces of land under custody of their neighbours. For example, an 'absentee' migrant tasked Blessings of Mungate Village to look after her piece of land while she stayed in Harare. The 'absentee' migrant grew maize on her piece of land, and anticipates constructing a house in future. Such arrangements were important in creating social networks among migrants. Similarly, renting is also a common practice critical in strengthening social networks among neighbours in Masvingo (Scoones *et al.*, 2010).

In some cases, household members rented land without homesteads. For example, the practice of land exchange for draught power as revealed by Ruvarashe of Chogugudza Village when she said, *"We often rent fields from our uncle. We do not pay cash for using their land, but we give them our plough and cattle to till their fields. We exchange draught power for land".* Land borrowing mechanisms enable tribal members to temporarily dispose of underutilized land in



exchange for something of value. This entails entrusting individual land rights on others. This is also a common practice in Mazoe (Matondi & Dekker, 2011), and in Masvingo (Scoones *et al.*, 2010). The case of Ruvarashe's household however remains unusual since rentals on land and homesteads in Domboshava were generally paid in monetary terms. The practice however demonstrates traditional means of assisting poorer kin within social networks of the Shona culture. This demonstrates that land strengthens social relations among tribal kin, and so are land transactions.

Cases of renting land and homesteads to some extent show compliance with structures that regulate land transactions under the system of customary tenure. Renting does not involve permanent disposal of tribal land rights to migrants. Renting, particularly in Chogugudza Village was to some extent acceptable because it involved temporary land exchanges, and benefited both the tribal members and migrants without disposal of land rights as illustrated in Box 5.4 below.

**Box 5.4: Non-approval of land transactions**

"In this village I do not allow that as the VH. The whole village is still intact because I listen to the law of the government which says VHs are not allowed to sell land. All land belongs to the government. People should not sell land. Any VH who is practicing land sales is selling government land. This land does not have a receipt. Land belongs to the state. The state tells us to live where we are for free. The receipt comes from God. I do not know where this business of selling is coming from. In my village, I do not recommend the practice and I do not sign such agreements. ... Where is this business coming from? I do not allow or approve it. All my people are not doing it. What are we going to become if we sell our land? ... Rentals are another business. People can rent. They cannot sell or buy land. ... The radio is always saying our land is our heritage. So where are they getting the land from? The land does not belong to a single individual" (VH for Chogugudza Village, Domboshava, 2012).

Source: Field data, (2012).

Through renting, transacted land remains part of the household's property. The probability of successful termination of rentals and retraction of land rights by tribal members through renting is higher compared to direct land sales. In addition, rentals preserve tribal land rights, and do not undermine or disrupt customary practices such as inheritance. By not approving direct land sales, the VH for Chogugudza also protected women's land rights particularly widows against land dispossession. Makura-Paradza (2010) found out that land rights for widows and divorces in Chikwaka communal area of Goromonzi District were more secure in villages where VHs did not approve land sales. However, the choice to regard renting as an 'acceptable business' demonstrates a waiver of the norms that define the structure on customary land tenure. The conditions on which rentals remain acceptable and consistently practised within the realms of customary land tenure in Chogugudza Village continue to be

tested. Since Domboshava is situated on the periphery of Harare and commercial farms, more and more migrants are likely to come and rent both homesteads and land. The temptation to sell land apart from renting to migrants is inevitable as signalled by the contested case of a direct land sale in this village.

#### 5.4.4 Land grabs

Seven land grabs were recorded (see Table 5.2 above). None of them involved a homestead. Three cases were witnessed before 2002, and four during the 2002 to 2012 period. There was an increase in land grabbing during 2002 to 2012 compared to the period before. This could probably be a result of the monetization of land, as well as the influx of migrants into this communal area. Whatever the case, land grabbing reveals not only the individualization of common property rights, but also the absence of sanctions that regulate behaviour of individuals with regards allocation of and access to land under the system of customary land tenure. In some cases, tribal kin took opportunity of renting to grab and sell land. This probably explains why renting land without homesteads was seldom practised as most tribal members preferred to share homesteads with lodgers. Although some of the land transactions in Domboshava took place without objections, all land grabs were conflict ridden thereby straining social relations (see Box 5.5 below).

##### Box 5.5: Gender and land grabs

“We used to have two fields. Each was three quarters of an acre. We gave our son one of the fields as part of his inheritance long back in the 1990s. The wife to my husband’s young brother sold one of our fields after we rented it to her. We thought we were helping our kin through sharing fields. We only used that field once. Later, we discovered that she sold our field including part of our garden. How dare could she sale the VH’s fields? We are now left with half an acre of our garden that I am sharing with my daughter in-law. We took our case to the Headman. The Headman was so biased and corrupt. They had already given the Headman some money, so he ruled the case in their favour. I challenged the verdict. They wanted to beat me when I challenged the traditional court’s decision. It is so painful. I always caution my children to make sure that they keep an eye on their inheritance” (Ida & Kudzai, Domboshava, 2012).

Source: Field data, (2012).

Land grabs are not new in Domboshava and were spotted as early as 1924 as highlighted by Cheater (1990:200). Cheater (1990) presents a story of Ndawana ke Sinyanga of Chinamhora communal area (Domboshava) who had difficulties in accessing land and forcibly obtained land in this communal area. “Yes, I had considerable difficulty in getting land. The natives would not let me have any so I helped myself. ... I simply took it” (Cheater, 1990:200). Similarly, land grabbing as a ‘self-help’ or ‘self-allocation’ mechanism of land is evident in

contemporary Domboshava (see Box 5.5 above). The vignette above also illustrates the ability of women to participate in individualized land transactions despite their positions as secondary land rights holders. Women are not allowed to transact land under the system of customary land tenure because Domboshava is patriarchal. Land transactions are an adult male role. The above case also illustrates the malleability of the system of customary land tenure, and the capability of women to go beyond the structure to grab and to sell land within a patriarchal community where males dominate the decision-making process. The wife to Ida and Kudzais' young brother took advantage of renting to challenge the existing structure that gives men the prerogative to exchange land. She was simply responding not only to the surrounding circumstances in this peri-urban communal area, but also to her individual motives or goals as an agent. Clearly, the conduct of individual agents in land transactions is not only determined by the kinds of desires and motives of individuals, but also their creativity and the nature of the structure itself. "Agents are not those beings who are islands unto themselves, separated from social currents" (Stones, 2009:90).

On the other hand, the case presents women like Ida as vulnerable and disadvantaged by lack of voice in local decision-making processes. Women often fail to get justice in male dominated or patriarchal systems although they support and defend their husbands as a traditional and social obligation when their household members face challenges (Tsikata & Whitehead, 2003). However, the above case is unusual since a woman (Ida) challenged traditional authorities something perceived as disgraceful in the culture of the Shona. "Women are supposed to be incapable of conducting court cases ... and have limited responsibilities in offenses" (Bourdillon, 1976:70). The case also presents local decision-making structures as instruments of gender repression, and not necessarily balanced conflict resolution (cf. Tsikata & Whitehead, 2003). It also shows that it was easier for tribal members to break the rules that sanction land exchanges than to observe them because TLs were mesmerized by net benefits from bribes. Thus, TLs are part of the conflict. Two other cases of land grabbing were also recorded in Murape Village. These involved two tribal households, and two migrant households. The case that involved two migrants turned fatal as illustrated in Box 5.6 below. The case is rather awkward because it involves a land dispute between migrants that legally did not have autochthonous land rights that define their 'membership' in Domboshava. Access to land in communal areas is based on membership to a tribe (Berry, 2002).

## Box 5.6: A fatal land grab

Muneni rents a room in a two roomed cottage. She has four children. She used to stay on a farm with her husband and children in Mazoe. Her husband used to work as a mechanic on a white owned commercial farm in Mazoe. Muneni said, "We bought two pieces of land in Domboshava. In 2006, we decided to come and stay in Domboshava after my husband lost his job as a result of the Land Reform Programme (*Hondo yeminda*). He was a mechanic at a farm in Mazoe. We did not benefit from the Land Reform Programme. Do you think it is easy to get land through *jambanja*? When we came here, we discovered that my husband's young brother had sold one of our pieces of land. The two brothers argued. The young brother killed his big brother. My husband is buried near the dip tank. That cemetery is reserved for tribal members of Domboshava. My husband is buried there because he was a close friend to the Headman. My husband's young brother is now living at our stand and is using my land whilst I am a lodger. He even used my roofing sheets on his house. I never pursued the case at the courts" (Muneni, Domboshava, 2012).

Source: Field data, (2012).

The above case also illustrates the extent to which individual agents can stretch their conscience in order to secure land rights in this communal area. For example, the young brother to Muneni's husband did not only grab land, but took part of the household property. The case demonstrates vulnerability of women from land grabs as well as lack of support from the community, and their in-laws since widows such as Muneni looked up to the local decision-making structures for justice. Due to widowhood, Muneni was rather weak to challenge the outcomes from male dominated decision-making processes, although her late husband was a close friend to a VH's son. Thus, Muneni failed to retain her land and property rights. From the perspective of TLs of Domboshava, cases of murder are criminal offenses presided by the national courts of law. This shows that TLS clearly distance themselves from individualized land transactions they initially approve - particularly when they become complex. This calls for attention and clarity on administration of land rights, as well as procedures on dispute resolution in this communal area. Individualized land transactions and non-compliance with the structure on customary land tenure is simply a rational choice by community members and TLs of Domboshava who as knowledgeable actors were aware of the rules that capacitate their action in the practice.

#### 5.4.5 Land transactions and gender in Domboshava

Discussions on gender and land transactions in Domboshava provide explanations to social differentiation processes that characterize access to land rights in this communal area. In some villages of Domboshava, female descendants that lost inheritance of land rights under customary land tenure accessed land through buying. The vulnerability of the girl children emanates from patriarchal disparities on access to land rights in most rural communities of Zimbabwe. For example in Masvingo, women were entitled to land, but they accessed land at

a lower rate compared to men (Scoones *et al.*, 2010; Mutopo, 2011). In Domboshava, tribal girl children such as Rose bought land outside the system of customary land tenure due to failed inheritance (see Box 5.7 below).

**Box 5.7: Failed inheritance vs. land transactions**

“My husband’s parents are originally from Zambia, but my husband is from Mtoko. I was born at Showground Clinic. We bought this land in July 2010 and came to stay here in January 2012. Some of my children were born in Mtoko and others were born here ... We do not have a field. We only have this yard. It is a quarter of an acre including this homestead. We do not have a garden. My parents live in Mungate Village. I never got any land from my parents. I never claimed any land from them. We bought this land for US\$1500.00 from our neighbour. I wandered door to door looking for a piece of land. I used to rent a house in this village. It took one week for all processes to complete. There were no objections. We are going to start making payments at the Council. We were paying through the VH. We pay US\$3.00 land levy to the Council. We do not have any livestock. ... All this area used to be forest and a grazing area. I grew up in this area and we used to fetch firewood from this place” (Rose, Domboshava, 2012).

Source: Field data, (2012).

Girl children that are married to migrants (like Rose) lose their tribal land rights particularly on inheritance because they assume migrant status through marriage. In the culture of the Shona, girl children use their tribal identities before marriage. After marriage, they assume their husbands’ tribal identities, and are expected to inherit land through marriage. This explains why Rose bought land relegated for human habitation such as pastures and wetlands. Inversely, the system of customary land tenure recognizes and allows migrant girl children to acquire secondary land rights as daughters-in-law through marriage and belonging, while denying local tribal girl children married to migrants such rights at the same time.

The above case also shows that it was easier for the girl children to lose their land rights than the boys whose rights were secured through inheritance. However, access to land by women through land transactions empowers them to control their own lives through participation and involvement in a wider social universe within changing gender relations (Cliffe *et al.*, 2011). Although Rose obtained land as she “wandered door to door looking for a piece of land”, in principle that piece of land is under the control of her husband who has the prerogative even to sanction further transactions. This situation does not only undermine Rose as the ‘owner’ of the land, but also limits the extent to which her land rights can stretch. Although women like Rose used their negotiating skills as a resource to obtain land, in patriarchal societies land is regarded as men’s. The situation is also common in Mwenzi District of Masvingo where women that obtained land through the FTLRP had ‘their land’ registered under their husbands’ names (Mutopo, 2011). Marriage thus remains a source of insecure land rights for

women in rural areas because married women lack land titles in their names (Nyamu-Musembi, 2006; Paradza, 2011).

In another case, Edzai failed to inherit land and property rights at her matrimonial home in Mt Darwin after the death of her husband. She purchased residential land in Domboshava. The experiences of Rose and Edzai are similar in terms of failed inheritance although the circumstances are different. For example, Edzai lost her inheritance through unfair distribution of her husband's property rights, whereas, Rose lost her land rights through individualized land transactions. Elsewhere, some women in Masvingo province also failed to access land after the deaths of their husbands (Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Inheritance of land rights in patriarchal societies in sub-Saharan Africa is commonly reserved for the male offspring, although legally females are entitled to such (Makura-Paradza, 2010). Thus, allocation of property rights through inheritance is often conflict ridden (Matondi & Dekker, 2011).

Most tribal members of Domboshava believe that the underlying challenges on gender discrepancies in land allocation land emanates not only from reluctance of community residents to practically observe legal expectations on inheritance, but poor planning and land allocation during the 1960s. Village Head Tenzana revealed this when he said, *"It is very difficult to tell how much land has been transacted to date, but more land is 'gone' compared to what is left. People that planned this settlement did not consider that we were able to create generations of children. Many generations are even ahead of us. When they planned this communal area, they looked at the land needs of the generations present at that time, and not their future needs. This is now a problem. Even our own children will soon lack land even for residential purposes - forget about the fields and the pastures"*. Some tribal members and TLs believe that the original land allocations did not make provisions for future household formations since colonial focus was on households that existed at that time. What is happening in Domboshava could be a result of population pressure in this communal area. Oversights in planning and population projections are evident in most resettlement areas where there are no provisions in place to cater for the land needs of the second generation except through inheritance (Dekker & Kinsey, 2011). However, in Domboshava there is no guarantee that the elders would generationally pass land as inheritance to their descendants given the rate of individualized land transactions such as land sales in this communal area. Through direct land sales tribal members prioritize current generational needs at the expense of the future generational land needs.

#### 5.4.6 A summary on land transactions in the four villages

In summary, both customary and individualized categories of land transactions were observed in Domboshava and these are not new. There is however an increase in individualized land transactions particularly during the 2002 to 2012 census decade. The source of conflict that surrounds the individualized land transactions is that migrants procedurally consult TLs with regards these land transactions. Involving TLs in individualized land transactions by migrants indicates the relevance of observing tradition and institutions that regulate access to land rights in Domboshava. This was also necessary if buyers wished to secure their land transactions through local arrangements.

Important similarities and differences on trends were observed in the four villages. Inheritance as a customary category was practised by tribal members although migrants expected their descendants to inherit land obtained through land sales. There is a shift of emphasis from inheritance to direct land sales in Domboshava. While Makura-Paradza (2010) found out that parents whose children died before them claimed the deceased's land and assets through 'upward inheritance', no cases of 'upward inheritance' were recorded from the sampled villages. With the rate at which land transactions occur in Domboshava, land acquired through 'upward inheritance' could trigger land grabbing among kin. Widows or their kin are likely to sell such land as they would regard themselves as having 'excess' land. Cases of 'upward inheritance' followed by land transactions are however common in Chikwaka area of Goromonzi District where widows dispose of inherited land (Ibid).

Both the better-off and worse-off households practice land transactions in Domboshava. However, poor tribal members often rent their land to fellow tribal members and migrants in exchange for something of value such as draught power and money without completely disposing of their land rights. On the other hand, better-off tribal members and migrants offer rental housing to fellow community residents. Migrant lodgers represent the poor category of migrants in Domboshava. For tribal members, renting land and homesteads to migrants emerge as a way of securing land rights through agency rather than the structure. In addition, migrant lodgers and one's neighbours emerge as security agents for tribal land leasers and 'absentee' migrants. Clearly, new forms of securing land tenure rights are apparent in Domboshava. Although most of the land transactions occurred without objections, conflict ridden land transactions are a common feature in Domboshava. The role of conflict is to

expose individualized land transactions, as well as loopholes in processes of allocating customary land rights.

Women in Domboshava were expected to participate in land transactions only in consultation with their husbands and patrikin because they lack power to dispose of their land rights. However, women still participated in both individualized and customary land transactions as individuals. Women that found themselves trapped by the structure often found their exit thorough agency. Individualized land transactions enabled women to acquire land through direct land sales, and not under the custody of their parents or their husbands. Widows as household heads passed land to their household members as inheritance. In any case, most women considered themselves part of household land transactions although they did not directly take action or make decisions in some cases. As secondary land rights holders, women considered themselves as participants in household land transactions through making reference to 'we' or 'our' land in their stories. Such narrations suggest that women were comfortable with their secondary land rights statuses as wives and children under customary tenure. According to Scoones *et al.* (2010), the situation is not unique because culturally women are expected present themselves that way. Thus, women are subordinated through culture, and are unable to recognize any injustice in the prevailing social order (Razavi, 2003:25).

Young men that generationally inherited land and were in charge of homesteads and fields could participate in land transactions as heads of households. However, young children had no rights to participate in land transactions. In their minds, land transactions were an 'adult business'. Children are secondary rights holders until they inherit or buy land. These dynamics of land transactions clearly demonstrate the meaning of land in creating social relationships and power relations within households. Despite these alterations in land allocation procedures, male household heads and male patrikin continue to be regarded as critical decision makers (particularly in land allocation) by their household members.

### **5.5 Reasons for land transactions in the four villages**

My interest in this section is to highlight the influence of household survival strategies and RDP on land transactions, and not the other way round (see Figure 5.1). During interviews, I asked heads of households or their representatives (the stand-ins) not only to describe the



nature of land transactions, but why they entered into these - their goals and motives. I also asked TLs and other stakeholders to shed light on the causes, and to explain why community residents of Domboshava behaved the way they did concerning land transactions. Land transactions emerge for various reasons (Delville, 2000). The structure that defines the system of customary land tenure determines how people are supposed to behave, in this case how they are supposed to enter into land transactions. Agents always create their own action as pragmatic and strategic responses to circumstances that surround them (Scott, 2011). Consequently, agency enables people under certain circumstances to move outside and go beyond the structure - to nonconformity and to break rules. Agents have the ability to choose to behave otherwise (Giddens, 1984; Stones, 2009). Clearly, it is possible to bend tradition and custom to suit particular occasions (Bourdillon, 1976). Thus, participation of both tribal and migrant household members in land transactions was a result of a myriad of causes.

#### 5.5.1 Influence of household survival strategies on land transactions

Since most individualized and transactions such as direct land sales and renting were witnessed during the 2002 to 2012 decade when survival in both rural and urban areas of Zimbabwe was generally difficult, these were viewed as a way of generating income for household survival, as well as a response to deteriorating economic conditions. After the introduction of the multicurrency system in Zimbabwe, most households were unable to keep abreast with the high cost of living in both rural and urban centres (Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011; Chiumbu & Musemwa, 2012; Kabwato, 2012; Mukwedeya, 2012; also see section 3.5 in Chapter 3). This prompted migration of households from urban centres into rural areas particularly those situated in the peripheries of cities where access to services and accommodation was arguably cheaper. Under these circumstances, tribal members of Domboshava either rented homesteads and rooms, or sold residential land to migrants as a way of generating household income as highlighted by TL Gadara when he said, *"People have their own personal reasons, and buyers give their own reasons. It is about rural poverty, people need to survive, they need to raise school fees for their children, and they also need money to buy food"*. Individualized land transactions in Domboshava are therefore perceived as a solution to rural poverty, and an innovation to alleviate economic hardships. This shows that structures are always constraining as well as enabling (cf. Ritzer, 2008). The choices of community members of Domboshava to dispose of land for purposes of survival were rather forced choices. They are a pointer to the "sellers' short-term financial distress" (Colin & Woodhouse, 2010:4).

However, in the eyes of many tribal members, direct land sales as opposed to renting remain unwise since they entail dispossession of land rights to migrants largely regarded as an essential physical asset not only for livelihood security, but also for tribal identity and belonging. “Land is a tangible expression of the tribe as a whole” (Bourdillon, 1976:88).

Most tribal members and TLs of Domboshava believed that individualized land transactions as a household survival strategy were misguided propositions, and were acts of sheer greediness, and not necessarily survival. In their minds, gains particularly from land sales deliver brief gratification, yet survival is long term. For example, Katty from Zimbir Village said, *“These land sales are not about poverty. People just want money. It is difficult to make money these days. If it were not about money, why would they sell land used by their households for farming? They just want money to spend usually on petty things such as beer. Some clever migrants tell them that the soils are weak and tired. That is not true”*. This revelation was also confirmed by VH Zuze. Since Idai and Kudzai lost part of their arable land through land grabbing, they also believed that land transactions particularly direct land sales were not about household survival per se but greediness when they said, *“Land sales have nothing to do with survival. It is all about greedy people. They want to make money quickly without working hard for it. How can someone sell land that their children will use in future. Our own kin stole our land and sold it to strangers. People that sell other people’s fields get a lot of money. Isn’t that greediness?”*. Tribal members viewed land sales and land grabs as acts of greediness because they delivered immediate gains as opposed to sustainable benefits for future generations through inheritance. Greediness was associated with abuse of individual privileges under the system of customary tenure for personal gratification. Most TLs also believed that tribal members that regarded land sales as a household survival strategy disposed of collective land rights largely regarded as a medium for community identity as highlighted by VH Nango when he said, *“... tribal members that sell ‘their’ land to migrants are the losers. Where else will you get ‘your’ land after selling it? They sell land and make money for a while, and yet land is an everlasting inheritance for our own children. If you sell your land, it means you have sold yourself, your people, your children ... (stammering and highly emotional). I cannot even express it...you you you would have killed your whole generation!”* These findings also show the multiple meanings of land to tribal members of Domboshava.

Inferences from the influence of household survival strategies on land transactions show that participation in land transactions was about both individual gain and survival at the same time. As a result, individualized land transactions particularly direct land sales became a common practice not only among tribal members, but also among migrants. In the minds of

both tribal and migrant members that participated in individualized land transactions, there was nothing wrong about non-conformity to values of customary tenure as long as people achieved their goals. Stones (2005) also states that people do not only use their knowledge to make decisions and behave the way they do within given social systems, but they also make use of resources such as power and authority to exercise their rights. In this case, tribal members were simply utilizing their power as primary land rights holders, whereas migrant land seekers used their negotiating and purchasing powers to access customary land rights. In doing so, community residents motivated others to participate in individualized land transactions as pointed out by Redza and Yeukai of Zimbiru Village who said, *"We do not have fields. If I had one, I would have sold it like others. All fields are being sold. There are no more fields here. Ndiani angade kusaririra. Ifashani - who would want to be left behind? It is fashionable"*. Village Heads Nango and Zuze also reiterated these sentiments when they pointed out that tribal members of Domboshava engaged in individualized land transactions particularly direct land sales because everyone did it, and thus land transactions were an activity of the moment - it was fashionable. This shows lack of incentives for those who choose to comply with sanctions. According to Bromley & Cernea (1991:17), in many settings sanctions and incentives have unfortunately become inoperative or dysfunctional largely because of pressure and forces beyond the control of the group or because of internal processes groups are unable to master.

Due to increased number of tribal members that sought survival through individualized land transactions in Domboshava, demand and supply factors on land for housing were created. These prompt many people to buy land for residential purposes. The land market is regulated primarily by individualized social structures although formal structures exist (cf. Nyamu-Musembi, 2006). Some migrants moved to Domboshava as lodgers in anticipation to buying land in the villages (see Appendix B). As more and more migrants settle in this communal area, tribal members are motivated to sell land for housing. According to Yvonne of Mungate village, a 'land rush' exists in Domboshava. Yvonne used to stay in Harare, and she came to Domboshava because she heard that land was being sold at cheaper rates. Yvonne also pointed out that it was easy to buy land in Domboshava when one has cash on hand. Tribal members were also willing to dispose of 'their' land to migrants for cash. According to VH Tenzana, pieces of land in Domboshava were sold for an average of US\$1000.00 to US\$2500.00. In most instances, these were once-off payments, although payments through short-term installments were common. For example, Edzai from Mungate Village said she paid US\$1200.00 and owed the seller US\$400.00. The prices of land in Domboshava were

regarded as cheaper by many migrants compared to prices of land in urban centres such as Harare. However, as demand for land increased, and as more and more migrants paid higher prices for land, the plot sizes got smaller. Clearly, as demand for land increases the land becomes scarcer and expensive, for example in the 1950s migrants paid five shillings (five cents) (Holleman, 1952:19), and in the 1980s it rose to seventy dollars (Bourdillon, 1982:63), and three decades later to US\$2500.00 - for much smaller plots. Similar dynamics of demand and supply also characterizes land transactions in Malawi (Peters & Kambewa, 2007).

Migrants regard rental housing in Domboshava as cheaper and affordable compared to what they paid elsewhere. For example, Pepukai and Chenia from Chogugudza paid US\$300.00 on monthly rentals for a house in Harare, and US\$50.00 in Domboshava for a homestead including the garden and fields. In some instances, renting single rooms in Domboshava cost US\$20.00 per month. For example, Martina and her household from Chogugudza Village paid US\$20.00 monthly in rentals for a single room. Rental terms vary from household to household and from village to village. Rentals also depend on the size of the rooms and the nature of the built structures. Renting modern and new houses cost more than old and dilapidated structures. Likewise, renting roundavels is 'cheaper' (see Photograph 5.1). Renting rooms with access to electricity is 'expensive'. In Zimbiru Village for example, Ida and Kudzai charged US\$35.00 per room (with access to electricity), whereas Revai from the same village charged US\$20.00 (without access to electricity). In some cases, the rentals terms included land for cultivation such as the case of Pepukai and Chenai from Chogugudza Village.

Renting land and accommodation in Domboshava was a necessary option for migrants that sought to settle in the communal area on a permanent basis after saving enough money for land purchases. Resources such as money to purchase land and power to bribe TLs during the procedures on individualized land transactions remain vital. Migrants without adequate money to purchase land remain as lodgers in Domboshava for as long as they cannot afford to purchase land even after they secure land. For example, Alice a young divorcee who stayed in Chogugudza Village said, *"I am looking for my own stand. Before I divorced my husband, we secured a piece of land to purchase. It is outside this village. Someone subdivided a yard for us. My husband lives in Chitungwiza. He initiated the deal. Now, I do not have the money to purchase that land. I cannot afford it. The stand cost US\$1500.00. As soon as I get money, I will buy a stand"*.

Purchasing, negotiating, and bargaining power increase freedom of agents to break the rules that define the structure on land transactions, while lack of these restrict women's participation in land transactions. Individualized land transactions increase the chances of individuals to access land particularly women (Cf. Colin & Woodhouse, 2010). Whereas, lack of finance and power to negotiate land rights often disadvantages women from accessing land rights (Tsikata & Whitehead, 2003; Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2006; Colin & Woodhouse, 2010). Poor, divorced, and widowed migrants without good jobs or constant income streams such as Alice could not buy land due to lack of purchasing power. Communal land in Domboshava has turned into a fee good obtainable on the market. Yet, communal land is legally non-tradable and 'valueless' (CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002).

Migrant widows and divorcees from Domboshava that purchase land through individualized land transactions enjoy primary land rights as heads of households as long as they remain unmarried. This situation is common in most sub-Saharan Africa (see Whitehead & Tsikata, 2003). Similarly, in Gokwe, land transactions enabled divorced women particularly those that worked in urban areas to acquire land (Nyambara, 2001). This provides the structural relevance of land transactions on women who often find it difficult to return to their natal homes for fear of being ostracized since divorcing one's husband is often regarded as a shame (Paradza, 2011). Tribal members that lack other income generating strategies were likely to sell land for survival regardless of their generation. For example, all land transactions recorded were mediated by adults of different age groups, and not by youths or children. Youths and children are secondary land rights holders, whose land rights are largely oral promises by their elders.

### 5.5.2 Influence of Rural Development Policy on land transactions

In this section, I demonstrate the influence of RDP on land transactions in Domboshava (see Figure 5.1). According to tribal members and TLs, another major driver of both customary and individualized land transactions in Domboshava was the announcement by a late Headman that the communal area was earmarked for upgrading from rural to urban. The GRDC proposed settlement upgrading for Domboshava as a solution to increased individualized land transactions. Conversion of rural areas particularly those situated at the edge of cities to urban is not a new phenomenon in implementation of RDP strategies in Zimbabwe (Gasper, 1991; Munzwa & Jonga, 2010). Such a policy proposal was enforced in

Seke communal area now Chitungwiza Town situated southeast of Harare. Ubink (2008) observed a similar development policy in Kumasi in Ghana. However, “when the town reaches the farms, people lose their rights” (Ubink, 2008) in Peters (2010:157). Many tribal members regard land transactions as a way of sabotaging and frustrating the GRDC’s proposal to change the communal area from rural to urban. Tribal members are afraid of losing their land rights through the announced RDP strategy (see Box 5.8 below).

**Box 5.8: Influence of RDP on land transactions in Domboshava**

According to Redza and Yeukai, the major reason for land sales was the announcement that Domboshava communal area was going to become a location. Yeukai said, “We all panicked thinking that we were going to lose ‘our’ land to the Council. We just thought it was better to eat our money than to lose both the land and the money. I do not think there are any fields left. All the people in this area sold their fields and gardens. I am using my mother in-law’s land. Vanerson my nephew once said we were stupid because we now hoard tomatoes from far way after selling our garden...” Redza interjected and said, “They were not stupid because what was happening triggered everything. Our Council is made of a bunch of thieves. They made a lot of noise about turning this communal area into a location and we ended up selling everything forgetting our own children. We subdivided our gardens. We are now buying tomatoes from Nyamande. We sold our gardens and people built their houses on our land. ... We are now regretting. All those people who did not sell ‘their’ land will regret too because of that name Goromonzi. When the Council implements its projects it does so without any further warning ... For example, in Chitungwiza the Municipality just brought a grader and erased all houses without further notice. There was no meeting, but just destruction” (Redza & Yeukai, Domboshava, 2012).

Source: Field data, (2012).

In their minds, tribal members believe that land in Domboshava communal area rightfully belongs to them and their ancestors, and are therefore entitled to obtain cash benefits from the land sales. Yet, all communal land is legally invested in RDCs on behalf of the state (CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002). Thus, residents in communal areas are entitled to occupy and use land at the discretion of the state, and not as a right (Matondi & Dekker, 2011). In other words, they have usufruct rights. The CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002 prohibits the sale of land classified as communal by individuals. Clearly, there exists conflict of interest not only on upgrading Domboshava from rural to urban, but also on ownership of land rights under the system of customary land tenure between tribal members on one hand and GRDC on the other. As a result, individualized land transactions continue unabated.

The influence of RDP on land transactions in Domboshava also involves migration of people not only from Harare and the adjacent farms, but also from other faraway places that are homelands to migrants. Most migrants that settled in Domboshava were looking for either cheap rental accommodation or land for residential purposes. During the 2002 to 2012 period, most of the migrants that migrated to Domboshava were victims of the FTLRP of 2000, and Operation Restore Order (ORO)/Operation Murambatsvina (OM) of 2005 (see section 3.4 in

Chapter 3). Some ex-farm workers that lost their jobs on commercial farms because of the FTLRP sought refuge in Domboshava (see Box 5.6 above, Matondi & Dekker, 2011; Hanlon *et al.*, 2013). Since Domboshava is situated in proximity with commercial farms, that is, Wards 6 and 7 (see Figure 3.5 in Chapter 3); exodus of ex-farm workers into this peri-urban communal area was inevitable. In some cases, new farmers were unable to employ ex-farm workers, although new farmers retained 'retrenched' farm workers to some extent (Cliffe *et al.*, 2011; Hanlon *et al.*, 2013). Under these circumstances, some ex-farm workers continue to work on farms while they stay elsewhere close to the farms. This creates new relations between farm workers and the farm owners - a shift from 'belonging' - that typifies the lives of farm workers through staying and working on farms, as opposed to finding their own accommodation and to commute on daily basis to work on farms (Cliffe *et al.*, 2011).

Some former white farmers bought land in Domboshava as terminal benefits for their employees such as the case of Edzai from Mungate Village who said, *"My boss was a white commercial farmer. He had a house in Strathaven in Harare. I worked at the house as a domestic servant. He went back to his country because of 'hondo yeminda' (FTLRP). He gave me US\$3000.00 to buy this land. Originally, I come from Mt Darwin. I stay here permanently because I no longer have a home or fields in Mt Darwin. My husband died a long time ago"*. The case of Edzai reveals survival challenges faced by migrant widows not only in their capacities as former employees of former white farmers, but also as widows that lack land rights through widowhood in their homelands. The LRP as an RDP influences land transactions in Domboshava through migrants that seek alternative spaces to adapt to changes in their livelihoods. According to tribal members and TLs of Domboshava, ex-farm workers constitute a significant number of people that settled in Domboshava during the 2002 and 2012 census decade.

Descendants of ex-farm workers that did not benefit from the FTLRP such as Rabi from Zimbiru Village bought land. Most migrants of Malawian descent originate from commercial farms where their parents or grandparents were farm labourers. They were assimilated into the communal area through individualized land transactions. Rabi said, *"We are originally from Malawi. My father used to work on one of these farms. We grew up on the farm. I bought this place in 2005. ... I tried to find some more land, but there are no empty spaces anymore. I no longer have enough money to buy land. I need a field. I did not benefit from the LRP. I did not get a chance to fill in forms for the LRP. The set channels did not give some of us a chance to own land. My focus is now on rentals other than farming"* (Also see the case of Muneni in Box 5.6). Some people failed to obtain land through the FTLRP because the programme was politicized and hijacked by influential elites and politicians

(Sachikonye, 2003, Chaumba *et al.*, 2003; Marongwe, 2008; Scoones *et al.*, 2010; Cliffe *et al.*, 2011; Helliker & Murisa, 2011; Kanyenze *et al.*, 2011; also see section 3.4.1 in Chapter 3). The selection process of beneficiaries was cumbersome, bureaucratic, and in some cases ad hoc (Marongwe, 2008; Cliffe *et al.*, 2011; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Under these circumstances, the FTLRP exacerbates landlessness and homelessness among its target group.

On the other hand, victims of ORO/OM lost their dwellings and livelihoods under this clean-up campaign in urban areas (Tibaijuka, 2005; Kamete & Lindell, 2010; also see section 3.4 in Chapter 3). The urban cleansing programme is often referred to as '*tsunami*' in local expression. Tsunami is a metaphor derived from an Indian Ocean wave that displaced people and destroyed infrastructure in 2004. The government through ORO/OM enforced 'back to the village' calls, and triggered an exodus of displaced households into peri-urban areas such as Domboshava. Most victims of displacement sought alternative accommodation to recover from their losses and to regain their livelihoods through migration into the peripheries of cities. Peri-urban communal areas became critical safety nets for these households (Scoones *et al.*, 2010). This also explains why Zimbiru Village situated closer to the commercial farms in proximity with the border with Harare experienced more individualized land transactions during 2002 and 2012 compared to other villages of Domboshava.

The migration history of migrant households of Domboshava indicates that some came from Harare and bought land in Domboshava, some were already staying in Domboshava when they accessed land in this communal area, while others came from elsewhere and settled in Domboshava (see Appendix B). However, the majority of migrants migrated from Harare (this includes the farms) compared to those from elsewhere. For migrants whose last moves were in Domboshava, being lodgers was an innovation that scaled up their chances to access land through individualized land transactions. The strategy provides migrant lodgers with ample time to create and forge necessary relationships with tribal members, to scout for vacant spaces in the villages, to save money for acquiring land, and to negotiate land prices with tribal members. Turbulent situations experienced by migrants through ORO/OM present structural relevance of the influence of state policy on individualized land transactions as revealed by Blessings from Mungate Village who said, "*I am originally from Masvingo and my husband is from Chipinge. I used to stay with my father in Harare and that's when I met my husband. We were staying in Glen Norah. We were affected by Murambatsvina in 2005. We couldn't find accommodation in*



*Harare. We came here as lodgers. We were living down there a little far from here, at Masvosve. Thanks to the cleansing programme Murambatsvina. We now have our own piece of land and accommodation”.*

Clearly, individualized land transactions such as land sales and rentals did not only provide cheap land, but also enabled migrants to acquire housing in the absence of an efficient urban housing market. Bureaucratic procedures constrained some migrants to access affordable land and houses in cities. Land transactions were rather an outcome of constraints in obtaining urban land and housing (cf. Colin & Woodhouse, 2010). The revelation by Blessings shows that victims of ORO/OM that lacked urban housing resorted to peri-urban spaces where bureaucratic procedures on access to residential land were avoidable. Clearly, bureaucratic procedures on the formal land market translate into structural barriers that obstruct access to residential land in urban areas, and simultaneously force people to access residential land in peri-urban areas. As a result, criticized programmes such as ORO/OM are of structural relevance. Non-conformity to the structure of the system of customary land tenure emerges a necessary innovation. However, observing structures remains important in guiding land transactions within the system of customary land tenure.

Due to the influx of migrants into Domboshava because of the ORO/OM, a late VH cum Headman in Domboshava sold land directly to migrants. He viewed land sales as a benevolent gesture to homeless migrants. The late Headman argued for prioritization of people's housing needs against the preservation of forests for grazing animals. The behaviour of the late Headmen demonstrates the role of authority in controlling common property regimes thereby turning these spaces into private property for personal gain. This excludes other communal residents from exercising their common property rights, and narrows their scope of land rights under the system of customary land tenure (cf. Peters, 1994). My observations also revealed homesteads built on the commons, arable land, and protected areas such as wetlands. For example, many community residents consider a place called Masvosve in Domboshava as precarious and uninhabitable because it is infested with ants and dwalas. However, through individualized land transactions some desperate migrants bought such land and built their homesteads.

Proliferation of individualized land transactions in Domboshava was also exacerbated by the geographical location of the peri-urban communal area in proximity to Harare and the commercial farms. Domboshava presents magnetic forces for migrants from faraway

homelands to seek land for residential purposes and rental housing and not necessarily victims of the FTLRP and ORO/OM. This explains why Domboshava continues to experience individualized land transactions after the FTLRP and ORO/OM. The geographical location of Domboshava allows migrants to tap opportunities from Harare and adjacent farms even after the FTLRP and ORO/OM. While patterns of migration show mostly inward movement of migrants into Domboshava, outward movement of migrants out of Domboshava can however not be ruled out completely because by nature migrants are mobile. Migration of migrants within the villages is common. Migrants often exit villages after obtaining alternative rental housing, residential land, or through marriage.

In summary, most tribal members of Domboshava believe individualized land transactions such as direct land sales and land grabs are a survival strategy within a dollarized economy, and are a result of the proposal to upgrade Domboshava from rural to urban. However, some tribal members and TLs of Domboshava perceive such claims as naive justifications for the individualization of customary land rights because land remains an integral household asset for survival in communal areas. Land is not only fundamental to the livelihoods of rural communities, but also a core element in the construction of social relations (Chambers & Conway, 1991; Bryceson, 2005; Toulmin, 2006; Anseeuw & Alden, 2010). As such, many tribal household members regard those who sell land as greedy and corrupt.

From the perspective of migrants, individualized land transactions were a response to displacements experienced through the FTLRP of 2002, as well as ORO/OM of 2005. Victims of displacement sought refuge and recovery in spaces situated on the periphery of cities such as Domboshava. This temporary solution turned permanent, with many migrants from elsewhere coming to this communal area. As a result, individualized land transactions proliferate long past these events/programmes. Migrant homes seekers pay cash for purchasing land, while tribal members are ready and willing to part with their tribal land rights as the case of Madziwa and Bushu communal areas (see Matondi & Dekker, 2011). The customary land tenure relationships in Domboshava are therefore under stress from social change because of migration of people into this communal area. This does not only lead to various forms of land exchanges and conflict, but precisely the reproduction and redefinition of the system customary land tenure (cf. Quan, 2000a; Okoth-Ogendo, 2008). These shifts in the status quo reinforce the characterization of peri-urban areas as chaotic and laden with socially embedded interests of tribal members with autochthonous land rights on

one hand, and migrants from elsewhere on the other (cf. Peters, 2004; Cousins, 2007; Walker, 2008; Anseeuw & Alden, 2010; Carruthers, 2010; Chauveau & Colin, 2010; Mabin, 2012).

## 5.6 Dynamics of negotiating land rights in Domboshava

In this section, I demonstrate how the different agents in land transactions developed their own rules within the system of customary land tenure in peri-urban Domboshava in contrast to statutes on land and settlement as well as traditional values of the customary land tenure system. Archer (1982) in Haralambos & Holborn (2008:889) believes that the possibility for producing and reproducing structures through agency and the extent to which agents have the ability to transform the social world depends upon the nature of the social system itself, as well as individual motives and goals. Both tribal members and migrants of Domboshava were simply tapping into the existing structure through agency to perpetuate the tradition of land allocation in its invented form (cf. Ranger, 2000).

### 5.6.1 Manipulation of circumstances

In the minds of community residents of Domboshava participation in land transactions was a rational and inevitable choice that entailed deliberately ignoring set guidelines on the practice of land transactions within the system of customary land tenure. As a deterrent measure, TLs anticipate to punish community residents that sell land. Those found guilty were expected to pay fines. In extreme cases, they would be expelled from the communal area, or get jail terms as revealed by TL Shoshoni when he said, *“This year we want to enforce harsh laws. We want to enforce stringent and punitive measures so that those who sell land get stiffer sentences. We want to throw them out of our communal area and allow those migrants to take their spaces forever. Isn't it what they want?”* Such approaches remain necessary in regulating behaviour of community members insofar as the practice of individualized land transactions such as direct land sales and land grabs is concerned. However, the implementation of such proposals is yet to be practical. Those found guilty of selling communal land under section seven of the CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002 are liable to prosecution. Fah, a Local Government Officer at the GRDC however pointed out that it was very difficult for the GRDC or anyone to openly challenge the participation of TLs in individualized land transactions such as land sales. Traditional Leaders as custodians of land under the system of customary land tenure in Zimbabwe are rather protected by the Constitution of Zimbabwe, the TLA Chapter 29:17 of 2001, and the CLA Chapter 20:04 of

2002. By participating in individualized land transactions, TLs were simply using their authoritarian values, as well as political immunity as subservient to the state (cf. O’Flaherty, 1998; Alexander, 2006; Cousins, 2008a). Thus, “structures cannot be equated to constraints but always seen as both constraining and enabling” (Giddens, 1984:25).

Migrants were fully aware of loopholes in procedures on land allocation under the system of customary land tenure in Domboshava. As a result, they constructed residential structures without approval from TLs and the GRDC. Migrants were also fully aware of lack of capacity of both TLs and the GRDC to sanction demolition of the built structures. Demolition of built structures requires the GRDC to follow a bureaucratic process of compensating owners of the residential structures through the courts of law (RTCPA Chapter 29:12 of 2001). This is often expensive as RDCs across the country and the GRDC in particular were experiencing budgetary constraints. According to Pinto from GRDC, compensation of non-physical structures such as social values, norms, social networks, belonging, and other cultural assets such as graves was also a substantial challenge. Attaching monetary values on such community institutions and artifacts is often difficult.

However, some tribal members viewed prevalence of individualized land transactions as a product of the laissez-faire approach by TLs particularly the Chief. These tribal members argued that Domboshava communal area belongs to the tribe of the Tembo totem, while the Chief was of the Soko Murehwa totem. The origins of the Chief are linked to Chishawasha communal area (Vambe, 1972; Bourdillon, 1976; Palmer, 1977). Tribal members of Domboshava consider this as the reason why the Chief lacks motivation to enforce strict sanctions on individualized land transactions in Domboshava (see Box 5.9 below). Contestation over land rights such as those highlighted in Box 5.9 below is common in many communal areas of Zimbabwe (see Mujere, 2011). For example, Chief Chikwanda of Gutu in Masvingo was disposed of his land through land alienation during the colonial era and did not get back his land to date (Ibid). Thus, land rights in communal areas originate from lengthy history of belonging, attachment, and use of particular land parcels. In most cases, the historical evidence is oral as highlighted in Box 5.9 below.

## Box 5.9: A history of land rights in Domboshava

"Buru of the Shiri (bird) totem married Nyamhunga's daughter. Buru was given Zimbiru area as a token to a son-in-law. It was a security measure to get protection from enemies. ... So, Buru and the Rural District Commissioner at GRDC had a misunderstanding over remitting of taxes. Buru was scared of white people so he did not remit taxes. Buru had his area given to Chinamhora who was initially part of Chishawasha area. That is how Chinamhora moved from Chishawasha to this area. Chinamhora became very powerful and was in charge of Buru, Masembura, and Nyamhunga areas. In real terms, this place does not belong to Chinamhora. When the government instructs Chiefs to carry out rain-making ceremonies, Chinamhora summons the real owners of this place to perform the rituals. This soil, this land, does not belong to Chinamhora. It belongs to the Tembos and Buru. Buru was given powers to sanction and preside over all traditional ceremonies and rituals and not Chinamhora. The history of this area is a history of land. Chinamhora actually transacted land through the RDC. ... Chinamhora was an extension of Salisbury" (Runga, Domboshava, 2012).

Source: Field data, (2012).

On the other hand, TLs are scared to reprimand or to report community members that practice individualized land transactions such as land sales to the Headman, the Chief, the GRDC, or to the law enforcement agents. It is difficult for TLs to undertake this role because of the risks involved. For example, VH Karri stated that, *"It is not allowed to sale land but I cannot say no. They (community residents) will tell you it is their land. It is difficult. They can do anything to you"*. VH Beta also said that, *"It is very difficult for the VH to ask for the true stories. They (community residents) are very cheeky. They will ask, 'What is that you want?'"* VH Mukachi also pointed out that, *"As a VH my role is to intercept land sales, but people still sell their land. I cannot do anything about it. People are greedy. They just love money. I am afraid of those people"*. These findings reveal the nature of conflict between TLs and community residents in land allocation, and collective 'ownership' of land rights. Tribal members regard the freedom to dispose of land "as central to their right to land" (Nyamu-Musembi, 2006:18). On the other hand, TLs lack the will, and the power to stop land transactions particularly direct land sales in such cases. Powerlessness of TLs emanates from fear of witchcraft. In the Shona culture, witchcraft is a subtle and an evil spiritual weapon used by weaker individuals against others particularly the powerful (Bourdillon, 1976; Taringa, 2006). "When direct confrontations are not possible, the 'weak' have a range of weapons at their disposal for resisting the power plays of the 'strong'" (Scott, 1986, in Cousins, 1990:30). Witches use among other tools animals such as hyenas, owls, and snakes at night to inflict misfortune, diseases, or death on their victims (Taringa, 2006). Nyambara (2001) also observed the same situation in Gokwe where villagers used witchcraft scare to instill fear in TLs, and to proceed with land sales without interception. Because of witchcraft scare, TLs of Domboshava gave up on stopping community residents from practising direct land sales. This demonstrates limitations of tribal authority in regulating individual action.

### 5.6.2 Gifts or bribes?

The changing role and meaning of gifts is significant in mediating land transactions outside the system of customary land tenure. Most tribal members and some TLs viewed the role of gifts as transformed from welcoming migrants to mandatory objects of value or cash. Holleman (1952:18) states that gifts were a way of showing gratitude and to say “thank you”. In Domboshava, gifts are regarded as corruption since most TLs benefit through the process as revealed by VH Shungu when he said, *“Headman XXX is allowing land sales. They are benefiting from land sales. They make people pay. That's the major cause of land sales. It started with the father to the current Headman, the late. He was too terrible, very terrible. But even he died it did not help”*. Individualized land transactions emerge as income-generating mechanism for those that engaged in the practice. Traditional gifts such as hoes lost their symbolic relevance in processing customary land transactions. Yet, even valueless items such as sticks or stones suffice as substitutes for real gifts. Migrants prefer to offer monetary gifts in most cases, although in some cases, they use goats and chickens to guarantee their legitimacy. Legitimacy entails the right to land ‘ownership’, land use, and burial in the communal area after death. Death and burial are important indicators for belonging drawn from the permanent and physical attachment with soil (Mujere, 2011). Separate cemeteries for tribal and migrants members exist in Domboshava as a way of retaining the tribal/migrant distinction and tribal identity of tribal members. However, through burial migrants claim their belonging and legitimacy as they are able to remain in Domboshava.

Traditional institutions on customary transactions are not only being monetized, but modernized through gifts. Such creativity by community residents is a response to the peri-urban nature of this community. In Ghana, most migrants use gifts in cash and kind to obtain land rights from the Chiefs (Berry, 2008 in Peters, 2010). The Chiefs also receive gifts as tokens of appreciation and approval of land transactions from ‘grateful’ buyers of land (Berry, 2011). Gifts symbolically remain a way of acknowledging the existence of tribal authority and this varies in space and time. However, in the minds of migrants such gestures do not necessarily mean the same. The role of gifts is to turn blind the eyes of some TLs so that they approve individualized land transactions such as direct land sales. The changing role of gifts and the ‘unrestricted’ authority of TLs in approving land transactions engender the prevalence of direct land sales in Domboshava.

### 5.6.3 Backdated payments

As land transactions continue in Domboshava unabated, the GRDC stopped accepting new migrants in the communal area. According to Local Government Officers, this measure was not only an intervention to curb urban sprawl, but a way to reduce population increase into this communal area. This approach to solving the increase of individualized land transactions in Domboshava turned into one of the major causes of land transactions outside the system of customary land tenure as community members tried to overcome what they perceived as a structural barrier to their action. In their creativity, tribal members and VHs forged the names of migrants on the village registers to enable migrants to register at the GRDC as if their names existed in these records before. This practice has its origin in the colonial era where inclusion of individuals' names in the village tax-register was viewed as proof of membership to that village and communal area (Holleman, 1952). According to Pakurai, one of the IDs, some migrants that bought land in Domboshava were instructed by the VHs to backdate their land levy to 2006 as if the payments were in arrears. Such 'new' entries in 'arrears' used backdated payments and backdated dates of land purchase to register at the GRDC for their stay in Domboshava. In such cases, the VHs obtained 'a cut' (a kickback or a tip) for assisting migrants to register at the GRDC in this way. Thus, TLs benefit from the fraudulent registration of migrants at the GRDC apart from gifts that grace the land exchanges - a departure from the procedures on land allocation to migrants as highlighted in Box 5.2 and Box 5.3. According to Pakurai, the GRDC is more concerned about collecting revenue from 'defaulters' without necessarily checking the revenue sources.

For tribal members and TLs, this fraudulent practice is an innovation to get away with land sales undetected. These findings also demonstrate that traditional and conventional values on transacting land to migrants under the system of customary land tenure rest upon an eroded structure as TLs, tribal members, and migrants creatively dodge the requisite procedures to facilitate registration of migrants at the GRDC. To put it differently, reversing the process on allocation of land rights to migrants is a form of creativity adopted by both tribal and migrants to circumvent constraints within the bureaucratic procedures on accessing customary land rights. The backdated payments demonstrate the agents' power of reason and their capabilities to reproduce existing structures through interaction with the social system. In any case, structures do not exist independent of the agents' knowledge and their conduct in daily activities (Giddens, 1984). However, as tribal members and TLs take trouble to conceal

land sales as well as to assist migrants to register at the GRDC through backdated payments, these procedures do not only secure and legitimize the migrants' land rights under the system of customary land tenure in Domboshava, but also dispose themselves of tribal land rights. While tribal members secured the land rights of migrants, they made themselves land rights insecure at the same time.

Backdating land levy payments to some extent fulfills the requirements for land transactions. Migrants sacrifice their capacities to obtain receipts for a land levy because section ninety-six of the RDCA Chapter 29:13 of 2002 empowers RDCs to impose a land levy on rural land 'owners' for development purposes. Both tribal and migrants pay an annual land levy of US\$3.00 to the GRDC, which they equate to land title. Similarly, the Ferlo of Senegal pay taxes to legitimize their stay (Berry, 2002). From the GRDC's perspective, a land levy is a form of a development fund as highlighted by Pinto a Local Government Officer at GRDC when he said, *"The levy or land levy is for the development of their area such as road construction and tar maintenance. It is a form of community contribution to the development of their communal area"*. Significant variations on the land levy paid by different households of Domboshava were apparent. Some households paid US\$3.00, others paid US\$5.00, whereas some paid US\$6.00. Some community residents paid the land levy directly to the GRDC while others paid through their VHs (see Box 5.7). This made the relevance and credibility of the land levy questionable. Given the number of migrants in Domboshava, records on land levy kept by some TLs particularly VHs remain suspect if ever they exist. However, tribal members of Domboshava were content with paying a land levy for land they regarded as 'theirs', and that belonged to their tribal ancestors. Clearly, people are not imprisoned by the structures and are always capable of escaping rules and sanctions through agency in order to achieve their goals. "Rules are often bent and broken in practice and in the process of their own change" (Malinowski, 1926 and Bailey, 1969 in Cheater, 1990:192).

#### 5.6.4 Gerrymandering

Tribal members of Domboshava believe that individualized land transactions such as direct land sales in this communal area were a result of gerrymandering by the TLs. Land issues are never apolitical (Okoth-Ogendo, 2008). In Zimbabwe, land issues dominate political debates. In Domboshava, land sales were instruments of canvassing political followers. Traditional Leaders expected to garner popularity and political support from migrants through direct land



sales. Direct land sales turned a crucial vote buying technique. Generally, African Chiefs use land transactions in exchange for tribute and allegiance from their kin and migrants (Berry, 2002). According to Marylyn the WC for Domboshava, a late VH cum Headman intended to enlarge his political constituency by settling many migrants during his tenure as the WC for Ward 4. Runga an ID also stated that, *"The late Headman was the major culprit. He was selling land for a mission. He wanted to create an empire and a following for himself. It was a way of canvassing votes. He was looking for popularity in the event of an election. Now all VHs are doing the same. They are also looking for support from the majority"*. These findings also concur with VH Shungu in his revelation when he said that even when the late Headman died the situation never improved.

There is a strong relationship between gerrymandering and the dynamics on accessing land rights. In Domboshava, gerrymandering emerges as agency used by some TLs that seek to perpetuate individual goals through individualization of land rights rather than through the structure. Migrants were expected to pay allegiance and patronage to those with traditional and political power, and to 'vote correctly' as a way of returning 'favours' on land rights obtained through direct land sales. In Zimbabwe, political parties assert their powers in communal areas through TLs (Makura-Paradza, 2010). In any case, people that live in rural areas are a powerful base for different political ideologies (World Development Report, 2004; Vaddiraju, 2013). Similarly, many Kikuyu of Kenya accumulated many migrants during the colonial era thereby advancing their tribal territories and influence (Berry, 1992). However, gerrymandering does not always guarantee positive votes for the political parties supported by the TLs. In Zimbabwe, voters are free to vote for political representatives of their choices.

#### 5.6.5 Language, relationships, and power

Proliferation of individualized land transactions such as direct land sales in Domboshava is possible through the clandestine and secretive nature of the practice. In Goromonzi District, villagers were often reluctant to tell the true stories behind their land transactions (Marongwe (2008). Village Heads revealed that information surrounding the various land sales in Domboshava only surfaces when conflicts arise between sellers and buyers. The sellers of land never state that they sold land but 'cut' a piece of their land and 'gave' it to migrants. In these discourses, there is no mention of 'sell or 'buy'. On the other hand, migrants regard such gestures as acts of benevolence from tribal members. Migrants always said they were

‘given land’ and not ‘bought land’. This shows the linguistic power of speakers as they shift the meaning of conversations away from others (see Box 5.10 below). Code switching and metaphoric expressions in land transactions allows direct land sales to take place without detection.

Box 5.10: The role of language in land transactions

“People are not consulting the VH about the land sales. The whole activity is shrouded in secrecy. You only see a built house. That’s when you get to know that land has been sold, and that there is a migrant in the village. When you inquire about the new homestead, that is when the seller tells you that it is one of their relatives, in-laws, or ‘*sahwira*’ who came to settle, and that they ‘gave’ them a piece of land. They will never say ‘sell’ but ‘give’ as if it was for free. After this, they will process their deal through the VH, Headman, and Chief. The VH does not have the authority to sanction demolition of built structures. This can only be done by the RDC. Demolitions of built structures also calls for compensation of building materials used. It is very tricky. The problem of land sales emanates from the dollarization that the country has just embarked on. It is very difficult to make money these days. Selling land is one of the easiest ways of making money particularly for the unemployed and the rural poor. It is quick money” (VH Tenzana, Domboshava, 2012).

Source: Field data, (2012).

From Giddens (1984)’s views, community residents as agents in land transactions are purposive agents who have reasons for their conduct, and could even lie about these when asked to elaborate. The use of language in land transactions influences the conduct of community residents within the structure of the system of customary land tenure. Language therefore plays a significant role in land transactions such as land sales through producing and reproducing the procedures that regulate land allocation. Through language, ordinary conversations are tailor made to suit the context of individualized land transactions (particularly direct land sales) as obligatory acts of benevolence towards migrants. In this regard, both tribal and migrants go beyond the structure by means of language as a resource that disseminates the structure on one hand, while it facilitates and conceals land sales on the other. This also demonstrates creativity and capability of tribal and migrant members in using language to practice individualized land transactions such as direct land sales.

Tribal members often falsify relationships with migrants in order sell land (see Box 5.10 above). According to TLs and tribal members of Domboshava, land rights in this communal area are supposed to be allocated to tribal kin and their relatives (see Box 5.2 and Box 5.3). ‘Strangers’ such as migrants could obtain land rights only on exceptional occasions (Cousins, 1990). Migrants were however referred to as tribal members’ extended families such as in-laws, cousins, nephews, uncles or a ‘*sahwira*’ meaning a close friend (see Box 5.10 above). Blessings from Mungate Village also revealed that, “*In order to get this land my husband sealed the deal with his friends at the beer hall. The sons of the VH are our friends. They brokered this land for us*”.

Forged relationships not only conceal, but also facilitate direct land sales. Migrants who share the same totems with tribal household members easily relate with tribal members, and assimilate into the community fabric. For example, Pepukai and Chenai were not related to the owner of a homestead in Domboshava but they shared the same totem. In the culture of the Shona, people relate through totems, tribes, and marriage (Holleman, 1952; Bullock, 1972; Vambe, 1972; Bourdillon, 1976; Beach, 1980; Beach, 1994; Taringa, 2006). Totems symbolize one's descent and tribe (Beach, 1980; 1994). In another case, Prim from Mungate Village originally comes from Beitbridge. Her mother-in-law networked a piece of land for her and her husband since the mother-in-law's sister was married to a VH in Domboshava. Resources such as power, connections, and influence with TLs strengthen migrants' bargaining positions during negotiations on land transactions. These dynamics were also employed by many people in Masvingo to get land for resettlement (Scoones *et al.*, 2010). Totems, language, and the relationships these create are significant in constructing social relationships necessary to negotiate access to land rights through individualized land transactions in Domboshava. As such, evading sanctions that regulate access to land rights under customary tenure through relationships between tribal and migrants and adapting to common language are new forms of proceeding with individualized land transactions created by agency rather than structure under the system of customary land tenure. Clearly, commoditization of land rights under customary land tenure in Domboshava is embedded in social relationships (cf. Mathieu *et al.*, 2003).

Findings from Domboshava also demonstrate the role of power as a resource in facilitating individualized land transactions such as direct land sales. Buyers of land such as migrants revealed that they bought land from tribal members commonly referred to as '*vana vemuno*' - meaning tribal children or tribal descendants from this community. This term is also used not only to distinguish the status of tribal members from migrants, but to reinforce the power relations between tribal and migrants in Domboshava. The tribal status of community residents of Domboshava is part of the structure that determines access to customary land rights. Tribal members use their tribal status to justify their conduct, their participation in land transactions, as well as their legitimacy and authority over customary land rights. Tribal power enables tribal members to dominate migrants as these community residents participate in individualized land transactions such as direct land sales. Tribal land rights not only presuppose power to transact land in this communal area, but reinforces differential status of tribal members and migrants in terms of class. Through invention of tradition, TLs refer to

their tribal status (that allows them to allocate land to migrants) to assert their control and dominate migrants, as well as land rights in Domboshava. Distinct categories of ‘powerful’ tribal members because they legally hold customary/tribal land rights on one hand, and ‘powerless’ or ‘landless’ migrants that lack such rights on the other hand clearly exist. From the perspective of tribal members of Domboshava, migrants remain ‘second-class’ community residents although they enjoy access to common property regimes. The knowledge of community residents about the procedures on land allocation under the system of customary land tenure gives tribal members leverage to engage in different forms of land transactions, and to mobilize resources such as power, relationships, and language to capacitate their conduct to their advantage (cf. Sewell, 1992).

#### 5.6.6 Documentation

Community residents used various forms of agreements of sale and other kinds of documentation as proof of land exchanges through direct land sales. Better-off migrants preferred to use individually drawn documents and lawyers, whereas poor migrants in most cases made oral agreements and assertions with witnesses. This practice is also prevalent in most countries within sub-Saharan Africa (Mathieu *et al.*, 2003; Peters, 2007). For example, in Burkina Faso such documentation is referred to as “*proces - verbal de palabre ...* a hybrid and legally organized procedure at the interface between administration procedures and customs” (Peters, 2007:13). In Cote d’Ivoire, documents in land transactions are designated as “paper receipt (*papier reçu*)”, “sale convention (*convention de vente*)”, or “concessionary agreement (*accord de concession*)” (Chauveau & Colin, 2010:93). Use of agreements of sale and lawyers entail possession of information as a resource about the legal provisions on the procedures of accessing customary land rights, and the ability to behave creatively (cf. Giddens, 1984; Sewell, 1992). For example, Whatmore and Lyn said, “*When we sealed this deal, we engaged lawyers. There is an agreement of sale*”. Yvonne from the same village also said, “*There are no lawyers involved in this case, but there is an agreement of sale*”. Yet, according to VH Tenzana, procedures on land transactions are “*a clean process that should not involve money, lawyers, or agreements of sale. People must come to us as VHs. We will take them to the Chief’s Council (dare) where we welcome them. They must bring their gifts there. During this procedure, we dedicate their presence in this communal area to our ancestors. When they (migrants) die, they can be buried here. The process is now distorted*”. In the minds of TLs, allocation of land is contingent to their approval. Yet, the use of different kinds of documentation such as agreements of sale, as well as engagement of

lawyers in land transactions demonstrates not only the modernization of procedures that regulate access to land rights in this communal area, but a response to changing conditions in securing land tenure rights within a peri-urban communal area undergoing transformation.

This approach to securing land rights in Domboshava is fast gaining relevance in direct land sales between tribal and migrants as opposed to traditional procedures that are largely oral. However, both documentation and oral procedures serve the same purpose on legitimizing migrants' stay through assertions. The documents and legal agreements merely affirm but do not guarantee secure land rights (Mighot-Adholla & Bruce, 1994; Simbizi *et al.*, 2014). Land rights acquired outside the system of customary tenure are insecure, until they become customary through fulfillment of requisite procedures.

In the minds of migrants of Domboshava, proof of land 'ownership' rights is definable through written agreements, and not necessarily autochthonous land rights. Yet, according to TLs of Domboshava, tribal land rights are defined through the lived experiences of tribal members, their relationships with particular land parcels, as well autochthonous tribal status (cf. Bromley & Cernea, 1991; Cousins, 1990; Nyambara, 2001; Bennett, 2008). Walker (2012:816) posits that, "Proof of land ownership and community membership lies not in written texts but in ... the 'lived social processes' of the local and the everyday, as well as in an historical testimony that is primarily oral". Relegation of oral and traditional forms as inauthentic and preference of modernized procedures such as agreements of sale and engagement of lawyers indicates that community residents of Domboshava as agents of land transactions are simply abandoning unresponsive structures they regard as obsolete. The system of customary land tenure as a structure is being transformed through agency as community residents adopt modern practices in practicing land transactions and securing land rights in light of the peri-urban circumstances that characterize their community. These 'new' methods of securing land rights are simply attempts to provide 'official backing' to land transactions that proceed through agency rather than the structure (cf. Nyamu-Musembi, 2006).

## 5.7 Conclusion

While most communal residents of Domboshava made efforts to follow the system of customary land tenure, new ways of transacting land were accepted thereby institutionalizing

a process of adaptation, and adoption in exchanging land. People abandoned procedures they regarded as obsolete or unnecessary. Given the circumstances of change in Domboshava communal area - new households came because of migration and urbanization - community residents use agency to move beyond the structure to non-conformity, and break the set rules on land transactions. This means that the structure that regulates land transactions does not constrain people's behaviour, but enables them to access, hold, enjoy, and dispose of their land rights and other resources under customary tenure.

There is no single story about the dynamics of the on-going land transactions in Domboshava. The different accounts narrated by the different respondents were disparate. However, the reasons and ways in which the land transactions were negotiated are more or less the same. Individualized land transactions such as land sales are often disguised. The prevalence of individualized land transactions in Domboshava can be traced not only to the period between 2002 and 2012, but also to the period before this decade. The various land transactions are dependent upon the local circumstances. They are complex. The growing prevalence of land sales and rentals in Domboshava over the past years ten years is thus directly related to forces of urbanization and migration in terms of the attractions of people from elsewhere in Zimbabwe to this peri-urban communal area in proximity to the capital city.

Under these circumstances new conflicts, local contestation of authority, and legitimacy within the existing status quo on customary system of land tenure on allocation of land and land rights clearly emerge. Key figures in land transactions were males who hold primary land rights in this communal area. This group of people represents '*vana vemuno*' - children/descendants of this community. Women remain powerless to exercise land rights in land transactions unless they are widowed or divorced in the case of tribal women. Whereas, migrant women particularly divorced women could exercise their freedom to participate in renting and buying land as long as they had money to purchase and to rent land, or remain unmarried. This demonstrates the structural relevance of land transactions as women negotiate for access to land rights in a male dominated system. These dynamics of land transactions in Domboshava demonstrate that the concepts of land transactions and customary land tenure in peri-urban communal areas are misnomers as individualization of land rights in these areas are on the increase (cf. Peters, 2004). Community residents of Domboshava as agents in land transactions were using the structure/agency dialectics to

practice land transactions under the system of customary land tenure in innovative ways. They established new rules and new institutional arrangements in response not only to changing circumstances within a peri-urban communal area, but to suit the dynamics of land transactions themselves. Along the way new identities and new forms of securing land rights emerged.

Although the poor entered into land transactions because they lacked money, the land seekers/buyers with money to purchase land also lacked land and secured land rights. Such vulnerabilities among these categories of people were determined by the context within which land transactions took place in Domboshava. Belonging to a class in Domboshava is not necessarily the possession of material aspects commonly used to define social differentiation, but secure land rights within the tribal/migrant categories. This is of more relevance to this communal area than status or wealth. Thus, the rich/poor or better-off /worse-off dimensions are figuratively associated with secured land rights under customary tenure. Tribal members regard land rights as more important compared to beautiful gated houses built and owned by most migrants as pointed out by VH Shungu when he said, *"Some talk of beautiful houses...built where? Who gave you the permission? Where is your residence permit?"*

## Chapter 6 Residents and stakeholders' perceptions of Rural Development Policy

### 6.1 Introduction

This chapter highlights the complex nature of RDP, and the community residents' knowledge and perceptions of this policy. The chapter addresses my second research question namely: What are the community residents' perceptions of RDP in the peri-urban communal area of Domboshava? My assumption was that there exist procedures that characterize implementation of RDP insofar as land transactions were concerned. In order to address these research concerns, I used the LPS framework (see Figure 2.2 in Chapter 2). My focus is to evaluate the influence of land transactions and household survival strategies on RDP, and not the other way round as shown in the arrows in Figure 6.1 below.




Figure 6.1: Influence of land transactions and household survival strategies on RDP  
Source: Field data, (2012).

During the interviews, respondents were asked to state their views on what they knew, and how they felt about RDP in Domboshava. I evaluated community residents' perceptions of RDP in terms of voice, exit, and loyalty - criticism or disregard of, or compliance with policy. According to Hirschman (1970), exit means quitting, voice means speaking out, and loyalty means sticking with the situation.

The second section examines how the community residents and other stakeholders interpret RDP in Domboshava, and the third section sets forth the views of community members of Domboshava about RDP or the absence of this policy. The fourth section brings to the fore the community residents' perceptions of policy as RDP end-users.



## 6.2 How Rural Development Policy is interpreted in Domboshava

Local government officials at district, province, and ministry levels revealed that the concept of RDP in Domboshava is synonymous with settlement and land tenure issues. According to these officers, Goromonzi Rural District Council (GRDC) lacks a precise or written document on RDP for Domboshava as revealed by Pinto when he said, *"In terms of an existing RDP for the district, we do not have anything in place because you know the hardships being faced by the government in terms of resource allocation. We should be having some district profiles. We do not have those profiles but we should have them. We were going to have development plans of what is going to be done in the district. At the moment we do not have ..."*. Hart, a Local Government Officer in the Ministry of Local Government Rural and Urban Development (LGRUD) also acknowledged this situation (see Box 6.1 below).

Box 6.1: The concept of RDP in Zimbabwe

"There is no RDP in place. We have an unwritten RDP. We do not have a single comprehensive RDP, but pieces of what constitutes RDP. These pieces come from different Acts as components of what is defined as RDP, for example, the RDC Act, RTCP Act, CL Act, TL Act. ... The challenge is on how to manage influence of urban development into rural areas situated in the peri-urban, for example, Domboshava and Seke. All communal land in Domboshava and Seke was sold to migrants. ... It is messy. It is now impossible to recover the communal character of these spaces. We are therefore committed to produce an RDP to solve these issues. ... Planners must consider coming up with a unique model on settlement particularly for Domboshava. ... The decision to upgrade Domboshava is there, but it can bring consequences in terms of displacements. Currently, there is no framework for most RDPs in Zimbabwe particularly on displaced households. That is why we are being challenged to come up with an RDP that is distinct. ... In Zimbabwe, communal land is complex. It has its value held by and presided on trust. It is non-transferable until it becomes urban. We can declare state land urban to give title to it. ... Tribal authorities have no power to allocate land. The RDC is the land authority, and does that on behalf of the state. Tribal authorities should however be consulted on land issues, but must not allocate land. The role of tribal authorities is to work with local authorities in identifying vacant spaces and recommending settlement of migrants. This is not happening. ... Although the CL Act makes reference to compensation, this may not be feasible. Compensating things like belonging and disruption of networks is difficult. For example, with the case of Tokwe-Mukosi community, and Murowa Diamond Mine in Midlands province. Currently there is no uniform way and obligations in compensating victims of displacement. ... Seke is even uglier. We are going to engage the police later after deliberating these issues once more. In Seke, we have already used the police. It is difficult to solve the problem" (Hart, Harare, 2013).

Source: Field data, (2012).

Local Government Officers (district, province, national) are the custodians of RDP on behalf of the state. Rural Development Policy for Domboshava and other communal areas of Zimbabwe in general is informed by a plethora of statutes on land and settlement, and an array of institutions on land administration (see Box 6.1 above). This creates complexities on the RDP direction not only for Domboshava, but also for other peri-urban communal areas in Zimbabwe. Conversations with renowned scholars on RDP discourses in Zimbabwe such as Conrad Brandy of the University of Zimbabwe, Des Gasper of the Institute of Social Studies in Netherlands, and Bert Helmsing of the Institute of Social Studies in Netherlands - in 2012 -

confirmed the absence of written RDP documents for rural areas of Zimbabwe. The concepts of RDP and land tenure thus presuppose each other as abstractions that define the social structure (cf. Stones, 2005; 2009; Blaikie, 2010).

### **6.3 Community residents and stakeholders' views about Rural Development Policy**

This section demonstrates how different categories of respondents in Domboshava understood RDP. My focus is on the implementation of RDP in Domboshava, and how this was interpreted given the complexities that surrounds land tenure issues, and diverse interests of agents. I pay attention to differential aspects in terms of gender, generation, and class among community residents of Domboshava.

#### **6.3.1 Views of community residents**

Tribal and migrant members of Domboshava understood RDP somewhat similarly. Tribal members understood RDP as the upgrading of the communal area from rural to urban. Upgrading of Domboshava from rural to urban was one the GRDC's prioritized RDP strategies (see Box 5.7 in Chapter 5). The practice of upgrading of rural settlements to urban was introduced in Zimbabwe as a way of bringing urban services closer to the people that live in rural areas (Munzwa & Jonga, 2010). In the case of Domboshava, upgrading of the communal area was meant to harmonize urban spread (cf. Munzwa & Jonga, 2010), to stop individualized land transactions (particularly direct land sales), and to curb sprawl. The structural context of customary land tenure and this RDP strategy were meant to frustrate tribal members' actions on land transactions such as land sales on one hand, while advancing and facilitating the purpose of the GRDC on the other. The practice of settlement upgrading in rural Zimbabwe has been dormant for years due to budgetary constraints faced by many rural local authorities.

Tribal members of Domboshava understood RDP in terms of not only access, but also the adequacy of services such as water through the sinking of boreholes, the provision of electricity, and the resurfacing of dirt roads by the government as the service provider. Communal areas suffer from poor services and infrastructure provision (Cousins, 1990). For example, some tribal residents of Domboshava had flush toilets while others lacked proper toilet facilities, yet every household in any communal area in Zimbabwe is expected to own a

pit latrine commonly referred to as 'Blair' toilet. Households that did not have toilets relied on their neighbours' facilities. Most tribal members got access to electricity many decades ago, but others still did not have access to electricity. Households without access to electricity used wood fuel as a source of energy mainly for domestic consumption. In terms of water provision, tribal members used unprotected communal sources such as streams, dams, springs, rivers, as well as protected sources such as community boreholes, open wells, and deep wells (*mughodhi*) - a synonym for a mine. Deep wells are protected wells, whereas open wells are rather shallow and unprotected. Local experts in most cases drill deep wells. It cost US\$80.00 to drill a deep well. Open wells are dug manually. Able-bodied youths carry out the task in most cases. Sometimes it is done through hired labour. Most community residents perceived well drilling charges as exorbitant, hence they resorted to communal or shared water sources. Tribal members that did not have water wells at their homesteads also obtained water from their neighbours' wells. Sharing water wells among tribal members is a way of strengthening social relationships, and helping others in difficult circumstances because water is obtained for free. Observations however revealed that most water wells and 'Blair' toilets were haphazardly sited in proximity to each other particularly in Zimbiru Village. Under these circumstances, water from wells was at risk of contamination as revealed by Pakurai in Box 6.2 below. In any case, unplanned settlements expose people to unhygienic and insecure environments (Quan & Payne, 2008).

Box 6.2: Views on sanitation provision in Domboshava

"People are so crowded especially those close to the shops. In terms of disease outbreak, it can be a disaster. It is a health bomb. These people use open wells. The borehole was only repaired recently. It is very unfortunate that those who buy land have money, and they are able to build beautiful and standard houses with toilets. Some homesteads do not have toilets. Some use pit latrines that collapse especially during this rain season. If you take a look at those homesteads, they do not have toilets (pointing). We were surprised that the school fence was cut each time it was repaired. People from those homesteads use a hole in the fence to gain entry into the schoolyard to access the school toilets. Now, the school gate is left open to allow people to use the school toilets. The NGOs should provide toilets like what is happening in other communal areas. The RDC's intervention should prioritize toilets at each homestead" (Pakurai, Domboshava, (2012).

Source: Field data, (2012).

Some tribal members also understood RDP in terms of solutions to land sales. They looked up to the state for intervention as highlighted by Eve of Chogugudza Village who said, "*In terms of policy, we only get projects and not electricity. I participate in a flower project led by an NGO called Kaite. ... We want the government to stop land sales in our communal areas. We want our land to remain ours*". Tribal members viewed RDP in terms of projects offered by other service providers such as NGOs. They also viewed RDP in terms of adequate supply of services such as electricity.

On the other hand, migrants from Domboshava also understood RDP in terms of settlement upgrading of the communal area from rural to urban, as well as access to services such as functional toilet facilities, clean water, and electricity. Migrants in Domboshava used flush, pit, and 'Blair' toilets. They also shared toilets with their neighbours in some cases. Migrants like most residents of Domboshava obtained portable water from wells. Some migrant households without water wells used common property resources such as boreholes, springs, gullies, weirs, streams, and in some cases their neighbours' wells. Fetching water from neighbours' wells is also vital in strengthening social networks for migrants. However, some migrants sold water to those without wells as revealed by Blessings of Mungate Village who said, *"If you do not have a well of your own, you buy water from others. Some people are mean. They sell water. They make you pay for fetching water from their wells. Yes, people sell water here"*. The practice of selling water in Domboshava is rather exceptional since water in communal areas of Zimbabwe such as Domboshava is regarded as a common property resource obtainable free of charge. Water charges are synonymous with urban water provision through urban municipalities. These findings show not only individualization of common property resources such as water, but that the communal area is undergoing transformation. This behaviour is therefore a response to circumstances that surround provision of services in terms of RDP, as well as the encroachment of urban influence into this communal area. The behaviour of community residents demonstrates the role of social relations and complexities from local institutions, and how these were constructed and shaped by residents' views on RDP. In this regard, community residents as agents used their capabilities go beyond the structure and exit the system of customary land tenure by selling common property resources such as water to fellow residents through agency. This also demonstrates voice from community residents to the service providers (the GRDC) about inadequate water provision in this communal area.

Observations revealed that migrant households in Domboshava used more than one source of energy such as electricity (though limited in supply), wood fuel, generators, and solar panels. Before the decade of crisis, it was unnecessary for households to have multiple sources of energy due to availability of electricity and firewood (cf. Chiumbu & Musemwa, 2012). Domboshava like the rest of Zimbabwe experienced erratic supply of electricity due to load shedding. Depletion of firewood from the local forest resources was apparent, and obtaining firewood was a challenge. Some communal residents supplied firewood for sale. Migrants without access to electricity expect to benefit from the government's Rural Electrification Programme (REP). According to Local Government Officers at GRDC, the Government of

Zimbabwe prioritized access to electricity in rural communities through the REP as a way of correcting imbalances in service provision between rural and urban areas. The non-authorization of new connections of electricity in Domboshava under the REP was viewed by migrants as a failure of RDP in meeting its objectives.

In summary, access to services such as water, toilet facilities, and electricity was not only unevenly distributed among tribal and migrants, but also inadequate. New homesteads belonging to migrants built on dwalas in most cases used flush toilets with septic tanks since sewage reticulation is absent. Both migrants and tribal members obtained water from deep wells situated at their homesteads, as well as common property sources such as boreholes, streams, dams, rivers, and streams. There were only two water boreholes in this communal area. Photograph 6.1 below shows a community borehole in Domboshava.



Photograph 6.1: A community borehole in Murape Village  
Source: Field data, (2012).

The concerns of some community residents with regards to water sources were not necessarily about access, but the distance between the water points and their homesteads. For example, the community borehole shown in Photograph 6.1 above is situated in Murape Village considered central to most villages in this communal area. Community residents

particularly migrants whose homesteads were far from the borehole complained about the distance between their homesteads and the borehole. For example, Edzai from Mungate Village said, *"We do not have a well of our own. We get water from our neighbour's well. We pay for water. They charge us each time we go to fetch water. The community borehole is too far from this homestead"*. As result, distance from water sources creates inequalities in terms of access to clean water. Access to water sources situated at homesteads apart from those regarded as common property resources is thus a symbol of status among community residents.

Water from boreholes and to some extent water from wells was presumed cleaner compared to tap water in cities such as Harare since water borne diseases (cholera and typhoid) once reported in Harare were never experienced in Domboshava (see Chiumbu & Musemwa, 2012). The desire to access services such as water, sanitation, and electricity was higher among migrants than tribal members. Most migrants built their homesteads on arable land, grazing land, wetlands, and in some cases in forests where established infrastructure in terms of roads, boreholes, and shops was absent. Both tribal and migrants understood RDP in terms of adequate service provision by the GRDC as well as upgrading of the communal area from rural to urban. In addition, tribal members understood RDP in terms of ending land sales and community projects, while migrants looked forward to provision of land for housing through the same policy. These circumstances demonstrate not only polarized expectations from RDP by tribal and migrant members, but also the divergence of their understanding of RDP.

While both tribal and migrants concurred in understanding RDP in terms of access to services, there was no homogeneity not only on issues of land sales and provision of land for housing, but also on the context in which the community residents expected to access these services. Priorities of tribal and migrant members were rather different. Tribal members wanted to obtain services within a rural context while migrants expected the services within an urban context. There was conflict of interest between tribal and migrant members on what RDP entailed, as well as their expectations from the policy as policy end-users. Whatever form RDP took in Domboshava, it was not understood as text, but as a process in terms of what it could achieve (cf. Somekh & Lewin, 2011). Tribal and migrant household members' understanding of RDP thus demonstrates expectations rather than the substance of policy. Community residents of Domboshava were rather concerned with 'getting things done' in terms of access to and adequate provision of services in this communal area (cf. Bebbington, 1999). Both held a rather normative view of RDP. Understanding of RDP was therefore



localized and embedded within the everyday and lived experiences of the community residents.

Under these circumstances, class differences associated with service provision; that is, due to differences in access to water, electricity, and toilet facilities were apparent within the tribal/migrant categories as well as within the tribals and migrant categories separately. For example, community residents without water wells regarded their neighbours with water wells as better-off. On the other hand, those without access to electricity regarded community residents with access to electricity as better-off. Community residents that used generators and solar panels for energy were also regarded as better-off since they purchased such gadgets compared to those that used wood fuel as their only source of energy. Use of alternative sources of energy apart from those commonly used is therefore a measure of status.

### 6.3.2 Views of Traditional Leaders

Traditional Leaders held a different understanding of RDP. Village Heads understood RDP in terms of lack and not necessarily presence of policy. They understood RDP in terms of the strategy to upgrade the communal area from rural to urban, as well as programmes and community projects such as improved methods of farming through the Department of Agriculture Technical and Extension Services (AGRITEX). Traditional Leaders also understood RDP in terms of preservation of cultural sites in this communal area. These comprise Domboshava Hill, Ngomakurira Caves, a sacred spring in Murape Village, a sacred woodlot at Domboshava Hill, and a sacred spring at Chikomo Chavaroyi in Zimbiru Village. Traditional Leaders are the custodians of cultural sites in communal areas.

Furthermore, TLs also regarded a project on a proposed boarding school for primary and secondary education in this communal area as RDP. There were only three primary schools and two secondary schools in Domboshava. Institutions of learning were overwhelmed by the ever-increasing enrolment of pupils due to population increase in this communal area. Traditional Leaders also regard RDP as the ability of the government and the local authority (GRDC) to end individualized land transactions (particularly direct land sales) in this communal area, as well as provision of communal services such as cattle dipping. From their perspective, RDP was understood in terms of its content, and outcomes from the policy

implementation process. Village Heads' understanding of RDP entails improved living conditions in this communal area through state programmes, projects, and strategies. In sum, TIs' understanding of RDP was largely constructed by collective interest derived from shared community expectations as opposed to individual household needs.

### 6.3.3 Views of other stakeholders

Stories from other stakeholders revealed multiple meaning and often contradicting views of what constitutes RDP in Domboshava. These stakeholders were frontline service providers in Domboshava on behalf of the state. Stakeholders' understanding of RDP was largely shaped by their roles and relationships with other stakeholders within the service delivery chain. The GRDC was the authority responsible for RDP on behalf of the state, and community residents were the ultimate policy end-users. Stakeholders' understanding of RDP was largely situational and contingent. They were more concerned about the input-output relationship on what they politically, technically, and professionally regarded as goals of RDP strategies on their intended policy end-users.

Elected officials such as the Ward Councillor (WC) represent the needs of the electorate that vote them into power. Ward Councillors are crucial links between residents and the GRDC. The WC for Ward 4 of Goromonzi District (Domboshava) understood RDP in terms of drilling and rehabilitation of water boreholes. One of the community water boreholes needed rehabilitation since it malfunctioned. The WC also understood RDP in terms of implementation of development projects such as construction of more schools, and provision of toilet facilities at a local clinic, community residents' participation in civic education<sup>7</sup>, solutions to increased land sales, and donor-driven services such as provision of food aid, seed, and fertilizer. The WC also understood RDP as the ability of local institutions to network with other service providers in the ward such as NGOs and representatives from government departments, as well as a tool for finding solution to development challenges more generally in this communal area. The WC's views were shaped by her relationship with other stakeholders and her place in the system of land administration under the system of customary land tenure where traditional values on one hand, and the conventional expectations on the other hand compete and run parallel rather than complement each other.

---

<sup>7</sup>During fieldwork in 2012, the community consultative process on the new national constitution for Zimbabwe was in progress.



Thus, adequate service provision and expectations from the RDP remain important not only to the electorate, but to political appointees such as the WC.

Local Government Officers at district, provincial, and national levels understood RDP in terms of strategies such as upgrading settlements from rural to urban (see Box 6.1). In Goromonzi District, the RDC upgraded Acturus Mine, Ruwa, and Juru Townships from rural to urban in the late 1990s. No other settlements in this district were upgraded within the period covered by my study. The practice of upgrading settlements from rural to urban aims at urbanizing communal areas in line with the provisions of section three of the RDCA Chapter 29:13 of 2002. With the case of Domboshava, this approach as an RDP strategy does not necessarily focus on what community residents expect from RDP, but on what laws expect in terms of land and settlement in this communal area. Local Government Officers also understood RDP in terms of statutes on land and settlement, delivery of services, and development projects. Rural Development Policy translates to spatial issues reflected on master plans. A master plan for Domboshava was prepared in line with the GRDC's proposal to upgrade the communal area from rural to urban. The master plan provides for the orderly and planned layout of physical structures in this communal area concomitant with urban spaces. Local Government Officers' understanding of RDP was largely constructed on what could be, and not necessarily what should be relevant to community residents in terms of RDP.

From the perspective of Local Government Officers, the mixed and unplanned settlement pattern emerging from villages of Domboshava conflicted with the principles of planning on conviviality, city imaging, and the beauty concomitant with international destinations such as Harare. As such, beautification of Domboshava was inescapable because of the location of this communal area in the periphery of the capital city. The Local Government Officers regarded Domboshava as one of Harare's frontiers because "we approach cities from their rear" (Mabin, 2012). Thus, settlement upgrading as an RDP strategy was justifiable as a response to settlement growth of Domboshava, and the urban expansion of Harare into its periphery. This justification however ordinarily seeks to preserve the image of Harare, and not necessarily that of Domboshava. On the other hand, by trying to beautify Domboshava and to avoid 'another Epworth in the making' as highlighted by Fah a Local Government Officer at GRDC, land use planners sought to restructure the traditional system of customary land tenure through the proposed master plan since Domboshava was 'degenerating' into an

'informal settlement' like Epworth. Thus, settlement upgrading as an RDP strategy was meant to ameliorate the prevalence of land sales.

In the minds of Local Government Officers, settlement upgrading and its allied activities was a rationalization they had to maintain. This demonstrates the power of the GRDC and its employees as agents of the state in implementing what they regard as RDP for communal areas (see Box 6.1). The GRDC as an agent of the state had the power to propose and impose the settlement upgrading strategy for purposes of the beautification of rural settlements. In the event of resistance by community residents, section thirty seven of the RTCPA Chapter 29:13 of 2002 authorizes the GRDC to use necessary force in order to achieve the planning ideals. The above provisions from the RTCPA Chapter 29:13 of 2002 are somewhat different from the situation of South Africa where custom provides a range of protection on land rights including that rights may not be withdrawn or people evicted without the matter having been debated at various levels of society (Love, 2008).

Since the situation in Domboshava presents uncoordinated and overcrowded residential structures from the perspective of GRDC, this meant application of clean-up measures akin to ORO/OM of 2005. This strategy involves the demolition of structures perceived as discordant, illegal, and substandard in physical and planning terms. Ironically, the situation in Domboshava emanates from previous displacements through the FTLRP of 2002, OM/ORO of 2005 and possibly 2012 in Epworth (see Tibaijuka, 2005; Kamete & Lindell, 2010; Kamete, 2011; Kamete, 2012; Nehanda Radio, 2012). The Local Government Officers' approach to RDP could possibly resuscitate a vicious cycle of displacement. Quan & Payne (2008:4) also point out that, evictions "lead to the creation of new unauthorized settlements elsewhere, only moving the problem from one location to another at great social, economic, and occasionally political cost". In this regard, GRDC's understanding of RDP does not take cognisance of the causes behind the status quo, and is rather divorced from the lived experiences, as well as polarized expectations of community residents from RDP. For example, tribal members expect improved access to services within a rural context and an end to land transactions, whereas migrants expect improved access to services, and access to land for housing within an urban context. The proposal to upgrade Domboshava from rural to urban is sensitive particularly during the election season as highlighted by Fah when she said, *"as long as we have elections coming we cannot carry out such programmes. How will the politicians take it?"* (also see Box 6.4). The GRDC deliberately delayed implementation of the settlement

upgrading strategy in Domboshava in order to avoid frustrating voters. The GRDC as an agent of the state is cautious and reluctant not to undermine or upset the political power base of the state - the rural electorate. The election season therefore is a critical determinant of when the RDP strategy could be implemented, as well as what it could achieve, and not necessarily what community residents expect.

In addition to the spatial dimension, planners also understood RDP in terms of statutes on land and settlement since there was no distinct RDP for Domboshava (see Box 6.1). Absence of a comprehensive RDP document for Domboshava was attributed to lack of commitment and adequate resources by the GRDC. According to Pinto, inefficiency of the GRDC was a result of little or no incentives for its workforce, as well as lack of skill. The situation at the GRDC was not exceptional since in most instances the service sector in Zimbabwe experienced brain-drain during the decade of crisis - the 2000 to 2010 period (Chiumbu & Musemwa, 2012). Most of the RDCs in Zimbabwe are generally struggling financially to provide incentives that attract skilled personnel, and to provide adequate services to rural residents. According to Pinto, the RDCs in Zimbabwe in most instances rely on other service providers such as NGOs, individual donors, politicians, and government departments for the implementation of policy strategies. Thus, RDP was understood in terms of projects initiated by other service providers on behalf of GRDC, for example, the construction of roads, schools, and clinics.

Professionals such as civil servants that work for government departments located in Domboshava are vital caretakers of RDP accountable to community residents. For example, the department of AGRITEX provides technical and extension services to community members on farming since Domboshava is generally famous for its vleis gardens. From the perspective of such professionals, RDP was understood in terms of community projects, the establishment of market linkages for peasant farmers. However, the projects could not absorb all potential beneficiaries and thus were inadequate. Most households were unable to participate in the AGRITEX projects due to their limited land holding capacities. This shows that RDP was selective in its implementation. On the other hand, officers from the Department of National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe (DNMMZ) regarded RDP as a means to preservation of national monuments such as Domboshava Hill and Ngomakurira Caves. From this perspective, RDP focuses on conflict resolution between the DNMMZ and community residents of Domboshava. The conflicts emanate from poaching of

protected tree species such as 'misasa' (*brachystegia spiciformis*) and 'mitondo' (*julbernadia globiflora*) for firewood; and the destruction of a buffer that separates the monument and the communal area by community residents as revealed by Mharidzo an officer at the DNMMZ when he said, *"What is happening in the community is affecting conservation of this monument. Community residents poach firewood, stones, and sand from the monument. Some force their livestock into the monument. This causes deterioration and depletion of natural resources within the monument. Another thing concerns the lack of respect of the monument boundary. Community residents always extend their boundaries into the buffer zone. For example, these houses near us are built within the monument boundary. Our work focuses on heritage management, but now it is more of management of conflict as TLs approve land sales in the villages"*. These views about RDP were shaped by the DNMMZ's conservation effort of national monuments and not necessarily what communal residents valued as RDP. Tribal residents of Domboshava regard the monuments as 'their' cultural sites that define 'their' tradition and spirituality, and not sites of national relevance per se. In summary, there was no consensus on what other stakeholders understood as RDP in Domboshava.

#### **6.4 Perceptions of RDP - criticism or disregard of, or compliance with policy**

In this section, I discuss community residents' perceptions of RDP in Domboshava. Community residents comprising tribal members, migrants, and TLs were the policy end-users likely to be affected by the RDP outcomes. Since there was no consensus on what these groups of people regarded as RDP, when they found themselves stuck within a policy context they perceived as vulnerable and dysfunctional, they reacted differently to their situation. My interest was in determining what happened to these community residents when they found themselves making use of RDP within a peri-urban context, and their perceptions when such policy did not apply. Implementation deficiencies from RDPs translate into constraints and structural barriers that prevent community residents as agents from acting the way they want. According to Hirschman (1970), when community residents perceive the policy context as inefficient, worthless, or short of their expectations, they are capable of choosing alternatives from exit, voice, loyalty, or any of their combinations to express their dissatisfaction. Such reactions are significant in seeking redress, as well as to "put pressure from below" for the state to intervene (cf. Razavi, 2003:26). I demonstrate the perceptions of the community residents of Domboshava from a vulnerability context of a peri-urban communal area where land transactions were on the increase, and where RDP was applied as an official solution to this rural problem. Community residents as agents had "a large stock of knowledge of how to

go on or how to get things done”, as well as “how to accomplish their objectives” (Haralambos & Holborn, 2008:889). By employing exit, voice, and loyalty strategies community residents used their agency to “challenge existing power relations and the ways that things were commonly done” (Cleaver, 2007:230). This relates not only to the implementation of RDP strategies by the local authority (GRDC), but to the regulation of customary land transactions through statutes on land and settlement. There exist ‘nested layers’ of power relations in implementation of RDP comprising traditional authority, the local authority, and the state.

According to Bekker & Leilde (2003), being organized, knowledgeable, and influential (power) helps to elicit attention within undesirable policy situations. Community residents of Domboshava therefore needed information on how RDP promotes their well-being since the impact of information gaps cannot be ignored (cf. World Development Report, 2004). For example, while community residents viewed RDP in terms of service provision, legally RDP translates into statutes on land and settlement. Since community residents of Domboshava lacked such information on RDP, they were bound to perceive the policy the best way they understood it. This creates diverse perceptions of policy. When policies fall short of the expected outcomes, they are often regarded as worthless by the policy end-users (Bekker & Leilde, 2003; World Development Report, 2004).

#### 6.4.1 Perceptions of tribal household members

Land sales influenced RDP through the proposal by the GRDC to implement the settlement upgrading strategy. Box 6.3 below illustrates how tribal members in Domboshava perceived the RDP strategy on settlement upgrading. Zimbiru Village is the initial target for settlement upgrading due to its proximity to Harare. The GRDC regarded Zimbiru village as a development node for Domboshava because of Mverechena Shopping Centre situated at the centre of this village. These circumstances define the status quo, as well as the vulnerability context in which RDP and land tenure issues are experienced in Domboshava. Box 6.3 below thus demonstrates that RDP strategies that do not take cognisance of local and rural context of tribal members are undesirable.

## Box 6.3: Perceptions of RDP by tribal members

“Rural development policy is only welcome if it respects us and our culture. We want to talk to the Council. We have heard about their plan to change this communal area into a location. A big NO to a location. Write it in capital letters. Yes, a big NO! *Ivhu iri*, this soil is our land (winnowing soil). We died for this land. Our ancestors are buried here. We will never watch and let the Council take our soil from us. We will fight. I was one of the delegates to the GRDC concerning the idea of a location. We told them that we do not want to be removed from this area. We gave them our report. Look, we have shops. These were never built by the Council. Mvarechena started that business centre on his own. He sold firewood in Harare. Every day he cycled to Harare to sell firewood, and that is how he got money to build those shops. We saw it growing from one shop until it is like what you are seeing today. Where was the Council? If they change this area to a *rukisheni* (location) where will they put the graves of our ancestors? We want ‘*ruzevha*’ not *rukisheni*. Yes, we have electricity. We pay for it. It is not for free. All this is local effort. We want development in our area, but not *rukisheni*. Leave us as we were. We want to be free. We do not buy water. We do not pay for refuse collection. We pay our levies annually and not monthly. No to *rukisheni*. Yes, a big NO!” (Revai, Domboshava, 2012).

Source: Field data, (2012).

Tribal members of Domboshava view settlement upgrading as a hidden agenda by the local authority to dispossess them of their tribal land rights. In their minds, the proposal is meant to generate revenue to the benefit of the GRDC. Yet, from the perspective of Local Government Officers, land in rural areas or reserves (*maruzevha*) “... is called a reserve meaning land that is reserved for future development. They do not have title to their land. Reserve means land reserved for government purposes or local authority purposes. That's why we always come up with alternative settlements” (Fah, GRDC, 2012). As a result, tribal members sell ‘their’ land to migrants ahead of the proposal to upgrade the communal area. By selling land directly to migrants, tribal members seek to benefit somehow (perhaps in monetary terms) from their customary land rights. Tribal members are thus purposive in their action. Redza and Yeukai of Zimbiru said it was better to sell their land and ‘eat their money’ (see Box 5.7 in Chapter 5). This was confirmed by Runga one of the IDs who stated that people thought it was better to get money through selling land that did not belong to them rather than to lose it when time comes. As tribal members sell land to migrants, in essence they simply transfer their land rights, and not necessarily land because communal land in Zimbabwe belongs to the state. According to Toulmin & Quan (2000), such circumstances are very tricky because the state continues to ‘own’ land despite local changes. Yet, tribal members perceived their customary land rights as unchallengeable in Domboshava. The problem lies within the levels of decision-making between the traditional authorities and the GRDC who both claim to have power to allocate land to migrants, yet in legal terms the GRDC on behalf of the state overrides the powers of localized structures (see Box 6.1; cf. Cousins, 2008a). However, rules under the tradition and customs of tribal members of Domboshava remain authoritative and provide a sense of

legitimacy in regulating individual behaviour in land transactions although these rules are largely unwritten and unspoken (cf. Cousins, 2008b).

As land transactions influenced RDP, tribal members interfered with the structure that regulates customary land tenure in Domboshava. The behaviour of tribal members also demonstrates resistance not only to an RDP strategy they regarded as undesirable, but also to the structure on customary land tenure they regarded as confusing. Shifts from the status quo that defines the terms of customary land result in resistance particularly if these changes fail to capture people's needs (Quan & Payne, 2008). As a result, tribal members were simply exiting the structure or rules that regulate customary land tenure as described in statutes on land and settlement, as well as the values of the Shona culture. Statutes capacitate and constrain (at the same time) individual freedom of tribal members to exercise their land rights. In the minds of tribal members of Domboshava, exiting these institutions is a worthy cause because the structure failed to protect their customary land rights against possible dispossession by the GRDC. Tribal members are content with their rural and tribal status that allows them to practice inheritance for their descendants.

Perceptions of tribal members of Domboshava to settlement upgrading were largely shaped by familiar and similar experiences in the Seke communal area as highlighted in Box 5.7 in Chapter 5. Runga also pointed out that the GRDC had *"the power to move people from this area just like they did in Seke Chitungwiza. It used to be communal land. ... The area was turned urban. ... If one sells land at least they benefit other than lose everything like what happened in Seke ... The real owners of land were removed while the migrants took over the land."* From Hirschman (1970)'s perspective, other consumers' behaviour as well as the market experiences from elsewhere influence the decision and choices made on the market. The perceptions of tribal members of Domboshava were influenced by the similar experiences from Seke. According to Stones (2005), agents always choose to act and to react through improvisation and innovation of ways often influenced by their past.

Tribal members from Zimbir, Mungate, and Murape Villages that preferred direct land sales to other kinds of land transactions ahead of settlement upgrading employed dynamics of voice and loyalty to demonstrate their preference of their rural status to urban. They collectively voiced their concerns and disapproval of the settlement upgrading strategy through organizing themselves and sending village representatives to negotiate with the

GRDC since the RDP strategy was perceived as shrouded with uncertainty (see Box 6.4 below). By voicing to the GRDC, tribal members sought redress on an RDP proposal they regarded as disruptive and undesirable.

**Box 6.4: Perceptions of RDP**

"The pegs for the location were put during the Smith regime before the liberation war. After 1980, politicians wanted to advance the idea of a location and it was towards election. They decided to halt the plan for fear of losing the election. People from this area once went to Council to voice against a location. The rumour is back this year. It is still going on. During election season, it is not discussed. One of the VHs has been our spokesperson to Council. We sent him to GRDC several times concerning that issue. He has so far managed to represent our concerns. But then, he is now sick and weak. The Council wants us to move from here to Gokwe. We don't want. At this age, do you expect us to start new homesteads? We cannot. ... We once went to Muzarabani looking for fields but we came back. There is no water. It is all rural poverty there. This was in 2004 to 2007. ... Our story is interesting but very sad. We no longer have any inheritance for our children. If a location is important, why can't the government get farms like what happened through the Land Reform Programme? Some farms are not viable. We used to have fresh mealies from some of these farms. Now the farms are full of fresh weeds. The land is underutilized. Shame! Yet, they want to take this land from us and change it into a location. Why take 'our' land from us?" (Redza and Yeukai, Domboshava, 2012).

Source: Field data, (2012).

Although, settlement upgrading paves way to planned activities on the master plan, the layout for residential, commercial, industrial, and institutional spaces on the master plan are inadequate to cover the ever-increasing population of Domboshava. For example, the master plan covers only two hundred and eleven residential units. According to Local Government Officers, residential structures deemed substandard are likely to be excluded from the new layout. This means possible exclusion of residential structures of some tribal members whose residences are old and dilapidated (see Photograph 5.1). Yet, residential structures in rural areas are never built according to plans. There exists no layouts for rural settlements in Zimbabwe. In the minds of tribal members, creating order and beautification in Domboshava through the settlement upgrading strategy is a false justification for imaging Domboshava. Tribal members perceived Domboshava as a tribal asset and a common property resource that had to be collectively protected against upgrading since the proposal is likely to disrupt the tribal structures, and render their customary land rights useless. Thus, Walker (2009:474) notes that,

"Laws and policy prescriptions that underestimate the distinction between the economic and the social values of land run the risk of being implementable. What is important here is that the social meanings of land are constructed differently at different levels - individual, household, community, nation - and the interplay among these different levels is significant for determining how rights-based claims to land get framed by ordinary women and men".



Enthusiasm by tribal members to continue pressing for reprieve from the settlement upgrading strategy through voice was affected by the ill-health of the village representative (see Box 6.4). From Hirschman (1970)'s perspective, a weak voice does not make impact. In this regard, a weak voice was a result of vulnerabilities such as ill-health. This also weakened collective action in seeking audience with the GRDC. While tendency is to reduce voice when a deteriorating situation improves (Barry, 1974; Bekker & Leilde, 2003), in this case disappearance of voice is a sign of 'sinking' as people drown within the vulnerable RDP context. On the other hand, reduction of the voice strategy also means that tribal members were 'shouting' at the GRDC without getting a response.

Perceptions of tribal members also reveal the multiple meanings, and the symbolic relationship they derive from land. As in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, tribal members of Domboshava base their rights to land on history and indigeneity (cf. Peters, 2010). Thus, the tribal members' perceptions of the RDP strategy on settlement upgrading illustrate collective emotional attachment to land figuratively referred to as '*ivhu*' meaning soil in vernacular Shona. By winnowing the soil, Revai demonstrated the symbolic significance of tribal land rights and belonging both in spatial and institutional terms (see Box 6.3). "Belonging is a rational concept which entails among other things attachment to a group or place ..." (Mujere, 2011:1125). In this case, customary land rights and attachment to the community of Domboshava characterizes the belonging of tribal members. Belonging is embedded not only in the structure on the system of customary land tenure, but also in the social system. For tribal members, homesteads and graves of their ancestors dotted around the schoolyard for Zimbiru Primary School suffice as evidence in legitimation of their claims to autochthony as the case in Masvingo (see Mujere, 2011). Thus, the meaning of land goes beyond its use value, to a linkage between generations, and as "a potent element for social identity" (Walker, 2003:116).

This symbolic relevance of land, 'soil', or '*ivhu*' is associated with the lived experiences of tribal members. These perceptions also illustrate a common identity of tribal members of Domboshava through making reference to "we", and the role of land as a unifying force between the dead and the living - "we died for this land" (see Box 6.3). These emotional sentiments originate from the mystical beliefs of tribal members in the presence of their dead in form of ancestors; and that these ancestors live amongst them through burial (Gelfand & Hannan, 1959; Taringa, 2006; Mujere, 2011). This affirms the declaration by a Yoruba Chief

who said, “I conceive that land belongs to a vast family, of which many are dead, few are living, and countless numbers are yet unborn ... land is God-given and cannot be alienated” (WALC, 1916:31-2 in Berry, 1992:342). This is also similar to what happens in Western Burkina Faso where customary land tenure relations are linked to ancestors and the supernatural beings through their living descents (Mathieu *et al.*, 2003). For tribal members of Domboshava, land is therefore a critical source of community cohesion that carries both communal and individual interests of the users (cf. Mathieu *et al.*, 2003; Cousin, 2008b). Land is an important productive resource, as well as a potent symbol of their past (Cousins, 2008b). Clearly, land in Domboshava is not only a spatial entity that defines the territorial boundaries of the communal area, but a physical asset and entitlement used by community residents and passed to the next generations. Land is rather a determinant of “socio-physical realities that are significant to human well-being” (cf. Walker, 2009: 467).

The major concern of tribal households of Domboshava about the settlement upgrading strategy was the risk of possible relocation to an unspecified place elsewhere - possibly to Gokwe - a dry and tsetse fly infested communal area located almost 350kilometres northwest of Harare (Box 6.1; Box 6.3; Box 6.4). The recurrent question asked by tribal members particularly those advanced in age and those with ailing health was - where do we go from here? However, possible relocation of households to new places shows that the individual and collective land rights of community residents of Domboshava were rather insecure. According to Cousins (2008b), displacement of communities affects individuals’ land rights in many ways. In Domboshava, forced eviction and relocation of tribal households implies displacement of these people from their homeland. Through settlement upgrading, tribal members risk being ‘pushed out’ of their community through clean-up measures akin to ORO/OM of 2005 - a complete departure from the rational comprehensive models in planning to politics of muddling through (Lindblom, 1959; McLaughlin, 1987). Forced eviction of households and the destruction of dwellings has been the general response to substandard and informal structures by local authorities in Zimbabwe (Kamete & Lindell, 2010). Clean-up measures were also applied in Gutu in Masvingo on households that settled themselves on ungazetted land (Mujere, 2011). Police destroyed houses and burnt down crops to force people to return to their original places (Ibid). Direct land sales by tribal members of Domboshava are therefore a voice to the GRDC and an expression of discontent and non-approval of what they viewed as unwarranted clean-ups and possible relocation. It is an attempt to solicit attention from the GRDC as well as the state.

From the GRDC's perspective, policy processes on settlement upgrading aim at improving access to services such as water, electricity, and sanitation - largely regarded as RDP by communal residents of Domboshava. However, tribal members from Domboshava perceived services initiated by the GRDC as inferior (see Box 6.3). Tribal members were thus not excited about services accompanied by clean-up measures. Generally, local authorities were failing to provide adequate services to residents in most urban centres, particularly in Harare due to budgetary constraints experienced by the municipalities (Chiumbu & Musemwa, 2012). Effectiveness of the tribal members' voice to bring the desired change also depends upon the GRDC's willingness to listen and to respond to community concerns. This impasse emanates from regarding laws as RDP. Laws give the GRDC more power to control the practice of RDP. Rural Development Policy thus is contingent. Since the election season is a crucial determinant in the implementation of RDP strategies, tribal members need to amplify their voice during such moments. In the end, effectiveness of voice is more to do with timing, and not necessarily willingness of the GRDC to respond.

Having seen no reward in voicing Redza, Yeukai, and their household members once left Domboshava for Muzarabani communal area after selling all their land and belongings (see Box 6.4). Muzarabani is a communal area located about 300kilometers from Harare in the northern part of Zimbabwe. The purpose of this move was to find a 'better' place with abundant fields and to build a new homestead. These findings represent an exit strategy as an alternative to a failed voice. Redza and Yeukais' household members stayed in Muzarabani for only four years. Lack of clean water, unfavourable weather, rural poverty, and harsh living conditions contributed to the abortion of the exit strategy. Clearly, exit strategies are worth exploring after voice failures, but in some instances they culminate into 'wrong choices'. This leads to regret. However, failed alternatives remain rational. Exit strategies demonstrate that agents are reflexive in their action. For example, after reflexive monitoring of their own conduct, and as part of their practical consciousness, the household decided to return to Domboshava (cf. Giddens, 1984; Kaspersen, 2000). From Hirschman (1970)'s perspective, an emotional attachment to the status quo, for example, the lived experiences of tribal members were setbacks for the success of the exit strategy. Although this household sold its land in Domboshava, the tribal status of its members and their social networks and possibly relationships with the common property regimes enabled them to claim their tribal space they once denounced in Domboshava. This space carries their lived experiences. Thus, execution of an exit strategy is often difficult for most tribal members because they largely

regard Domboshava as their homeland laden with tribal histories, experiences, relations, ancestral graves, and developed through local effort (see Box 6.3).

Voice and exit strategies by tribal household members in Domboshava did not bring the desired change therefore loyalty naturally took precedence. According to Hirschman (1970), the loyalty strategy entails keeping exit at bay, while activating voice and continuing to campaign for change from within. Loyalty also entails to 'simply stick it out' or 'grin and bear it' while advocating for redress (Hirschman, 1970; Barry, 1974; Bekker & Leilde, 2003). Tribal members advanced in age and had little ability to build new homesteads from scratch elsewhere demonstrated loyalty. The elderly argued that their roots and tribal identity belong to Domboshava, and that they invested social capital and networks in this communal area (cf. Chambers & Conway, 1991; Ellis & Biggs, 2001; Cahn, 2002; Cousins, 2007; Scoones, 2009). Leaving Domboshava for other places elsewhere was inconceivable since their ancestors were buried in this communal area. In this regard, loyalty entails vigilance while waiting and adapting to the deteriorating conditions in anticipation of uncertainties, and not necessarily change for the better.

With reference to projects as RDP, tribal members of Domboshava particularly those from Zimbiru Village reacted by resisting projects they perceived as suspicious. According to Hirschman (1970), when people are suspicious of new products they are likely to resist or boycott the products by simply not buying them. The GRDC intended to install piped water in Zimbiru Village. As much as tribal members in Domboshava looked forward to sources of clean water closer to their homesteads, the piped water project was perceived as a deceptive precursor for a settlement upgrading strategy that needed to be resisted, rejected, and boycotted. According to Ida and Kudzai of Zimbiru village, *"In 2002 the Council wanted to bring piped water in this area. It was without our knowledge. People refused the development. The excavated sand was restored before the pipes were laid down. Construction of the water pipe is still unfinished business. People are very scared about the idea of a location"*. Some tribal members from Zimbiru Village were not excited about the water project. They viewed the project as a form of interference with their rural life, and not necessarily RDP. They believed in RDP strategies that valued their communal status even though they were fully aware that the communal area was situated in a peri-urban zone. These tribal members therefore campaigned against the piped water project from within through collective resistance and direct confrontation with Local Government Officers from the GRDC.

Chasing away Local Government Officers and removing land surveyors' pegs not only demonstrates defiance and confrontation, but loyalty to the structure that defines the system of customary land tenure. Similarly, community residents of Gokwe demonstrated resistance and anger by attacking officials from the local authority when the government introduced a villagization programme in this communal area (Nyambara 2001). Villagization programmes involve relocation and reorganization of land use of rural households in terms of arable, grazing, and residential (Potts & Mutambirwa, 1990). Elsewhere in northern Zimbabwe, residents of Dande communal area resisted a development project that aimed at land redistribution (Spierenburg, 2004). In another case, the community residents of Binga sabotaged a project by the RDC through selling communal land to migrants (Dzingirai, 2003). These reactions are similar to those of Kgatleng residents of Botswana against the imposition of legal rights on boreholes when the land administration authority failed to convince people about the project, and the residents were generally skeptical about the project (Peters, 1994). In Kenya, the Luo tribe clashed with government over the land titling programme because the Luo perceived the programme as a threat to their belonging and ancestral land rights (Shipton, 2004 in Mujere, 2011). According to Robins (1995) in Nyambara (2001:278), peasants have always resisted relocation of homesteads and consolidation of villages, and this took form of "attacks on state officials who come to peg new homes, the removal of pegs from home fields and yards, making the officials object of witchcraft, boycotting meetings, and so on". In these cases, projects from the local authorities "caused a great deal of anger" since these were literally after land dispossession and displacement of people from their ancestral 'soil' (Peters, 1994:21).

The perceptions of tribal members of Domboshava were thus shaped by possible dispossession, loss of land rights, and many freedoms (cf. Cousins, 2008a). The 'freedoms' of tribal members entail autochthonous land rights, choices to bequeath land and other property rights through inheritance, choices to exchange land, choices to access the commons, and above all the right to belong to this communal area (see Box 6.3). The issue of belonging in rural communities of Zimbabwe is attached to the 'soil' figuratively 'owned' by all including the ancestors (see Mujere, 2011). Similarly, South Africans often perceive loss of freedom through land dispossession (Cousins, 2008a). Loyalty to customary land tenure by tribal members of Domboshava is rather a forced alternative and not necessarily a rational initiative in order to preserve their freedoms as well as belonging (cf. Hirschman, 1970).

While some tribal members remained loyal to the system of customary land tenure in Domboshava, they perceived their ancestors would supernaturally ‘fight’ on their behalf against the GRDC’s undesirable proposal on settlement upgrading. According to Runga, *“the spirit of Nehanda hinted on re-organizing the chieftaincy of this area and return Buru’s chieftaincy. We shall see. ‘Ivhu iri’ (this soil) will fight back for us. In the future, where we are heading, the spirits, the ancestors, the real owners of this land are definitely going to fight back. Council will definitely lose because they do not own anything here. We will get back our land”*. This revelation demonstrates powerlessness of tribal members against the upper hand of GRDC in land administration through statutes on land and settlement. However, in the minds of tribal members of Domboshava, the living generations have a significant obligation to ‘resist’ land dispossession, to safeguard tribal land rights, and to preserve cultural heritage and values on behalf of the past and future generations. Land in this communal area is regarded as an inheritance from the ancestors that needs to be protected against dispossession, and not necessarily a state property. Ancestors are an important institution with an obligation to wage invisible battles for their descendants in the culture of the Shona (Bullock, 1972; Vambe, 1972; Bourdillon, 1976; Nyambara, 2001; Taringa, 2006). Resistance to RDP is therefore a spiritual warfare - a battle of the invisible. Land, ‘soil’, or ‘ivhu’ signifies not only the existence of the community, but their spirituality. For tribal members, customary land rights were thus regarded as more important than being referenced as urban. Customary values and land rights form the basis of entitlement to land, as well as the identity of individuals and communities within the system of customary land tenure (Love, 2008). The cultural assurances among tribal members are sources of strength to pressurize the GRDC from below to do something about an undesirable policy context.

Since Mungate, Murape, and Chogugudza Villages were located outside the proposed master plan, the tribal members in these villages felt reprieved from possible clean-ups and relocation - at least for the moment. According to Hirschman (1970), such behaviour also demonstrates loyalty. The locational ‘advantage’ of the other villages outside the master plan provided tribal members with a sense of ‘security’ although settlement upgrading also threatened their collective tribal land rights. Some tribal members of these villages paid little attention to the RDP on settlement upgrading. Most of them were ‘not worried’ about RDP in general. This demonstrates loyalty strategy as these tribal members remained vigilant on what happened in Zimbiru Village concerning settlement upgrading. Loyalty did not only entail patience, but vigilance on unforeseeable outcomes from RDP.

In some cases, loyalty was rather a forced choice, for example, with tribal members from Mungate and Murape Villages. The Headmen stayed in these villages. Even if tribal members were not comfortable with the status quo, they were afraid to overtly disapprove RDP. For example, Maniti from Murape Village said, *“I am not worried about RDP. Do you think it is possible to go against your leaders? What they propose we just follow. We do not have power to oppose them”*. In such instances, some tribal members believed that RDP strategies were initiatives from their TLs. According to Hirschman (1970), these tribal members were simply ‘staying put’. Being loyal was rather an obligation, and not necessarily an alternative. These tribal members demonstrate a wait and see attitude, which entails being loyal and silent at the same time.

#### 6.4.2 Perceptions of migrant household members

Migrants perceived settlement upgrading and provision of services as worthwhile aspects of the RDP. In their minds, settlement upgrading could lead to improved living conditions concomitant with urban spaces. In this regard, household survival strategies influence RDP as migrants look forward to upgrading of Domboshava from rural to urban. Many migrants were rather uncomfortable with and uncertain of their migrant status associated with squatters by the GRDC since they were unregistered through the formal procedures. Migrants that bought land through individualized land transactions were legally categorized as squatters (CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002; TLA Chapter 29:17 of 2001). In the minds of migrants, settlement upgrading would secure their land rights since in most cases these migrants were victims of displacement through the FTLRP and OM/ORO. Securing land rights in Domboshava is a challenge for migrants as this process is inbuilt within the procedures of land allocation under the system of customary land tenure. Yet, most migrants obtained land outside these procedures. Migrants that went through the long and bureaucratic process of fulfilling both the traditional and the statutory requirements secured their land rights within customary land tenure.

If Domboshava turns urban, the context allows for formal registration of individual land parcels with the GRDC, and land would be considered as urban with title. Land titles are “preemptive”, that is, they prevent the state from allocating the same pieces of land to others (Migot-Adholla, 1994:25). As such, land titles confer absolute and legal private property land ownership rights to migrants. Migrants of Domboshava therefore expected to obtain land titles through settlement upgrading. In Kenya for example, land titles were effectively used to

curb direct land sales and urban sprawl. However, some scholars often view land titles as a precursor to inequitable distribution of land as those with money, information, power, and authority tend to influence the process in their favour ahead of many people that intend to benefit particularly the poor and women (Qaun, 2000; Razavi, 2003; Tsikata & Whitehead, 2003). Land titles are likely to reinforce men's control and 'ownership' of land rights and perpetuate disappearance of married women's rights (Nyamu-Musembi, 2006).

Migrants that did not register their land at the GRDC were thus worried about their migrant status, compared to those that were registered as demonstrated by Danai and Tino who said, *"If they make this settlement urban, it becomes an advantage to some of us who bought land. We do not have title deeds to this land. This will enable us to have title to our land. We will be able to have land titles. We want title to our land"*. This quote demonstrates the fear of unregistered migrants about possible eviction from Domboshava because they lack secure land rights not only definable through autochthonous land rights in Domboshava, but also through formal registration at the GRDC. Clearly, secure land rights are much more important to migrants in Domboshava than the dynamics and agency they used to access land through direct land sales (cf. Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Similarly, most beneficiaries of land through the FTLRP regard their land rights as insecure because they lack title deeds (Cliffe *et al.*, 2011; Matondi & Dekker, 2011; Scoones *et al.*, 2010). Farmers in Mwenezi that lack 'papers' as proof of land ownership also fear eviction (Mutopo, 2011). Although land titles secure land rights, in Kolkata, Egypt, Cambodia, and Rwanda people were evicted despite secured land rights (Payne *et al.*, 2009). This means that the notion of secure land rights is a mere abstraction that can be understood within the context in which applied.

Migrants regard Domboshava as urban due to its proximity with Harare. However, Domboshava is rural since the peri-urban area is categorized under communal areas in policy terms (CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002). Migrants however support settlement upgrading from rural to urban because they retain their tribal status in their homelands. Such land rights legitimize their land claims even after migrants' long absence. Migrants had nothing to lose in terms of autochthonous land rights in Domboshava through land dispossession by the GRDC, but probably could gain titled and private land rights through settlement upgrading. According to Hirschman (1970), migrants' perceptions typify neither voice nor exit, but rather loyalty to RDP. Loyalty in this regard, translates to waiting in anticipation for an improvement. Being loyal also entails patience (Hirschman, 1970; Ayes, 1971; Barry, 1974;



Dowding *et al.*, 2000). For migrants, waiting patiently for transformation from rural to urban is a significant and a calculated alternative rather than to use overt strategies such as voice or to exit. Engaging voice was somewhat tricky and difficult for some unregistered migrants because of their 'illegal' migrant status in Domboshava. Migrants were simply sticking with the status quo while waiting for change come. Loyalty also provides an explanation to the standard and state of the art houses constructed by migrants in Domboshava. Such modern and often gated structures are unlikely to be demolished during clean-up exercises. These residential structures stand a better chance of being integrated into the GRDC's master plan. Runga, one of the IDs, also pointed out that the only alternative for community residents to secure their land rights was through building permanent residential structures. Demolition of physical structures involves compensation to the owners (RTCPA Chapter 29:12 of 2001; Box 6.1). This is often an insurmountable task for RDCs in Zimbabwe as they struggle financially to meet most of their budgetary requirements (see Box 6.1).

Construction of permanent and modern structures by migrants is however a way of securing land rights, and to remain safe from the GRDC's non-planning interventions akin to ORO/OM associated with the RDP strategy on settlement upgrading. Secured land rights are therefore obtainable not only through building permanent and modern physical residential structures, but also through fulfilling local procedures on land allocation even outside customary procedures. This situation however shows that insecure land rights do not affect the investment confidence of migrants, but instead boost their investment confidence through expectation on land titles and perceived integration into the 'urban plan' through settlement upgrading. However, Cliffe *et al.* (2011) believe that insecure land rights often dampen and reduce investment confidence of people.

Some migrants from Mungate and Murape Villages were unconcerned with RDP. They were too busy with personal activities to notice RDP activities. For example, in Mungate Village some migrants such as urban professionals, accountants, university lecturers, and civil servants had little time at their disposal to engage in community activities. In their minds, RDP was sheer politicking as stated by Whatmore and Lyn when they said, "*We need better policies that improve the lives of all people in the community otherwise we are so much occupied by our own activities. Some of these things do not necessarily benefit everyone. We need to work for our own progress*". In such instances, migrants concentrated on better and satisfying issues in their personal lives as opposed to RDP initiatives they regarded as worthless. Putting more effort on other pressing

personal issues translates to loyalty. These circumstances however reveal complexities concerning people that do not necessarily show commitment to the status quo, but quit (exit) while disregarding dissatisfaction (cf. Dowding *et al.*, 2000). In this case, the deteriorating policy situation is a matter of concern to those interested in communal issues.

Since most migrants bought land regarded as the commons particularly in Murape Village, they perceived settlement upgrading as a noble RDP proposal. In their minds, the strategy was likely to mediate both land titles and services. Since these migrants obtained land as a favour from the late Headman, they could neither exit nor voice the RDP context as their behaviour could be perceived as ungrateful and disobedient to authority. Loyalty was rather a forced alternative associated not only with dynamics of accessing land outside the system of land tenure, but protection from vulnerabilities associated with deviance from the expectations of those in power. According to Hirschman (1970), it is wise to remain loyal in order to avoid risks and vulnerabilities associated with overt choices - why expose yourself? Overt choices, such as voice could be associated with rebellious conduct. This can attract sanctions in one way or another, and thus loyalty takes precedence.

On the other hand, migrant lodgers of Domboshava that were entitled to use homesteads and land as part of their rental terms, were not interested in RDP issues. The perceptions of migrant lodgers were disparate and were shaped by their 'landlessness' as a form of vulnerability. The perceptions of migrant lodgers, and some migrant widows were somewhat constrained by their land holding capacities as highlighted by Chipso and Muneni, the two widows from Murape Village who stated that, "*RDP is good but we want land to build our own houses. What development do we need if we do not have land?*" Migrant lodgers and poor migrant widows felt somehow alienated by the RDP context. Community residents of Domboshava perceived migrant lodgers as 'temporary' residents, and thus settlement upgrading was of less significance to them. The perceptions of migrant lodgers exhibit concern about their landlessness, and not necessarily RDP issues. Landlessness is a form of vulnerability that not only limits, but bars individuals particularly migrant lodgers as RDP end-users to benefit from projects regarded as RDP. Landlessness inhibits their sense of agency as RDP end-users because land rights are a prerequisite for full entitlement to policy initiatives in this communal area. Clearly, RDP in Domboshava is ad hoc and selective in its implementation. Migrant lodgers neither applied exit nor voice about the unsatisfactory conditions on the

policy market, but remained loyal to the status quo while patiently and vigilantly waiting to access land rights in this communal area.

However, migrants could only buy land from other villages and not in Chogugudza Village since the VH did not approve direct land sales. This limits the scope of migrants from Chogugudza Village and from other villages as well to exercise their freedom to access land through direct land sales. As a result of their migrant status, most migrant lodgers in Domboshava lack interest in RDP. Their major concern is to obtain land for housing. Customary land rights determine, shape, and construct perceptions of migrants about RDP strategies in Domboshava. Loyalty emerges as a rational, as well as a value-oriented alternative.

#### 6.4.3 Perceptions of Traditional Leaders

Perceptions of TLs about RDP in Domboshava were shaped by their interests and needs as community residents as well as custodians of RDP. The TLs demonstrated that RDP was only supportable when it was in line with the collective interests of the communal residents as highlighted by VH Beta when he said, *"The relationship between the Council and this community must be mutual .... Both sides should work together. We need the Council because those are professionals. We do not want to separate ourselves from the professionals; otherwise, we will not get far. Council often comes with programmes. We only take what is good for us, and they must appreciate when we need to substitute their ideas. If Council leads people perfectly, people will respect it"*. While TLs value projects and programmes as RDP in their communal area, these TLs perceived RDP strategies that did not respect their traditional role in land allocation as worthless. Yet, conflict exists between TLs and Local Government Officers with regards to this role (see Box 6.1). By allocating land to migrants through direct land sales, TLs of Domboshava exit undesirable RDP that strips them of power, to exercise authority, and to control land under the system of customary land tenure. Traditional Leaders felt that the GRDC flexed its political muscle to grab communal land through dictating projects for communal residents. Yet, statutes on land and settlement empower the GRDC as a local authority to appropriate land for development purposes. These statutes on land and settlement recognize TLs as custodians of land in communal areas, while rendering them powerless at the same time. Thus, statutes on land and settlement emerge as sources of conflict and insecure land tenure, and hence the resentment of TLs to settlement upgrading (cf. Migot-Adholla & Bruce, 1994).

All VHs from Domboshava like their tribal subjects were against an RDP strategy that aims at confiscating tribal land through settlement upgrading. In their minds, such development strategies could benefit outsiders and not necessarily tribal members. If Domboshava turns urban, the GRDC can sell land to outsiders. Traditional Leaders used voice and loyalty concurrently as a way of reacting to the RDP strategy on settlement upgrading. Their major focus as custodians of land on behalf of the tribal community members was to preserve tribal land rights for the current and future generations. On the other hand, some TLs like VH for Chogugudza Village demonstrated loyalty to customary land tenure by not approving permanent transfer of land rights to migrants but renting. This behaviour is an attempt to convince other TLs, as well as GRDC to remain loyal to customary tenure.

Generally, TLs regard RDP as worthwhile if it perpetuates the traditional and community values of the customary land tenure system. For example, the proposed project on constructing a boarding school on arable and grazing land in one of the villages of Domboshava was perceived as a ploy by the GRDC to grab communal land from tribal residents. Traditional Leaders viewed the proposal as a lame excuse, a defense mechanism, and a naïve justification to land grabbing by the GRDC. The policy proposal was also viewed as one of the GRDC's revenue generation strategies, and thus had to be rejected since community benefits from the project were perceived as absent. Traditional Leaders engaged voice. Some VHs were in support of the project while others were against it. Traditional Leaders were rather divided in their reaction. On the other hand, the GRDC was insisting on this project. According to Hirschman (1970), collective voice makes impact, while divided voices are often weak, inaudible, and unable to produce desirable change in redressing unsatisfactory policy.

Perceptions of TLs to RDP were shaped largely by their role as custodians of land on behalf of communal residents and the state in this communal area as illustrated by VH Shungu when he said, *"We do not belong to the party (the MDC). We belong to the government"*. This illustrates the relationships between TLs of Domboshava and the state. Traditional Leaders in Zimbabwe like in South Africa and in Ghana are instrumental in mobilizing support for political parties they support (Cousins, 2008a; Ubink, 2008 in Peters, 2010). Traditional Leaders emerge as political constituency in organizing the rural electorate and the formation of alternative democratic structures for the state (Cousins, 2008a). In Zimbabwe, TLs are recognized as a legitimate institution through the Constitution of Zimbabwe, as well as the TLA Chapter

29:17 of 2001. Traditional Leaders in Zimbabwe legally are civil servants. As a result, TLs of Domboshava seek to please the state, as well as their subjects with regards to their perceptions of RDP. By virtue of being representatives of the state, TLs are expected to comply with RDP. This implies loyalty. In this case, loyalty becomes an obligation for TLs, and not necessarily a deliberate choice. As much as TLs disagreed with the GRDC's RDP strategy on settlement upgrading, and the proposal on construction of a boarding school on 'their' land, these TLs were expected to support these initiatives on behalf of the state. Resistance to GRDC's policy strategies is imprudent because TLs are legally on the government's payroll and are entitled to monthly stipends. By keeping TLs as salaried appointees of the state, the government seeks to eliminate discontent, and increasingly use them to build rural constituencies (Alexander, 1999). Clearly, TLs are more concerned with pleasing the state than with claiming their lost powers in land allocation. However, by sanctioning land sales in Domboshava, TLs exit the structure that defines the system of customary land tenure.

In summary, the perceptions of community residents of Domboshava were not homogeneous, however, they converge on viewing rural development strategies such as settlement upgrading and access to services as RDP. The reactions of tribal and migrants were shaped by the location of villages, conflicting interests on upgrading of the communal area from rural to urban, as well as land rights among these groups of people. Tribal members expect better services within a rural context while migrants expect these services within an urban set-up. Tribal members thought access to services translate to RDP and not necessarily the urban influence from Harare. On the other hand, migrants expect services and the shift from rural to urban as RDP. The reactions of TLs on RDP reveals powerlessness. They could neither overtly express voice nor exit. They need to please both the state and their subjects. While tribal household members were simply reacting to changing circumstances without taking into consideration what policy said about these changes, TLs were simply protecting their image from attack by the community members, as well as the state.

In terms of generational differences, most old tribal widows were unconcerned about RDP in this communal area. Their perceptions emanate from the position of women not only as secondary land rights holders, but from their vulnerability as widows whose contributions were likely to go unnoticed in RDP discourses although they were primary landholders through inheritance. Clearly, widows from communal areas are vulnerable people who look

up to others in their communities for protection (Makura-Paradza, 2010). In terms of their perceptions of RDP, the widows were powerless to challenge their leaders even when the context was not satisfying.

For tribal and migrant youths and children, the generation gap between them and their adults was a structural barrier that constrained them from participating in RDP discourses. Their views on RDP as secondary landholders in patriarchal societies such as Domboshava were part of the primary land rights holders' perceptions. Adults make decisions on behalf of children and youths in communal areas. The children and youths consider policy issues as 'adult business'. Lack of clarity on administration of land under the system of customary land tenure shaped the perceptions of community residents of Domboshava with regards the implementation of RDP in this communal area.

## **6.5 Conclusion**

Rural Development Policy in Domboshava is unwritten, and is largely informed by statutes on land and settlement. There exist lack of consensus on what RDP entails among residents, TLs, and other stakeholders. Community residents understood RDP in terms of settlement upgrading, access to services such as water, electricity, and sanitation, as well as finding a solution to increased direct land sales. Traditional Leaders saw RDP in terms of community projects such as schools, clinics, access to services, as well as settlement upgrading. These views were shaped by expectations from policy, and not necessarily a common policy goal. However, state provision of services emerges as a key concern, with strong difference reported between tribal members and migrants whether Domboshava should be rezoned as urban or remain rural. The LPS framework of analysis accounts for the different strategies implicit in the perceptions of community resident of Domboshava, as well as the dynamics of relationships in these social relations and change within this peri-urban communal area. There are disparities with regards to the context in which these services should be availed. Tribal members regard service provision worthwhile when availed within their rural context, whereas migrants expect these services within an urban context. While both tribal and migrant members from Domboshava perceived rural development projects as worthwhile, their sentiments differed with regards to the role of settlement upgrading strategy as RDP.

Clearly, a conflict of values exists between tribal members and migrants in terms of gains and losses attached to settlement upgrading. Among tribal members, settlement upgrading is associated with loss of land rights, whereas migrants equate the programme with access as well as secure land rights through land titles. There exist strong differences between tribal members and migrants with regards secure land rights through settlement upgrading. Future scenarios however predict a complex combination of resistance to settlement upgrading by tribal members that preserved their land parcels for their future generations against those that resigned and totally exit the system of customary land tenure through land sales to migrants. The latter group of tribal members is likely to support settlement upgrading. On the other hand, migrants are likely to team up with tribal members that hold small residential land parcels in support of settlement upgrading. These findings show that customary land tenure and RDP issues are dialectically interconnected as both constitute agency, yet at the same time they are the very medium of this constitution (cf. Giddens 1984; 1989; 2001). Clearly, the system of customary land tenure is simply a product of human action (cf. Jackson & Hogg, 2010).

## Chapter 7 Types of household survival strategies in Domboshava

### 7.1 Introduction

This chapter brings to the fore the kinds of household survival strategies adopted by community residents in the peri-urban communal area of Domboshava as stated in my third research question namely: What types of household survival strategies are developing in Domboshava? The assumption was that the established way of life based on peasant farming in this communal area was under siege and no longer holds because of increased land transactions, influx of migrants, as well as the administration of Rural Development Policy (RDP). My interest therefore is in demonstrating what happened to the survival strategies of households that experienced land transactions that were supposed to have taken place under the system of customary land tenure (also viewed as RDP). In order to demonstrate the shifts in status quo, I reflect on the kinds of land transactions highlighted in Chapter 5, as well as the perceptions of RDP discussed in Chapter 6. In my analysis, I use the LPS framework to demonstrate the dialectical character of the changes in economic contexts and livelihood strategies of households on one hand, and land property regimes on the other. During interviews, my focus was to illustrate the influence of land transactions and RDP on household survival strategies, and not the other way round as shown by the arrows in Figure 7.1 below.




Figure 7.1: Influence of land transactions and RDP on household survival strategies  
Source: Field data, (2012).

In the discussions, I categorize households as tribal and migrant. Tribal members are those with autochthonous land rights in Domboshava. Migrants constitute household members from elsewhere whose livelihoods were adversely affected by a variety of factors (including state policies and actions, and their impacts) and sought to practice diverse non-farm livelihoods from a base in Domboshava. I categorize land transactions as customary and



individualized. The discussion is organized around different aspects of household livelihood strategies with rich empirical evidence detailed from the stories generated during fieldwork.

After this introduction, my second section highlights the nature of land rights, and household assets held by community residents of Domboshava. The third section provides an outline of the types of household survival strategies that developed in Domboshava. The account is an historical analysis of changing survival strategies and influences from land transactions taking place under a broad RDP within the 2002 to 2012 census decade. The fourth section explains livelihoods diversification in Domboshava, and the fifth section highlights the changing patterns of migration as community residents straddle the rural urban divide. The sixth section reveals emergent class differentiation because of the survival strategies pursued by community residents.

## **7.2 Land rights and household assets in Domboshava**

Access to land rights in Domboshava translates to land use in terms of arable, residential, and the commons. Land rights are a significant resource and media through which community residents animate the structure of land tenure and produce other household assets. The land holding capacities of community residents of Domboshava were not uniform. Livelihood strategies in Domboshava like in most rural communities of sub-Saharan Africa depend on the nature of assets people hold, the structures and processes that regulate individuals' conduct and the vulnerability context in which people operate in (cf. Cahn, 2002; Scoones, 2009; Scoones *et al.*, 2010). These survival strategies always respond to the external stimuli. In most cases, people do not have control over such external environments, for example, national policies (Cahn, 2002; Bryceson, 2005).

The assets of tribal members and migrants of Domboshava varied from household to household. Assets as resources are always unevenly distributed, and are the media for power relations (Sewell, 1992). Tribal members with land rights in Domboshava and migrants that obtained land through individualized land transactions such as direct land sales considered land as one of the important assets at their disposal. On the other hand, migrant lodgers lacked land rights in Domboshava, and this defines their vulnerability. Access to land rights among community residents distinguished them as rich or poor. A significant number of tribal members regard all migrants (including those that acquired land through individualized

land transactions and migrant lodgers) as well as tribal members that sold part of 'their' land parcels as poor. For example, VH Nango and VH Zuze revealed that tribal members that sold land to migrants ended up poorer because they had neither the land nor the money. Tribal members and migrants that acquired land through land sales regarded migrant lodgers as poorer because they did not 'own' land parcels in this communal area. Tribal land rights under customary tenure were a measure of status among community residents of Domboshava because most community residents regard land as an important asset for food production and income generation for households (cf. Razavi, 2003; Anseeuw & Alden, 2010).

In most cases, migrants hold customary land rights in their homelands elsewhere. For example, Tino and Danai from Zimbir Village stated that, *"We come from Rushinga and our neighbour also comes from Rushinga. We just bumped into each other and realised that we were both from Rushinga. Our fields and cattle are in Rushinga. We keep contacts with our neighbours. We have eight cattle and several goats. We often sell some of our cattle and goats to raise household income. When we want to grow crops on a large scale, we do it in our rural village. We do not have a garden here. We have not looked for one"*. Although migrants create new relations with their neighbours as social assets in Domboshava, these migrants remain attached to their homelands where they cultivate their fields and raise livestock. Homelands as physical assets are an important hedge against risks associated with 'urban' lifestyles in Domboshava. Migrants could claim their tribal land rights in their homelands even after their long absence (Christodoulou, 1990; Potts & Mutambirwa, 1990). Similarly, in many resettlement areas farmers live dual lives as a hedge against risks associated with agriculture production (Dekker & Kinsey, 2011).

Secure tribal land rights (through belonging) are a significant component of identity for migrants who are tribal members in their homelands elsewhere. In such cases, migrants emerged as better-off compared to tribal members because they combine land they obtain through individualized land transactions in Domboshava, and their land rights in their homelands elsewhere. Individualized land transactions are a strategy of acquiring multiple land rights and a survival strategy in general, as well as a process of asset accumulation within a peri-urban context. Land rights are therefore a resource. Community residents of Domboshava viewed land as more than simply a usable property (cf. Bourdillon, 1976; 1982).

### 7.2.1 Arable, grazing, and the commons

In Domboshava, arable land comprises fields and vlei gardens, whereas the commons encompass forests, water, grazing, wetlands, hills, rivers, and watersheds. Vlei gardens are low laying wetlands at the bottom of valleys (Scoones *et al.*, 2010). On average, tribal members of Domboshava held between three quarters of an acre to three acres of residential and arable land combined out of the five acres allocated to households in the 1960s. Ida and Kudzai of Zimbiru Village revealed that, *“These allotments we have here were distributed to us in the 1960s by a Land Development Officer from the government. All of us had the same size of land. It was well organized. All yards were properly allocated and everyone got an acre for the yard, three acres for the fields, and an acre for a garden”*. This was reiterated by Eve from Chogugudza Village who pointed out that land that was allocated to tribal members in the 1960s was demarcated as fields, vlei gardens, and residential apart from grazing land. The old generation was therefore expected to hold larger land parcels accessed directly from the Land Development Officers of the 1960s compared to the younger generation that obtained land subdivided through inheritance. Community residents of Domboshava like those of Gwayi Valley in Matebeleland North province of Zimbabwe used the same portions of land allocated to them in the 1960s ever since they established themselves (Thebe, 2010). On the other hand, the land holding capacities of migrants also varied depending on whether they were lodgers or migrant land owners. Migrants held between three quarters of an acre to two acres in some instances. Some migrant lodgers were using about three acres of land because their rental terms included access to land and homesteads.

Arable land constitutive of fields and vlei gardens is supposedly meant for growing crops and vegetables on a rotational basis (see Photograph 7.1 below). Observations revealed that households in Domboshava grew crops such as maize (the staple), groundnuts, roundnuts, pumpkins, beans, sweet potatoes, and to some extent sorghum on their fields. They also grew vegetables such as tomatoes, green beans, cabbages, carrots, pepper, and to some extent crops in their vlei gardens. Land use in vlei gardens was perennial owing to the water retention capacity of dark grey soils and dambos in these gardens. Vlei gardens thus characterize Domboshava communal area for a long time as the ‘Tomato Kingdom’ - ‘*Kumadomasi*’ (Saruchera, 2002; Box 5.7 in Chapter 5). Similarly, in Mwenezi District of Masvingo Province vegetable gardens are meant for growing vegetables and to some extent crops for immediate household consumption (Mutopo, 2011).



Photograph 7.1: Arable land use  
Source: Field data, (2012).

Owing to the prevalence of land transactions in Domboshava (both individualized and customary), most tribal households resort to shared vlei gardens as was witnessed in Madziwa and Bushu communal area (cf. Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Such arrangements were common between tribal mothers-in-law and their daughters-in-law. This was also vital in strengthening social relationships. It also ensured maximum utilization of households' arable land, as well as increased food production for households. Besides vlei gardens, some community residents had small gardens on their residential land. This was common among migrants since they purchased land solely for residential purposes. Households often dried surplus vegetables and crops produced from fields and vlei gardens, and stored them in sacks for consumption during off-season. When households ran out of stock, they supplemented their food resources through purchasing from supermarkets in Harare and at local shops. This was also observed in Masvingo (Scoones *et al.*, 2010), and Matebeleland North (Thebe, 2010).

Observations revealed that all community residents of Domboshava had rights to the commons. Common property regimes such as forests and pastures were collectively ‘owned’ by community residents in perpetuity under the control of TLs. Tribal members that owned livestock used common grazing land outside their villages because most pastures were sold through individualized land transactions. In Madziwa and Bushu communal areas, TLs also sold grazing land to migrants (Matondi & Dekker, 2011). In Domboshava, available grazing land was far from the villages studied as revealed by Ruvarashe from Chogugudza Village when she said, *“Our cattle use a grazing area that is four kilometres away from here. The place is called Njedza. It is a common grazing land for all cattle in Chogugudza Village and from other villages. There are no more pastures close by. We used to take our cattle to pastures in Murape Village. That is why we now graze our cattle on pastures that are far away from here”*. Looking after livestock is a male role. Due to lack of grazing land, some households grazed their livestock on residential land and the monument forest. Under these circumstances, most migrants perceived livestock as a menace, because in their minds Domboshava is urban. Yet, grazing land turned residential, and this presents a source of conflict between land transactions and household survival strategies.

Since migrants had access to the commons, they were expected to observe local rules that regulate use of common property regimes (cf. Cousins, 1990). As such, tribal members and migrants obtained firewood and wild fruit such as sweet plums (*mizhanje*) and water-berries (*hute*) from the local forests, as well as water from the local springs, dams, and rivers. Wild fruit are critical in supplementing food supplies particularly when households fail to survive on agricultural production (Bourdillon, 1982). Gathering wild fruit and leaves has become an important regular source of income for poorer households in most African countries (Quan, 2000a). Interference with commons through direct land sales approved by some TLs, and the extension of homestead boundaries into the sacred forest at Domboshava Hill accounts for the conflicts that characterize individualization of common property resources in Domboshava. This presents not only the survival strategies of households, but also the conflicts that arise from the conduct of community residents with the structure that defines common property resources within the system of customary land tenure.

### 7.2.2 Homesteads and household property

Apart from common property rights, community residents had individual private property rights. These were associated with the built structures such as homesteads as well as

household property such as fruit trees, wells, and household furniture. Individuals in communal areas of Zimbabwe can own built structures, but not the land (CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002). Owning homesteads in a communal area entails belonging, and distinguishes substantive community members from lodgers. Community residents of Domboshava regard homestead owners as 'landowners', and lodgers as 'landless'. In Domboshava, homesteads are significant assets that not only entail belonging, but 'ownership' of land although legally land belongs to the state. Cousins (1990:6) however stresses that, "absolute landlessness is rare in communal areas". Migrant lodgers always had access to land in one way or the other. Migrants that owned homesteads in Domboshava and in their rural districts were materially better-off than migrants that did not have homesteads elsewhere. For example, some ex-farm workers evicted by the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP), and victims of Operation Restore Order/Operation Murambatsvina (ORO/OM) did not have rural homes. Most ex-farm workers were descendants of farm workers of foreign origin (Chambati, 2011), whereas victims of ORO/OM were largely the homeless urban poor (Kamete & Lindell, 2010).

Community residents of Domboshava conserved wild fruit trees situated at their homesteads and in some cases planted exotic fruit trees. Exotic fruit trees comprised but not limited to avocado, guava, lemon, apple, mango, mulberry, orange, and peach. Whereas, wild fruit comprised mostly '*mizhanje*' and '*mikute*'. Fruit trees located on arable land such as fields and vlei gardens were regarded as private property (see Photograph 7.1 above). Migrants that purchased arable, grazing, or forest land in some instances preserved wild fruit trees at their homesteads, and these were converted to private property. Access to such trees without permission from the 'owners' is prohibited. This clearly demonstrates individualization of common property resources through land transactions as well as the influence of land transactions on household survival strategies. In some cases, households with fruit trees sold fruit at local markets and in Harare. Local markets are situated mostly at local shopping centres, for example, at Mverechena, Mungate, and Showground; whereas in Harare the markets include mainly Mbare Musika as well as undesignated selling points on the streets' walkways within the city centre.

Tribal members of Domboshava obtained homesteads through inheritance or through erecting building structures from scratch. In such cases, tribal members built homesteads on land bequeathed to them as new household formations. On the other hand, migrants bought

residential land, cleared the land, and built their homesteads in most cases from scratch. Migrants in some instances bought homesteads from tribal members although such cases are minimal and exceptional in my study. Site clearance for new settlements requires a lot of investment in terms of finance, labour, and equipment as observed by Scoones *et al.* (2010) in Masvingo. Both tribal and migrants expect to pass their homesteads to their descendants as inheritance (see section 5.4.1 in Chapter 5). Bequeathing homesteads through inheritance remains an important element of survival for both tribal and migrant descendants. In any case, household heads in communal areas are identifiable through owning homesteads.

On the other hand, migrant lodgers that did not own homesteads could not claim rented homesteads as part of their household assets although in conversations they referred to these homesteads as ‘their’ homes or houses - meaning where they stayed. Owning homesteads by both tribal and migrants also entitled them to access common property regimes as discussed above although lodgers could access these too. This means that homesteads as household assets did not only accord community residents the right to belong to this community, but also enabled them to access common property regimes. For example, tribal members that lived in the diaspora and belonged to this community could claim customary land rights through owning homesteads even after their long absence as revealed by VH Shungu when he said, *“Everyone has a place of origin. For example, my son lives in South Africa. He built that house. Each time he comes, he uses that house. We keep his fields. He will use them when he comes to stay in Zimbabwe forever. You see, these people are also leaving vacant spaces in their homelands. They must go back to their homelands. Why should they come to Domboshava?”* While VH Shungu cynically regards migrants of Domboshava as disturbing the status quo, his son was a migrant in South Africa. This shows that the tribal/migrant categories are transient identities as individuals are capable of moving in and out of these categories to assume other identities (cf. Ranger, 2000). Constant return to one’s homelands is therefore a way of securing land rights through belonging, as well as keeping in touch with one’s kin.

Both tribal and migrant members of Domboshava regard homesteads as private property. The homesteads are often fenced. Boundaries separate homestead from other common property regimes. Different kinds of boundaries such as fences, pre-cast walls, bushes, and barbed wire were meant to exclude others (see Photograph 7.2 below). In Gwayi Valley, for example, the practice of fencing homesteads is also a way of protecting individual land rights against common exploitation by other community residents (Thebe, 2010). Observations in



Domboshava also revealed that community residents were aware of these demarcations even in cases where abstractions served. For tribal members, homesteads usually comprised main houses, kitchens (roundavels), fowl runs, sheds, wells, 'Blair' toilets, and trees (see Photograph 7.2 below).



Photograph 7.2: A modern and a traditional tribal homestead in Domboshava  
Source: Field data, (2012).

Rich tribal members owned modern homesteads, whereas poor tribal members in some instances owned a single housing unit such as a roundavel. There were clear differences among the types of homesteads as assets owned by community residents of Domboshava. Homesteads that belonged to old tribal members depict a traditional look, and were in some cases dilapidated, whereas those owned by the young tribal generation and most migrants looked modern and new as in Photograph 7.2 above. For migrants and some tribal members, homesteads comprised mostly the main houses, sheds, trees, wells, 'Blair' toilets, fowl runs, and in some cases garages. Some tribal children built new and modern homesteads for their parents as a social investment. For example, VH Beta's children built a homestead for him. His children also use the homestead during their visits to the communal area. In this regard, secure land rights within the system of customary land tenure enable tribal members to invest through building homesteads in Domboshava despite the absence of land 'ownership' rights in legal terms. While perceived secure land rights enable tribal members to invest in homesteads, migrants were driven by perceived insecure land rights to build and invest in homesteads (see section 6.3.1 in Chapter 6). Clearly, there is conflict on the role of secure land rights and investments in assets such as homesteads in Domboshava. This is a clear



departure from De Soto (2000)'s claims that lack of secure land rights undermines investments.

### 7.2.3 Livestock

Apart from land and homesteads, livestock was also regarded as significant household assets. The kinds of livestock observed in Domboshava comprised mainly cattle and goats. Cattle have been for long regarded as symbol of status and authority in most rural communities of Zimbabwe. According to Vambe (1972), traditionally cattle were as important as the 'Whiteman's bank account'. My experience has shown that rural households use cattle as a hedge against poverty, as well as accumulation of wealth and food production. For example, most TLs and some households in Domboshava owned cattle. However, only two out of the sixteen tribal households that participated in this research owned cattle. These cattle comprised cows, bulls, and calves. This situation is not unusual as most households in communal areas no longer own or invest in cattle (Dekker & Kinsey, 2011). Most community residents that owned cattle in Domboshava valued cows more than oxen for purposes of increased herds although oxen provide more effective draught power than cows.

Although, the number of households that owned cattle from the sampled villages is small, most TLs from this community regard cattle as important household assets. In Domboshava, households use cattle to get milk, draught power, and to generate income through sales. Money obtained from cattle sales purchase food, and pay school fees among other household expenditures. Draught power from cattle is often exchanged for land on seasonal basis among kin as revealed by Ruvarashe from Chogugudza Village (see section 5.4. 3 in Chapter 5). In some cases, cattle were used as bridal wealth. Through draught power and bridal wealth, cattle create and mediate other forms of assets such as relationships and networks between households. Cattle as a household asset for community residents of Domboshava carry different meanings and values to tribal members and migrants in terms of relevance in space and time. Cattle carry economic, religious, and cultural values (Bourdillon, 1982; Palmer, 1977; Vambe, 1977; Potts & Mutambirwa, 1990; Dekker & Kinsey, 2011).

The role of cattle as household assets in Domboshava diminished among tribal members. Cattle were viewed as burdensome in terms of attention and labour, and took long to yield returns that were generally low compared to those from direct land sales. For example, VH

Mukachi revealed that cattle cost between \$250.00 and \$400.00 depending on their size and sex. Yet, a piece of land cost \$2500.00 on average. In addition, increased cattle thefts discouraged many households from owning cattle in Domboshava. For example, VH Mukachi once bought seven cattle from Mt Darwin and some were stolen. Furthermore, the responsibility of households that owned cattle to pay cattle-tax, and to ensure that their livestock was dipped and vaccinated. Yet, these are some of the services and responsibilities tribal members expected from Goromonzi Rural District Council (GRDC). There were two dip tanks in Domboshava. Observation revealed that a dip tank in Murape Village was dilapidated due to non-utilization and lack of maintenance. Scoones *et al.* (2010) made similar observations in Masvingo where cattle holding capacities of households were generally decreasing, and problems of cattle rustling were increasing. Thebe (2010) also observed that households in Gwayi Valley shifted from cattle ownership to possession of other assets as cattle were no longer viewed as a symbol of status.

On the other hand, migrants that participated in my study did not own cattle in Domboshava. They kept cattle in their homelands usually under the care of their kin or herdboys that doubled as home keepers. This is also common in Gutu where some resettled farmers leave their old homes and livestock under the custody of their elder sons and relatives (Mujere, 2011). In such cases, migrants had split families as part of their members stayed in their homelands elsewhere while others were in Domboshava. This is not a new phenomenon among migrants globally (see Tacoli, 2002; Kinsey & Dekker, 2011). For example, Yvonne from Mungate Village said, *"I come from Mrewa and my husband comes from Chipinge. Those are our rural homes now. This is town for us. We have fields in our rural homes. We have livestock there. This place is our workplace. That's why we are not keeping livestock here"*. Migrants that own cattle in their homelands often sell their cattle in time of need including purchasing of land and building material. Migrants kept cattle in their homelands because they regarded Domboshava as urban. Such migrants were thus materially better-off compared to some community residents of Domboshava as cattle in their homelands were considered as household assets. Homelands emerged as safety nets and fallback positions for migrants in the event that they were 'fed up' or 'tired' of 'urban life' in Domboshava. Many people in Zimbabwe regard their rural homes as retirement spaces (Potts & Mutambirwa, 1990).

Apart from cattle, tribal members of Domboshava owned small livestock such as goats and chickens as household assets. Like cattle, goats provide meat, milk, and skin for household

consumption and use. Goats and their products were also sold to generate household income. In some cases, small livestock were used to mediate land transactions as gifts, and inversely mediate conflict resolution processes between community residents. Community residents also owned chickens and rabbits in some cases. However, less than a quarter of community residents owned chickens. Most chickens died from bird flu. Community residents blamed GRDC for lack of chicken vaccinations. Chickens were reared for both domestic and commercial purposes. Rearing chickens for commercial purposes is done through projects or as small business enterprises. For example, Yvonne from Mungate Village said, *“When we were looking for land, we wanted space to grow maize, do projects, and to build a house. I grow chickens for sale. Currently, I have one hundred birds”*. For most households it was easier to sell chickens to generate quick cash particularly during emergencies. For example, Eve from Chogugudza Village often sold chickens for purposes of paying school fees for her grandchildren.

Access to rural assets such as land rights under customary tenure and homesteads was a prerequisite to accumulation of other assets in Domboshava. Social assets mediate access to other material assets such as social relations, networks, and processes that determine social cohesion and shared identities. Often, this enables the vulnerable groups especially the poor that lack financial assets to develop a sense of belonging (Tacoli, 2002). However, the process of accumulation of household assets differed between tribal members and migrants. In most cases, migrants that obtained land in Domboshava and owned homesteads and cattle in their homelands elsewhere emerged as better-off compared to some tribal members and migrant lodgers. Such migrants had assets both in Domboshava as well as in their homelands. On the other hand, migrants that bought land and did not have homelands were also better-off compared to their homeless status after displacement through state programmes such as FTLRP and ORO/OM. Tribal members that reduced their land holding capacities as a result of individualized land transactions particularly land sales and perceptions to RDP became worse-off because they disposed of their tribal land rights that were part of their households' assets. However, land reduction through customary land transactions such as inheritance among tribal members was tolerable since autochthonous land rights were retained. It was however difficult to attach price tags on different household assets owned by community residents of Domboshava in monetary terms because households assets in communal areas do not only carry the physical values, but sentimental values as well (Scoones *et al.*, 2010).

### 7.3 Emergent household survival strategies in Domboshava

Many rural community households engage in multiple and extended livelihood strategies (Razavi, 2003). Community residents of Domboshava employed various routes as household survival strategies. In this section, I identify and discuss these routes and highlight the extent to which these remain viable under the influence from land transactions and RDP within a peri-urban context. I demonstrate the different types of household survival strategies that developed in Domboshava. The vulnerability context of community residents of Domboshava was characterized by prevalence of land transactions outside the system of customary land tenure where the local authority (GRDC) perceived RDP as a solution to this peri-urban challenge. Instead of ameliorating the problem, this precipitated individualized land transactions thereby influencing the kinds of survival strategies adopted by households in this communal area. My context builds on peasant households whose livelihoods resource is land and other natural resources in this communal area such as grazing land, forests, and vleis gardens (cf. Cousins, 1990; Chambers & Conway, 1991; Bryceson, 2000a; Cahn, 2002; Cousins, 2007; Batterbury, 2008; Scoones *et al.*, 2010). Concerning institutional processes, reference is made to the system of customary land tenure, as well as the legislative framework that governs access and household members' land rights in Domboshava. Power relations between the traditional authorities on one hand and the GRDC on the other mediate these institutions.

#### 7.3.1 Land transactions as a household survival strategy

The most prevalent land transactions were inheritance, direct land sales, and renting. These land transactions were household survival strategies. Both tribal members and migrants practiced rental and land sales. Migrants also expected inheritance on part of their descendants although no cases of migrant inheritance were recorded in my study. Inheritance assists new tribal households to start a life through bequeathed land rights and assets such as homesteads. In such cases, inheritance eases the burden and provides relief on primary landholders particularly heads of households as new household formations were expected to independently take care of their household needs using the bequeathed primary land rights and other household assets. According to VH Karri, both male and female descendants in Domboshava could legally inherit land and other property rights as well as household assets such as cattle and homesteads under the system of customary land tenure. Village Head Karri

gave his sons and daughters part of his fields as inheritance. In most cases, girl children accessed such entitlements after they divorced their husbands and returned to their paternal roots or through patrikin primary landholders before marriage.

Evidence from the tribal members and TLs shows that most households practiced direct land sales as a household survival strategy as these generate quick and large amounts of money. Speculative hoarding of land by migrants emerged as a form of investment for those involved as they accumulated land for resale at a higher price later. In some cases, migrants were subjected to continuous land payments as tribal members sought to persistently benefit from direct land sales. According to Fah a Local Government Officer at the GRDC, some tribal members were taking migrants as their 'money links' where they could get cash anytime particularly during emergencies such as funerals. Although direct land sales provide brief gratification, tribal members sought to obtain long-term benefits from the practice through agency. Such dynamics of land sales are not guided by basic rules of formal exchanges between buyers and sellers, but rather the prevailing and evolving social processes and relations between the buyers and sellers (cf. Colin & Woodhouse, 2010).

Rental housing emerged as a common income generation activity for both tribal members and migrants that own homesteads in Domboshava through provision of continuous income streams as households leased rooms or land with homesteads. Both tribal and migrant members to used their homesteads as assets to generate household income through rentals (see Photograph 5.1 in Chapter 5). Homestead owners collected rentals in person from each tenant. Absentee homestead leasers often instruct their kin to collect rentals on their behalf. In some instances, migrants construct large houses with the hope of leasing some of the rooms to lodgers in future as the case of Danai and Tino from Zimbiru Village who revealed that, *"When we finish building this house, we expect to rent out some of the rooms in order to generate household income"*. In some cases, migrants rented out part of their homesteads (rooms) to migrant lodgers. For example, Rabi a migrant from Zimbiru Village rented out part of his house to another migrant for US\$20.00 per month. Martina also rented out a room in Chogugudza Village for US\$20.00 per month. Apart from generation of financial capital through rentals, homesteads also generated social capital through relationships and networks. For example, households that lived in neighbouring homesteads often ended up related through sharing common boundaries of homesteads as well as common property resources such as wells, rivers, dams, grazing, and forests. Relations and networks also developed between lodgers

and homestead owners. From the LPS framework's perspective, this demonstrates the influence of land transactions on household survival strategies.

Apart from selling land to migrants in its entirety, tribal members of Domboshava excavated sand and stone from their fields or from the commons for sale, mostly in Harare as revealed by Ida and Kudzai from Zimbiru who stated that, *"A lot of people are selling sand in town. These deals are done at night"*. VH Mukachi also said, *"Some people, for example, do not sell their fields. They extract pit sand from their fields, and sell in Harare. Some extract river sand and stone quarry from rivers and hills close to their fields. They sell the products in Harare. Selling sand is just as good as selling your field. The fields become useless. They cannot be cultivated because of gullies. It is about survival and nothing at all. However, it is also self-destructing"*. This revelation demonstrates strategies adopted by some tribal members as faster ways of generating income through land transactions without disposing of their land rights. In Zimbabwe, extraction, possession, and transportation of sand and clay deposits for commercial purposes without an official license is however illegal. In the minds of tribal members, land is a geophysical asset that is infinite (cf. Walker, 2012).

Since community residents of Domboshava regard land transactions as household survival strategies, these emerged as a process of accumulation and thus had close implications for class differentiation among households. What made land transactions a process of accumulation for household survival is contingent upon how the gains made translate into household survival. In most cases, VHs and most tribal members stated that people that sell land often spend the money on beer and other 'inessential' expenditures. On the other hand, migrants that obtain land established homesteads as bases for their household members. In some cases, migrants generate cash through subdivision of original land parcels to other land seekers usually at exorbitant prices. In the end, community members regard those that reproduced tangible assets from the process of accumulation as better-off. For example, tribal members that used the money obtained from land transactions to build lodgers' quarters were regarded as better-off than those that used their money on drinking beer. Thus, land transactions as a household survival strategy were never homogenous. The process of accumulation for both tribal members and migrants was disparate because of the motives behind the action of the agents (cf. Matondi & Dekker, 2011; Scoones *et al.*, 2010; Cousins, n.d.).

### 7.3.2 Changing patterns of subsistence farming

Many peasant farmers in this communal area at times sold what they regarded as ‘surplus’ produce to supplement household income. Peasant farming in Domboshava entails the growing of crops in summer around September and October of each planting season. Mature crop is harvested and stored for food until the next harvest. Peasant farming is seasonal and highly dependent on natural cycles, climatic conditions, as well as good soils. The activity is largely manual and involves use of draught power for tilling land, as well as hoes for weeding. Ranger (1983:110) refers to the practice as “*chibhakera*” meaning ‘fist’ cultivation. Holleman (1952:2) describes weeding as “scratching the soil” using hoes. This approach to agricultural production is labour intensive. Community residents of Domboshava used their fields or vlei gardens to practice peasant farming (see Photograph 7.1). Poor households without draught power often resort to ‘zero tillage’, a technique used to plant seeds without tilling the soil. Poorer tribal members also exchanged their land for draught power on rentals terms, whereas richer tribal members often hired draught power for a fee. The practice of land rentals is fundamental for household survival strategies as both the leasers and leasees obtain something of value from the plot through putting idle land to productive use (cf. Matondi & Dekker, 2011).

Often, natural phenomena such as drought hampers peasant farming in Domboshava (see Photograph 7.1). For example, Zimbabwe experienced drought in 1982, 1992, 2002 (Potts & Mutambirwa, 1990; Thebe, 2010); and of late in 2012. Some tribal members attribute persistent drought in Domboshava to the practice of individualized land transactions particularly direct land sales. Tribal members regard adverse weather conditions as curses, anger, and wrath from God and the ancestors. In their minds, land sales were punishable through drought and disease. Violation of tribal institutions by individuals was believed to attract spiritual sanctions and collective consequences as revealed by one of the VHs when he said, “*Selling land is the norm. It is shameful. It is disgraceful. Gardens are now houses especially in Zimbiru, Murape, and Mungate. How can you expect the rains to fall, and expect no drought when you are breaking tradition? VHs are no longer powerful. We no longer have any chance. Matsotsi aya (those crooks) ... they say I want to sell my land ... where did you get that land from? ... People are getting sick because they are after money. It really pains me (weeping). Where will our children go?*” Similarly, Cleaver (2007) found out that in Tanzania people perceived drought, land infertility, and the inability to secure livelihoods as consequences of lack of respect to custom and elders. Traditional Leaders in

Masvingo also blamed drought on alienation of autochthonous land rights of their ancestors through the FTLRP (Mujere, 2011). In Domboshava, the cultural justifications to failed peasant farming were relevant only to tribal residents and not necessarily to migrants because local values were of significance to tribal members although migrants were obliged to observe the same.

Peasant farming in Domboshava varied from household to household depending on the nature of land transactions they engaged in. For example, households that disposed of their land rights mostly in Zimbir, Mungate, and Murape Villages practiced peasant farming to a lesser extent compared to those in Chogugudza Village that rented land and homesteads as opposed to direct land sales. For example, Ruvarashe's household from Chogugudza Village grew crops and vegetables for household consumption and for sale at the local market. According to Ruvarashe, a bundle of vegetables cost US\$2.00. Ruvarashe's sister-in-law was given a portion of the garden to grow vegetables. The practice of peasant farming demonstrates loyalty to traditional methods of household survival. Migrants particularly those from Chogugudza Village that rented homesteads and land also practiced peasant farming as highlighted by Pepukai and Chenai in Box 7.1 below.

**Box 7.1: Crop and vegetable farming by lodgers**

"We are lodgers the owner of this homestead 'mwana wemuno'. He stays in Harare. We used to stay in Glen View in Harare. We came to this place in August 2011. We are not related to the owner of this homestead, although we share the same totem. Both of us are not working. We grow crops and vegetables for sale at Mbare Musika in Harare. We go to Harare to sell our vegetables at least twice a week. Each time, we hire a truck. On average, we earn US\$300.00 from selling vegetables. We have access to a garden and a field. We also use this yard while looking after the homestead. We do not have land of our own. We look forward to buy our own land" (Pepukai and Chenai, Domboshava, 2012).

Source: Field data, (2012).

Shifts from peasant farming were a result of the influence of land transactions and RDP on household survival strategies. These shifts were meant to offset risks associated with agriculture such as drought and crop thefts. Some tribal members viewed peasant farming and owning fields in a 'residential' area such as Domboshava (not a communal area per se) as out of context. As such, most tribal members that practiced peasant farming in Zimbir, Mungate, and Murape Villages were rather motivated by the generation gap to practice peasant farming. For example, Fadziso's grandmother (*Gogo*) from Zimbir Village practiced peasant farming during her lifetime as revealed by Fadziso when she said, "*We have never sold or rented our fields. We grow maize on this plot, and it does not take us through the season. We are already buying maize for food this season. ... Our field is three acres. Gogo reserved the fields for her grandchildren.*"



*Our field is big, but we fail to grow crops. This does not make sense. Gogo's land never changed. It has been arable land ever since. We have a garden and we grow vegetables and maize there. Our garden is smaller than the field. We do not grow tomatoes because we do not have herbicides. Gogo shares her garden with her daughter-in law and one of her daughters as well".*

In Domboshava, the practice of peasant farming by old tribal members is a response to circumstances that surround households, and not necessarily about the reduction in land through land transactions. As such, the old generation sticks with old and traditional values of household survival as a way of avoiding destitution associated with inability to generate income through other means that require wit. Access to land rights and the land holding capacities of households were critical elements for the practice of peasant farming in this peri-urban communal area. The elderly women of Domboshava relied more on land than young women. This situation is similar to a case of Malawi where young women depend less on land for survival (Paradza, 2011).

By resorting to practicing peasant farming even on a reduced scale in small gardens and yards, tribal members and migrants demonstrated that they had not abandoned this traditional method of household survival completely, but were simply responding to the local circumstances. Community residents with limited land holding capacities also utilized empty spaces on their yards or small gardens to grow vegetables and crops such as maize, groundnuts, beans, and roundnuts mainly for household consumption. The practice of peasant farming was related to the symbolic relevance of the peasant economy in this communal area. This demonstrates loyalty to peasant farming as a traditional method of household survival as community residents were not completely 'dropping out' but were just 'hanging in' this process (Scoones *et al.*, 2010; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). This also shows that peasant farming in this communal area was not necessarily intended to provide household food that lasts a harvesting season, but was just a way of getting and keeping in touch with the past values. In most cases, the output from peasant farming was inadequate as illustrated by Fadziso in the above quote. This rendered most households food insecure as they relied on purchased food from the supermarkets in most instances. For migrants, growing of crops in small gardens or on empty residential spaces was a hobby since they practiced peasant farming at a larger scale in their homelands in some cases. Clearly, peasant farmers' ways of life in Domboshava manifested in different forms, and these are far from being

homogeneous. Peasant farming in this peri-urban communal area was simply being replaced by a new economic order (cf. Maxwell *et al.*, 1998).

Peasant farming was no longer viable as a safety net for household survival on its own not only due to increased land transactions, but due to other influences that surround the peri-urban context of Domboshava such as RDP strategies. For example, some TLs and tribal members pointed out that community members lack farm inputs such as fertilizers and seed for the practice of peasant farming, and that the soils were 'tired'. Farm inputs were regarded by many community residents of Domboshava as expensive following the dollarization of the economy of Zimbabwe in 2009. Community residents often obtained seed from their previous harvests. This practice is common in many resettled and communal areas as farmers cope with seed shortage (Thebe, 2010; Dekker & Kinsey, 2011). According to the WC for Ward 4 in Goromonzi District, some NGOs discontinued the distribution of food and farm inputs such fertilizer and seed. An AGRITEX officer in Domboshava, Mutima, confirmed these findings when he pointed out that the diminishing trends in the practice of peasant farming were a result of reduced effort by both the state and the NGOs in offering adequate support to peasant farmers in Domboshava (see Box 7.2 below).

**Box 7.2: AGRITEX support and peasant farming in Domboshava**

"Arable land available in Ward 4 is approximately 3.2 hectares. A third of this hectrage is used to grow crops, while the rest is used for housing and infrastructure. The minimum hectares for peasant farming are determined by three rotations of the major crops such as maize, groundnuts, and roundnuts. Each of these crops should cover at least an acre. Since the land which we seek to develop is fast disappearing, land sales complicate implementation of RDPs in this area. Local leaders are very powerful when it comes to land issues. They settle migrants in restricted areas that are not meant for housing, and should be conserved. We are implementing different projects and programmes in this Ward. In 2011 for example, 1250 farmers benefited through horticulture projects, while 294 benefited through conservation farming. We only target farmers with 0.5hectares of arable land, and they get free farm inputs from AGRITEX. This year the number dropped. Only thirty-nine farmers benefited. Twelve farmers got loans through an NGO called Cluster Agricultural Development Services, and through Windmill, a fertilizer making company in Harare. Only three farmers benefited through farmer demonstrations. We also focus on mushroom production. Fifty farmers are doing mushroom production. We have projects on tree growing, floriculture, and chicken rearing. It is not everyone willing to benefit from these projects that can participate because there are too many farmers in this ward. We also look at their ability to perform. All the programmes are viable despite that most of the arable land turned into residential. Land transactions therefore lead to elimination from projects" (Mutima, Domboshava, 2012).

Source: Field data, (2012).

In Domboshava, farmer support from AGRITEX remains minimal and is overwhelmed by the number of community residents that required farm inputs as highlighted in Box 7.2 above. Inadequacy of farm inputs has been generally a problem to many farmers across the country (Dekker & Kinsey, 2011). Since projects such as conservation farming target community

residents with an arable land holding capacity of 0.5 hectares, this excludes many households that either sold or parceled their land through inheritance. In most cases households had less than 0.5 hectares of arable land. This benchmark was however designed to incentivize tribal members from practising land transactions particularly direct land sales. Inversely, the benchmark became a structural barrier not only to tribal households that looked forward to practice inheritance, but also to those that looked to access state implements for peasant farming. In the end, most beneficiaries of state farm inputs were peasant farmers (*hurudza*) - the real farmers - from other Wards such as Munyawiri and Nyamande, and a few TLs in Ward 4. Clearly, the projects from AGRITEX neglect the critical processes that define RDP in terms of community projects and how these influence household survival strategies. While availability of labour, credit, and markets are regarded as key elements in agricultural production in rural areas (Tacoli, 2002), in Domboshava concerns were more to do with land holding capacities of households.

Victims of ORO/OM, and ex-farm workers that did not benefit from FTLRP could not benefit from AGRITEX projects. Yet, only a few ex-farm workers accessed land through the FTLRP (Matondi & Dekker, 2011; see Box 5.6 in Chapter 5). Ex-farm workers could be clustered among the poor and the landless (Chambati, 2011). The chances of getting such migrants to practice peasant farming in Domboshava are negligible. Peasant farming in Domboshava depends on both the size of the plots, as well as access to inputs. Clearly, the changing patterns in the practice of peasant farming as a household survival strategy in Domboshava were mediated by the influence of land transactions and RDP, as well as other circumstances that regulate these processes in this peri-urban communal area. This communal area remains a critical shock absorber to provision of livelihoods for an increasing number of households not only from Harare and neighbouring farms, but also from other homelands elsewhere (also see Razavi, 2003; Kandiyoti, 2003).

### 7.3.3 Formal employment - the 'salarial'

Household members of Domboshava engaged in formal employment as a survival strategy. Cousins (1990:9) refers to this category of workers as "salarial" because they hold salaried jobs, and earn a salary from their engagements. The 'salarial' in Domboshava includes both males and females that participate variously on the formal job market. Formal employment comprised a mixture of professionals and non-professionals. Professionals included inter alia

university lecturers, teachers, accountants, civil servants, and construction workers. On the other hand, non-professionals encompassed mainly farm workers, shopkeepers, and domestic servants. Domestic servants were commonly referred to as (*maBorrowdale*) because many of them worked in Borrowdale one of Harare's 'leafy' neighbourhoods situated in proximity with Domboshava. In these cases, the males were employed as gardeners while females worked as housemaids. Males could work as house 'maids' whereas female gardeners were rare. Some domestic servants were locally employed in Domboshava. In terms of generation, the 'salariat' of Domboshava comprised school-leavers in their early twenties and old professionals. The older generation engaged in traditional professions such as teaching, lectureship, and civil service, whereas the younger generation associated mostly with construction work apart from traditional professions. Most of the 'salariat' were from Mungate, followed by Zimbiru, Murape, and Chogugudza Villages.

Formal employment in Zimbabwe used to be synonymous with education and professional qualifications. Education and professional qualifications of individual household members were significant household assets capable of generating other kinds of income through formal employment. The 'salariat' from the sampled households held secondary education as well as professional qualifications and training such as college diplomas and university degrees. Nonprofessional jobs did not require training. As such, community members regarded the 'salariat' as better-off because their income streams were often constant. However, in some instances employers struggled to pay their workforce on time as revealed by some community residents. Some community residents were retrenchees. Whereas, some degreed individuals were unemployed, for example, Tonya stated that she was unemployed although she had a BSc Honors in Sociology. On the other hand, some professionals chose to engage in nonprofessional activities because they were better paying compared to formal professional employment.

There were significant variations among what the 'salariat' earned. This also translated into the better-off/worse-off categories of households. Tendency among community residents was to regard those that earned more as better-off and those that earned little as worse-off regardless of the nature of employment or income generating activities they engaged in. For example, Blessing from Mungate Village revealed that her husband was an accountant at a construction firm in Harare, and he earned US\$100.00 per month. In a different case, Yvonne from Mungate Village stated that her husband was an army officer, and he earned

US\$300.00. Household incomes generated through formal employment were not homogeneous. The nature of the job, the industry people worked in, and personal attributes such as, the profession, skill, qualification, and experience however did not translate into 'better' salaries. These varied. In the end, the better-off/worse-off categories were determined more by how the earnings were translated into productive household survival.

#### 7.3.4 Informal employment

Many households in Domboshava no longer rely solely on farming or formal employment, but engage in repertoire of perennial off-farm and non-farm activities that are largely informal as forms of livelihoods (cf. Bryceson, 1999; 2000a; 2000b; 2002; 2005). Such activities are often marginal, of less significance, and not prime cash earners (Bryceson, 1996). For most households of Domboshava, the activities required low investment and were "easy-entry" points (cf. Gaidzanwa, 1997:161). The place of informal employment as a distinct household survival strategy in Domboshava comprised income generation activities that were in most cases opportunistic. Informal employment and activities were referred to as '*kiya-kiya*' in local language. The idea behind '*kiya-kiya*' is to generate as much quick cash as possible from opportunistic and usually incidental activities through little or no investment. In this regard, the level of informality did not really matter compared to the relevance and contribution of such activities to household survival. In some cases, community residents survived on a day-to-day basis - literally from 'hand to mouth'. While Cousins (n.d.) and Scoones *et al.* (2010) believe such activities are significant within the process of 'accumulation from below', for many community residents of Domboshava that engaged in less significant forms of '*kiya-kiya*' it was more of 'accumulation from hand to mouth' as they survived each day as it came. The behaviour of community residents shows that household members as agents continuously reflect on their actions to suit the demands and dynamics of survival in a peri-urban context.

Tribal members and migrants engaged in an array of informal activities that embrace informal trading and small business enterprises. For example, tribal members engaged in activities such as buying and selling, petty trading, vending/*musika*, and cross-border trading; and small business enterprises such as tuck shops, local shops, barbershops, welding, building, brick molding, chicken and flower projects. On the other hand, migrants engaged in activities such as buying and selling, petty trading, vending/*musika*, cross-border trading; and

small business enterprises such as photography, transport business/*kombi* operators, and chicken projects. Cross-border activities and migration to other countries was done on a short and long-term basis depending on the nature of activities people engaged in while in faraway destinations. For example, cross-border activities to South Africa were made easier following the relaxation of the migration legislation for Zimbabwean travellers to South Africa by the South African government in 2011. There were more similarities than differences among the activities and small enterprises among tribal members and migrants of Domboshava.

In all the four villages, engagement in multiple informal activities was common. Both the better-off and worse-off community residents engaged in '*kiya-kiya*' in one way or the other. Worse-off tribal members were likely to engage in piece jobs/*maricho*, such as weeding, vending/*musika*, and street vending compared to the other activities. For example, Fadziso from Zimbiru Village said, *"My husband went to South Africa. I am not working. My brother is a fruit vendor in Borrowdale in Harare. He makes an income of US\$5.00 per day. At times, he comes home empty-handed. It is very difficult to make money these days. ... We often do piece jobs but it does not pay much. The pieces are very big even if they pay US\$10.00"*. On the other hand, better-off tribal members such as Kundai's from the same village also engaged in informal activities. Kundai said, *"My husband buys and sells clothes in Harare and South Africa. He commutes to Harare every day. On average, he gets US\$6000.00 per year. This year we managed to buy a kombi. My husband does not want me to do piece jobs or sell wild fruits. As a household rule, my husband does not allow us to engage in piece jobs. We only grow crops. We grow maize"*. Whereas, Whatmore and Lyn, migrants from Mungate village, said, *"Our income comprises monthly salaries, remittances from diaspora, investments from projects in Harare, and loans from banks"*. There exist disparities on activities that generate household income among tribal members and migrants of Domboshava. For some households, the informal activities were a source of investment, while for others they were for basic survival. For example, Fadziso's household members used their earnings from informal activities to buy food since food production through peasant farming was inadequate, whereas Kundai's household saved their income and bought a taxi (*kombi*). Informal activities, '*kiya-kiya*', or piece jobs/*maricho* also varied from household to household in terms of relevance and scale, and were largely determined by what household members regarded as their major income-generating activity. While other community residents engaged in buying and selling locally, others assumed a wider spatial coverage. Even those with salaried jobs engaged in informal activities. As such, these activities were not relegated to the poor or those informally employed; but were viewed more in terms of generation or supplementing household income. For example, a self-employed shop owner defined his engagement in building as piece jobs. Yet, other builders in

this community regarded building as their major source of income. On the other hand, some household members viewed piece jobs as small income-generating activities such as weeding other people's land. This demonstrates the disparities entrenched in the practice of '*kiya-kiya*' as a process of accumulation in general, as well as a process of accumulation from hand to mouth. Similarly, '*kiya-kiya*' as a survival strategy was a common practice among the Shona during the 1970s, and manifested as barter trade of small and big items, for example, among the Duma society of eastern Zimbabwe (Ranger, 1983).

Weeding other people's arable portions for money however remains a livelihood option for the poorest of the poor in Domboshava as with the case of Fadziso. Although piece jobs such as weeding generate household income, sometimes the poor worked on big pieces of land. The activity is thus exploitative in some instances as the richer households that hire labour abuse the mutual benefits from the practice. According to Thebe (2010), the rich enslave and exploit the poor by hiring their labour for little or no pay. In Domboshava, the poor clung and continued to engage in piece jobs as vital household survival strategies because they had limited choice since most income generating activities required some form of investment. It was not only the number of activities that household members engaged in that was of significance, but also the amount of income generated from these activities and their contribution to household survival that mattered.

Women preferred to engage in piece jobs that involved weeding, while men preferred to engage in vending mostly in Harare. Generally, women from East and Southern Africa are often burdened with household activities and they always show willingness to take up demeaning activities even when remuneration is low or in some cases absent (Bryceson, 2000b). Within these realms, gendered division of income-generating activities emerges, and a class of the rural poor is clearly visible as revealed by the quotes in the above paragraphs.

Although fruit vending was a common income-generating activity in Domboshava, some community members shunned selling wild fruit such as '*mazhanje*' (see quote from Kundai above). Some community residents preferred selling exotic fruit such as bananas, oranges, and apples in Harare as in the case of Fadziso's brothers. Fruit vending as an income-generating activity paid very little although it remained preferable among vendors compared to weeding or similar piece jobs. According to Fadziso, fruit vending requires a lot of effort, yet it yields low returns in some instances. The returns often depend on luck. Most young

women and men in their late twenties or early thirties practiced street vending. This activity was a necessity and not necessarily a choice. Street vending was a response to household survival needs, as well as an alternative to orthodox means of survival such as peasant farming and formal employment.

There exists a strong demand by urban residents for traditional commodities such as wild fruit (*mazhanje*), wild mushroom, wild vegetables, salted peanuts, greenmealies, roundnuts, groundnuts, fish, sweet potatoes, cucumbers, and sometimes firewood. Wild vegetables include wild mushrooms, pumpkin leaves (*muboora*), and the African cabbage (*nyevhi/cleome gynandra*). These commodities are availed to residents of Harare through street vending. Street vendors that sell wild fruit and vegetables particularly in Harare are driven more by the market demand, as well as the access dynamics associated with season and abundance of common property resources. Community members gather wild fruit from the local forests for sale in Harare. Wild fruit and vegetables are uncommon in urban areas. These commodities are rather 'exotic'. These income-generating activities were certainly a response to market opportunities in Harare, and constraints in selling local produce in the local community because of glut. After sales, vendors buy some merchandise from Harare for resale in Domboshava often at double or treble the original prices. Buying and selling wares and commodities creates synergies between Domboshava and Harare because the people from these two settlements benefit from the rural-urban linkages in terms of supply and demand of goods. However, street vending as a household survival strategy is associated with risks as highlighted in Box 7.3 below (also see Chirisa, 2009; Mutopo, 2011).

Box 7.3: A tale of a street vendor from Domboshava

"My husband is a general worker in Borrowdale, Harare. He commutes daily to work. I am not free to disclose our income. I am a street vendor in Harare. I sell vegetables, wild fruit such as *mazhanje* (*uapaca-kirkiana*) and wild mushroom. I specialize in vending. I do not do piece jobs.... I go to town daily to do vending. I use a kombi. As street vendors, we always run battles with Municipal Police. Municipal Police Officers often arrest us. I was once arrested for street vending, but that did not stop me from vending. I need money to survive. When you get arrested, they make you pay a fine and confiscate your wares. It is risky, but there is nothing I can do. In fact, *pane mapurisa ndipo pane mari* - meaning - where police officers are (risk) there is money" (Rose, Domboshava, 2012).

Source: Field Data, (2012).

The city byelaws require vendors in urban centres of Zimbabwe to use designated selling points. However, in some cases vendors opt to sell their wares on undesignated spaces. This attracts penalties such as fines, arrests, and confiscation of wares. Rose's case above demonstrates that street vendors intentionally violate local authorities' byelaws through



vending on undesignated spaces resulting in clashes with the Municipal Police Officers. Yet vendors view 'risk' and undesignated vending zones as synonymous with generation of higher returns (see Box 7.3 above). The undesignated and prohibited zones mostly in the inner city are the ones convenient to customers. Clearly, street vending by women in Harare is open to women "with courage, wit, and resourcefulness" (Razavi, 2003:18). This case demonstrates the spatial and structural complexities associated with household survival strategies in Domboshava. It also shows that whichever action households adopt to change their situation or status quo depends upon their capabilities to make a difference under prevailing circumstances.

Community residents that engaged in small business enterprises referred to themselves as self-employed. Self-employed household members were part of the larger informal sector of Zimbabwe (Gumbo & Geyer, 2011). For example, Tonya said, *"My husband is self-employed. He buys and sells cell phones. We have a shop in town and another one at Mungate shops"*. Incomes generated by self-employed household members varied in scale and size depending on the nature of activities they engaged in, location, as well as the returns. At times, trades or the nature of activities did not really matter as community members focused more on opportunities that maximized their household incomes. Self-employed household members remained handy in offering services particularly related to construction of houses for migrants and new tribal household formations. Small businesses such as brick molding, for example, were a direct response to the demand for construction materials in Domboshava. Most of the small and medium enterprises sell construction material such as bricks, doorframes, cement, and window-frames (see Photograph 7.3 below). Such opportunistic activities emerge as a response to market needs (cf. Bryceson, 2002). This indicates an exit strategy by community residents of Domboshava from relying solely on traditional methods of income generation such as farming and formal jobs to opportunistic activities that generate quick cash.

A relationship exists between the land holding capacities of individuals and engagement in small business enterprises such as brick molding or running tuck-shops. Community residents that owned residential spaces freely operated their small business on their yards. This did not require large tracts of land compared to agriculture based activities such as peasant farming. Labour intensive activities such as brick molding were however done by young able-bodied men in their mid and late twenties, whereas women in most cases were in charge of small businesses since this did not require much labour (see Photograph 7.3 below).



Photograph 7.3: An example of small and medium enterprise in Mungate Village  
Source: Field data, (2012).

In most cases, young adults were economically active compared to the old generation that was constrained by vulnerabilities such as illnesses and age. Tendency among women was to regard their roles as housewives not as work although household work burdened them as revealed by Tonya in previous quote. The ZNSA Mashonaland East Report (2012) also highlights the tendency of women to believe that they are unemployed even when they combine household work and chores with other small productive activities for household survival. These perceptions about roles of women as housewives are colonial constructs that pushed men into wage labour on farms and industries while women stayed at home (Ranger, 1983; Thebe, 2010). The case of Kundai however demonstrates male domination in patriarchal system as her husband did not allow her to engage in piece jobs even when she desired. According to Walker (2003), patriarchal households are a site of female oppression.

Community residents that engaged in fruit vending and other smaller income generating activities focused more on their daily profits and not necessarily the transaction costs involved such as labour and travel. Household survival in Domboshava is rather opportunistic

and contingent. Every household member has an obligation to generate and contribute to household income within his or her ability. This provides a sense of responsibility for the individual household members. In such cases, survival strategies are involuntary as household members have little choice. Such obligations are generated by the sense of belonging as different household members fulfil their roles. It is therefore not the amount of income generated by these members that is of relevance, but their roles, effort, and contribution to the pool of household income. Household members neither quit nor exit activities that produce low returns, but they continue for as long as they can to accumulate from below, and in some cases from hand to mouth - the idea behind '*kiya-kiya*'.

Household survival strategies for both tribal and migrant households of Domboshava demonstrate resilience and determination to generate income within a peri-urban context characterized with conflict between land property regimes on one hand, and undesirable RDP strategies on the other. Engagement in informal activities was somewhat a forced choice under these circumstances as traditional methods of income generation lost relevance. Community residents as agents use their capabilities to construct their own action as practical and strategic responses to circumstances that surround them (Giddens, 2001; Stones, 2005; Ritzer, 2008; Stones, 2009; Scott, 2011). This also demonstrates the community residents' ability to manipulate and resist what they perceived as constraints to their households' survival.

#### **7.4 Livelihoods diversification and survival in Domboshava**

Diversification of household survival strategies in Domboshava was visible as household members pursued other income generating strategies apart from peasant farming. While diversification of household strategies during the 1990s was more of a choice, with the case of Domboshava it was more of a forced alternative because the conventional means of household survival were no longer viable. Similarly in a resettlement area of Masvingo, diversification of household survival is out of necessity rather than choice and can be viewed as a positive response to new opportunities and as a route to offsetting risks and impact of shocks particularly from farming (Scoones *et al.*, 2010). Lack of constant income streams by most tribal members of Domboshava as a result of the general decline in the national economy engendered diversification of household survival. As a result, community residents of Domboshava increasingly relied on informal activities or '*kiya-kiya*'. This translates into

off-farm and non-farm activities. The output from '*kiya-kiya*' serves to offset declining returns from peasant farming, as well as the circumstances that surround these declines. Poor tribal household members often spend most of their time on other people's farms engaged in piece jobs/'*maricho*' although in some instances they 'owned' land and other assets such as homesteads. Better-off households also diversified their household incomes in unique and varied ways. In this regard, '*kiya-kiya*' as a form of diversification of household survival strategy in Domboshava depends on the 4Ws - what, where, when, and why phenomena (Rubin & Rubin, 2012). I call them 5Ws in terms of: - **what** community residents engaged in, and **where** they practiced the activity. For example, community residents believed that petty trading and vending in Harare produced better returns than locally. This also involved **how** community residents diversified their activities, that is, whether on a full time or part time basis. For example, vendors believed that mobility generates more returns through 'chasing' money by accessing customers on undesignated and prohibited selling points. I also focused on **when** they did it. This entailed during what time of the day, season, and the frequency. For example, wild mushrooms and wild fruit are seasonal. The **why** entails the purposes and reasons, for example, whether the activities were for daily survival or for investment.

For migrants, access to land rights in Domboshava was a form of livelihood diversification. In their minds, Domboshava as a residential extension of Harare provides a base for planning and expansion of their income streams through diversification. For example, Batai of Chogugudza Village said, "*This place is just our work place ... there are a lot of business opportunities here. Otherwise our home is Mutorashanga*". In such cases, migrants were likely to emerge as better-off compared to tribal members from Domboshava because migrants combined what they obtained through diversification in Domboshava, and what they produced in their homelands elsewhere. Clearly, community residents as actors engage in purposeful action in order to adapt to change that surrounds them and in order to survive. For example, migrants that live in Domboshava confronted the changing conditions in their households' survival not only because of the forces of urbanization and migration, but because of other issues that surround land transactions and implementation of undesired RDP strategies. Thus, 'living' becomes some form of an improvised performance that people engage in as they continuously adapt to change within circumstances that surround them - these are fast changing than ever (Chambers, 2010:17). In Madziwa and Bushu communal areas for example, community residents also diversified their household survival strategies after reduction in arable, vleis gardens, and pastures through land sales (Matondi & Dekker, 2011).

For young persons, diversification is often about offsetting social pressure of being labelled idle, lazy, useless, and unenterprising not only by their household members, but by other community residents at large (see Tacoli, 2002). Livelihoods diversification therefore entails power to make a difference within a peri-urban context experiencing transformation, and this enables community residents to forge ahead with their lives.

In Domboshava, some formally employed community residents diversified their livelihoods portfolios through loans from the banks or work places. Borrowing money from the bank or workplaces usually was a 'last resort' after failure to obtain credit through social networks. It was through forced circumstances that households borrowed money and not necessarily a luxury as highlighted in Box 7.5 below.

Box 7.4: Loans as a household survival strategy

"I work at Glen Forest farm near Harare. I need to work for this household to get income, because my husband is not working. I cannot do any other piece jobs because I am always occupied at the farm. We are often given vegetables for free at the farm. It is better to work at the farm because local piece jobs do not pay much, and they are seasonal. In some cases, they do not pay you on time after a piece job, and they expect you to understand their situation. 'Havabhadhari' (they do not pay). Yet, I need money for survival. I therefore prefer to work at the farm on a full time basis because I get something at month end. I go to Glen Forest farm every day except on Sundays when I am off-duty. A lorry picks us every day in the morning at the shops, and drops us in the evening. I get a monthly wage of US\$60.00. Last month I got a small loan of US\$60.00 from my workplace to pay for my grandchild's school fees, uniforms, and stationery. My grandchild goes to Zimbiru secondary school. They will deduct the loan from my salary at the farm. I am not going to get a salary this month. I am working in arrears. It is difficult, but I have no choice. At least I was able to pay for my grandchild's education. Borrowing such large amounts of money from neighbours is also difficult. You cannot get such money from people. People do not have money. They are also struggling to survive" (Monica, Domboshava, 2012).

Source: Field data, (2012).

Most community residents however never borrow money from financial institutions such as banks because they are afraid to default on loans since they lack constant income streams. In some cases, the process of obtaining loans from established institutions such as banks is rather bureaucratic for many community residents as revealed by Tumai who said, *"We would want to get a bank loan, but the process is rather long and their demands are too much. Even if we are to get a bank loan, 'tinoidzosa nei'? (How will we repay it?). Our income is too little. We rather not apply for a bank loan"*. Banks and other money lending institutions in Zimbabwe require collateral. Most community residents could not access loans or credit from these money lending institutions because they lacked collateral in the form of immovable assets of value such as land or houses. Land under the system of customary tenure could not be used as collateral because it does not have title or 'value'. As a result, land rights under customary tenure are of no significance in enabling community residents to borrow money from established finance

institutions such as banks. The value of land in Domboshava is relevant at local level through creation of social networks that enable community residents to borrow money from their friends, neighbours, and relatives. These 'informal' networks of accessing credit are relaxed and less bureaucratic. However, access to 'informal' credit in Domboshava was to some extent secured in land since the transactions involved people within the villages or the communal land at large - often related. Borrowing money through social networks is often difficult because most community members survived under difficult circumstances too.

Box 7.5 above shows that diversification of household survival strategies in Domboshava often involves multiple activities. The ability of household members to diversify their incomes was determined by the circumstances that surround them. For example, diversification of survival through loans from work place was easier for the 'salaried' even those that engaged in unprofessional jobs such as farm work. Extension of short loans, and free farm produce to farm workers is not unique. Remuneration of farmworkers has generally been low, and they obtain incentives through loans, free transport, and in some cases free housing (Chambati, 2011). For women, diversification of livelihoods was also limited by other roles such as caring for the sick. For example, Ida used to be a cross-border trader. She stopped the activity because she had to take care of Kudzai who was terminally ill.

### **7.5. Changing patterns of migration and mobility - straddling the rural-urban divide**

As community residents diversified their livelihoods portfolios, they straddled the rural-urban divide. This activity as a livelihoods strategy was viewed as significant in coping not only with the changes in a peri-urban environment, but also with undesired RDP strategies. This shows that, "peasants' livelihood strategies embrace far wider geographical terrains than the village, and their working lives are full of contingent rather than permanent aims" (Bryceson, 2000:317). Community residents of Domboshava straddle the divide on both short and long-term basis. Continual daily movement of household members between Domboshava and Harare did not disrupt household units as with the case of migration. Upon their return home each day household members engaged in other local activities that generate income before they retire to bed, for example, attending gardens. While Tacoli (2002) believes diversification and mobility is prevalent among young people as observed in Mali, Nigeria, and Tanzania; in Domboshava almost everyone with a few exceptions engaged in occupational diversification and mobility regardless of their age and gender. Community



residents of Domboshava as human agents were capable of putting their structurally formed capacities to work in a creative and innovative way through diversification of livelihood strategies (cf. Giddens, 1984; Sewell, 1992; Parker, 2000; Blaikie, 2010). Almost all the community residents that participated in this research indicated that at least one of their household members commutes to Harare on a daily basis. This was echoed by VH Shungu who said, “*Yes, we can go to Harare so many times a day ...*”. The reasons for constant straddling the rural-urban divide by many community residents of Domboshava were determined by the what, where, when, how, and why aspects of household survival. Community residents habitually straddle boundaries within villages, to Harare and other towns of Zimbabwe, as well as beyond the national borders.

Some children commute to Harare to attend school. Parents or kin travel with these children on their way to work. In some cases, children travel to school in Harare unaccompanied. Children that attend local schools walk to school often straddling boundaries between villages. Children from commercial farms also straddle the boundary between Domboshava and Harare to attend schools in this peri-urban communal area. According to most community residents, schools in Harare offer better education services than those in the local community. The local schools were perceived as overcrowded due to increased enrolments since migrant children often accompany their parents to Domboshava. Most community residents also straddle the rural-urban divide to access other services such as health and retail in Harare. However, services in Harare were also deteriorating (cf. Chiumbu & Musemwa, 2012). In Domboshava, service provision was offered by private, public, and NGOs sectors, and in some cases, these were overwhelmed. Most community residents of Domboshava commute to Harare on a daily basis owing to the proximity of Domboshava to the city, shorter travel time, and availability of transport such as buses, taxis (*kombi*), and private vehicles (see Photograph 7.4 below).

Competition on provision of transport to daily commuters was also clear *between* buses, taxis, and private vehicles. For private vehicles owners, offering transport services to commuters emerged as a household survival strategy through generation of money. This is referred to as ‘pirating’ in local language. Though little in some instances, the amount generated through ‘pirating’ covered small transactions such as buying lunch, bread, or consumables for household survival. Individuals paid fifty cents or five Rand during off-peak hours, and one dollar or ten Rand during peak hours for a trip to or from Harare. These fares

were however regarded by many commuters as exorbitant given the daily trips they were required to make, and the household income they generated.



Photograph 7.4: Straddling the urban-rural divide in Domboshava  
Source: Field data, (2012).

Elsewhere in Tanzania and Mali, the cost of transport is a hindrance for those that seek services in urban centres (Tacoli, 2002). Straddling the rural urban divide for purposes of accessing services in Harare demonstrates an exit, as well as a voice strategy to GRDC about inadequate or inferior service provision. Transport services and the tarred road that links Domboshava and Harare are potent to sustained rural-urban linkages between the two settlements.

Proximity of Goromonzi District to Harare is a major force of attraction for people to settle in this district (Marongwe, 2011). Harare as an urban centre plays a significant role in the rural-urban linkages in terms of provision of markets for agricultural produce for Domboshava. In addition, Harare serves as a destination for many commuters and migrants not only from Domboshava, but from other parts of the country as well. Such movement of goods and people from Domboshava does not only sustain the rural-urban linkages (Lynch, 2005;



Gough *et al.*, 2010), but defines Domboshava as a peri-urban settlement. According to Fah a Local Government Officer at GRDC, *"The definition of peri-urban according to Council is land close to the city. We look at proximity to the city centre. It is an area where people can stay and work in the city centre crossing boundaries. For example, Domboshava is peri-urban because of Harare"*. Many community residents of Domboshava work in Harare while they stay in this communal area on a permanent basis. In such cases, homestead owners leave their homesteads under the care of housemaids. Job seekers in Domboshava believed it was possible for them to commute daily to the city. As a result, most migrants support the proposal by GRDC to upgrade Domboshava from rural to urban. This enables them to legitimize their stay in Domboshava, and to intensify diversification of livelihood portfolios while they stay in Domboshava on a permanent basis. Circular migration is evident as community residents oscillate within and between Domboshava and other places in search of better opportunities for survival (see Potts & Mutambirwa, 1990; Bekker, 2002; Kinsey, 2010; Potts, 2011; Bekker & Therborn, 2012). Movement of people creates linkages for rural and urban people as they drift into zones of comparative advantage (Bekker, 2002). In Ghana for example, most people that live in the peri-urban Kumasi commute to work and to trade in the city thereby creating diversity in terms of migrants and tribal populations in these areas (Berry, 2011).

In some cases, community members of Domboshava migrate to other cities as well as countries such as Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia. These countries are also popular destinations for people of Gwayi Valley (Thebe, 2010). Some community residents of Domboshava migrate to Europe mainly the United Kingdom. As community residents migrate to other countries, they seek employment opportunities or sell wares through cross-border activities, as well as extending their *'kiya-kiya'* activities. Access to markets is a critical component in migration activities (Tacoli, 2002; Mutopo, 2011). Household members that remain behind rely on remittances from migration activities. In some cases, household members believe it is cheaper to send remittances home rather than to travel to Domboshava as this includes travel expenses apart from remittances. In Domboshava, remittances were vital for survival of many households, for example, Solo from Mungate Village said, *"My sister is based in South Africa. She does piece jobs and braiding there. She brings groceries, and at times cash each time she comes back from South Africa. Whatever she brings makes a difference. She helps us a lot particularly with groceries. Things in Zimbabwe are very expensive especially after we started using the American Dollar"*.

Migration therefore remains a viable option for many community residents of Domboshava as migrants remit in cash and kind to their household members. In South Eastern Nigeria, migration is also viewed as an important household survival strategy in generation of income as well as achievement of social and economic success (Bah *et al.*, 2003). However, in Domboshava this has contributed to class distinctions among household that receive remittances. Remittances emerge as a symbol of status although the poor often remit less than those with paid jobs. Most male adults generally in their early and late twenties travel outside the country to look for opportunities. For example, Katty from Zimbiru Village said, *"My older sons work in Harare and the other one in Kadoma. The one in Harare comes to Domboshava weekly. The one in Kadoma comes after three months. Of my two sons, one works as a Central Statistics Officer in Kadoma, and the other is a shop attendant in Harare. They visit us, and they look after us. They buy us groceries. My son who stays with me here is a cross-border. He sells wood stuff in South Africa in Simons Town. He gets about R8000.00 per month through selling wood stuff. At times, it is difficult to calculate the returns. My son also brings groceries and money from South Africa"*. Tribal members of Domboshava used their remittances to scale up household consumption, and to improve or to build 'better' homesteads for their household members. On the other hand, migrants in some cases invest their remittances in assets such as land and homesteads since they aim to establish bases in Domboshava. The amounts of money remitted by both tribals and migrants in some cases were often too meagre to allow household savings because of the nature of activities these categories of household members engaged in while they worked across the borders or in other towns. Clearly, diversification of livelihood portfolios remains basic to household members' survival although in some cases the activities do not necessarily improve people's lives, but remain a hedge against destitution or starvation (Scoones *et al.*, 2010). This creates class distinctions between tribal members and migrants in terms of asset accumulation. This varied from household to household, and even within these two distinct categories of households in Domboshava. Similarly, in southeast Nigeria, migrants often invest their remittances through construction of schools and public infrastructure as a social responsibility in their homelands (Tacoli, 2002). In Ghana, migrants also invest their remittances locally (Berry, 2011).

Community members of Domboshava keep in constant touch with their household members and kin through cell phones. For example, most community residents use prepaid cellphones to communicate with their household members, friends, and relatives in other places in Zimbabwe or outside the country. In some cases, household members that migrate to other places make return journeys. On the other hand, migrants in Domboshava visit their

homelands occasionally. About seventeen migrants from the sampled households maintained their homeland identities and ties with their kin in rural areas elsewhere, for example, during funerals, national holidays such as Christmas and Easter, as well as other public holidays as revealed by VH Honor when he said, *"They still visit their homelands and regard this space as urban. Yet we regard this land as rural. They go to their homelands during the holidays and whenever they want to perform traditional functions with their relatives"*. Journeys by these migrants are often unplanned, for example, to attend funerals. The same applies to tribal members of Domboshava that visit this communal area as their homeland during national holidays, or for rituals and funeral purposes. Their household members expect them to bring groceries and new clothes particularly during the festive season. This shows that movement of migrants (in whichever form) is significant for them to keep in touch with their tribal roots. Scoones *et al.* (2010) also found out that in Masvingo newly resettled farmers constantly connect with their homelands as a way of maintaining social relations. The notion of homelands is an important social construct that is observed by many Zimbabweans at all costs (Potts & Mutambirwa, 1990). Failure by migrants to join their household members during celebrations and rituals dampens the spirits of those waiting for reunion.

While young community residents migrate to other countries and cities, the 'split or divided family syndrome' common among families of migrants was also evident in Domboshava as recently married youths left their wives under the custody of their mothers with the hope of coming back or making frequent visits to check on their partners (cf. Potts & Mutambirwa, 1990). For example, Katty's son who worked in South Africa left his pregnant wife under Katty's custody. The 'split or divided family syndrome' not only presents conflict on the desire to maintain intact families that live together, but also the need to generate income (Potts & Mutambirwa, 1990; Tacoli, 2002).

Although migration of household members to other places is an important livelihoods strategy, Bryceson (2002) argues that it disorganises families (households) as units of production. Household members are a significant component of agrarian processes in terms of labour supply (Shanin, 1975; Harriss, 1982). Cousins (1990); Potts & Mutambirwa (1991); and Dekker & Kinsey (2011) observed patterns of labour shortage on rural farms in Zimbabwe because of mobility of household members. In Domboshava, more informal rather than formal employment seekers characterize the labour market. As a result, it is not a question of shortage of labour on peasant farms in Domboshava, but reduced arable land

through land transactions. Women, children, and piece job seekers in most cases manage fields and vleis gardens. Abundant labour in Domboshava converts into unemployment particularly among male and female youths as these seek to be engaged in one way or the other through formal or informal employment. According to ZNSA Mashonaland East Report (2012:93), the unemployment rate for Goromonzi District is 12.3%. In the same report, more males are unemployed compared to women. These findings suggest that the usual tasks such as herdboys that provide traditional work categories for most young men in rural areas through looking after cattle and farming are diminishing in relevance due to reduced livestock herds and arable land. Young women easily find employment as housemaids locally or in other towns such as Harare. Migration and straddling the rural-urban divide therefore represents an exit strategy not only to the traditional modes of survival, but also to the local conditions that undermine viability of traditional modes of survival.

#### **7.6 Emerging class differentiation and division of labour in Domboshava**

As community residents of Domboshava engaged in different activities for the purposes household survival, class differentiation and division of labour were evident among household members, as well as between the tribal and migrant categories. For example, both tribal and migrants engaged in formal employment, informal activities, and diversification of livelihoods. However, due to the number of migrants in Domboshava in terms of my sample, this category of residents appeared to have more people engaged in each of the livelihoods activities than tribal members except for the case of peasant agriculture. In these terms, migrants appeared to be better-off and more dynamic than tribal members. This situation is not unusual as in many contexts “peri-urban populations are heterogeneous in terms of the extent to which they participate in the flow of goods and services between villages and urban centres” (Narain & Naschal, 2007:262).

Since household survival strategies are a process of accumulation, dynamics of rich/poor community residents (tribal/migrant) in Domboshava were evident. These differences emanate from the kinds of livelihood activities the household members engaged in, and the outcomes from these activities. Tribal and migrant households that had more members engaging in different highly paid professions and activities were likely to generate more household income. This also demonstrates the differential outcomes from livelihoods diversification within and between the two distinct categories of households in this communal

area. Class distinctions among community members of Domboshava were thus a result of the available opportunities, and the number of household members that contributed to household income. However, the number of people engaged in different activities was in some instance of less relevance, but the returns from the activities they engaged in. The findings also show the differential outcomes that exist within the households themselves.

Migrant widows had to make more effort through diversification of household survival strategies amidst personal vulnerabilities such as widowhood. The case of poor migrant widows such as Chipso and Muneni from Murape Village is an example of households that found it difficult to generate household income through diversified livelihood portfolios when they said, *“Our way of living is very difficult. We wake up at around 4am to buy tomatoes and board a bus to town to sell tomatoes. We sell them on a ‘door to door’ basis and come back at six in the evening. We also do piece jobs on other people’s fields. We prioritize working to raise our rentals and food. We often sleep without food. Our children often help us with the upkeep of their siblings. We do not qualify to receive food aid. At times, we are not eligible to participate in development activities because we are not originally from Domboshava. We are lodgers in this community. We once got help from Christian Care, and that was it”*. Whereas, old tribal widows like Eve diversified their household survival strategies through peasant farming, and projects because of their land holding capacities and physical assets such as homesteads. However, household members that stayed close to each other often offer encouragement and share ways of diversifying survival strategies thereby extending their social networks. For example, Chipso and Muneni referenced themselves as ‘we’ in their activities. This demonstrates collective as well as individual effort as the two widows worked together for the survival of their individual household members. Similarly, women of Mwenezi worked as groups of cross-borders to South Africa, and used strategies based on communal working relations in their activities (Mutopo, 2011). These cases challenge the notion that widows are weak, yet some are enterprising (Ibid).

In terms of division of labour, household members from both tribal and migrant households contributed labour to their households in varied forms. The members contributed to the household income in distinct ways. In most rural communities of sub-Saharan Africa, the composition of households, the roles of household members, and social networks of households determine the adequacy of household provisions (Bryceson, 2002). In Domboshava, male household heads were regarded as breadwinners, while women from such households were perceived as responsible for household labour, peasant agriculture tasks,

minor cash supplementation, and looking after the children (cf. Bryceson, 1999). In female-headed households (cases of widows and divorces), females assumed the role of income generation for their households apart from other household tasks. In both male and female-headed households, adults and able-bodied children generated household income according to their abilities (also see Bryceson, 1999; 2000a; 2000b).

In Domboshava, children and youth also contributed to household survival through labour in their capacities (see quotes from Tumai, Chipu, and Muneni above). Children however spent most of their time at school and thus their contribution to household labour and income was only visible after school or during weekends. For example, children looked after homesteads in the absence of their parents and helped their parents in some cases with weeding the fields and vlei gardens. Children (both boys and girls) attended market stalls (*musika*), and alerted their parents about prospective customers. This allowed parents or adults to engage in other household activities often multiple with minimum disruptions. Young children also took care of their siblings through play (see Photograph 5.1 in Chapter 5). Apart from this, children also performed menial tasks such as fetching water for household use (see Photograph 6.1 in Chapter 6). This also lessened the burden of water carrying particularly on women who are traditionally expected to fetch water for domestic purposes. In some cases, young children looked after small livestock such as goats, while adult children particularly boys looked after cattle. Assumption of these roles by children was therefore viewed not as child labour, but rather as socialization of children into adult roles. The elderly looked after the homesteads while working on arable land at the homesteads. Clearly, all members of society are competent in one way or the other to accomplish social activities (Giddens, 1984). However, Cousins (1990:7) perceives unpaid household labour as 'self-exploitative' because it "places limits on the extent to which surpluses can be generated and invested back into production".

## 7.7 Conclusion

Household survival strategies in Domboshava varied from household to household since household compositions were not homogeneous. Households engaged in multi-activities as survival strategies. In any case, livelihood comprises more than one activity (Chambers & Conway, 1991). Customary land rights and homesteads were the major assets by community residents of Domboshava. Land in Domboshava is a critical asset for tribal members and migrants in terms of generation of other forms of capital including relationships, belonging

and household income. These assets also distinguished community residents as better-off or worse-off. Tribal members that sold land for survival became worse-off and land-poor, whereas buyers of land became better-off and land-rich. Survival strategies of both tribal members and migrants characterized the processes of accumulation, and determined the scale and magnitude on which land based peasant farming could be practiced in Domboshava.

Both tribal and migrants diversified their survival strategies by continuously straddling the rural-urban divide between Domboshava and Harare, and beyond the national borders through migration on short-term and long-term basis. For migrants, diversification of livelihood strategies was already in progress since they came to Domboshava as land seekers for purposes of establishing their livelihood bases. As both tribal and migrant households diversified household survival strategies, age, and gender played a particular role within the household structures. Both males and females in their mid to late twenties continuously straddled the urban-rural divide on daily basis or migrated to other countries, while elderly household members such as grannies looked after small children and homesteads. Old widows as household heads engaged in locally based survival strategies because they could not cope with the demands of migration due to age. In some cases, young children looked after homesteads and small livestock while their elders engaged in income-generating activities. Housemaids also emerged as significant caretakers of homesteads while their employers diversified household strategies away from home. Both men and women engaged in informal activities popularly known as '*kiya-kiya*' and these differed in scale and size. For example, petty trading simply manifested as hawking, and for others it involved more expensive and bigger items.

Class differentiation among households of Domboshava was evident in terms of better-off/worse-off, and rich/poor distinctions. These inequalities were visible in both material and physical forms; although in some cases good houses did not translate into better-off situations as some tribal individuals from dilapidated traditional houses were doing well because of the kinds of household survival strategies they engaged in. However, within this process of accumulation, migrants that own residential spaces in Domboshava and retained their homeland tribal statuses emerged as better-off compared to tribal members of Domboshava. As these migrants diversified their livelihoods, they combined what they produced in Domboshava with what they already had in their homelands. The situation was however different with migrant lodgers particularly widows and divorces that needed to generate and

save income for survival, as well as to accrue assets such as land and homesteads through diversification while staying in Domboshava at the same time.

Diversification of household survival strategies in Domboshava was more of an involuntary and coping activity to supplement household income in response to other stimuli, and not necessarily the reduction of land holding capacities of individual households although land holding was significant in operation of small business enterprises. In many cases, diversification was the result of opportunistic activities during which advantage was taken of situations to make profit through income-generating activities. Community residents were simply responding to not only land transactions and undesirable RDP strategies, but to other factors outside the village boundaries that embrace urbanization, adverse weather conditions, and dollarization of the national economy. Shifts in relevance of peasant farming as well as salaried employment to more diversified portfolios of household survival strategies demonstrates reproduction of social systems, as these are inseparable from the activities of community residents as agents (Kaspersen, 2000; Parker, 2000; Stones, 2005). Community residents were therefore not trapped by orthodox modes of household survival, but used their agency to adapt to changing conditions within their peri-urban context through exit. Diversification of household survival strategies is processual, and not static.



## Chapter 8 Conclusion: the complex interplay of land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies in Domboshava

### 8.1 Introduction

Urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa has led to the proliferation of peri-urban settlements close to cities. Development policies in these settlements are multi-pronged. Residents who have local tribal as well as migrant backgrounds often take land matters into their own hands. This leads to diverse land transactions and changing household survival strategies. My thesis is based on field research of a case study comprising four villages in Domboshava, a peri-urban area of Harare, in Zimbabwe. In this peri-urban communal area, land transactions are shifting from customary inheritance in the tribal line to individualized direct land sales and renting. Household survival strategies are also shifting from rural peasant farming to off-farm and non-farm activities. Appropriate policy strategies that address these peri-urban challenges in Zimbabwe are sorely needed. This chapter brings out the complex interplay *between* land transactions, Rural Development Policy (RDP), and household survival strategies - and addresses my final research question namely: What mutual influences emerged from the interactions *between* land transactions, perceptions of RDP, and household survival strategies? To address this question, I reflect on the LPS framework in Figure 8.1 below.




Figure 8.1: The dialectical relationships between land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies  
Source: Field data, (2012).

During fieldwork, heads of households or their representatives (stand-ins), Traditional Leaders (TLs), Informal Discussants (IDs), and other stakeholders were asked to describe the resultant changes from land transactions, what they perceived as RDP, and household survival strategies. What is happening in Domboshava is a result of mutual relationships and feedback loops *between* these three variables. In my analysis, I therefore provide an interpretation of the intended and unintended consequences of these mutual relationships

flowing from the community residents' rational decisions to participate in land transactions over a census decade from 2002 to 2012. My research focused on four villages of Domboshava (Zimbir, Mungate, Murape, and Chogugudza) situated close to the boundary that separates Domboshava and Harare (see Figure 3.7 in Chapter 3).

The second section of this chapter situates Domboshava historically and geographically in contemporary Zimbabwe, and subsequently discusses the complex interplay of land transactions and RDP in a multi-pronged policy environment where state authority enjoys little respect in land allocation. The third section brings to the fore the nature of RDP strategies in Zimbabwe, and their influence on land transactions and household survival. The fourth section unravels the shifts from customary to individualized land transactions in Domboshava, and the resultant intended and unintended consequences. The fifth section reveals the emergent household survival strategies in Domboshava. The sixth section highlights the emergent class and gender distinctions in Domboshava. The seventh section focuses on the dilemmas regarding land rights of tribal and migrant households and how these may be addressed. The last section presents tentative generalizations as well as suggestions on dissemination of the research findings.

## **8.2 Situating Domboshava historically in contemporary Zimbabwe**

Domboshava is situated on the periphery of Harare, northeast of this city (see Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1). In policy terms, Harare is urban, whereas, Domboshava - where tribal members reside - it is rural. Traditional authority and a local authority called Goromonzi Rural District Council (GRDC) administer land issues in Domboshava. Traditional authority in Domboshava is informed by the tradition and values of the Shona culture. On the other hand, GRDC administers land issues through statutes on land and settlement. Together the traditional and statutory requirements on land administration define the structure that regulates access to land property rights in Domboshava (TLA Chapter 29:17 of 2001; CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002). "Structures serve as the medium of action as they provide, through memory, the bases upon which agents draw when they engage in social practices" (Stones, 2009:91). There exist conflict between traditional and local authorities on land allocation, and on administration of customary land rights in this peri-urban communal area. This leads to increase in land transactions outside this regulatory framework.

Domboshava consists of two categories of households, and these are tribal and migrant households. Tribal households are from Domboshava by origin, whereas migrant households originate from outside Domboshava. Tribal members hold autochthonous customary land rights in Domboshava, whereas migrants are outsiders or sojourners (*vatorwa*) without autochthonous land rights in Domboshava, but hold land rights elsewhere in places they regard as their homelands (*kumusha*) (Holleman, 1952; Bullock, 1972; Bourdillon, 1976; Mujere, 2011). Migrants came to Domboshava mostly from places such as Harare, commercial farms, as well as other distant places across Zimbabwe (see Appendix B). Some migrants are of foreign origin from countries such as Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia. Migrants often assume collective identities as tribal members commonly refer to them as '*vanhu ava*' - meaning 'those people'. Customary land rights in Domboshava separate tribal members - '*vana vemuno*' - from migrants - '*vanhu ava*'. Tribal membership in Domboshava entails belonging, legitimation, and the ability to exercise authority and power to control land and other resources both at individual and collective levels.

The tribal/migrant dialectics define the nature of land and property rights that exist in Domboshava. Land rights of tribal members fall under the system of customary land tenure since land in this peri-urban communal area is held in common (CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002). "Land held in common belongs generally to everybody, but particularly nobody" (Peters, 1994:161). Under customary land tenure, individual land rights are deemed as absent as collective or group rights dominate (Cousins, 1990; Nyambara, 2001; Cousins, 2000; Bennett, 2008). In Domboshava, land belongs to all tribal members inclusive of the living, the dead, and generations to come (see Berry, 1992; Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2006).

Legally, land under the system of customary land tenure in Zimbabwe is untitled, lacks a market value, and therefore is untradeable (CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002). Customary land rights are however transferable, for example, through inheritance (Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Tribal land rights are also alienable, for example, if migrants plead need to traditional authorities they can access land under the system of customary tenure (Holleman, 1952; Bullock, 1972; Bourdillon, 1976; Cousins, 1990). Traditional Leaders as custodians of customary land rights in communal areas retain the prerogative of allocating land rights to tribal and migrant households (Holleman, 1952; Bullock, 1972; Bourdillon, 1976). Traditional Leaders perform this role in consultation with tribal male adults usually household heads and together they preside over the decision-making process. Males are the

primary land rights holders, whereas women's land rights are tied to those of men such as their fathers, brothers, or husbands (Makura-Paradza, 2010). Domboshava is patriarchal.

The peri-urban communal area of Domboshava experienced population increase in the past decade as a result of the urbanization of Harare, as well as the in-migration of people from Harare and other parts of the country (ZNSA National Census Report, 2012). Rural-urban migration in most academic discourses is linked to tribal members in search of opportunities outside their rural areas (Potts & Mutambirwa, 1990; Bekker, 2002; Potts, 2011). The case of Domboshava however demonstrates a new dispensation that challenges the rural-urban migration orthodox to more of urban-rural migration as people move from Harare and other cities to settle in Domboshava; as well as rural-rural migration as migrants move from their rural villages to Domboshava, as migrant lodgers move to new residential spaces in Domboshava, and as new tribal household formations settle away from their original homesteads within the villages of Domboshava. Migration of people into the peri-urban communal area of Domboshava is attributed mainly to displacement of households through state policies such as the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) of 2000 (see Marongwe, 2008; Moyo *et al.*, 2009; Scoones *et al.*, 2010), and Operation Restore Order/Operation Murambatsvina (ORO/OM) of 2005 (see Tibaijuka, 2005; Kamete, 2011; Potts, 2011). In addition, deterioration of the economic climate, hyperinflation, shortage of food, inadequate services in urban centres during the decade of crisis in Zimbabwe, and the subsequent dollarization of the economy in 2009 also contributed to migration of people to Domboshava (see Chiumbu & Musemwa, 2012). Migration of people to Domboshava though intermittent, was supposedly a temporary solution to households' housing and survival needs in general. Upon discovery of cheap and readily available residential land in Domboshava, migration turned into a permanent solution for many migrants and not necessarily victims of displacement alone. Constant migration of people to Domboshava is however exacerbated by the physical location of this peri-urban communal area in proximity with Harare. The boundary that separates Domboshava and Harare is porous due to the physical linkages and movement of people between these two settlements.

### **8.3 The multi-pronged Rural Development Policy environment in Zimbabwe**

The concept of RDP in Zimbabwe is broad and unclear. It is unwritten, and is linked to an array of statutes on land and settlement (see Box 6.1 in Chapter 6). Rural Development

Policy in Domboshava is synonymous with policy strategies such as the Land Reform Programmes (LRPs), service provision, development projects, and upgrading of rural settlements to urban (see Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990; Mutizwa-Mangiza & Helmsing, 1991; Munzwa, & Jonga, 2010). Implementation of RDP strategies cuts across different government departments, ministries, and levels of administration. Together, the traditional authorities and GRDC are the custodians of the RDP strategies in Domboshava. This institutional order emanates from the colonial legacies of land administration that many African countries never revised (Berry, 2002; Musandu-Nyamayaro, 2008; Thebe, 2010). As a result, there exists not only conflict of interest, but also skewed power relations in favour of local authorities as representatives of the state with regards to the implementation of RDP strategies in Domboshava.

There is lack of consensus on what community residents, TLs, and other stakeholders understood as RDP in Domboshava. The views of these categories of people are shaped by their expectations flowing from RDP strategies. For example, GRDC as a local authority viewed RDP in terms of statutes on land and settlement, rezoning of communal areas from rural to urban through upgrading of settlements, as well as provision of basic services and infrastructure in rural areas. Settlement upgrading sought to change the rural status of community residents to urban, and to curtail prevalence of individualized land transactions through provision of land titles to communal land once it turns urban. Tribal members and migrants viewed RDP in terms of provision of services such as water, electricity, and sanitation. Tribal members also viewed RDP in terms of finding lasting solutions to direct land sales, whereas migrants anticipated obtaining land for housing through the same policy. On the other hand, tribal members anticipated service provision within a rural context, while migrants expected these services within an urban context. There are clear disparities on some of the expectations of community residents on RDP, and the context in which RDP could be implemented in terms of service provision.

For tribal members, the local conditions on customary land rights, as well as their tribal status were more important than service provision through implementation of RDP strategies such as settlement upgrading. The perceptions of many tribal members demonstrate mistrust of RDP. Tribal members perceived settlement upgrading as a hidden agenda and worthless policy that sought to manipulate their autochthonous land rights at the expense of their lived experiences and belonging, and sought to dispossess them of their 'freedoms' under the

system of customary land tenure (see Cousins, 2008a). As a result, individualized land transactions particularly direct land sales proliferated ahead of settlement upgrading. Similar experiences were observed in Gokwe (Nyambara, 2001); in Binga (Dzingirai, 2003); as well as in Dande (Spierenburg, 2004) communal areas in Zimbabwe where community residents boycotted and sabotaged what they regarded as unattractive, suspicious, and undesirable RDP strategies. Such reactions demonstrate the capability of agents to challenge the status quo to their advantage in situated encounters. Sometimes well-designed policies are often flawed, and widely acclaimed policies often fail - they can go awry (Pretorius, 2003; World Development Report, 2003). Policies are also capable of producing unintended consequences (Giddens, 1989).

In contrast, migrants of Domboshava looked forward to settlement upgrading as an opportunity to obtain and to secure land rights in Domboshava. As a result, migrants demonstrated loyalty to the status quo (the system of customary land tenure) in anticipation of services within an urban settlement. However, formal titles to land do not always secure land rights in absolute terms (Migot-Adholla & Bruce, 1994). Land titles may secure land rights, but are capable of generating insecurity at the same time (Nyamu-Musembi, 2006). For example, migrants are susceptible to possible eviction and relocation if the GRDC decides to alienate land for development purposes after upgrading Domboshava in future. What is happening in Domboshava also shows that even collective rights are not secure because some community residents were able to individualize the collective land rights within the structure of customary land tenure through agency. Under these circumstances, community residents of Domboshava perceived RDP as undesirable.

#### **8.4 From customary to individualized land transactions - the intended and unintended outcomes**

Land transactions are on the increase in Domboshava. These entail land exchanges by both tribals and migrants mostly for residential purposes. This situation is not new, and is common in settlements situated in the peri-urban zones of cities, and in communal areas in general (Nyambara, 2001; Tacoli, 2002; Chimhowu & Woodhouse, 2006; Owusu, 2008; Wehrmann, 2008; Cousins, 2009; Benjaminsen & Sjaastad, 2010; Chirisa, 2010a; Chirisa, 2010b; Colin & Woodhouse, 2010; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Land transactions observed in Domboshava were categorized as *individualized* and *customary*. Individualized land transactions involve

land exchanges without approval of both traditional and statutory systems of land administration. Individualized land transactions include direct land sales, renting, and land grabs. Land grabs entail forceful dispossession of land rights without the consent of the land 'owners'. Individualized land transactions in Domboshava involved negotiated monetary exchanges of land rights between tribal members and migrants, and between migrants. In most cases, migrants were the land seekers. However, in some cases migrants sold land to desperate tribal members. Community residents engaged in direct land sales despite it being unlawful for households to sell state-owned communal land (see CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002). This is similar to what happens in Rwanda, Somalia, and Uganda where farmers also engage in land sales despite laws that prohibit such practices (Migot-Adhola & Bruce, 1994).

Individualized land transactions such as land sales in Domboshava also entail personalization of common property regimes for individual gain. Common property regimes in Domboshava include land (arable, grazing, commons), as well as other natural and physical resources. Although the system of customary tenure regulates access to these common property regimes, community residents were not trapped by this structure. Through individual agency, community members were capable of going beyond the set rules to transact untitled and nontradeable land outside the customary land tenure procedures. However, by exercising their tribal land rights beyond the system of customary land tenure through land transactions such as direct land sales, tribal members arguably failed to recall that customary land rights come with both individual and collective responsibilities not only to exclude others but also to balance these land rights with structural obligations for future generational needs (Cousins, 2000; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Land transactions outside the structure such as direct land sales engender dispossession of customary land rights although tribal members could still claim these rights through belonging since Domboshava is their homeland - '*kumusha*'.

Customary land transactions comprise inheritance, and this involves land exchanges within the confines of both the traditional and statutory requirements (see CLA Chapter 20:04 of 2002). Legally, both male and female offspring have the right to inherit land property rights in Zimbabwe. In Domboshava, inheritance involves the passage land and other property rights to one's descendants through the generational order. Apart from this, inheritance also involves bequeathing of land and property rights not necessarily during the afterlife of the original owners, but during their lifetime. In such cases, inheritance emerges as a way of safeguarding land and other property rights against conflict associated with afterlife

inheritance procedures, and as a new form of securing these rights from dispossession through individualized land transactions such as direct land sales and land grabs. This presents a reversal of the process of inheritance that in most rural communities involves passage of land other property rights from the dead to the living (Hilhorst, 2000; Makura-Paradza, 2010; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Thus, inheritance facilitates passage of customary land rights through the structure of customary land tenure and agency of individual heads of households, while securing these land rights through land transactions at the same time.

Both individualized and customary land transactions were witnessed in Domboshava before, during, and after 2002. They continue unabated. The practice of inheritance was common before 2002; however, it gradually decreased after 2002. Individualized land transactions also took place during and after 2002, and are on the increase in Domboshava compared to those sanctioned under the system of customary land tenure. Direct land sales were predominantly practised in Zimbiru, Mungate, and Murape Villages, whereas tribal members in Chogugudza Village preferred renting. The VH for Chogugudza Village did not approve of direct land sales, but preferred renting. Thus, individualized land transactions in Domboshava such as direct land sales were more prevalent in villages where the VHs approved the practice, as well as in villages located closer to the border with Harare (see Figure 3.5 in Chapter 3). Prevalence of both individualized and customary land transactions in Domboshava clearly shows that procedures that regulate access to land under customary land tenure are neither rule bound nor static, but processual. Land transactions in Domboshava like in the past (colonial era) were a way of resisting processes incompatible with local changes (Cheater, 1983; 1990). Thus, the system of customary land tenure as the structure empowers different categories of community residents differently to participate in land transactions, while at the same time these community residents reproduce the structure to suit their needs. Structures are an outcome of agents' social practices (Stones, 2009). However, relatively stable structures may go through or experience transformation (Sewell, 1992). This demonstrates that land acquired through 'informal' markets can be subjected to 'customary law' through individualized land transactions.

The causes of land transactions in Domboshava were multiple and complex. These emanate from the national and local scales. At a local scale, individualized land transactions were a result of influences from both a multi-pronged RDP and household survival strategies. Tribal members that engaged in individualized land transactions viewed the practice as capable of



generating quick cash for household survival compared to other activities such as peasant farming through growing crops and livestock keeping. On the other hand, migrants viewed these individualized land transactions as a way of reorganizing their survival strategies within an 'urban' zone closer to the capital city. Migrants particularly those displaced through the FTLRP and ORO/OM, sought to diversify their livelihood opportunities through a base in Domboshava. Through agency, tribal and migrants members went beyond the structure and individualized customary land rights while they sought survival at the same time. Through the structure, some tribal members individualized customary land rights and common property resources for personal gain. Renting enabled tribal members to generate income, as well as to retain customary land rights in contrast to direct land sales that entailed outright dispossession of these rights. Renting is more concerned with perpetuation of land rights in terms of 'ownership' (see Colin & Woodhouse, 2010).

The complex and multifaceted nature of RDP such as the GRDC's intention to upgrade Domboshava from rural to urban in particular emerged as one of the major causes of land transactions in Domboshava. Settlement upgrading as an RDP strategy regarded as a panacea to individualized land transactions by GRDC became a tragic prescription that created confusion about how tribal members could secure their customary land rights within an urban context. Thus, proliferation of individualized land transactions in Domboshava originates from the multi-pronged nature of RDP, as well as failure of the proposed policy strategy to realize its set goals. Settlement upgrading was constrained not only by the nature of the policy strategy itself, but by diverse views, expectations, and perceptions of community residents about the policy proposal. Tribal members engaged in direct land sales as a way of frustrating and sabotaging this GRDC's policy strategy on one hand, whereas migrants on the other hand unintentionally sabotaged and frustrated the policy through buying land outside customary land tenure. Migrants that obtained land in Domboshava through individualized land transaction anticipated to secure their land rights through implementation of settlement upgrading as an RDP strategy, whereas tribals sought to secure their rights through resisting the same proposal. From the perspective of the LPS framework, these dialectics demonstrate the influences as well as relationships between land transactions and RDP strategies in Domboshava.

Apart from these conflicts and causes, individualized land transactions were attributed to individual goals and motives as well as the dynamics used by different agents to access land

on the land market in Domboshava. For example, the corrupt tendencies of some TLs that sold communal land to migrants for personal gain. Most tribal members regarded these TLs as 'greedy' because they transformed gifts to bribes. Gifts in most cases no longer served their traditional role as symbols of welcoming sojourners, but degenerated into instruments of corruption. Gifts have since become income generating activities for some TLs. Community residents also disguised individualized land transactions such as direct sales through language. In addition, direct land sales emerged as a form of gerrymandering as TLs sought to boost their political careers through settling more migrants, for example, the case of Murape Village. Individualized land transactions seemed to proliferate in villages closer to the boundary with Harare, and mostly in villages where TLs supported the practice. Thus, individualized land transactions were a result of proximity between Domboshava and Harare the capital city, as well as the resultant peri-urban nature of Domboshava, and not necessarily a multi-pronged RDP and household survival strategies alone. This shows that the dynamics of change in this peri-urban communal area, as well as shifts within the wider political economy of Zimbabwe contributed toward the rise in land transactions (cf. Peters, 2004).

A typical blame game among tribal members, TLs, and the GRDC is ongoing in Domboshava with regards the proliferation of individualized land transactions in this communal area. The Chief blames the VHs and Headmen for not following procedures on allocation of land rights to migrants. On the other hand, VHs and Headmen blame the Chief for his laissez-faire approach to the increase in land transactions outside customary land tenure. In turn, the TLs cast their blame on tribal household members whom they claim to undermine tribal authority by taking land matters into their own hands. Conversely, tribal household members accuse the TLs for presiding over individualized land transactions. Traditional Leaders and tribal household members blame the GRDC for the increase in land transactions through proposing undesirable and inappropriate RDP strategies. Meanwhile, migrants are mute and remain loyal to the status quo because they lack autochthonous land rights in Domboshava. A similar blame game ensued in Madziwa and Bushu communal areas between TLs and community residents (Matondi & Dekker, 2011). The different agents in land transactions shift the blame on proliferation of individualized land transactions and refuse to take responsibility for their own action because of the unintended consequences from their conduct. Yet, when they entered into various land transactions, they were simply negotiating the structure to their advantage (cf. Peters, 2007). The blame game that is currently ensuing in Domboshava is not only pointing to conflict in land administration among land users, but within the system of

customary land tenure where customary land rights are informed through statutory provisions and traditional values, while at the same time these rights are recognized from individual and collective perspectives. This demonstrates that the system of customary tenure regards communities and institutions as homogenous with fixed interests on land, and underestimates the individual agency of community residents to go beyond the structure to their own advantage. "It is a mistake to assume that unified, internally consistent and well defined systems of rules and practices exist ... there are certainly multiple, overlapping and sometimes mutually contradicting sets of rights of access and control" (Berry, 1988; 1989 in Cousins, 1990:17). Clearly, customary land rights are "complex combinations of de jure and de facto rights ..." (Cousins, 2000:155).

#### 8.4.1 Reduced arable land and diminishing tribal legitimacy

As community residents of Domboshava engaged in customary and individualized land transactions; reacted to RDP strategies; and shifted household survival; their choices seemed simple, but the outcomes were variable and complex through significant reduction in arable spaces. Community residents needed to survive through land transactions while they secured their land rights at the same time. They did not intend to destabilize the status quo, but were simply responding to surrounding circumstances. This created shifts in household survival strategies, while the emergent household survival strategies in turn influenced land transactions, and RDP at the same time. During the 1960s, tribal households of Domboshava were allocated three acres of fields, one acre of a garden, and one acre of the yard - by the then Land Development Officers. These ceilings to land holding capacities of residents in communal areas were institutionalized by the colonial government through the Land Husbandry Act of 1951 as ways of standardizing households' land parcels in communal areas (Holleman, 1952; Cheater, 1990). Fifty years later, none of the surveyed households in Domboshava owned these original land parcels in full. Yet, tribal members simply expanded households' income streams by other means, catered for new household formations, as well as extended assistance to victims of displacement. As a coping mechanism to reduced arable land, some tribal members resort to sharing their portions of vleis gardens and arable spaces. The colonial government clearly underestimated the generational land needs of tribal members in Domboshava.

As tribal members practiced individualized land transactions such as direct land sales to migrants, they inversely transformed their territorial boundaries both in physical and institutional terms. Land sold translates to reduced land holding capacities of individual tribal households, as well as tribal land collectively. As more and more migrants settled in Domboshava, they occupied more territorial space than tribal members - a development incompatible with the '*vatorwa*' concept in the Shona culture (see Holleman, 1952). Thus, individual action and choices to practise direct land sales engendered collective consequences in terms of loss of territorial space and community identity. Identities are constructed through occupying specific territorial spaces (Gervais-Lambony, 2006). In institutional and physical terms land is an integral property and economic resource that serves in the production of wealth, as well as a territory in terms of a governed space that gives those who control it leverage to control others (Berry, 2008:27 in Peters 2010:604).

Reduction of tribal land through individualized land transactions presents new sets of conflict in terms of the legitimacy of TLs as the custodians of tribal authority and land under the system of customary land tenure. The Chief is increasingly losing his legitimacy in Domboshava. Legitimacy of Chiefs is definable through dominance of tribal members often of the same lineage within a communal area, and the breadth of the territories they govern (see Holleman, 1952; Bullock, 1972; Latham, 1973; Goldin & Gelfand, 1975; Bourdillon, 1976; O'Flaherty, 1998; Andersson, 1999). Land in communal areas defines not only the existence of communities under TLs such as Chiefs, but also the territorial space under their command - the soil/'*ivhu*' (Holleman, 1952; Bullock, 1972; Bourdillon, 1976). Rural communities in Zimbabwe are not only geographic entities characterized by people who occupy the spaces and boundaries, but cohesion of these people as they share common property resources at their disposal under the custody of Chiefs (Goldin & Gelfand, 1975; Latham, 1973; O'Flaherty, 1998; Andersson, 1999). Part of what is happening in Domboshava because of individualized land transactions particularly direct land sales and land grabs is therefore the disappearance of the tribal community in spatial, territorial, and institutional terms - something both tribal and migrants did not intend in the first place. Migrants emerge as winners from land transactions as they access additional land rights apart from their autochthons rights in their homelands. Whereas, tribal members disposed of their tribal land rights, territory, and legitimacy to migrants.

In addition, tribal members lost their prerogative in land allocation in Domboshava as migrants often sell land to other land seekers, and expect their descendants to inherit land in this communal area. This demonstrates that tribal authority is slowly diminishing as migrants not only assume land rights, but also in some instances tribal roles in land allocation to fellow migrants, and to some tribals like the girl child whose inheritance failed (see Box 5.7 in Chapter 5). This marks the departure from traditional values and statutory procedures on land allocation under the system of customary land tenure, as this role is a prerogative of TLs and tribal heads of households. This situation not only creates new land tenure regimes, but also reproduces new forms of securing the acquired land rights within the current system of customary land tenure.

Often, tribal members regret their conduct. In their minds, land sales provide brief gratification and simultaneously generate negative, irreversible, and long term unintended consequences. For example, Redza and Yeukai of Zimbiru Village regarded themselves as 'stupid' because they sold their garden and were buying tomatoes and other vegetables from other tribal members that did not sell their land (see Box 5.8 in Chapter 5). Unintended consequences like these are what tribal members unintentionally caused (cf. Giddens, 1984). Since the concept of land carries different meanings to different categories of people in space and time, these unintended consequences from land transactions did not necessarily mean the same for migrants because migrants' major goals were mostly about securing residential land. Yet, for tribal members of Domboshava the concept of land is rooted in the definition of land rights within the system of customary land tenure, as well as the emergent social constructions and relations mediated through use of particular land parcels and common property regimes.

#### 8.4.2 Changes of land use

Both customary and individualized land transactions in Domboshava result in change of land use categorized as arable, grazing, residential, and the commons. Arable land constitutes the fields and vleis gardens, whereas the commons comprise forests, grazing lands, wetlands, and watersheds. Land use for peasant farming in Domboshava varies between villages, as well as between individual households, and is never homogeneous. For example, villages that experienced more direct land sales as opposed to renting such as Zimbiru, Mungate, and Murape had significant reduction in peasant plots compared to Chogugudza Village where

peasant farming was practiced on fields and vlei gardens by both tribal members and migrants because to a large extent the VH did not approve land sales but allowed renting. As a result of land transactions such as inheritance and land sales, the commons and arable land reserved for peasant farming slowly degenerated into residential spaces. Yet, peasant farming is generally regarded as the backbone of survival in most communal areas of Zimbabwe (Dekker & Kinsey, 2011; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). The traditional hallmark for survival of most tribal households in Domboshava - the vlei gardens - turned into residential spaces. As a result, tribal members of Domboshava lost their title as the 'Tomato Kingdom' - '*Kumadomasi*' as most households relied on other peasant producers of vegetables in other villages such as Nyamande (see Box 5.8 in Chapter 5). As vlei gardens and common property resources such as grazing, forests, and watersheds degenerated into residential spaces, this leads to the extinction of natural habitats for a variety of animal and plant species. In most cases, these spaces were rendered unusable particularly for peasant farming due to extraction of sand and quarry for construction purposes (see Photograph 8.1 below).



Photograph 8.1: Degradation of the commons in Domboshava  
Source: Field data, (2012).

The settlement pattern and density in Domboshava were also altered because of the increased number of migrants that settled in this communal area. The layout of the residential spaces in Domboshava changed greatly from a typical rural settlement where homesteads are scattered (see section 3.7.2 in Chapter 3), to more closely settled homesteads that are overcrowded and messy. Similar changes were also witnessed in Accra in Ghana where residential development through land transactions overshadowed other forms of land use such as grazing and arable, and building emerged as permanent crops (Berry, 2011). In Domboshava, new building structures of modern outlook are juxtaposed with traditional structures often dilapidated. This creates a mixed settlement 'far from being rural'. For example, new homesteads depict a modern outlook compared to some traditional residential structures (see Photograph 7.2 in Chapter 7). Migrants that bought large residential spaces constructed up-market houses in most cases with a roof under tiles, gated, and had security pre-cast walls popularly called 'dura-walls'. These structures symbolize status. Security walls are also associated with privacy. In most cases, dwelling units for tribal members had a traditional outlook such as roofs under thatch, traditional rounded kitchens separate from the main houses, and fowl runs (see Photograph 7.2 in Chapter 7). Differences between physical structures of homesteads account for differential outcomes from land transactions mostly unintended in terms of rich migrants/poor tribals and rich tribals/poor migrants. In order to cope with these changes, some tribal members invest in building modern structures, while some tribal children build homesteads for their parents as a way of improving their social conditions, and disrupting distortions and class distinctions that emanate from mixed settlements.

As more and more migrants settle in Domboshava, the population increases. For example, in 2002 the population of Domboshava (Ward 4 of Goromonzi District) was 16 149 (Zimbabwe Census, 2002:105), and it almost doubled to 30 123 in 2012 (ZNSA National Census Report, 2012:138). Ward 4 has the highest population among the twenty-five Wards in Goromonzi District. Migrant population is more than the tribal population in this Ward (see Table 3.1 in Chapter 3). Migration has been the major contributory factor to changes in demographic patterns of Domboshava. The trends in population increase in Domboshava signify future scenarios on domination of land rights by migrant households compared to tribals. Because of population increase in Domboshava, an increase in crime such as ritual murders, muggings, stock theft, and crop theft has been reported (Share, 2012).



The population increase in Domboshava also led to new village formations. There are seventy-three villages in Domboshava against twenty-five officially proclaimed villages. The VHs for the emergent villages are unofficial. Traditional Leaders of Domboshava were aware of these institutional distortions, and often referred to such VHs as '*tumasabhuku twenzara*' meaning penurious, impoverished, and unauthorized VHs. Chimhowu & Woodhouse (2008) describe such VHs as spurious and poor TLs that are willing to exchange land even for small sums of money. The existence of unofficial villages and VHs and their recognition through the local structures is a pointer to the fragmentation of tribal power and authority in this communal area.

As the settlement density in Domboshava increases, individualization of common property also increases. Common property resources such as the rainmaking cave and the sacred forest at Domboshava Hill degenerated as revealed by Mharidzo, an officer under DNMMZ. In addition, cultural dominance of *Zvigure* culture and their *Nyau* dance (typical of the Malawian culture) dominates. On the other hand, traditional practices of the Shona such as the rainmaking ceremony rarely feature as TLs and tribal members postponed the ritual indefinitely due to lack of tribal commitment.

### **8.5 Emergent household survival strategies in Domboshava**

The household survival strategies adopted by tribal members and migrants of Domboshava depend upon the nature of household assets, and the nature of households' land rights under the system of customary land tenure. These determine the well-being of household members and enhance their opportunities for survival as a response to what is happening within their surroundings. In most cases, community residents do not have control over the external environments such as national policies (cf. Cahn, 2002; Bryceson; 2005). Elsewhere in communal areas under the resettlement scheme or the A1 model of the FTLRP, household survival strategies generally fluctuated between 2002 and 2012 (Scoones *et al.*, 2010; Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Households in these areas experienced improvement as well as challenges on livelihoods due to deterioration in the micro economic climate, adverse weather conditions, and lack of farm inputs.

Households in Domboshava owned different kinds of assets individually and collectively in form of common property regimes. For example, tribal members considered their tribal



status, customary land rights, homesteads, livestock, vlei gardens, and household property as assets. Migrants that acquired land through land transactions considered their land parcels, homesteads, and other household property as assets. However, migrants that bought land and migrant lodgers that retained their homeland statuses included their customary land rights, homesteads, livestock, and other household property in their homelands as part of their asset portfolios. Migrants that held customary land rights in their homeland perceived themselves as better-off through 'double belonging'. The situation was however different for migrant lodgers of foreign origin without homelands or 'land' in Domboshava. They had a narrow asset base recognizable through their household property in Domboshava. This category of households comprised mainly the urban poor, and ex-farm workers displaced by ORO/OM and FTLRP respectively. However, both tribal and migrant members owned social assets such as relationships, belonging, social networks, and had access to common property resources such as forests, water, and hills. For migrants, access to common property regimes demonstrates the role of land transactions in mediating land and other forms of assets in this communal area. The asset base of households in Domboshava was never homogenous. It varied between the tribal/migrants categories, as well as within these categories and individual households.

#### 8.5.1 Diminishing practice in peasant farming

Peasant farming in Domboshava involves growing of crops each planting season, and livestock rearing for household consumption and for sale. The practice of peasant farming in Domboshava varies according to village, gender, generation, and status among community members and this leads to social differentiation. For example, peasant farming was prevalent in villages where direct land sales were minimal. In addition, the older generation that did not sell their land, and lacked other means of livelihood practiced peasant farming even under constraints of weather conditions, farm inputs, and technical services. In most cases, peasant farming often failed to generate food as well as income requirements for these households throughout the season. Because of limited output from peasant farming, such households often emerged as poor. For example of Fadziso's household grows maize that does not take them through the planting season despite nonparticipation in land transactions (see section 7.3.2 in Chapter 7). Similarly, in Bushu and Madziwa communal areas, households generally experienced more of downward trends in the performance of peasant farming (Matondi & Dekker, 2011). Shifts in the practice of peasant farming in Bushu and Madziwa communal

areas were due to adverse weather conditions, lack of agricultural inputs, changes in the macroeconomic climate, and reduced arable land because of persistent land transactions (Ibid).

In Domboshava, community residents were simply ‘hanging in’ as they struggled to practice peasant farming on reduced land parcels (cf. Scoones *et al.*, 2010; 2011c). In some cases, community residents were ‘dropping out’ of practicing peasant farming (Ibid). Whereas, better-off households and TLs that practiced peasant farming owing to their large land parcels were ‘stepping up’ (Ibid). The department of Agricultural Technical and Extension Services (AGRITEX) offered technical services on peasant farming in this communal area. However, these services were minimal compared to the number of people that expected to benefit from the state’s assistance (see Box 7.2 in Chapter 7). The programmes from AGRITEX as an RDP strategy from the perspective of GRDC and the state were also selective in their implementation. Only households with at least 0.5 hectares of arable land were eligible to benefit from the government sponsored technical services and free farm inputs. Most households in Domboshava were constrained by their land holding capacities to benefit from the state assistance. In the end, most beneficiaries from the AGRITEX programmes were from other Wards of Goromonzi District such as Munyawiri and Nyamande, and not necessarily Domboshava. A few households from Domboshava that benefited from the programme were mostly from Chogugudza Village where the VH did not approve direct land sales.

On the other hand, some migrants practiced peasant farming on empty spaces on their residential land, and in some cases in their homelands. For these migrants, peasant farming in Domboshava was constrained by land holding capacities. Given a chance, many migrants would practise farming on a larger scale in Domboshava. By practising peasant farming on reduced arable land parcels, both tribal members and migrants attempted to preserve their peasant status. Thus, peasant farming in Domboshava was not necessarily a question of output, but symbolic relevance and meaning of the practice within the lived experiences of the community residents. Their lives were rooted in their farming backgrounds and relationships with land, and thus they struggled to grow crops on limited arable land, with limited farm implements, and even under adverse weather conditions. Peasant farming therefore remains an important survival strategy for some households in Domboshava, apart from diversified portfolios.

### 8.5.2 Shifts from peasant farming to off-farm and non-farm activities

There is a significant shift from peasant farming in Domboshava. This engenders implications for household survival strategies, and presents complex patterns of unintended outcomes from land transactions through diversification of survival strategies. While Bryceson (2000a; 2000b; 2005), and Tacoli (2002) believe that diversification of household survival strategies results from growth in agriculture or peasant production, the case of Domboshava presents diversification as a pointer to decline in the practice of peasant farming. Peasant farming is no longer worthwhile due to interactions between land transactions and an undesired RDP context. This stimulates shifts from household survival based on peasant farming to other faster methods of generating household income typically off-farm and non-farm. Community residents of Domboshava diversified their households' survival strategies from peasant farming because this requires land. The activity is also seasonal and cumbersome compared to non-land based or non-farm and off-farm activities. In addition, diversification was also driven by adverse weather conditions such as drought, apart from lack of inputs to support peasant farming. Farm inputs became expensive within a dollarized economy. Most households in Domboshava lacked sufficient income to purchase farm inputs such as seed and fertilizer. The government no longer subsidizes farm inputs as was the case in the 1980s and 1990s (see Dekker & Kinsey, 2011). Seed and fertilizer distributed as handouts through the department of AGRITEX in Domboshava hardly satisfies households' needs in peasant farming. As a result, a decrease in peasant farmers in Domboshava as a community of agrarian producers is evident. Waning of the traditional means of household survival through peasant farming is therefore not a result of a multi-pronged RDP and adverse weather conditions alone, but also economics.

Non-farm activities pursued by household members in Domboshava include both formal and informal employment. Some community residents were formally employed in government and private entities, on farms, as well as domestic workers. Through formal employment, these household members were assured of constant income streams on monthly basis in some cases. Cousins (1990:9) refers to formally employed individuals as the "salarariat". Income streams from different jobs varied in space and time. For example, some farm workers earned both in cash and in kind. In some cases, earnings were meagre. Some companies also struggled to pay their employees on time. On the other hand, informal employment or activities commonly referred to as '*kiya-kiya*' comprised buying and selling, petty trading,

vending/*musika*, cross-border trading, piece jobs, and small business enterprises. With cross-border activities, not all migrants ended up in well-paid jobs (Tacoli, 2002). Thus, the nature of and the output from '*kiya-kiya*' varies.

Availability of markets in Harare and at local shopping centres was also important in diversification of household survival portfolios through informal activities. Markets at local shopping centres such as Mverechena, Mungate, Showground, and those in Harare catered for a variety of goods such as agricultural produce, vegetables, and fruit. In some cases, people sold wild vegetables and wild fruit in Harare through street vending. In this regard, diversification of household survival strategies was simply a process of accumulation. For some poor tribal members and migrants, it was accumulation from hand to mouth. In such cases, informal activities never went beyond sustenance of survival on a daily basis. Whereas for the rich, the process of accumulation enabled them to invest what they earned through the various activities (see Scoones *et al.*, 2010; 2011c; Cousins, n.d). For example, the case of Kundai's household that bought a taxi/*kombi* through investments from buying and selling. According to Tacoli (2002), diversification of survival strategies among the poor households is more about risk minimization, whereas for the rich it is an accumulation strategy from different sources. Raising income through diversified portfolios was very difficult for many households of Domboshava within a dollarized economy. Diversification of survival strategies therefore emerged as a coping mechanism and a creative response to changing conditions at local scale of Domboshava, and at a national scale as well. For migrants the diversification of survival strategies was not an option. Many settled in Domboshava solely for residential reasons. Many diversified their portfolios already before their arrival. The multi-pronged nature of RDP and the desire by household members to diversify their livelihoods within a dollarized economy contribute to increased land transactions in Domboshava.

Diversification of household survival strategies for both tribal and migrants from Domboshava was also achieved through continual straddling of the rural-urban divide between Domboshava and Harare. Community residents migrated to other places for work on short and/or long-term basis, and in some cases beyond the national borders. Migration patterns in Domboshava shifted from common and predictable trends that result from pull-push factors and assumed more of itinerant or circular migration (see Bekker, 2002; Tacoli, 2002; Potts, 2011). Domboshava also emerges as a dormitory village for Harare and the

adjacent commercial farms as most community residents stay in this communal area while they work in Harare and on commercial farms. This situation is similar to what Ubink (2008) in Peters (2010) as well as Berry (2011) observed in Ghana where peri-urban areas of big cities such as Kumasi degenerated into dormitory villages where movement of people is also itinerant. In Mali, the peri-urban settlement of Dialakorodji gradually transformed into a satellite settlement for the capital Bamako through land transactions, as well as in-out migration (Tacoli, 2002). Such situations result in social differentiations among the residents in various ways (Ubink, 2008, in Peters, 2010).

In Domboshava, households were noticeably fragmenting and fracturing as their members migrated to other places to seek income. Given the rural-urban linkages between Harare and Domboshava, households as units of interaction and production were temporarily split as their members commute to the city on a daily basis. Long-term or short-term migration however remains imperative in generation of remittances in cash and kind for most community residents of Domboshava. In some cases, cash and goods remitted were often meagre due to menial activities undertaken by household members away from home. In such cases, migration and remittances as primary household survival strategies provide false impressions in terms of their contribution to household income. Nonetheless, they are considered obligatory and not necessarily choices because they make a difference to household survival where peasant farming no longer provides sustainable output, and where non-farm and off-farm activities dominate survival. Poor households engaged in activities that require less investment compared to better-off households. Emergent household survival strategies in Domboshava clearly demonstrate replacement of households as units of production by individualistic activities through informal activities. In turn, patterns on division of labour in households were obscured as opportunistic activities dominate income generation (cf. Tacoli, 2002). In the end, most household survival strategies were literally not confined to distinct categories but oscillated *between* ‘dropping out’, ‘hanging in’, ‘stepping out’, ‘stepping up’ (see Scoones *et al.*, 2010; 2011c). For example, community residents were ‘dropping out’ of peasant farming, while they were ‘hanging in’ at the same time through straddling the rural-urban divide, and practicing peasant farming on limited arable land; as well as ‘stepping out’ through diversification of livelihoods by way of ‘*kiya-kiya*’ and remittances. Some TLs that sold ‘their’ excess arable land and the commons were ‘stepping up’ through individualized land transactions, bribes, and gifts, as well as peasant farming. The number of households that were ‘stepping up’ however, remains minimal compared to

those that were ‘hanging in’ or ‘dropping out’. The outcomes from these activities vary both in magnitude and spatially while the dynamics were generally similar.

### 8.5.3 Signs of depeasantization

Diversification of household survival strategies remains a significant pointer, and one of the broader dimensions of the process of depeasantization in Domboshava (cf. Tacoli, 2002). From Bryceson (1999; 2000a; 2000b; 2002; 2005; 2012; 2013)’s perspective, signs of depeasantization were apparent in Domboshava. Depeasantization is visible through diversification of household survival strategies and other forms besides wiping away peasants completely (Ibid). Households still practice peasant farming, and a new kind of peasant farmers is apparent. This presents the reason why tribal members resist upgrading from rural to urban - to pursue rural lifestyles and values such as peasant farming even with their full knowledge of the peri-urban nature of Domboshava. The process of depeasantization in Domboshava is a product of:- (i) changes in land holding capacities of households (farm); (ii) split of household members (family) through migration; (iii) an emerging category of peasant farmers within a peri-urban communal area (class); (iv) a decrease in the number of peasant farmers (community); (v) internal and external drivers of land transactions; and (vi) an inappropriate, undesired, and a multi-pronged RDP context.

Bryceson (2000b; 2005; 2012; 2013)’s approach to depeasantization explains the diminishing relevance and constrained practice of peasant farming, but not necessarily the disappearance of such farmers in Domboshava. Diminishing land holding capacities of rural farmers signal depeasantization of the community - a shift from survival strategies that depend solely on agricultural activities (Bryceson, 1999; 2002a; 2000b). Clearly, different peasant farmers in different localities experience the process of depeasantization differently. The process of depeasantization in Domboshava is uneven as some villages practice more peasant farming than others. In most cases, the poor clung onto their small parcels of land (cf. Maxwell *et al.*, 2001). What is happening in Domboshava redefines concepts such as peasant farmers and peasant farming, and moreso peasant farms within peri-urban spaces. Bryceson (1999) calls them rural peasants, peasant households or agricultural households. Cousins (n.d.) does not concisely define peasant farmers, he refers to them variously as the “small scale subsistence farmers” “semi-commercial farmers”, “petty commodity producers”. Scoones *et al.* (2011c:976), also refer to emerging farmers in the resettlement areas under the FTLRP

variously as “middle farmers”, “petty commodity producers” and “worker peasants” because of their engagement and output in peasant farming activities. Helliker & Murisa (2011:13) highlight the already existing tension, whether to call such farmers “peasants, smallholders, petty commodity producers, small scale farmers, semi-proletariats or peasant workers”.

There is lack of consensus on what peasant farmers are, moreso in peri-urban areas characterized as distorted, and chaotic - where a multitude of land, policy, and survival processes interface with internal and external forces. In essence, peasant farmers are never a homogenous group (Ranger, 1983; Cousins, n.d.). As a result, peasant farmers in Domboshava are rather ‘*rurban*’ peasant farmers (see Vanempten, 2009:865). ‘*Rurban*’ peasant farmers are characterized with:- (i) lived experiences and belonging rooted in peri-urban spaces which are neither rural nor urban; (ii) diminished trends in peasant farming due to constraints on arable spaces; (iii) cultivation for nostalgic rather than rational reasons; (iv) survival on diversified household portfolios including migration; (v) constant straddling of the rural-urban divide; and above all, (vi) maintaining close relationships with tribal land. From this perspective, ‘*rurban*’ peasant farmers as a category of producers, and ‘*rurban*’ peasant farming as a way of accumulation probably might never completely disappear in Domboshava even when the communal area increasingly experiences land transactions, a multi-pronged RDP, and new household survival strategies emerge. The new dispensation is mediated by a complex interplay of land transactions, undesired RDP strategies, and emergent household survival strategies within a peri-urban communal area context - thereby stimulating intended and unintended consequences from migration, urbanization, external influences of national policy, and other factors prompted by individual agency. Thus, ‘*rurban*’ peasant farming in Domboshava is not necessarily about output, but symbolizes people’s lived experiences since many rural residents of Zimbabwe are deeply rooted in their peasant background as peasant producers (see Matondi & Dekker, 2011).

## **8.6 Emergent class and gender distinctions**

Competition on access to land rights and the emergent residential land use as opposed to farming, grazing, and the commons led to class distinctions not only between tribal/migrant categories of households in Domboshava, but also between household within these two categories. While some tribal members disposed of their land rights to migrants, migrants inversely accumulated land through these land transactions. Individualized land transactions

such as direct land sales and land grabs therefore allowed poor households to generate income for survival, while at the same time these land transactions made these households poor through diminishing customary land rights rendering the structure self-destructive through agency. This creates class distinctions not only between migrant landholders, but also between migrant and tribal members because land is an integral asset that determines wealth in rural areas. Different tribal and migrant households had different land holding capacities. Similarly, in Cote d'Ivoire "strangers became richer and richer, whereas local families were struggling" (Chauveau & Colin, 2010:94). In Domboshava, migrant landholders became better-off compared to tribal members that disposed of their land and migrant lodgers, for example, VH Nango and most VHs of Domboshava considered tribal members that sold land to migrants as losers, and migrants that bought land as winners. 'Landless' lodgers particularly widows regarded themselves as poor not only because of their 'landlessness', but because of their lack of money to purchase land through individualized land transactions. For example, two widows Chipu and Muneni from Murape Village stated that, *"Even if we want to buy land, we do not have the money. We are poor. Stands cost US\$1000.00 or more. It is very difficult to get land without money. Maybe one day we will"*.

However, in some cases the question of class distinction in Domboshava is not necessarily about the possession of material aspects commonly used to define social differentiation, but secure land rights within the tribal/migrant categories under the system of customary land tenure. Secure customary land rights are often perceived as of more relevance in this communal area than the status or wealth of households. Thus the rich/poor or better-off/worse-off social differentiations were figuratively associated with customary land rights as households with land were presumed richer than migrant lodgers and tribal members that disposed of their land rights. Clearly, tribal members and migrants were therefore rich or poor in peculiar ways, and this creates sub-categories of classes within the larger distinction of migrant/tribal since land carries different meanings in space and time to these categories of people.

In terms of gender, women were not a homogenous group, and had diverse land needs. Women in Domboshava as secondary land rights holders often face constraints through loss of inheritance of land rights. Women's experiences within their life cycles as daughters, married women, mothers, divorcees, or widows present differential outcomes in terms of access to customary land rights. Newly married women acquired land rights through their



husbands. In some cases, they shared vleis garden with their mothers-in-law. Some divorced and widowed women accessed land rights through individualized land transactions particularly direct land sales. This demonstrates women's capabilities to access land rights and recognition of these rights through local structures largely dominated by men, as well as the utility and relevance of land transactions. Women particularly divorcees often ostracized by society and widows that lost inheritance could 'own' land presenting shifts from the prerogative traditionally reserved for males in this patriarchal community. While Makura-Paradza (2010) believes that women are constrained by patriarch to obtain land, in Domboshava patriarch as part of the social system is not wholly deterministic in access to land rights as community residents could use agency to go beyond this structure to obtain land. Instead, women's capacities and capabilities to mobilize finance and to negotiate land rights within a patriarchal system determines access to land, and not necessarily customary land tenure as the structure that regulates land transactions. Since women are prohibited to transact land in a male dominated decision-making process, patriarch as a social system sustains land transactions, while at the same time these land transactions sustains patriarch. However, poor women are likely to remain landlessness despite these existing opportunities to acquire land rights in Domboshava as illustrated by Chipso and Muneni above. Similar trends were observed in Mtoko communal area in 1985 where "widows with little or no wage labour were the poorest" (Cousins, 1990:4). The capability and possibility of women to mobilize finance to access land in a patriarchal system is not only determined by their individual potential, but also the macro-economic climate within a dollarized economy, as well as women's perceptions in believing in themselves. Clearly, it is not only access to land that is a significant variable in explaining differential outcomes from the interplay *between* land transactions, RDP strategies, and household survival strategies in Domboshava (in terms of class and gender); but also the way land is accessed, the nature of land rights, as well as the wider macro processes (social, economic, and political) that characterize peri-urban environments.

### **8.7 Dilemmas in peri-urban communal areas and how these can be addressed**

The mutual influences *between* land transactions, a multi-pronged RDP, and household survival strategies in the peri-urban communal area of Domboshava present complex patterns of intended and unintended consequences. Complex and often conflicting outcomes from these interactions appear as inevitable because of the peri-urban nature of this communal

area, as well as the presence of continuous change. The three variables (land transactions, RDP, and household survival strategies) are causes as well as outcomes of the circumstances that surround the peri-urbanity of Domboshava - they are interdependent and presuppose each other. From the perspective of the LPS framework, particular land transactions influenced choices of household survival strategies while at the same time these household survival strategies led to particular land transactions. The same relationships are evident between land transactions and RDP strategies where land transactions prompted intervention through RDP strategies, and inversely various perceptions of the undesired RDP strategies by community residents influenced particular land transactions. As land transactions and RDP influenced household survival strategies, mutual influences of household survival strategies complete the set of feedback loops *between* the three variables.

The LPS framework demonstrates that the reproduction of the customary system of land tenure, RDP strategies, and household survival strategies respond to social and economic stimuli variously in space and time. The methodological implications of the LPS framework rests upon its ability to adequately explain in detail the mutual influences *between* the three variables in Domboshava as well the nature of human conduct and relationships not only among each other in society, but with society itself (see Giddens, 1999; Stones, 2005). The LPS framework takes cognisance of the transformation of Domboshava as a peri-urban communal area through the interactions of agents and how the new social relations, structures, and practices were produced and reproduced along the way (cf. Parker, 2000). For example, within the four selected villages (Zimbiru, Mungate, Murape, and Chogugudza) different experiences were evident on issues related to land transactions, perceptions of RDP, and emergent household survival strategies. In any case, peri-urban contexts by nature are characterized by heterogeneity in terms of population dynamics, kinds of land tenure, kinds of land use, uncoordinated and unplanned settlements, as well as survival strategies (cf. Simone, 2004; Wehrmann, 2008; Mabin, 2012; Watson, 2012). Peri-urban interfaces present unique social, economic, environmental, and institutional characteristics that vary from context to context (Narain & Niscal, 2007). From the LPS framework's perspective, proliferation of land transactions in Domboshava is not a result of undesirable RDP strategies and the emergent of household survival strategies alone, but is also rooted in the peri-urban nature of Domboshava. With or without undesirable RDP strategies, in fact, it is probable that individualized land transactions would take place and concomitantly new household survival strategies would emerge. With or without land transactions it is also probable that GRDC

would propose settlement upgrading in line with the RDP strategy on settlement hierarchy, and influence both land transactions and household survival strategies. Inversely, with or without household survival strategies it is also probable that land transactions would take place and induce RDP strategies concomitant with settlement upgrading given the peri-urban nature of Domboshava.

Clearly, the residents of Domboshava, GRDC, and TLs were under pressure to behave the way they do because of the peri-urban nature of Domboshava. This situation is likely to prevail until reforms not only to the administration of land and access to customary land rights in peri-urban zones are applied, but also in terms of the implementation of desirable RDP strategies. Land under the system of customary land tenure in Domboshava is under siege from overlapping institutions and administrative structures often applied selectively and contingently. The willingness of the state to protect interests of both tribal and migrant residents remains critical. This can only come about through possible new land tenure arrangements, secured land rights through titles, while legally recognizing these land rights under the system of customary land tenure at the same time - an idea that has not been previously developed in Zimbabwe. Legitimation of land rights for both tribal and migrant households is potently needed. This recommendation is a clear departure from a “replacement paradigm” - where land tenure systems of indigenous inhabitants are replaced by state prescriptions as the case with the colonial and post-colonial states - towards an “adaptation paradigm” (Migot-Adholla & Bruce, 1994:261). In the peri-urban communal area of Domboshava, an ‘adaptation’ model would recognize the existence of a parallel system of land administration under customary land tenure as well as: (i) evolving land and other property rights; (ii) the multiplicity of land use, land users, and land interests; (iii) secure land rights; (iv) appropriate development policies; and (v) emergent household survival strategies. Such a legally recognized ‘living’ customary system of land tenure that is responsive to local conditions and changes, as well as capable of harnessing peri-urban challenges is urgently needed (see Mnisi, 2003; Peters, 2004; Claassens, 2008).

A great deal of the evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates that the ‘living’ customary land tenure system in Domboshava has evolved and adapted over time to allow for a range of land transactions with outsiders. The status quo in Domboshava is building on long-standing ideas and practices about procedures for obtaining membership within a land-holding group, as well as strong family and individual rights within the overall system of communal land

tenure. Thus, a process that compromises and reconciles the diverse interests while at the same time guards against the extinction of tribal land rights, those of migrants, children, and women - the 'living' customary land tenure - is critical. The 'living' customary land tenure system is however far from being problem free. The practice is capable of generating tensions and conflicts amongst a range of actors as evidenced by the findings of this thesis. These dilemmas arise from the tension particularly between the official rules and the customary procedures. Land laws recognize the official rules and customary procedures at the same time. These laws are static and represent an 'outdated' version of custom. It is therefore critical that the land laws be adjusted and adapted to suit the changing realities and circumstances in communal areas situated in peri-urban zones.

The dilemma in the Domboshava case rests on maintaining customary land rights of tribal members - who have autochthonous rights to land as a result of their tribal status - while at the same time safeguarding their interests and those of migrants without upsetting or rendering these categories of households insecure and more vulnerable. Migrants in some cases have been vulnerable because of prior displacements through OM/ORO and the FTLRP (see Tibaijuka, 2005; Kamete & Lindell, 2010; Cliffe *et al.*, 2011). The challenge is thus to "square the circle" in recognizing land rights within accountable local institutions, while at the same time avoiding entrenching inequitable power relations and social differential outcomes (Cousins, 2008a). The resultant dilemmas are therefore not only about the importance of maintaining traditional aspects of rural tribal culture, but also about balancing and maintaining the interests of migrants who settled in Domboshava. Both categories of households seek to survive within a peri-urban context. This would provide a balance between the rural and the peri-urban nature of this communal area.

## **8.8 Concluding remarks: Generalization and dissemination of findings**

Urbanization and migration forces in sub-Saharan Africa have far-reaching consequences on land and settlement issues in peri-urban zones of cities. In Zimbabwe, urbanization of cities and migration of people between the cities and rural areas leads to the development of peri-urban spaces, as well as the proliferation of individualized land transactions. Through the case study of the peri-urban communal area of Domboshava, situated outside Harare the capital city of Zimbabwe, these challenges have been researched. Individualized land transactions in Domboshava were on the increase. The mutual relationships between land

transactions, a multi-pronged RDP, and household survival strategies in Domboshava were evident, and this created differential outcomes in terms of class among community residents. Noticeable unintended consequences through reduced arable land for tribal members, diminishing relevance of tribal authority, the weakening and fragmentation of the principles of customary land tenure systems, increased settlement densities, mixed settlement, diminishing relevance of traditional methods of generating household income such as peasant farming, the onset of depeasantization, and the increased migration of community residents to other places are evident. Bryceson (1999; 2000a; 2000b; 2005)'s account of de-peasantisation is also vindicated. Resentment of an undesired RDP strategy (as a possible solution to these challenges) has however compounded the problems leading to what may be called peri-urban 'anything goes'. The situation in Domboshava is turning ugly.

Although the case of Domboshava has unique features, given the patterns of migration and urbanization, as well as the undesirable nature of RDP strategies, cities elsewhere in Zimbabwe may not be able to withstand such forces. Accordingly, the experience of Domboshava is likely to reflect circumstances in other communal areas situated on the periphery of cities. My research therefore is important not only for Domboshava, but to other peri-urban communal areas in Zimbabwe. I am confident that my findings are valid and could generate learning experiences for other peri-urban communal areas of Zimbabwe as most of what was happening in Domboshava is not a result of the internal organization of this particular peri-urban communal area, but spill-overs of national events as well the location of Domboshava in proximity to Harare.

Given the inevitability of Domboshava's incorporation into the greater Harare zone, policy in the interim could address the needs of tribal members that would like to maintain some form of peasant agriculture as they are used to this way of life. However, these goals may be difficult to implement amid corruption in the agency of tribal and migrant residents. The goals can be achieved through contextualizing these research findings within the differing situations of cities and their peripheries in Zimbabwe. I therefore look forward to producing a consolidated report of my thesis as a platform for discussions and deliberation with TLs and local government officials. My aim is to present the findings and feed them back into the current planning-policy processes. Further research needs to focus on the future of Domboshava after the national election of 2013, in particular, the consequences of

implementing settlement upgrading, and on what could be a suitable development policy for this peri-urban communal area. The challenge is complex and requires sober inquiry.

CODESRIA - LIBRARY

## REFERENCES

- Adams, M.; Sibanda, S. & Turner, S. 1999. *Land tenure reform and rural livelihoods in Southern Africa. Natural Resources Perspective Number 39*. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Adell, G. 1999. *Literature review. Theories and models of the peri-urban interface: A changing conceptual landscape*. London: DPU.
- Alasuutari, P.; Bickman, L. & Brannen, J. 2009. *The SAGE handbook of social research methods*. Los Angeles: SAGE.
- Alexander, J. 1999. State, peasantry and resettlement in Zimbabwe. *Review of African Political Economy*, 21(61):325-345.
- Alexander, J. 2006. *The unsettled land. State making and the politics of land in Zimbabwe 1893-2003*. Oxford: James Currey.
- Allen, A. 2003. Environmental Planning and Management of the peri-urban interface: perspectives on an emerging field. *Environment & Urbanization*, 15(1):135-148.
- Allen, A. 2010. Neither rural nor urban: Service delivery options that work for the peri-urban poor, in Khurian, M. & McCarney, P. (eds.). *Peri-urban water and sanitation services: Policy, planning and method*. London: Springer Science. 27-62.
- Amin, M.; Willetts, D. & Tetley, B. 1997. *The beautiful people of Kenya*. Nairobi: Textbook Centre.
- Andersson, J.A. 1999. The politics of land scarcity: Land disputes in Save communal area, Zimbabwe. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 25(4):553-578.
- Andres, L. 2012. *Designing and doing survey research*. Los Angeles: SAGE.
- Anseeuw, W. & Alden, C. 2010. *The struggle over land in Africa. Conflicts, politics and change*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
- Archer, M.S. 2003. *Structure, agency and internal conversation*. United Kingdom: Cambridge.
- Ayes, C.E. 1971. Exit, voice, and loyalty: responses to decline in forms, organizations and states by Albert O. Hirschman. *Annals of the American Academy of Political Science. Social Information for Developing Countries*, (393):170-171.
- Babbie, E.; Mouton, J.; Vorster, P. & Prozesky, B. 1998. *The practice of social research*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Bah, M.; Cisse, S.; Diyamett. B.; Diallo, G.; Lerise, F.; Okali, D.; Okpara, E.; Olawoye, J. & Tacoli, C. 2003. Changing rural-urban linkages in Mali, Nigeria and Tanzania. *Environment and Urbanization*, 15(1):13-24.
- Barry, B. 1974. Exit, voice, loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organisations and states by Albert O. Hirschman review. *British Journal of Political Science*, 4(1):79-107.
- Batterbury, S. 2008. *Sustainable livelihood: Still being sought, ten years on*. African Environment Programme. London: Oxford University Centre for the Environment.
- Baxter, P. 2010. *Rhodesia: Last outpost of the British Empire 1890-1980*. Alberton: Galago.
- Beach, D. 1994. *The peoples of Africa. The Shona and their neighbours*. United Kingdom: Blackwell.
- Beach, D.N. 1980. *The Shona & Zimbabwe 900-1850. An outline of Shona history*. London: Heinemann.
- Bebbington, A. 1999. Capitals and capabilities: A framework for analyzing peasant viability, rural livelihoods and poverty, *World Development* 27(12):2021-2044.
- Bekker, S. & Fourchard, L. 2013. *Politics and Policies. Governing cities in Africa*. HSRC Press: Cape Town.
- Bekker, S. & Leilde, A. 2003. 'Residents' perceptions of developmental local government: Exit, voice, and loyalty in South African towns. *Politeia*, 22(1):144-165.
- Bekker, S. & Therborn, G. 2012. *Capital cities in Africa*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
- Bekker, S. 2002. Diminishing returns: Circulatory migration linking Cape Town to the Eastern Cape. *SA Journal of Demography*, 8(1):1-9.
- Benjaminsen, T.A. & Lund, C. 2003. *Securing land rights in Africa*. London: Frank Cass.
- Benjaminsen, T.A. & Sjaastad, E. 2010. Race for the prize: land transactions and rent appropriation in the Malian cotton zone, in Benjaminsen, T.A. & Lund, C (eds.). *Securing land rights in Africa*. London: Frank Cass. 129-152.
- Bennett, T. 2008. Official vs "living" customary law: Dilemmas of description and recognition, in Claassens, A. & Cousins, B. (eds.). *Land, power and custom. Controversies generated by South Africa's Communal land Rights Act*. Cape Town: UCT Press. 138-154.
- Berry, S. 1992. Hegemony on shoestring: Indirect rule and access to agricultural land. *Journal of the International African Institute*, 62(3):327-355.
- Berry, S. 2002. *Debating the land question in Africa*. Johns Hopkins University: Society for Comparative Study of Society and History.



- Berry, S. 2011. Questions of ownership: Proprietorship and control in a changing rural terrain. A case study from Ghana. Unpublished paper.
- Blaikie, N. 2010. *Designing social research 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition*. Polity Press: Malden.
- Blake, R. 1977. *A history of Rhodesia*. London: Ayre Methuen.
- Bourdillon, M. 1976. *The Shona peoples: An Ethnography of the contemporary Shona with special reference to their religion*. Gwelo: Mambo Press.
- Bourdillon, M. 1982. *The Shona peoples*. Gweru: Mambo Press.
- Bridger, P., House, M., House, J., Salt, B., Akers, M., Yates, D. & Wood, F. 1973. *Encyclopaedia Zimbabwe*. Salisbury: The College Press.
- Bromley, D.W. & Cernea, M.M. 1991. *The management of common property natural resources. Some conceptual and operation fallacies*. World Bank: Washington D.C.
- Bryant, C. & White, L.C. 1984. *Managing rural development with small farmer participation*. West Hartford: Kumarian Press.
- Bryceson, D.F. 1996. Deagrarianization and rural employment in sub-Saharan Africa. A sectoral perspective. *World Development*, 24(1):97-111.
- Bryceson, D.F. 1999. *Sub-Saharan Africa betwixt and between: Rural livelihood practices and policies. Deagrarianization and rural employment network. ASC Working Paper 42. Africa- Leiden: Studiecentrum*.
- Bryceson, D.F. 2000a. *Rural Africa at the crossroads: Livelihood practices and policies. Natural Resources Perspective Number 52*. London: The Overseas Development Institute.
- Bryceson, D.F. 2000b. Peasant theories and smallholder policies: Past and present, in Bryceson, D.; Kay, C. & Mooij, J. (eds.). *Disappearing peasantries? Rural labour in Africa, Asia and Latin America*. London: Intermediate Technology Publications. 1-30.
- Bryceson, D.F. 2002. The scramble in Africa: Reorienting rural livelihoods. *World Development*, 30(5):725-739.
- Bryceson, D.F. 2005. Rural livelihoods and agrarian change in sub-Saharan Africa. Processes and policies, in Ellis, F. & Freeman, H.A. (eds.). *Rural livelihoods and poverty reduction policies*. New York: Routledge. 48-61.
- Bryceson, D.F. 2012. Deagrarianization and depeasantization, e-mail from D. Bryceson [Online], 17 May 2013. Available email: [ingwani@gmail.com](mailto:ingwani@gmail.com)
- Bryceson, D.F. 2012. The depeasantization approach, e-mail from D. Bryceson [Online], 3 November. Available email: [ingwani@gmail.com](mailto:ingwani@gmail.com)

- Bryman, A. 2008. *Social Research methods 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bryman, A. 2012. *Social Research methods 4<sup>th</sup> Edition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Budlender, D. 2003. The debate about household headship. *Social dynamics: A Journal of African Studies*, 29(2):48-72.
- Bull, T. 1967. *Rhodesian perspective*. London: Michael Joseph.
- Bullock, C. 1972. *The Mashona*. Cape Town: Juta.
- Cahn, M. 2002. *Sustainable livelihoods Approach*. Massey: Massey University.
- Campbell, S. 2003. *Readings in planning theory*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Carney, D. 1998. Sustainable Rural Livelihoods. What contribution can we make? Papers presented at the Department for International Development's Natural Resources Advisers' Conference. United Kingdom: Department for International Development.
- Carney, D. 1999a. *Approaches to sustainable livelihoods for the rural poor*. ODI Poverty Briefing 2. London: DID.
- Carney, D. 1999b. *Livelihoods approaches compared*. London: DFID
- Carney, D. 1999c. *Introduction to sustainable rural livelihoods: What difference can we make?* London: Department for International Development.
- Carruthers, P. 2010. The land debate - 'Doing the right thing': Ethical approaches to land use decision-making, in Winter M. & Lobley, M. (eds.). 2010. *What is land for? The food, fuel, and climate change debate*. London: Earthscan. 293-318.
- Cassell, P. 1993. *The Giddens reader*. Hong Kong: MacMillan Press.
- Chambati, W. 2011. Restructuring of agrarian labour relations after Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38(5):1047-1068.
- Chambers, R. & Conway, G. 1991. Sustainable rural livelihoods: Practical concepts for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. IDS Discussion Paper 296. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.
- Chambers, R. 1983. *Rural development. Putting the last first*. New York: Wiley.
- Chambers, R. 1995. *Poverty and livelihoods: Whose reality counts?* IDS Discussion Paper 347. Brighton: IDS.
- Chambers, R. 2010. *Paradigms, poverty and adaptive pluralism*. IDS Working Paper 344, Sussex: Institute of Development Studies. 1-57.
- Chambers, R. 2012. Workshop on participatory methodologies. Unpublished paper delivered at The 10<sup>th</sup> Development Dialogue on Knowledge for Equity and Social Justice. 10 October, The Hague.

- Chaumba, J., Scoones, I. & Wolmer, W. 2003. From jambanja to planning. The reassertion of technocracy in land reform in south-eastern Zimbabwe? *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41(4):533-553.
- Chauveau, J.P. & Colin, J.P. 2010. Customary transfers and land sales in Cote d'Ivoire: Revising the embeddedness issue. *Africa*, 80(1):81-103.
- Cheater, A. 1990. The ideology of communal land tenure in Zimbabwe. Mythogenesis enacted? *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 60(2):188-206.
- Cheater, A. 1999. Power in the modern era, in Cheater A. (eds.). *The Anthropology of power. Empowerment and disempowerment in changing structures*. London: Routledge. 1-12.
- Cheater, A.P. 1983. Formal and informal rights to land in Zimbabwe's black freehold areas. A case study from Msengezi, in Peel, J.D.Y. & Ranger, T.O. (eds.). *Past and present in Zimbabwe*. England: Manchester University Press. 77-91.
- Chideme, M. 2010. City of Harare boundaries extended. *The Herald Online*, 13 July: 2010.
- Chimhowu, A. & Woodhouse, P. 2006. Customary vs. Private property rights? Dynamics and trajectories of vernacular land markets in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Journal of African Agrarian Change*, 6(3):346-371.
- Chimhowu, A. & Woodhouse, P. 2008. *Communal tenure and rural poverty: Reflections on land transactions in Svosve communal area, Zimbabwe. Working Paper Number 35*. United Kingdom: Brooks World Poverty Institute.
- Chimhowu, A. & Woodhouse, P. 2010. Forbidden but not suppressed: A vernacular land market in Svosve communal lands, Zimbabwe. *Africa*, 80(1):14-22.
- Chiremba, S. & Masters, W. 2003. The Experience of resettled farmers in Zimbabwe. *African Studies Quarterly*, 7(2&3):1-17.
- Chirisa, I. 2008. Population growth and rapid urbanization in Africa: Implications for sustainability. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, 10(2):361-394.
- Chirisa, I. 2009. Informality, deceit and the conscience: A survey of ethical dilemmas in Harare. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, 11(2):257-280.
- Chirisa, I. 2010a. Peri-urban dynamics and regional planning in Africa: Implications for building healthy cities. *Journal of African Studies and Development*, 2(2):015-0126.
- Chirisa, I. 2010b. An analysis of the environmental stewardship concept and its applicability in peri-urban towns. Lessons from Epworth in Zimbabwe. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, 12(4):41-57.

- Chiumbu, S. & Musemwa, M. 2012. Introduction: Perspectives of the Zimbabwean crises, in Chiumbu, S. & Musemwa, M. (eds.). *Crisis! What crisis? The multiple dimension of the Zimbabwean crisis*. Cape Town: HSRC. ix-xxiii.
- Chome, J. & McCall, M.J. 2005. Neo-customary title registration in informal settlements. The case of Blantyre, Malawi. *IDPR*, 77(4):385-411.
- Christodoulou, 1990. *The promised land. Agrarian reform and conflict worldwide*. London: Zed Books.
- Claassens, A. 2008. Customary law and zones of chiefly sovereignty: the impact of government policy on whose voices prevail in the making and changing of customary law, in Claassens, A. & Cousins, B. (eds). *Land, power and custom. Controversies generated by South Africa's Communal Land Rights Act*. Cape Town: UCT Press. 353-382.
- Cleaver, F. 2007. Understanding agency in collective action. *Journal of Human Development*, 8(2):223-244.
- Cliffe, L. Alexander, J.; Cousins, B. & Gaidzanwa, R. 2011. An overview of the Fast Track Land Reform in Zimbabwe. Editorial Introduction. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38(5):907-938.
- Colin, J.P. & Woodhouse, P. 2010. Introduction: Interpreting land markets in Africa. *Africa*, 80(1):1-13.
- Cormack, I.R.N. 1978. Urban community development in Rhodesia. Unpublished doctoral thesis. Port Elizabeth: University of Port Elizabeth.
- Cousins, B. 1990. Property rights and power in Zimbabwe's communal lands: Implications for agrarian reform in the 1990s. Paper delivered at a conference on Land Policy in Zimbabwe After "Lancaster". 13-15 February, University of Zimbabwe.
- Cousins, B. 2000. Tenure and common property resources in Africa, in Toulmin, C. & Quan, J. (eds.). *Evolving land rights, policy and tenure in Africa*. United Kingdom: IIED Bookshop.151-179
- Cousins, B. 2007. Land and agrarian reform in the 21<sup>st</sup> century: Changing realities, changing arguments? Unpublished paper delivered at the Global Assembly of Members, International Land Coalition. 24-27 April, Entebe.
- Cousins, B. 2008a. Contextualising the controversies: Dilemmas of communal tenure reform in post-apartheid South Africa, in Claassens, A. & Cousins, B. (eds.). *Land, power and custom. Controversies generated by South Africa's Communal land Rights Act*. Cape Town: UCT Press. 3-31.

- Cousins, B. 2008b. Characterising 'communal' tenure: nested systems and flexible boundaries, in Claassens, A. & Cousins, B. (eds.). *Land, power and custom. Controversies generated by South Africa's Communal land Rights Act*. Cape Town: UCT Press. 109-137.
- Cousins, B. 2009. Potential and pitfalls of 'communal' land tenure reform: experience in Africa and implications for South Africa. Unpublished paper delivered at the World Bank conference on Land governance in support of the MDGs: Responding to new challenges. 9-10 March, Washington D.C.
- Cousins, B. 2012. Personal conversation. 24 August, Institute for Poverty Land and Agrarian Studies, University of Western Cape.
- Cousins, B. n.d. *What is a small-holder? Class-analytic perspective on small-scale farming and agrarian reform in South Africa. Working Paper 16*. Western Cape: PLAAS. 1-26.
- Creswell, J.W. & Clark, V.L.P. 2011. *Designing and conducting mixed methods research*. Los Angeles: SAGE.
- Creswell, J.W. 2009. Research design. Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches. Los Angeles: SAGE.
- Davis, H. 1991. Population densities and development potential in rural Zimbabwe: an assessment based on the 1969 and 1982 censuses. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New series*, 16 (3):332-353.
- De Soto, H. 2000. *The mystery of capital: Why capitalism triumphs in the west and fails everywhere else*. New York: Basic Books.
- De Vos, A.S., Strydom, H., Fouche, C.B., & Delport, C.S.L. 2011. Research at grassroots. For the social sciences and human science professions. Pretoria: Van Schaik.
- Deavers, K.L. 1980. Social science contributions to rural development policy in the 1980s. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 62(5):1021-1026.
- Deere, C.D. 2003. Women's land rights and rural social movements in the Brazilian Agrarian Reform. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 13(1 & 2): 257-288.
- Deininger, K. 2003. *Land policies for growth and poverty reduction*. Washington D.C.: World Bank and Oxford University Press.
- Dekker, M. & Kinsey, B. 2011. Contextualizing Zimbabwe's land reform: long-term observations from the first generation. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38(5):995-1019.

- Delius, P. & Schirmer, S. 2001. *Towards a workable rural development strategy. TIPS Working Paper 3*. Johannesburg: University of Witwatersrand.
- Delville, P.L. 2000. Harmonising formal law and customary land right in French speaking West Africa, in Toulmin, C. & Quan, J. (eds.). *Evolving land rights, policy and tenure in Africa*. United Kingdom: IIED Bookshop. 97-121
- Department of National Museums and Monuments of Zimbabwe. 2011. Domboshava Site Museum Exhibition/Display Panels. Domboshava Hill:
- Department of Surveyor General. 2012. Harare: Government Printer.
- Dixon, C. 1990. *Rural development in the third world*. United Kingdom: Routledge.
- Douglas, I. 2006. Peri-urban ecosystems and societies: Transitional zones and contrasting values, in McGregor, D., Simon, D. & Thompson, D. (eds.). *Peri-urban interface: Approaches to sustainable natural and human resource use*. London: Earthscan. 18-29.
- Dowding, K., John, P., Mergoupis, T. & Vugt, M.V. 2000. Exit, voice, and loyalty : Analytic and empirical developments. *European Journal of Political Research*, 37:469-495.
- Dzingirai, V. 2003. New scramble for the African countryside. *Development and Change*, 34(2): 243-263.
- Ellis, F. & Biggs, S. 2001. Evolving themes in rural development. 1950s-2000s. *Development Policy Review*, 19(4):437-448.
- Ellis, F. 1998. Household strategies and rural livelihood diversification. *Journal of Development*, 35(1):1-38.
- Fair, T.J.D. 1992. *African rural development: Policy and rural practice in six countries*. African Institute of South Africa: Pretoria.
- Faludi, A. 1988. *A reader in planning theory*. Oxford: Pergamon.
- Field data, 2012. Unpublished raw data. Domboshava.
- Flyvbjerg, B. 2011. Case Study, in Denzin, N. K. & Lincoln, Y. S. (eds.). *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, 4<sup>th</sup> Edition*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE. 301-316.
- Fothergill, R.J. 1953. *The monuments of Southern Rhodesia*. Glasgow: University Press of Glasgow.
- Friese, S. 2012. *Qualitative data with ATLAS.ti*. Los Angeles: SAGE.
- Fuchs, S. 2001. Beyond agency. *Sociological Theory*, 19(1):24-40.
- Gaidzanwa, R. 1997. Non-farm activities and gender in Zimbabwe, in Bryceson, D.F. & Jamal, V. (eds.). *Farewell to farms. Deagrarianisation and employment in Africa*. England: Ashgate Publishing. 157-166.

- Gaspar, D. 1991. *What happened to the land question in Zimbabwe. Paper presented at the Institute of Social Studies*. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies.
- Gelfand, M. & Hannan, M. 1959. *Shona rituals*. Cape Town: Juta.
- Gervais-Lambony, P. 2006. Space and identity. Thinking through some South African examples, in Bekker, S. & Leilde, A. (eds.). *Reflections on identity in four African cities*. South Africa: African Minds. 53-67.
- Giddens, A. 1984. *The constitution of society. Outline of the theory of structuration*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Giddens, A. 1987. *Social theory and modern sociology*. Oxford: Polity Press.
- Giddens, A. 1989. *Sociology*. Oxford: Polity Press.
- Giddens, A. 1999. Elements of the theory of structuration, in Elliott, A. (ed.). *The Blackwell reader. Contemporary social theory*. Malden: Blackwell Publishers. 119-130.
- Giddens, A. 2001. *Sociology. 4<sup>th</sup> Edition*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Gieryn, T.F. 2000. A space for place in sociology. *Annu. Rev. Sociol.* (26):463-496.
- Gilber, N. 2011. *Researching social life*. London: SAGE.
- Quan, J. & Payne, G. 2008. *Secure land rights for all*. Nairobi: Global Land Tool Network/UN-HABITAT
- Goldin, B. & Gelfand, M. 1975. *African law and custom in Rhodesia*. Cape Town: Juta.
- Gondo, T. & Kyomuhendo, V. 2011. Between reality and rhetorical conflicts. An anecdotal anatomy of the lawful, bona fide occupants and customary tenants in Kyenjonjo District, Uganda. *Land Tenure Journal*, 1(11): 27-49.
- Gonne, B. 2010. Karal land: family cultural patrimony or a commercialized product on the Diamare Plain?, in Anseeuw, W. & Alden, C. (eds.). *The struggle over land in Africa. Conflicts, politics & change*. Cape Town: HSRC. 71-82.
- Goromonzi Rural District Council Turn Around Strategy 2005-2015.
- Gough, K.V., Agergaard, J., Fold, N. & Moller-Jansen, L. 2010. *Rural-urban dynamics. Livelihood, mobility and markets in African and Asian frontiers*. London: Routledge.
- Government of Zimbabwe. 1983. City of Harare (Private) Act Chapter 29:04 of 1983. Harare: Government Printer.
- Government of Zimbabwe. 1993. Proclamation 18 of 1993, Statutory Instrument 129 of 1993. Harare: Government Printer.
- Government of Zimbabwe. 1998. TLs Act Chapter 29:17 of 1998. Harare: Government Printer.

- Government of Zimbabwe. 2000. Rural District Councils Act Chapter 29:13 2000. Harare: Government Printer.
- Government of Zimbabwe. 2001. Regional, Town and Country Planning Act Chapter 29:12 2001. Harare: Government Printer.
- Government of Zimbabwe. 2002. Communal Lands Act Chapter 20:04 of 2002. Harare: Government Printer.
- Government of Zimbabwe. 2005. The Urban Councils Act Chapter 29:15 of 2005. Harare: Government Printer.
- Government of Zimbabwe. 2012. Department of Surveyor General. Harare: Government Printer.
- Government of Zimbabwe. 2013. Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Number 20 Act of 2013. Harare: Government Printer.
- Gumbo, T. & Geyer, M. 2011. 'Picking up the pieces': Reconstruction of the informal economic sector in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. *Town and Regional Planning*, (59):53-64.
- Gunby, D., Conyers, D., Gunby C., Kahwa, S. & Manyika, Z. 2000. *Local Strategic Planning and Sustainable Rural Livelihoods. Rural District Planning in Zimbabwe: A case study by PlanAfric Bulawayo, Zimbabwe*. London: International Institute for Environment and Development.
- Hanlon, J., Manjengwa, J. & Smart, T. 2013. *Zimbabwe takes back its land*. Johannesburg: Kumarian Press.
- Haralambos, M. & Holborn, M. 2008. *Sociology. Themes and perspectives*. London: Collins.
- Harriss, C.L. 1982. *Rural development: Theories of peasant economy and agrarian change*. London: Hutchinson University.
- Hay, S. 1994. Structure and Agency and the sticky problem of culture. *Sociological Theory*, 12(1):57-72.
- Helliker, K. & Murisa, T. 2011. *Land struggles and civil societies in Southern Africa*. Trento N.J: Africa World Press.
- Helmsing, A.H.J.; Mutizwa-Mangiza, N.D.; Gasper, D.R.; Brand, C.M. & Wekwete, K.H. 1991. *Limits to decentralization in Zimbabwe*. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies.
- Hesse-Biber, S.N. & Leavy, P. 2006. *The practice of qualitative research*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE.
- Hilhorst, T. 2000. Women's land rights: Current development in sub-Saharan Africa, in Toulmin, C. & Quan, J. (eds.). *Evolving land rights, policy and tenure in Africa*. United Kingdom: IIED Bookshop. 181-196.



- Hirschman, A.O. 1970. *Exit, voice, and loyalty . Responses to decline in firms, organisations and states*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Hogwood, B.W. & Gunn, L.A. 1991. *Policy analysis for the real world*. Oxford: Oxford Press.
- Holleman, J.F. 1952. *Shona customary law*. London: Oxford.
- Human Development Report. 2009. *Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Human Development Report. 2013. *The rise of the South: Human progress in diverse world*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Jackson, R.L. & Hogg, M.A. 2010. Structuration, in Jackson, R.L. & Hogg, M.A. (eds.). *Encyclopedia of identity*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE. 794-798.
- Jonga, W. & Chirisa, I. 2009. Urban local governance in the crucible. Empirical overtones of central governance meddling in local urban Councils' affairs in Zimbabwe. *Theoretical and Empirical Researches in Urban Management*, 3(12):166-182.
- Kabwato, L. 2012. Imaging a different Zimbabwe, in Chiumbu, S. & Musemwa, M. (eds.). *Crisis! What crisis? The multiple dimension of the Zimbabwean crisis*. Cape Town: HSRC Press. 268-275.
- Kadenge, M. 2012. Linguistic negotiation of the Zimbabwean crisis, in Chiumbu, S. & Musemwa, M. (eds.). *Crisis! What crisis? The multiple dimension of the Zimbabwean crisis*. Cape Town: HSRC. 143-160.
- Kamete, A.Y. & Lindell, I. 2010. The politics of "non-planning" interventions in African cities: Unraveling the international and local dimensions in Harare and Maputo. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 36(4):889-912.
- Kamete, A.Y. 1998. Interlocking livelihoods: farm and small town in Zimbabwe. *Environment and Urbanization*, 10(1): 23-34.
- Kamete, A.Y. 2011. Interrogating planning's power in an African city: Time for reorientation? *Planning Theory*, 11(1):66-88.
- Kamete, A.Y. 2012. Not exactly like the phoenix but rising all the same: reconstructing displaced livelihoods in post-cleanup Harare. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, (30):243-261.
- Kandiyoti, D. 2003. The cry for land: Agrarian reform, gender and land rights in Uzbekistan. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 13(1 & 2): 225-256.
- Kanyenze, G.; Kondo, T.; Chitambar, P. & Martens, J. 2011. *Beyond the enclave. Towards a pro-poor and inclusive development strategy for Zimbabwe*. Harare: Weaver Press.

- Kaspersen, L.B. 2000. Anthony Giddens. *An introduction to a social theorist*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Kay, G. & Smout, M. 1977. *Salisbury*. A geographical survey of the capital of Rhodesia. London: Hodder and Stoughton.
- Kinsey, B.H. 1999. Land reform growth and equity: Emerging evidence from Zimbabwe's resettlement programme. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 25(2):173-196.
- Kinsey, B.H. 2010. Who went where..., and why: Patterns and consequences of displacement in rural Zimbabwe after Feb 2000. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 36(2):339-361.
- Kojo, S.A. 2010. Family values, land sales and agricultural commodification in south-eastern Ghana. *Africa*, 80(1):104:124.
- Kombe, W.J. 2005. Land use dynamics in peri-urban areas and their implications on the urban growth and form: the case of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. *Habitat International*, 29:113-135.
- Lacatelli, F. & Nugent, P. 2009. *African cities. Competing claims on urban spaces*. London: Boston.
- Latham, C.J.K. 1973. The social organization of the Mashona. Native Affairs Department *Annual*, 10(5):35-40. Salisbury:
- Laver, M. 1976. 'Exit, voice, and loyalty' revisited: The strategic production and consumption of public and private goods. *British Journal of Political Science*, 6(4):463-482.
- Leedy, P.D. & Ormrod, J.E. 2005. *Practical research. Planning and design*. 8<sup>th</sup> Edition. New Jersey: Pearson.
- Lieten, G.K. 1990. Depeasantisation discontinued. Land reforms in West Bengal. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 25(40):2265-2271.
- Lindblom, C. E. 1959. The science of "muddling through". *Public Administration Review*, 19(2):79-88.
- Lipton, M. 1977. *Why poor people stay poor: Urban bias in world development*. London: Temple Smith.
- Lloyd, B.W. 1962. *Early history of Domboshava School*. Salisbury: Native Affairs Department Annual.
- Love, J. 2008. Forward, in Claassens, A. & Cousins, B. (eds.). *Land, power and custom. Controversies generated by South Africa's Communal land Rights Act*. Cape Town: UCT Press. xii-xv.

- Lund, C. 2008. *Local politics and the dynamics of property in Africa*. United Kingdom: Cambridge.
- Lycett, M.; Rassau, A. & Danson, J. 2004. Programme management: a critical review. *International Journal of Project Management*, (22):289-299.
- Lynch, K. 2005. *Rural-urban interaction in the developing world*. London: Routledge.
- Mabin, A. 2012. Peripheries, suburbanisms and change in African cities. Unpublished paper delivered at the International Workshop on Changing Socio-Spatial Configurations of Inclusion and Exclusion: Planning and Counter Planning in the African City. 7-8 March 2012, Uppsala.
- Makura-Paradza, G.G. 2010. *Single women, land and livelihood vulnerability in a communal area in Zimbabwe*. Wageningen: Wageningen Academic Publishers.
- Mamdani, M. 1996. *Citizen and subject, Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.
- Mamdani, M. 2000. The politics of peasant ethnic communities and urban civil society: Reflections on African dilemma, in Bryceson, B.; Kay, C. & Mooij, J. (eds.). *Disappearing peasantries? Rural labour in Africa, Asia and Latin America*. London: Intermediate Technology Publications. 99-111.
- Marimira, S.C. 2010. *Livelihoods after land reform in Zimbabwe. Working paper 6. Institutions, leadership and service delivery in new resettlement areas of Zimbabwe*. United Kingdom: Institute of Development Studies.
- Marongwe, N. 2003. The fast track resettlement and urban development nexus: The case of Harare. Unpublished conference paper delivered at the Symposium on Delivering Land and Securing Rural Livelihoods: Post-Independence Land Reform and Resettlement in Zimbabwe. 26 - 28 March, Mont Clair.
- Marongwe, N. 2008. Interrogating Zimbabwe's Fast Track land reform and resettlement programme: a focus on beneficiary selection. Unpublished doctoral thesis. Western Cape: University of Western Cape.
- Marongwe, N. 2011. Who was allocated land, and what did they do with it? Selection of A2 farmers in Goromonzi District, Zimbabwe and its impact on Agricultural production. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38(5):1069-1092.
- Marshall, F., Waldman, L., McGregor, H., Mehta, L. & Randhawa, P. 2009. *On the edge of sustainability. Perspectives on peri-urban dynamics. STEPS Working Paper Number 35*. Brighton: STEPS Centre.

- Marx, C. 2007. *Do formal land markets work for poor people? An assessment of three metropolitan cities in South Africa. Synthesis Report*. Cape Town: Urban land Market.
- Mathieu, P. Zongo, M. & Pare, L. 2003. Monetary land transactions in Western Burkina Faso: Commoditisation, papers and ambiguities, in Benjaminsen, T.A. & Lund, C. (eds.). *Securing land rights in Africa*, London: Frank Cass. 109-128
- Matondi, P.B. & Dekker, M. 2011. *Land rights and tenure security in Zimbabwe's post Fast Track Land Reform Programme. A synthesis report for LandAc*. Harare: Ruzivo Trust.
- Maxwell, D., Larbi, O., Lamprey, G.M., Zakariah, S. & Armar-Klemesu, M. 1998. *Farming in the shadow of the city: Changes in land rights and livelihoods in peri-urban Accra*. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre.
- Maxwell, J.A. 1996. *Qualitative research design. An interactive approach. Applied Social Research Methods Series Volume 41*. London: SAGE.
- Maxwell, J.A. 2005. *Qualitative research design. An interactive approach. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition. Applied social research methods series. Volume 41*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE.
- Maxwell, S. Urey, I. & Ashley, C. 2001. *Emerging issues in rural development. An issues Paper*. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Mbiva, B. & Huchzermeyer, M. 2002. Contentious development: peri-urban studies in sub-Saharan Africa. *Progress in Development Studies*, 2(2):113-131.
- McAuslan, P. 2000. Only the name of the country changes: the diaspora of "European" land law in Commonwealth Africa, in Toulmin, C. & Quan, L. (eds.). *Evolving land rights, policy and tenure in Africa*. United Kingdom: IIED Bookshop. 75-96.
- McGregor, D.; Simon, D. & Thomson, D. 2006. *The peri-urban interface: Approaches to sustainable natural and human resource use*. London: Earthscan.
- McLaughlin, M.W. 1987. Experience: lessons from policy implementation. *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis*, 9(2): 171-178.
- Merriam, S.B. & Associates. 2002. *Qualitative research in practice. Examples for discussion and analysis*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Migot-Adholla, S.E. & Bruce, J.W. 1994. Introduction: Are indigenous African tenure systems insecure?, in Bruce, J.W. & Migot-Adholla, S.E. (eds.). *Searching for land tenure security in Africa*. Iowa: Kendall/Hunt. 1-13.
- Mnisi, S. 2010. *Reconciling living customary law and democratic decentralization to ensure women's land rights security. Policy Brief 32*. Western Cape: PLAAS.

- Mouton, J. 2011. How to succeed in your master's & doctoral studies. A South African guide and resource book. Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers.
- Moyo, S. & Yeros, P. 2005. The resurgence of rural movements under neo-liberalism, in Moyo, S. & Yeros P. (eds.). *Reclaiming the land: The resurgence of rural movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America*. London and New York: Zed Books. 8-64.
- Moyo, S. 1995. *The land question in Zimbabwe*. Harare: Southern Africa Institute for Policy Studies.
- Moyo, S. 2000. The political economy of land acquisition and distribution in Zimbabwe, 1990-1999. *Journal of Agrarian Studies*, 26(1):5-28.
- Moyo, S. 2004. The land and agrarian question in Zimbabwe. Unpublished paper delivered at the Conference on the Agrarian Constraint and Poverty Reduction: Macroeconomic Lessons for Africa. 17-18 December, Addis Ababa.
- Moyo, S. 2009. Land reform in Zimbabwe. The first ten years, in conference preceding on "Land reform in South Africa: Constructive aims and positive outcomes - reflecting on experiences on the way to 2014, 26-27 August 2008 Roode Vallei Country Lodge, Pretoria, South Africa. Johannesburg: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. 41-62.
- Moyo, S. 2011. Three decades of agrarian reform in Zimbabwe. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38(3):493-531.
- Moyo, S. 2013. Land reform and redistribution in Zimbabwe since 1980 in Moyo, S. & Chambati, W. (eds). *Land and agrarian reform in Zimbabwe: Beyond white-settler capitalism*. Dakar: CODESRIA. 29-78.
- Moyo, S., Chambati, W., Murisa, T., Siziba, D., Dangwa, C., Mujeyi, K., & Nyoni, N. 2009. *Fast Track land reform baseline survey in Zimbabwe: trends and tendencies, 2005/06*. Harare: African Institute for Agrarian Studies.
- Moyo, S., O'Keefe, P. & Sill, M. 1993. *The Southern Africa Environment. Profiles of the SADC countries*. London: Earthscan.
- Mpofu, B. 2012. Perpetual 'outcasts'? Squatter in peri-urban Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. *Africa Focus*, 25(2):45-63.
- Mujere, J. 2011. Land, graves and belonging: Land reform and the politics of belonging in newly resettled farms in Gutu, 2000 - 2009. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38(5):1123-1144.
- Mukwedeyo, T. 2012. Enduring the crisis: Remittances and household livelihood strategies in Glen Norah, Harare, in Chiumbu, S. & Musemwa, M. (eds.). *Crisis! What crisis? The multiple dimension of the Zimbabwean crisis*. Cape Town: HSRC Press. 42-58.

- Munyuki-Hungwe, M. & Dirwayi, O. 2010. Rebuilding local governance structures in Zimbabwe - the case of Chimanimani and Bulilima districts of Zimbabwe. Unpublished paper delivered at the International Conference on Dynamics of Rural Transformation in Emerging Economies. 14 - 16 April 2010, New Delhi.
- Munzwa, K.M. & Jonga, W. 2010. Urban development in Zimbabwe: A human perspective. *Theoretical and Empirical Researches in Urban Management*, 5(14):120-146.
- Musandu-Nyamayaro, O. 2008. The case for modernization of local planning authority framework in Southern and Eastern Africa: A radical initiative for Zimbabwe. *Habitat International*, (32):15-27.
- Musemwa, M. 2010. From 'Sunshine City' to a landscape of disaster. The politics of water, sanitation and disease in Harare, Zimbabwe, 1980 – 2009. *Journal of Developing Societies*, (26): 165-206.
- Mushamba, S. 2010. An analysis of powers and functions of local government authorities in Zimbabwe, in Visser, J.; Steytler, N. & Machingauta, N. (eds.). Local government reform in Zimbabwe. A policy dialogue. Western Cape: *University of Western Cape Community Law Centre*. 97-108.
- Mutizwa-Mangiza, N.D. & Helmsing, A.H.J. 1991. *Rural development and planning in Zimbabwe*. Brookfield: Avebury.
- Mutizwa-Mangiza, N.D. 1986. Urban centers in Zimbabwe: Inter-censal changes, 1962-1982. *Geography*, 71(2):148-150.
- Mutizwa-Mangiza, N.D. 1990. Decentralization and district development planning in Zimbabwe. Summary. *Public Administration & Development*, 10(4):423-435.
- Mutopo, P. 2011. Women's struggles to access and control land and livelihoods after Fast Track Land Reform in Mwenze District, Zimbabwe. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38(5):1021-1046.
- Narain, V. & Nischal, S. 2007. The peri-urban interface in Shahpur Khurd and Karnera, India. *Environment and Urbanization*, 19(1):261-273.
- Narain, V. 2009. Growing city, shrinking hinterland: Land acquisition, transition and conflict in peri-urban Gurgaon, India. *Environment and Urbanization*, 21(2):501-512.
- National Archives of Zimbabwe. 2012. Delineation Report S2929/3/1-6 for Goromonzi District from Salisbury District. File number S1542. Harare:
- Nehanda Radio. 2012. Police demolish homes in Epworth. October: 16.
- Neuman, L.W. 2011. *Social research methods. Qualitative and quantitative approaches*. Boston: Pearson.

- Nyambara, P.S. 2001. The politics of land acquisition and struggles over land in the 'communal' areas of Zimbabwe: The Gokwe region in the 1980s and 1990s. *Africa*, 71(2):253-285.
- Nyamu-Musembi, C. 2006. *Breathing life into dead theories about property rights: de Soto and land relations in rural Africa*. IDS Working Paper 272. Sussex: IDS.
- O'Flaherty, M. 1998. Communal tenure in Zimbabwe: divergent models of collective land holding in communal areas. *Journal of the International Africa Institute*, 68(4):537-557.
- Okoth-Ogendo, H. 2008. The nature of land rights under indigenous law in Africa, in Claassens, A. & Cousins, B. (eds.). *Land, power and custom. Controversies generated by South Africa's Communal land Rights Act*. Cape Town: UCT Press. 95-108.
- Owusu, G. 2008. Indigenes' and migrants' access to land in peri-urban areas of Ghana. *IDPR*, 30(2):177-198.
- Palmer, R. 1977. *Land and racial domination in Rhodesia*. London: Heinemann.
- Palmer, R. 1990. Land reform in Zimbabwe, 1980-1990. *African Affairs*, 89(355):163-181.
- Paradza, G. 2010. Reflections on Zimbabwe's past building blocks for its future. *Policy issues & actors*, 23(1):1-12.
- Paradza, G.G. 2011. Differentiation of women's land tenure security in Southern Africa. Working Paper 12. *International Land Coalition*. PLAAS: 1-15.
- Parker, J. 2000. *Concepts in the social sciences. Structuration*. Buckingham: Open University.
- Payne, G.; Durand-Lasserve, A. & Rakodi, C. 2009. The limits of land titling and home ownership. *Environment and Urbanization*, (21):443-462.
- Pellegrinelli, S.; Partington, D.; Hemingway, C.; Mohdzain, Z. & Shah, M. 2007. The importance of context in programme management: An imperial review of programme practices. *International Journal of Project Management*, (25):41-55.
- Peters, P.E. & Kambewa, D. 2007. Whose security? Deepening social conflict over 'customary' land in the shadow of land tenure reform in Malawi. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 45(3):447-472.
- Peters, P.E. 1994. The erosion of commons and the emergence of property: problems for social analysis. Unpublished paper presented to the society for Economic Anthropology. Notre Dame, March 1994.

- Peters, P.E. 2004. Inequality and social conflict over land in Africa. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 4(3):269-314.
- Peters, P.E. 2007. *Challenges in land tenure and land reform in Africa: An anthropological perspective*. CID Working Paper No. 141. USA: Harvard University.
- Peters, P.E. 2010. Contesting land and custom. *Journal of Agrarian Change*. 10 (4): 604-607
- Ploeg, J.D.; Renting, H.; Brunori, G.; Marsden, T.; Roest, K.; Sevilla-Guzman, E.; & Ventura, F. 2000. Rural development: From practices and policies towards theory. *Sociologia Ruralis*, 40(4):391-408.
- Popper, K.R. 1940. What is dialectic? *Mind, New Series*, 49(196):403-426.
- Potts, D. & Mutambirwa, C. 1990. Rural-urban linkages in contemporary Harare. Why migrants need their land. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 16(4):677-698.
- Potts, D. 2008. Displacement and livelihoods: the longer term impacts of OM/ORO, in Vambe, M. (eds.). *The hidden dimensions of OM/ORO*. Harare: Weaver Press. 53-64.
- Potts, D. 2011. *Circular migration in Zimbabwe & contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa*. Cape Town: James Currey.
- Potts, D. 2012. *Whatever happened to Africa's rapid urbanization? Counter points*. London: Africa Research Institute.
- Pretorius, L. 2003. Six contributions to understanding 'gaps between policy and implementation'. An overview and comments. *Politeia*, 22(1):6-21.
- Puttergill, C. & Leildè, A. 2003. Identity studies in Africa. Notes on theory and methods, in Bekker, S. & Leilde, A. (eds.). *Reflections on identity in four African cities*. South Africa: African Minds. 11-21.
- Pwiti, G. & Mvenge, G. n.d. Archaeologists, tourists and rainmakers: problems in the management of rock art sites in Zimbabwe, a case of Domboshava national monument. *Aspects of African Archeology*. 818-823.
- Quan, J. 2000a. Land tenure, economic growth and poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, in Toulmin, C. & Quan, J. (eds.). *Evolving land rights, policy and tenure in Africa*. United Kingdom: IIED Bookshop. 31-50.
- Quan, J. 2000b. Land boards as a mechanism for the management of land rights in Southern Africa, in Toulmin, C. & Quan, L. (eds.). *Evolving land rights, policy and tenure in Africa*. United Kingdom: IIED Bookshop. 197-205.
- Raftopolous, B. & Mlambo, A. 2009. *Becoming Zimbabwe. A history from pre-colonial periods to 2008*. Harare: Weaver Press.



- Rakodi, C. 1995. Harare. *Inheriting a settler-colonial city: Change or continuity?* United Kingdom: John Wiley & Sons.
- Ranger, T. 1983. Tradition and Traversy: Chiefs and the administration in Makoni District, Zimbabwe, 1960-1980, in Peel, J.D.Y. & Ranger, T.O. (eds.). *Past and present in Zimbabwe*. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 20-41.
- Ranger, T. 1985. Growing from the roots: reflections on peasant research in central and southern Africa\*. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 5(1): 99-133.
- Ranger, T. 2000. The invention of tradition, in Hosbawm, E. & Ranger, T. (eds.). *The invention of tradition*. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. 211-262.
- Ravitch, S. & Riggan, M. 2012. *Reason and rigor. How conceptual frameworks guide research*. Los Angeles: SAGE.
- Razavi, S. 2003. Introduction: Agrarian Change, gender and land rights. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 13(1 & 2): 2-32.
- Ritzer, G. 2000. *Modern sociological theory 5<sup>th</sup> Edition*. Boston: McGraw Hill.
- Ritzer, G. 2008. *Sociological theory 7<sup>th</sup> Edition*. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
- Roe, E.M. 1995. More than politics of decentralization: Local government reform, district development and public administration in Zimbabwe. *World Development*, 23(5):833-843.
- Rubin, H.J. & Rubin, I.S. 2012. *Qualitative interviewing. The art of hearing data*. Los Angeles: SAGE.
- Sachikonye, L.M. 2003. From 'Growth and Equity' to 'Fast-Track' reform: Zimbabwe's land question. War and the forgotten continent. *Review of African Political Economy*, 30(96):227-240.
- Sadiki, P. & Ramutsindela, M. 2002. Peri-urban transformation in South Africa: Experience from Limpopo province. *GeoJournal*, (57):75-81.
- Sargent, F.O. 1991. *Rural environmental planning for sustainable communities*. Washington D.C.: Island Press.
- Saruchera, M. 2002. Conflict analysis and resolution in natural resources management: The case of illegal land sales and settlement in Domboshava. Mashonaland East Province of Zimbabwe. Unpublished master's thesis. Harare: Southern African Research Institute for Policy Studies.
- Saunders, D.M. 1992. Introduction to research on Hirschman's exit, voice, and loyalty model. *Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal*, 5(3):187-190.

- Scoones, I. 1998. *Sustainable rural livelihoods. A framework for analysis*. United Kingdom: Institute for Development Studies.
- Scoones, I. 2009. Livelihoods, perspectives and rural development. Working Paper number 72. *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 36(1):171-196.
- Scoones, I., Marongwe, N., Mavedzenge, B., Mahenehene, J., Murimbarimba, F. & Sukume, C. 2010. *African issues. Zimbabwe's land reform. Myths & Realities*. Harare: Weaver Press.
- Scoones, I.; Marongwe, N.; Mavedzenge, B.; Murimbarimba, F. Mahenehene, J. & Sukume, C. 2011a. *Zimbabwe's land reform: A summary of findings*. IDS: Brighton.
- Scoones, I.; Marongwe, N.; Mavedzenge, B.; Murimbarimba, F.; Mahenehene, J. & Sukume, C. 2011b. Zimbabwe's land reform: challenging the myths. A paper for discussion at the Programme in Agrarian Studies Colloquium, Yale, 2 December 2011. Sussex: Institute of Development Studies. 1-44.
- Scoones, I.; Marongwe, N.; Mavedzenge, B.; Murimbarimba, F.; Mahenehene, J. & Sukume, C. 2011c. Zimbabwe's land reform: challenging the myths. *The Journal of Peasant Studies*, 38(5):967-993.
- Scott, J. 2011. *Conceptualizing the social world. Principles of sociological analysis*. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Sewell, W.H.Jr., 1992. A theory of structure: Duality, agency, and transformation. *American Journal of Sociology*, 98(1):1-29.
- Shabane, I.; Nkambe, M. & Chanda, R. 2011. Land use, policy, and squatter settlements: The case of peri-urban areas in Botswana. *Journal of Applied Geography*, (31):677-686.
- Shanin, T. 1975. *Peasants and peasant societies. Penguin modern sociology readings*. England: Hazell Watson and Viney Ltd.
- Share, F. 2012. Murders trigger fear, panic in Domboshava. The Herald Online, Zimbabwe, 22 September:
- Shaw, A. 2005. Peri-urban interface of Indian cities. Growth, Governance and local initiatives. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 40(2):129-136.
- Sigauke, N. 2000. Improving urban livelihoods: Epworth sustainable livelihoods benchmark study. [Online]. Available: [http://practicalaction.org/docs/region\\_southern\\_africa/Epworth\\_Benchmark\\_Study.pdf](http://practicalaction.org/docs/region_southern_africa/Epworth_Benchmark_Study.pdf)
- Simbizi, M.C.D.; Bennette, R.M. & Zevenbergen, J. 2014. Land tenure security: Revisiting and refining the concept for sub-Saharan Africa's rural poor. *Land Use Policy*, 36(2014):231-238.

- Simone, A. 2004. *For the city yet to come: Changing life in four African cities*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Singh, K. 1986. *Rural development. Principles, policies and management*. New Delhi: SAGE.
- Singh, K.; Singh, S. & Kingra, H.S. 2009. Agrarian crisis and depeasantisation in Punjab: Status of small/marginal farmers who left agriculture. *Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics*, 64(4):385-603.
- Sjaastad, E. & Cousins, B. 2008. Formalisation of land rights in the South. An overview. *Land use Policy*, (26):1-9.
- Smith, H. 2008. An overview of the communal land rights Act of 2004, in Claassens, A. & Cousins, B. (eds.). *Land, power and custom. Controversies generated by South Africa's Communal land Rights Act*. Cape Town: UCT Press. 35-71.
- Smith, N.J. 1972. *A brief guide to social legislation*. London: Methuen.
- Somekh, B. & Lewin, C. 2011. *Theory and methods in social research*. Los Angeles: SAGE.
- Spierenburg, M.J. 2004. *Strangers, spirits, and land reforms: conflicts about land in Dande, northern Zimbabwe*. Leiden: Brill.
- Stellenbosch University. 2009. Framework for Policy for the Assurance and Promotion of Ethically Accountable Research. Stellenbosch:
- Stoneman, C. & Cliffe, L. 1989. *Politics, economic and society*. London: Printer publishers.
- Stones, R. 2005. *Structuration theory*. New York: Palgrave.
- Stones, R. 2009. Power and structuration theory, in Clegg, R. & Haugaard, M. (eds.). *SAGE handbook of power*. London:SAGE.89-108.
- Tacoli, C. 1998. Rural-urban interactions: a guide to the literature. *Environment and Urbanization*, 10(1):147-165.
- Tacoli, C. 1999. *Understanding the opportunities and constraints for low income groups in the peri-urban interface: The contribution of livelihood frameworks*. Peri-urban research team. London: Development Planning Unit.
- Tacoli, C. 2002. *Changing rural-urban interactions in sub-Saharan Africa and their impact on livelihoods: a summary*. Working paper series on rural-urban interactions and livelihood strategies. Working Paper 7. London: IIED.
- Tacoli, C. 2008. *The links between rural and urban development in Africa and Asia*. IIED. [Online].Available:  
[http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/EGM\\_PopDist/Tacoli.pdf](http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/EGM_PopDist/Tacoli.pdf)

- Taringa, N. 2006. How environmental is African traditional religion? *Exchange*, 35(2):192-214.
- Tavuyanago, B. & Mbenene, K. 2008. Zimbabwe hill settlements in proceeding colonization: A study in location factors. *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, 2(3): 255-270.
- Taylor, G.A. 1927. *The Chindamora Reserve*. Salisbury: The Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs.
- The Standard, Zimbabwe. 2012. Families left in the open in Epworth. October: 21.
- The Zimbabwe Situation. 2010. City of Harare boundaries extended. July: 14.
- Thebe, V. 2010. Rural development policy cross-roads in a post-ZANU (PF) era. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa*, 12(3):87-106.
- Thomas, A. 2012. Challenging cases, in Mohan, G. & Thomas, A. (eds.). *Research skills for policy and development. How to find out fast*. Los Angeles: SAGE. 301-324.
- Tibaijuka, A.K. 2005. *Report on the fact-finding mission to Zimbabwe to assess the scope and impact of OM/ORO by the UN special envoy on human settlements issues in Zimbabwe*. New York: United Nations Human Settlement Programme.
- Todaro, M. 1997. *Economic development*. Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing.
- Toulmin, C. & Quan, J. 2000. Evolving land rights, tenure and policy in sub-Saharan Africa, in Toulmin, C. & Quan, L. (eds.). *Evolving land rights, policy and tenure in Africa*. United Kingdom: IIED Bookshop. 1-30.
- Toulmin, C. 2006. Securing land rights for the poor in Africa. *Key to growth, peace and sustainable development*. New York: International Institute for Environmental Development.
- Tsikata, D. & Whitehead, A. 2003. Policy discourses on women's land rights in sub-Saharan Africa: The implications of the re-turn to customary. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 13(1 & 2): 67-112.
- Vaddiraju, A.K. 2013. *Peasantry, capitalism and state: The political economy of agrarian societies*. United Kingdom: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Vambe, L. 1972. *An ill-fated people. Zimbabwe before and after Rhodes*. London: Heinemann.
- Vanempen, E. 2009. *Fragmented and dispersed: Designing Brussels rural landscape, in The new urban question: urbanism beyond neo-liberalism*. Amsterdam: International Forum on Urbanism.

- Van-Hoof, P. 1992. Rural development policy, regional development planning, and decentralization in Botswana, in Drakakis-Smith, D. (eds.). *Urban and regional change in Southern Africa*. London: Routledge. 147-179.
- Vincent, A.; Anfara, Jr. & Norma, T.M. 2005. *Theoretical frameworks in qualitative research*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE.
- Walker, C. 2003. Piety in the sky? Gender policy and land reform in South Africa. *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 13(1 & 2):113-148.
- Walker, C. 2005. The limits to land reform: Rethinking 'the land question'. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 31(4):805-824.
- Walker, C. 2008. *Land marked. Land claims & land restitution in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Jacana.
- Walker, C. 2009. Elusive equality: Women, property rights and land reform in South Africa. *SAJHR*, (25):467-490
- Walker, C. 2012. Finite land: Challenges institutionalizing land restitution in South Africa, 1995-2000\*. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 38(4):809-826.
- Wang, Y. 2010. The internal split of structure, in O'Donnell, M. (eds.). *Part 1. Structure and agency. Sage key debates in sociology*. London: SAGE. 286-306.
- Ward 4 Food Aid Database. 2012. Domboshava. Unpublished raw data.
- Watson, V. 2009. 'The planned city sweeps the poor away...': Urban planning and the 21<sup>st</sup> century urbanization, *Progress in Planning*, (72):151-193.
- Watson, V. 2012. Conflicting rationalities in Cape Town: Power at the interface. Unpublished paper delivered at the International Workshop on Changing Socio-Spatial Configurations of Inclusion and Exclusion: Planning and Counter Planning in the African City. 7-8 March 2012, Uppsala.
- Wehrmann, B., 2008. The dynamics of peri-urban land markets in Sub-Saharan Africa: Adherence to the virtue of common property vs. quest for individual gain. *Erdkunde*, 62(1):75-88.
- Wekwete, K.H. 1990. Rural urbanization in Zimbabwe: Prospects for the future, in Baker, J. (eds.). *Small town Africa. Studies in rural-urban interaction. Seminar proceedings* 23. Sweden: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. 130-142.
- Wekwete, K.H. 1991. Decentralized planning in Zimbabwe. A review of provincial, urban and district development planning in post-independence Zimbabwe, in Helmsing, A. H.J., Mutizwa-Mangiza, N.D., Gasper, D.R., Brand, C.M. & Wekwete, K.H. (eds.). *Limits to decentralization in Zimbabwe. Essays on the decentralization of*

*government and planning in the 1980s*. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies. 155-177.

Wildavsky, A. 1979. *The Art of Policy analysis*. London: The Macmillan Press.

World Development Report. 2003. *Sustainable Development in a dynamic world: Transforming institutions, growth and quality of life*. Washington D C: World Bank.

World Development Report. 2004. *Making services work for the poor*. Washington DC: World Bank.

World FactBook. 2012. Africa: Zimbabwe. [Online]. Available:

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html> [2012, April 18].

World Urbanization Prospects. 2012. *The 2010 revision*. New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

Yin, R. K. 2011. *Qualitative research from start to finish*. New York: Guilford Press.

Yin, R.K. 2009. *Case Study Research, Design and Methods*. 4<sup>th</sup> Edition *Applied Social Science Research Methods Series. Volume 5*. Los Angeles: SAGE.

Yoshikuni, T. 2006. *African urban experiences in colonial Zimbabwe. A social history of Harare before 1925*. Harare: Weaver Press.

Zimbabwe Census. 2002. *Provincial Profile Mashonaland East*. Harare: Central Statistics Office.

Zimbabwe Millennium Development Goals Progress Report. 2004. *The report of the Government of Zimbabwe*. Zimbabwe: UNDP.


Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency. 2012. *Mashonaland East Provincial profile*. Harare: ZimStat.

Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency. 2012. *National Census Report*. Harare: ZimStat.

Zinyama, L. & Whitlow, R. 1986. Changing patterns of population distribution in Zimbabwe. *GeoJournal*, 13(4):365-384.

Zinyama, L., Tevera, D. & Cumming, S. 1995. *Harare. The growth of problems of the city*. Harare: University of Zimbabwe.

Zinyama, L.M. 1992. Local farmer organisations and rural development in Zimbabwe, in Taylor, F.D.R. & Mackenzie, F. (eds.). *Development from within: Survival in rural Africa*. London: Routledge. 33-57.





## APPENDICES

## Appendix A: Interview profiles

## A1: Household interviews

HH No.	Head of HH	Village	Respondent	Pseudonym	Interview date	HH size	Language used
1	Male/Husband	Zimbiru	Wife	Themba	03.01.12	13	Shona
2	Male/Husband	Zimbiru	Both	Batai & Simukai	03.01.12	10	Shona
3	Male/Husband	Zimbiru	Husband	Joko	03.01.12	4	Shona & English
4	Male/Husband	Zimbiru	Husband	Rabi	03.01.12	4	Shona
5	Male/Husband	Zimbiru	Wife	Nakai	03.01.12	7	Shona
6	Female/Widow	Zimbiru	Wife	Katty	04.01.12	3	Shona
7	Male/Husband	Zimbiru	Both	Dan & Tino	04.01.12	6	Shona
8	Female/Widow	Zimbiru	Daughter	Fadziso	04.01.12	7	Shona
9	Male/Husband	Zimbiru	Wife	Kundai	05.01.12	5	Shona
10	Male/Husband	Zimbiru	Both	Redzai & Yeukai	05.01.12	7	Shona
11	Male/Husband	Zimbiru	Both	Idai & Kudzai	05.01.12	5	Shona
12	Male/Husband	Zimbiru	Gogo	Revai	11.01.12	8	Shona & English
13	Male/Husband	Mungate	Wife	Etina	12.01.12	6	Shona & English
14	Male/Husband	Mungate	Wife	Blessings	12.01.12	5	Shona
15	Male/Husband	Mungate	Wife	Yvonne	12.01.12	10	Shona & English
16	Female/Widow	Mungate	Gogo	Edzai	12.01.12	4	Shona
17	Female/Widow	Mungate	Maid	Kumbirai	12.01.12	4	Shona
18	Male/Husband	Mungate	Wife	Nyarai	12.01.12	7	Shona
19	Male/Husband	Murape	Wife	Monica	12.01.12	5	Shona
20	Female/Widow	Murape	Wife	Chipo	13.01.12	4	Shona
21	Female/Widow	Murape	Wife	Muneni	13.01.12	5	Shona
22	Female/Widow	Murape	Gogo	Maniti	13.01.12	9	Shona
23	Male/Husband	Mungate	Wife	Tonya	13.01.12	3	Shona
24	Male/Husband	Mungate	Wife	Tumai	13.01.12	8	Shona
25	Male/Husband	Murape	Wife	Farisai	17.01.12	6	Shona
26	Male/Husband	Murape	Wife	Rose	17.01.12	9	Shona
27	Female/Divorcee	Chogugudza	Wife	Alice	18.01.12	3	Shona
28	Male/Husband	Chogugudza	Wife	Martina	18.01.12	3	Shona
29	Female/Widow	Chogugudza	Gogo	Thula	18.01.12	3	Shona
30	Male/Husband	Chogugudza	Wife	Maidei	18.01.12	5	Shona
31	Male/Husband	Chogugudza	Both	Pepukai & Chenai	19.01.12	5	Shona
32	Male/Husband	Chogugudza	Daughter	Ruvarashe	19.01.12	10	Shona
33	Male/Husband	Chogugudza	Wife	Ropafadzo	19.01.12	11	Shona
34	Female/Widow	Chogugudza	Wife	Delight	19.01.12	6	Shona
35	Male/Husband	Mungate	Wife	Prim	22.01.12	5	Shona & English
36	Male/Husband	Mungate	Both	Whatmore & Lyn	23.01.12	2	Shona & English
37	Male/Husband	Zimbiru	Both	Ranga & Pam	07.01.13	5	Shona & English
38	Male/Husband	Zimbiru	Wife	Nguva	07.01.13	5	Shona
39	Female	Zimbiru	Maid	Precious	07.01.13	5	Shona
40	Male/Husband	Zimbiru	Wife	Davidzo	07.01.13	7	Shona
41	Male/Husband	Zimbiru	Wife	Taona & Meddie	07.01.13	4	Shona

Source: Field data, (2012).



A2: Interviews with Traditional Leaders<sup>8</sup>

TL No.	Pseudonym	Gender	Interview date	Language used
1	Karri	Male	02.01.12	Shona
2	Honor	Male	03.01.12	Shona
3	Beta	Male	05.01.12	Shona
4	Mukachi	Male	08.01.12	Shona
5	Zuze	Male	13.01.12	Shona
6	Tenzana	Male	17.01.12	Shona
7	Shungu	Male	20.01.12 & 19.01.13	Shona & English
8	Nhango	Male	02.01.12	Shona
9	Gadara	Male	16.01.12	Shona & English
10	Shoshoni	Male	09.02.12	Shona

Source: Field data, (2012).

## A3: Interviews with Informal Discussants

ID No.	Pseudonym	Gender	Interview date	Language used
1	Runga	Male	24.01.12	Shona & English
2	Pakurai	Male	27.01.12	Shona & English

Source: Field data, (2012).

## A4: Interviews with other stakeholders

SH No.	Pseudonym	Designation	Gender	Interview date	Language used
SH1	Marylyn	Ward Councilor	Female	05.01.12	Shona & English
SH2	Pinto	DA	Male	26.01.12 & 06.01.13	Shona & English
SH3	Mharidzo	Domboshava DNMMZ officer	Male	07.01.12	Shona & English
SH4	Mutima	Domboshava AGRITEX officer	Male	08.01.12	English
SH5	Fah	District Local Government Officer	Female	25.01.12 & 18.01.13	Shona & English
SH6	Aulga	National Local Government Officer	Male	23.01.12	English
SH7	Zenzo	National Local Government Officer	Female	15.01.13	English
SH8	Len	National Local Government Officer	Male	17.01.13	English
SH9	Shire	Provincial Local Government Officer	Male	15.01.13	English
SH10	Hart	Director of rural local authorities	Male	18.01.13	English

Source: Field data, (2012).

<sup>8</sup> Village names and titles are omitted for ethical reasons



**Appendix B: Migration history of migrants - the last moves**

Pseudonym/respondent	Place of Origin/ birth	When/Year	Last move	Residence by homestead
Themba	Bulawayo	2006	Harare	Permanent
Batai & Simukai	Mutorashanga	1994	Harare	Permanent
Joko	Originals	Origin	Originals	Permanent
Rabi	Malawi	2005	Domboshava, lodger	Permanent
Nakai	Originals	Origin	Originals	Permanent
Katty	Originals	Origin	Originals	Permanent
Dan & Tino	Rushinga	2011	Harare	Permanent
Fadziso	Originals	Origin	Originals	Permanent
Kundai	Originals	Origin	Originals	Permanent
Redzai & Yeukai	Originals	Origin	Originals	Permanent
Idai & Kudzai	Originals	Origin	Originals	Permanent
Revai	Originals	Origin	Originals	Permanent
Etina	Originals	Origin	Originals	Permanent
Blessings	Chipinge	2005	Domboshava, lodger	Permanent
Yvonne	Rusape	2005	Harare	Permanent
Edzai	Mt Darwin	2011	Harare	Permanent
Kumbirai	Masvingo	2005	Harare	Permanent
Nyarai	Originals	1987	Originals	Permanent
Monica	Malawi	1988	Harare	Permanent
Chipo	Masvingo	1997	Mutare	Lodger
Muneni	Mazoe	2006	Mazoe	Lodger
Maniti	Originals	Origin	Originals	Permanent
Tonya	Mt Darwin	2010	Harare	Permanent
Tumai	Originals	1980	Originals	Permanent
Farisai	Kwekwe	2010	Kwekwe	Permanent
Rose	Mtoko	2010	Domboshava	Permanent
Alice	Chitungwiza	2011	Chitungwiza	Lodger
Martina	Rusape	2011	Harare	Lodger
Eve	Originals	Origin	Originals	Permanent
Maidei	Chimanimani	2010	Harare	Lodger
Pepukai & Chenai	Chivhu	2011	Harare	Lodger
Ruvarashe	Originals	Origin	Originals	Permanent
Ropafadzo	Originals	1998	Originals	Permanent
Delight	Uzumba	2011	Harare	Lodger
Prim	Mberengwa	2010	Harare	Permanent
Whatmore & Lyn	Inyanga	2005	Harare	Permanent
Ranga & Pam	Chitungwiza	2012	Chitungwiza	Permanent
Nguva	Masvingo	2008	Harare	Permanent
Precious	Hwange	2012	Harare	Permanent
Davidzo	Masvingo	1998	Bindura	Permanent
Taona & Meddie	Rusape	2012	Rusape	Permanent

Source: Field data, (2012).